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Abstract 
 
Although internationally unrecognised, Somaliland seeks, like all states, to be able to 
unambiguously, repeatedly, and reliably identify its citizens. In the two decades of its self-
declared independence, this central task of statehood has proved to be one of the most 
difficult and protracted of all its accomplishments.  
 
At first glance, the impediments to the development of official identification schemes in 
Somaliland have been limited capacity, insufficient resources, and weak political will. 
Underlying these factors, however, are deeper issues relating to the state’s contested and 
imperfect ‘legibility’ of the population, the legacy of civil conflict and the country’s continued 
limbo in the world of juridical states. Comprehensive systems of civil registration and 
authoritative documentation are under-developed, meaning few people have paperwork 
with which they can be recognised and authenticated as citizens and voters. In order to 
verify the identity of its citizens, the Somaliland state therefore utilises practices of 
testimony and guarantee, in particular authentication by clan elders, increasingly 
supplemented by biometric authorisation. The intersection of vernacular identification 
practices and hi-tech, state-led processes is reflective of the hybridity that characterises 
Somaliland’s political institutions, and shows how official identification schemes draw on 
the underlying ‘identity architecture’ of norms, practices and narratives.  
 
Drawing on in-depth interviews, participant observation and archival research, this thesis 
presents an extended case study of biometric voter registration and the production of new 
IDs in Somaliland, an important contribution in light of the rapid growth of biometrically 
enabled identification systems across sub-Saharan Africa. I also delineate practices of 
vouching and quotidian verification as essential components of identification, arguing for 
their central place in the analysis of ID systems. This thesis therefore offers new empirical 
material on the case of Somaliland, and contributes theoretically to the scholarships on 
identification, citizenship, electoral management, and state-building.  
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Note: All terms are Somali, unless indicated otherwise. 
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muwaaddin ...................... citizen, national 
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qaadhaan ..........................  contribution 
 
qabiil .................................  tribe, clan, race, nation 
 
qabiilism ...........................  tribalism (Anglicised colloquialism from qabiili meaning tribalist) 
 
qaldan ............................... wrong, mistaken 
 
reer ....................................  family, household, lineage, clan, tribe, nation, folk 
 
Somaliweyn ......................  Greater Somalia, pan-Somalism 
 
suldaan .............................  chief, headman (head of sub-clan) 
 
tahrib ................................  illegal immigration (Arabic) 
 
tessera ............................... card (Italian) 
 
tirakoob ............................  counting, census  
 
tol ......................................  kinship, clan, tribe, descent group 
 
tolnimo ..............................  group feeling, kinship 
 
tooyo .................................  ask questions, inquire, seek some information 
 
tooyasho ...........................  finding out information 
 
xasuuqid ........................... extermination (also used to mean genocide) 
 
xawaalad .......................... transfer of property, transfer of funds (often simply xawaala) 
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A Note on Language 
 
In this thesis, I refer to Somaliland as a state, country and nation, distinct from Somalia. I 
use the term ‘Somalilander’ to refer to Somaliland nationals, aware that it is political 
nomenclature, but do so for clarity and economy. The term ‘Somali’ refers to the dominant 
(Af-Soomaali) language and to the Somali ethnie, for instance the ‘Somali diaspora’. Somalia 
before 1991 is called the Somali Republic; in the contemporary period, I refer to it as the 
Federal Republic of Somalia.  
 
For ease of reading, all extracts from my interviews are in English, except where the Somali 
word is not translatable or where English-speaking informants used a Somali word. Qabiil, 
meaning tribe or clan, is an example of such a term that is used by Somalilanders in both 
English and Somali. Somali words appear italicised in the text with the English translation 
in brackets, except in the case of ‘caaqil’ (pronounced ‘akil’), meaning elder or chief, which I 
have Romanised because of its frequency. 
 
In terms of orthography, I have used Somali spellings, retaining ‘x’ (which in English is 
pronounced similar to ‘h’); and the Somali ‘c’ (which is a guttural phonic with no English 
equivalent but which is often transliterated as ‘a’). However, I have also observed the fluidity 
of spelling in Somali, particularly with proper nouns, which often have Somali and 
Anglicised versions. I have followed the usage favoured by my interlocutors and in the 
secondary literature, so I use Burco, Taleex and caaqil, but Abdirahman.  
 
For spelling, I utilised the third edition of the Somali-English Dictionary by R David Zorc 
and Madina M Osman (Kensington, MD: Dunwoody Press, 1993). For questions of 
grammar, I used Martin Orwin’s Colloquial Somali (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995). Dr Orwin 
was also a generous and knowledgeable reference. All errors in spelling and translation are, 
of course, my own.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	   xvi	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The genealogy is the real ID. You do not need ID. Someone will say, ‘I 
know your uncle’, and then he knows you  
 
Farah, Hargeysa, 2013
	  	  1	  
Chapter	  1	  	   Introduction	  Identity	  Verification	  in	  Somaliland	  	  
Flying into Hargeysa’s Egal International airport, the aeroplane dips low over a seemingly 
endless stretch of amber-coloured earth, striated by water runnels and hoof-worn pathways, 
interrupted by solitary patches of scrubby bush and spiked trees. As the plane arranges itself 
for descent, smallholdings outlined by thorny perimeters become more frequent, until with 
a bump one has landed. Rushing along the airstrip, one spies out of a window a set of low-
rise buildings; out of another, the remains of broken and abandoned airplanes; and a third, 
a distant camel or scattered sheep, distinct with black heads atop white bodies. 
Disembarking the aeroplane, one is met with a wall of dry heat. Ushered into the Arrivals 
Hall, a sign declares that you are now in the Republic of Somaliland.  
 
As at one of hundreds of airports around the world, a standard process ensues: show one’s 
passport, receive an entry stamp, pay the fees, and locate one’s baggage. And yet though this 
may seem familiar, entering Somaliland is in fact quite unusual, because it remains an 
internationally unrecognised country. The signs at passport control appear typical, but who 
exactly should queue under the sign for Muwaaddiniinta (‘the citizens’)? Which authority 
has produced the black passport embossed with golden scales and clasped hands that signify 
the Republic of Somaliland? Who indeed is a ‘Somalilander’ and how is this verified?  
 
This is a thesis about the development of official identification and documentation in 
Somaliland. Though its de jure status in the international world of states has been pending 
for over twenty years, de facto ‘state-building’ has nonetheless progressed to the point where 
its new biometric voter registration scheme has been described as potentially ‘the most 
technically sophisticated voting register in the world’ (Sandhana, 2014). The state-building 
objectives of these projects are clear: to confirm Somaliland’s status as a modern and 
effective state worthy of recognition; and, importantly, to do so by identifying who falls 
under its jurisdiction and who does not. In naming its citizens, Somaliland names itself.  
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State-Building From Scratch 
The Republic of Somaliland was declared in the town of Burco (Map 1) on 18 May 1991 at 
the nadir of the Somali civil war that had decimated state and society.1 This war would 
ultimately engulf Somalia, becoming in that famous phrase ‘a mere geographical expression, 
a black hole into which a failed polity has fallen’ (Rotberg, 2004:9–10). In the former British 
Protectorate to the north, however, opposition fighters of the Somali National Movement 
(SNM) sat with clan elders in multiple locations and over many years to facilitate peace-
making, demobilisation and disarmament, beginning a process of state-building that 
continues to the present day.  
 
The first years of Somaliland were nonetheless uncertain, impoverished and frightening. 
The ten-year insurgency against the military dictatorship based in Mogadishu had scarred 
both physically and psychologically. Memories of the atrocities perpetrated by the Siyad 
Barre regime on the northern peoples in the late 1980s, including aerial bombardment, 
mass executions and scorched-earth tactics (Africa Watch, 1990; Brons, 2001), were fresh 
and piercing. These are acts that members of the Isaaq clan call genocide or xasuuqidda 
(literally, ‘the extermination’), and the recent unearthing and forensic excavation of mass 
graves from that time are unflinching testimonies of the horrors of a war that many 
contemporary Somalilanders lived through (see IRIN, 2001; Reini, 2014; Straziuso, 2014). 
Those who had spent the months of the war in refugee camps in Ethiopia also suffered: the 
deprivations of refugee life (too little food, fuel and shelter) were compounded by the 
predations of clan militia and state soldiers. People speak now of ‘when we came back 
home’, ‘when we came to Somaliland’, with mixed emotion: it was a time of hope, when 
people believed they could live freely and safely, but it was also the continuation of mere 
survival. ‘This country toughens you up [when] you step over dead bodies’ recounted 
Yaasmiin, a businesswoman in her early thirties who had returned to Hargeysa in those first 
desperate months (Interview, 2014; translated by Ashkir).  
 
Ostensibly independent after May 1991, the new Republic of Somaliland was extremely 
fragile. ‘All the cities were destroyed and all the people were refugees’, recalled Eid, a former 
member of the SNM (University of Oxford, 2015). Hargeysa, the old Protectorate capital, 
had borne much of the brunt of the Somali air force’s salvo in 1988/89. There were almost 
no roofs left: people joke about how, from the air, it looked as though the city was full of 
swimming pools – but these were just the ragged foundations of broken buildings (see also 
Bradbury, 2008:3). Rubble was everywhere, as were unexploded ordinance and landmines. 
Hargeysa was a ghost town: many people did not return immediately, whilst others lived in 
internally displaced people (IDP) camps. There were no jobs; the electricity and 
communications infrastructure had been destroyed; securing food and fuel was a constant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  formal	  account	  of	  Somaliland’s	  history	  since	  this	  has	  been	  done	  comprehensively	  elsewhere.	  For	  a	  thorough	  overview,	  see	  Bradbury,	  2008;	  Lewis,	  2002	  and	  2008;	  Laitin	  and	  Samatar,	  1987;	  Mohamed,	  2006;	  and	  Walls,	  2014.	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struggle. ‘Life began from scratch’, stated Ifrax, a woman in her fifties now heading up a 
leading NGO, when I asked her to recollect this period (Interview, 2014).  
 
In spite of the toll of war, social, political and economic life in Somaliland began to stabilise. 
After a difficult and conflictual decade in which civil war broke out on two occasions, 
Somaliland seemingly turned a corner at the new millennium, moving past the ‘politics of 
coping’ that had characterised the 1990s, and which was continuing to hold sway in Somalia 
(Menkhaus, 2006). A constitution was passed by referendum in 2001, the first multi-party 
elections held in 2002. Universities opened, newspapers were printed, and remittances from 
overseas relatives contributed to the rebuilding of homes and the flourishing of businesses. 
Now Hargeysa boasts glass-fronted shopping malls with displays of hi-tech wares from 
Dubai. People zoom around town in taxis, and socialise in European-style coffee shops or 
American fast-food joints. There is even a swimming pool at one of the city’s many hotels. 
This dramatic reconstruction has taken place within people’s lifetimes. Qasim, whom I first 
met in 2013, was just a young boy when he first returned to Hargeysa. He recalled that ‘all 
the roof was gone [sic]. All the things had been taken. I remember we saw little bones of 
human beings in front of the home … [At school] we were just sitting on the cans of the milk’ 
(Interview, 2013). Now Qasim is a senior civil servant in one of Somaliland’s largest 
ministries, with an impressive office near to the Presidential Palace. All this has been built 
‘from scratch’.  
 
Twenty years of effort have resulted in the embedding of national institutions of governance, 
a stable economy, and a general degree of law and order. There are still many challenges, 
however. The state-building ‘to-do list’ includes a comprehensive civil register, up-to-date 
census and comprehensive national statistics, and a national system of official identification 
and voter registration – key elements that would enable the Somaliland state to identify its 
citizens and count its population.  
 
Making States, Making Citizens 
Indeed, it is the task of every consolidating state to define its citizens. Under the Montevideo 
criterion of statehood, to be a state means to be able to lay claim to a particular population: a 
set of people that may or may not share cultural characteristics (language, customs, race or 
ethnicity) but who are bound by the laws promulgated over a particular territory, and in 
turn bestowed with certain rights and responsibilities. This is more than drawing, 
demarcating and defending borders: such physical boundary-making is necessary but not 
sufficient for the delineation of who is in and who is out. Rather, there must also be legal 
rules about citizenship and nationality that govern how it is acquired (and lost), and who is 
eligible for this status. It is not enough to declare that one has a particular legal status – for 
instance, as a citizen or national of a country – and expect the entitlements and expectations 
of that status to follow. Rather, one’s status must be recognised relationally by others, 
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particularly legal authorities, which formally attribute and document individual identity and 
associated statuses. The evidence of these decisions is often flimsy pieces of card and paper 
– ‘IDs’ – that provide a ‘legally sanctioned, secure and practically available capacity to prove 
one’s identity’ (Szreter, 2007:67). IDs are thus valuable proof of officially recognised 
identity.  
 
There are thus expectations on modern states to create systems in which these identities are 
produced, recorded, and made meaningful. Caplan and Torpey write that establishing the 
individual identity of people is fundamental to the functioning of the modern state (2001:1). 
The World Bank (2014:1) similarly reports that identification is a prerequisite for modern 
development; and the United Nations states that ‘one of the most basic institutional 
responsibilities [of government] is providing legal identity’, needed to prevent anonymity 
and marginalisation, and to ensure access to simple services (United Nations, 2013:50). 
Indeed the international Convention on the Rights of the Child lists a name and nationality 
as a basic human right (OHCHR, 1989). Without documentation, ‘individuals do not 
formally exist, and are therefore excluded from the many points of engagement between a 
modern state and its citizens’ (Gelb and Clark, 2013:1). In an important way, therefore, the 
right to have official proof of identity is a threshold to other rights. 
 
The registration of these identities is one of the essential tools of statecraft, since it 
formalises the state’s recognition of its citizens (Torpey, 2000). Importantly, registration is 
also a process of standardisation and regulation: identities must be recognisable and 
comprehensible to the state. James C Scott, in his masterly work on the development of 
state capacity, captures the challenge of identification quite simply. He asks: ‘How is a state 
to associate a name, however unique and unambiguous, with an individual?’ (1998:371, note 
38) In this seemingly straightforward formulation is a complex query about the 
informational, surveillance and documentary powers of the state. It provokes inquiry into 
the construction and reproduction of ‘official identity’, the identity that is registered and 
documented, and through which one becomes known to the state.  
 
Scott responded to this question through the concept of ‘legibility’ (1998; passim): the idea 
that identities, like other social information, must be ‘read’ by the state. To do so, the state 
develops standardised categories and forms of knowledge within which the social and 
physical world is made ‘legible’. ‘Legibility’ thus offers an important way of conceptualising 
the set of state practices of naming, identifying, classifying and registering that come under 
the rubric ‘identification’; and is therefore a crucial idea in this thesis.2   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Legibility	  is	  also	  used	  as	  an	  important	  conceptual	  frame	  by	  accounts	  of	  state	  identification	  projects	  in	  Breckenridge,	  2014;	  Caplan	  and	  Torpey,	  2001;	  Piccolino,	  2015a;	  and	  Torpey,	  2000.	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Myopia and the Documentation Gap 
Central to the ‘reading’ of ‘legible’ identities is documentary proof of official identities as 
recorded in state systems. Modern states therefore typically issue a range of paperwork 
including passports and national ID cards. However, the panoptic, centralised sight of ‘high 
modernism’ that stimulated Scott’s inquiry is not a reality in many states of the world. In 
low- to medium-income countries, the provision of identity documentation is typically 
incomplete or irregular because of limited capacity, poor resources, corruption and legal 
ambiguity. Many people lack any kind of official or formalised paperwork, complicating the 
tracking of their bodies over space and time. Across sub-Saharan Africa, it has been 
estimated that over half of children are not registered at birth (UNICEF, 2005), even though 
birth certificates are considered the first and most important document for the official 
verification of identity. Where they do exist, official identification systems are often 
fragmentary, with various agencies competing to provide their own identification document 
with different requirements of eligibility, cost and inclusion, making coordination and 
planning difficult (World Bank, 2014:2). 
 
In the absence of comprehensive registration systems, people find it difficult if not 
impossible to gain recognition of their legal identity, family relationships, age and 
nationality, therefore complicating their access to entitlements and rights (World 
Bank/WHO, 2014). In many cases, people are not ‘in the system’, either because they fall out 
of it (for instance, non-indigenes and migrants, the marginalised and the stateless) or 
because there is no ‘system’ in the first place. As Piccolino (2015c) sparingly puts it, ‘many 
[in the West] take for granted the existence of systems that register and identify citizens … 
This assumption is wrong for most African states’. Rather than legibility, African states seem 
to be characterised by myopia.  
 
Related to the challenge of registration for identity documentation is the task of 
enumeration. The theoretical centrality of statistics to the state has been emphasised by 
Weber and Foucault, the practical importance by the United Nations. Its 2000–15 
Millennium Development Goals were explicitly predicated on the importance and 
availability of national statistics to measure development progress (Gelb and Clark, 2013; 
Stuart et al, 2015). However, the reality is that most people in Africa and Asia do not appear 
in any legal record or official statistic – what Setel et al call ‘a scandal of invisibility’ 
(2007:1569) and Devarajan a ‘statistical tragedy’ (2013). Full or near-total birth and death 
registration takes place only in Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa; and only Madagascar 
and Zimbabwe have some cause-specific mortality figures (ibid; see also Rao et al, 2004). 
Where national data is produced, it tends to include estimates and overstatements; typically 
under-enumerates people who are homeless, nomadic, poor, elderly, physically disabled and 
mentally impaired, as well as women and minorities; and is characterised by data gaps 
because of inadequate data collection, weak statistical capacity and political agendas (Stuart 
et al, 2015; see also Sandefur and Glassman, 2014). As Stuart et al remark: ‘[E]ven when 
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people are counted, the counting is frequently not good enough. What is assumed to be an 
empirical fact – a statistic – is too often the result not of direct observation, but of inference, 
assumptions or extrapolation, or political negotiation’ (2015:7). However, as the Nigerian 
statistician-general, Dr Yemi Kale, recently lamented, ‘African statistical systems are often 
described as tragic, but they forget that we are developing, and that these systems evolve 
over time’ (Chatham House, 2015).  
 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that many African states can neither comprehensively ‘read’ 
nor count their populations. Somaliland is one such state, long characterised more by 
myopia than legibility. Governments since 1991 have not been able to put in place 
sustainable or effective systems of identification and documentation. These administrative 
objectives have remained out of reach in part because of the financial and administrative 
constraints on the state. Somaliland’s civil service has been characterised by its own Civil 
Service Commission as unskilled, inexperienced, poorly equipped and suffering from low 
morale (Nouh, 2014). Without recognition, it does not have access to international loans or 
large-scale aid packages. Of course, it has been Somaliland’s ability to fund peace-building, 
and political and developmental achievements despite this isolation that has been the source 
of some of its greatest accolades (Phillips, 2013:20–21). However, notwithstanding 
remittances that total some $700 million a year (ibid), which support many families with 
day-to-day expenses, and other items such as medical and educational fees (Hammond, 
2013), the government’s expenditure budget is a rather meagre $250 million (Somaliland 
Sun, 2014c), in the realm of the conflict-ridden Central African Republic, and a third of 
neighbouring Djibouti (CIA, nd). This has therefore strained the development of particular 
sectors of governance, not least identification and enumeration. In addition to funding 
issues, there are also important political and technical challenges related to institutional 
sequencing and capacity-building, national infrastructure and the state’s ‘broadcasting’ 
power (Herbst, 1998), and the politics of boundary-making in the face of ongoing border 
disputes and internal debates about belonging. Without the deep institutional legacies of 
colonial civil registration, central administration and bureaucratic record-keeping enjoyed 
by other states, Somaliland appears to face an uphill battle to put these conventional tools of 
legibility in place. This is why new projects, ambitious in scale and scope, are being 
introduced. Principal amongst these are new programmes of biometric registration.  
 
The Biometric Turn in Africa 
Until very recently in Somaliland and many other African countries, ‘identity management’ 
was limited to the issuance of ID cards for discrete purposes, without universal coverage. 
These often did not sit within overarching identity ‘infrastructures’ to connect together 
different schemes, databases, and documents, for instance in the form of civil registers or 
national identity numbers, leading to issues of sustainability, reliability, scalability, training, 
and integration (Onyemenan, nd). However, in the past ten years or so, national ID cards 
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have become more complex, aided by technology ‘turn-keys’ (ibid.) The development of 
biometric registration systems – for national ID cards and voter registers in particular – has 
offered a way of ‘leapfrogging’ the expensive and integrated identity infrastructures that 
have historically characterised identity management (Gelb and Clark, 2013).3 Indeed, it has 
been argued that the African take-up of biometric identification technologies has been far 
more systematic and sustained than that in the ‘West’ (see Breckenridge, 2014:16–17). 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Namibia, Ghana, Morocco, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Sudan, 
and Somaliland amongst others (see Map 2), have all recently developed biometrics-based 
ID cards driven by a combination of demand factors (including improved voter registration, 
inclusion of the ‘unbanked’ and ‘know your customer’ requirements) and supply factors (not 
least the promotion of the technology by donors and vendors).4 Biometric IDs contain the 
promise of improved election management, development planning, statistical measurement, 
and, of course, surveillance and control. 
 
Map 2: Adoption of biometric technology in elections in sub-Saharan Africa.5 
 
	  
Source: Piccolino, 2015c. 
 
Gelb and Clark estimate that biometric voter registration schemes have enrolled nearly 400 
million people in at least 34 low-to-middle income countries (2013:31). The great proportion 
of these has been in sub-Saharan Africa, where biometric voter registration has taken place 
in 25 countries (Piccolino, 2015c; see Map 2). Like a number of other states in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Somaliland has also adopted hi-tech solutions in an attempt to fill the gaps in its 
identification, verification and documentation functions, and to meet enhanced regulatory 
requirements for international financial transfers and travel. Indeed, the voter registration 
and national ID card schemes discussed in this thesis incorporate some of the most 
advanced biometric technology in the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	   instance,	   by	   using	   biometric	   data	   as	   a	   way	   of	   verifying	   the	   identity	   of	   adult	   users	   without	   the	   administrative	  infrastructure	  of	  civil	  registration	  (Szreter	  and	  Breckenridge,	  2012:2).	  4	  See	  Gelb	  and	  Clark,	  2013;	  Pénicaud	  and	  Katakam,	  2013;	  World	  Bank,	  2014.	  	  5	  Angola,	  Benin,	  Burkina	  Faso,	  Cameroon,	  Côte	  d’Ivoire,	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Gabon,	  Ghana,	  Guinea,	  Kenya,	  Lesotho,	  Malawi,	  Mali,	  Mozambique,	  Namibia,	  Nigeria,	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Rwanda,	  Senegal,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Somaliland,	  Swaziland,	  Togo,	  Uganda	  and	  Zambia.	  Gelb	  and	  Clark	  (2013)	  also	  include	  Cape	  Verde,	  Comoros,	  and	  Gambia.	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As in Somaliland, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) are now widely used 
in registration programmes in order to minimise duplicate registrations and ensure each 
eligible voter is enrolled only once. However, although the purchase and design of these 
registration systems appears to run relatively smoothly, the implementation phase is often 
replete with problems, not least basic technical and logistical issues emerging from 
fundamental infrastructural weaknesses (such as unreliable electricity access), operator 
error (the result of poor training or weak oversight), and data poverty (predominantly the 
issue of illegible fingerprints), as well as time and budget constraints (Gelb and Clark, 
2013:33). Examples from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana 
and Kenya all demonstrate how technical and political challenges strongly intersect to 
complicate biometric registration; and how the high expectations of new technologies can be 
quickly undercut when they break down or fail to deliver windfalls in one direction or 
another. For instance, despite domestic headlines that declared that Ghana’s 2012 biometric 
registration had been a great success, ‘[breaking] a world record by having approximately 13 
million people verified within 48 hours’ on election day (GhanaWeb, 2012), verification by 
fingerprint was problematic (see Commonwealth Observer Group, 2012). Yakubu and Adjei 
(2014) argue that although the Ghanaian electoral commission blamed the breakdown of 
verification equipment, the reliance on a single form of biometric data (fingerprints) was to 
blame. In Kenya, the use of thumbprint data in 2013 to identify registered voters on polling 
day was billed as ‘Africa’s most modern poll’, but the electricity-dependent system faced 
considerable problems in dealing with so much data; and polling officers, whose training 
had been shortened, were often unable to deal with the failure of the biometric kits 
(Bowman and Longwe, 2013; Gogineni, 2012; Wrong, 2013). Whilst in Nigeria, the 
landmark programme of biometric voter verification in 2015 was marred by accreditation 
failures, including of the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, whose thumbprints 
were not recognised when he went to vote (Vanguard, 2015).  
 
In many cases, these were glitches with the verification apparatus and protocols designed to 
check that voters were who they said they were, thus maintaining a basic principle of 
democratic elections that each eligible voter participates only once. One of the appeals of 
biometric technologies is the promise of a credible way to authenticate enrolled members. 
However, as these and other cases show, biometric solutions are sometimes insufficient to 
overcome historical and institutional gaps in documentation that would enable states to 
confidently associate names with individuals. ID cards may be the most tangible aspect of 
identification systems, but they are only one part of the complex technical and legal 
infrastructure needed to support the creation, maintenance and interpretation of large 
datasets of information; and the institutionalisation of secure and reliable procedures of 
proof. In many cases where biometrics have been introduced, verifying identities remains 
problematic, and thus the challenges facing ‘verification’ are both technically and politically 
apposite for investigation and review.  
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The ‘Verification Problem’  
In this thesis, I am therefore concerned with understanding the process of verification 
within state projects of registration and documentation. Verification – specifically, the 
‘verification problem’ – is an under-studied and under-theorised aspect of identification and 
registration, areas of study that also receive surprisingly little attention in the scholarly and 
policy literatures. It is, however, a productive area of inquiry, enabling the opening up of the 
‘routine functioning’ of the state (Blundo and Le Meur, cited in Fourchard, 2015:39); and in 
this way contributes to the study of what Olivier de Sardan (2008:1) calls ‘real governance’: 
the everyday operation of states as they are ‘actually being practised’. 
 
Verification is essential to official identification, through which citizens and states are made 
‘legible’ to the other. The need for verification arises when states seek to authoritatively and 
uniquely name and classify citizens through bureaucratic processes. State officials therefore 
require assurances that people are who they say they are, but, as Torpey puts it, they operate 
with the ‘fundamental suspicion that people will lie when asked who or what they are’ 
(2000:166). State administrations therefore typically construct forms of record-keeping that 
initiate ‘chains of verification’: trails of paperwork that assure officials that a person is who 
they say they are, beginning with birth certificates from which other functional forms of ID 
are typically derived. Some states also increasingly utilise biometric methods that verify 
identity by reading the physical body – a traditional means of face-to-face confirmation 
done in new technological ways. However, in cases where the state’s ability to triangulate 
and verify identity is functionally weak, geographically patchy or technologically 
underdeveloped, a basic problem emerges: states cannot authoritatively and unambiguously 
verify citizens’ identities. This is what I have termed the ‘verification problem’, and 
constitutes the research puzzle of this thesis.  
 
In the following chapters, I address this puzzle by looking closely at the ways in which 
verification, and identification more generally, is undertaken in Somaliland. I do so along 
two principal lines of inquiry, or ‘research themes’, which consider how the verification 
problem can be addressed: the construction of biometrics-based ID systems and the use of 
‘guarantors’.  
 
Understanding the Political Drivers of National Identification Schemes  
The first way in which the verification problem can be addressed is to develop 
comprehensive, credible and incorruptible systems of registration and documentation. 
Some states have deeply institutionalised frameworks of demographic reporting and official 
documentation, often because of historical factors that led to the amalgamation and 
centralisation of local or informal practices of record-keeping (see Higgs, 2009; Szreter and 
Breckenridge, 2012). States that do not have such systems may therefore seek to emulate 
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and develop them; and we have thence seen the development of costly national ID cards and 
hi-tech voter registers in sub-Saharan Africa, including in Somaliland.  
 
In this thesis, I therefore explore the Somaliland case in order to investigate whether these 
new biometrically enabled systems can coherently and reliably address the state’s 
verification problem. I explore how and why the Somaliland state has developed its official 
identity infrastructure since 1991, particularly in terms of biometric technologies. I therefore 
develop a case study of how states actually design, implement, and institutionalise new 
identification programmes, particularly in terms of biometric technologies. As more African 
states embark on such projects, it is important to unravel the decisions involved in planning, 
procurement, and execution in order to understand whether such schemes are owned by 
local stakeholders or by external actors, whether they are designed for short-term gain or as 
long-term infrastructure, and to what degree they are shaped by political agendas and 
commercial interests. Research in low- and middle-income countries has suggested that, 
particularly with biometric voter registration, such schemes tend to be one-off events that 
do not lead to permanent registries (Gelb and Clark, 2013). Moreover, in spite of (or because 
of) the enormous costs and effort involved, these projects often do not result in sustainable 
infrastructures for registration.6 What seems to be a silver bullet becomes instead, if not a 
white elephant, then often a disappointment, despite the vaunting of the hi-tech ‘legacy’ by 
electoral commissions and donors (Wrong, 2013). The Somaliland case that I delineate in 
this chapter demonstrates that there are considerable challenges in creating the relevant 
technical, legal and bureaucratic components, and the trade-offs in the expenditure of 
political commitment, resources, financing, and time required for such programmes.  
 
As well as looking at how identification and registration schemes are executed, I also look 
within the ‘black box’ of such projects to scrutinise the political decisions that determine 
their success. Through this line of inquiry, I therefore open up an investigation into the 
drivers behind new and augmented identity programmes, testing whether the assumptions 
about legibility and demographic ‘sight’ are correct, or whether there are other motivations 
that shape how, when, and why states like Somaliland seek to develop these projects, such as 
democratisation or political agendas. I therefore consider the formal rules of citizenship and 
informal narratives of belonging that underwrite these schemes, to understand to what 
degree biometric identification systems are designed to create inclusive ways of seeing a 
national population, or circumscribe and define particular groups of insiders with 
consequences for other political subjects. In the case of Somaliland, there is obviously also a 
state-making function to national ID systems in the face of unrecognition, so we can use the 
analysis of these projects to tell us more about political consolidation and state-building. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	   budget	   for	   Benin’s	   Liste	   Electorale	   Permanente	   Informatisée,	   for	   example,	   was	   initially	   almost	   $37	   million,	  increasing	  to	  over	  $51	  million	  by	  the	  time	  of	   implementation,	  with	  the	  biometric	  kits	  accounting	  for	  over	  one-­‐fifth	  of	  the	   costs	   (Piccolino,	   2015a:279).	   In	   Côte	   d’Ivoire,	   the	   cost	   was	   a	   staggering	   $266	  million,	   or	   around	   $44	   per	   head	  (Piccolino,	   2015c).	  Donors	   contribute	   funding	   and	   expertise,	   but	  donor	  priorities,	   particularly	   in	   terms	  of	   deadlines,	  and	  ring-­‐fenced	  budgets	  can	  skew	  projects	   in	   favour	  of	  quick-­‐wins	  (such	  as	  elections	  on	  time)	  rather	  than	   long-­‐term	  dividends	  (such	  as	  sustainable	  infrastructures).	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This research stream therefore contributes important empirical material with which to 
better understand the logistical and political considerations involved in the development of 
biometric systems in the sub-Saharan African context.  
 
Conceptualising Vernacular Verification and the Role of Guarantors 
Of course, greatly trumpeted hi-tech schemes in places such as Ghana, Namibia and 
Somaliland all take time to be developed and scaled to the national level. Whilst awaiting 
biometric registration, nationally comprehensive identity databases, and sustainable 
systems of record-keeping, the verification problem endures. These states therefore need 
alternative authentication protocols through which officials can identify and verify citizens. 
A second approach to the verification problem is thus to devolve responsibility for 
verification to other sources of authority and legibility. These might be private commercial 
firms that take on government contracts, such as the identity service providers that support 
the British government’s Verify hub.7 Alternatively, states may use verifiers within society, 
so-called ‘guarantors’, who are often accredited intermediaries who vouch for a person’s 
identity, but may also be ordinary citizens. The use of counter-signatories and vouchsafers is 
not uncommon – in fact, many states utilise these as safeguards in complex verification 
processes – but in places where record-keeping is weak or patchy and comprehensive 
national systems of registration do not exist, practices of testimony and guarantee are 
critical to verification.  
 
In this thesis, I call such practices ‘vernacular verification’, and I look to understand how 
these social practices of authentication work within official systems of identification. In 
particular, I try to understand why states use guarantors, whether it is for pragmatic reasons 
(for instance, as stopgaps) or whether there are other factors that explain their 
incorporation into the official domain. Significantly, we need to query the use of guarantors 
and vernacular practices of verification in light of the proposition above that it is the state 
that is the synoptic authoriser of identity. We can ask whether guarantors augment states’ 
administrative legibility, or whether they empower alternative sites of legibility that may 
undermine or challenge official identification. In the study presented here, I therefore 
elucidate how ‘vernacular’ verification works in Somaliland, and explicate the relationship 
between ‘official’ and ‘vernacular’ modes of identification. Through this research stream, I 
therefore explain how identity verification actually works in Somaliland, and thus how the 
verification problem is addressed in practice. I examine how verification draws on notions of 
truth and authenticity, and ask about how traditional authorities (typically, the clan elders 
known as ‘caaqils’) working as official guarantors index these shared norms during 
identification. I also look at the way that narratives of authentic belonging draw boundaries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Users	  of	  the	  GOV.UK	  Verify	  service	  are	  invited	  to	  select	  ‘an	  identity	  provider	  from	  a	  list	  of	  organisations	  contracted	  by	  the	   Cabinet	   Office	   to	   provide	   the	   service.	   Identity	   providers	   are	   private	   sector	   organisations	   that	   are	   certified	   as	  meeting	  relevant	  security	  and	  service	  standards.	  They	  carry	  out	  checks	  to	  confirm	  the	  user’s	   identity,	  using	  methods	  designed	   to	  meet	   published	   standards,	   and	   then	   communicate	   that	   identity	   to	   the	   relevant	   government	   department	  through	  the	  hub.’	  GOV.UK,	  nd.	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around particular in-groups, thus excluding those who fall outside such terms. This research 
stream therefore fleshes out the broader landscape of identification, and offers empirical 
and analytical insights about the social context and complex politics of verification.  
 
The Identity Architecture 
In this thesis, I argue that, despite the introduction of biometric technologies, 
authentication by guarantors remains an important, and even default, practice of identity 
verification for the Somaliland state. Applicants for citizenship certificates and municipal 
IDs, for instance, invoke the name of their clan elder so that he can testify that they are who 
they say they are. In the hi-tech programmes of voter and ‘civil’ registration undertaken 
since 2008, vouching by clan elders has also been incorporated as a key part of the 
verification protocol, confirming their role as key intercessors in the geometry of official 
identification. This ‘genealogical’ verification not only affirms a person’s name and 
nationality, but also authenticates him as someone who really belongs. This vouching 
therefore simultaneously ‘interpellates’8 individuals as members of clans and as citizens, 
animating different notions of Somaliland belonging. We therefore find affirmation of both 
the standard account of legibility – that ‘the state and its archiving and legal systems are 
ultimately necessary to provide th[e] verification and authorization role’ (Breckenridge and 
Szreter, 2012:29) – and the empirical insight that ‘vernacular’ practices of naming, situating 
and authenticating constitute an integral part of ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott, 1998). 
 
In Scott’s observations on the functioning of early states, he notes ‘a pattern of relations 
between local knowledge and practices on one hand and state administrative routines on the 
other’ (1998:24). This ‘pattern of relations’ is evident in the interaction of vernacular and 
official practices and processes in Somaliland’s formal documentation and registration 
activities. My principal argument in this thesis is that the enmeshment of genealogical ‘ways 
of seeing’ and formal processes of legibility is not only a pragmatic ‘stopgap’ response to 
institutional weakness and underdevelopment, or an expression of Somaliland’s hybrid 
political logic. It is also, importantly, because ‘caaqil’ verification in particular, and 
vernacular practices more generally, reproduce narratives of authentic citizenship and 
Somalilandness. These conceptions of authenticity, revealed in everyday relations and 
encounters, and embodied in discourses around citizenship, immigration and boundary-
making, find expression in the process of verification, which brings together genealogical 
and official identities. In important ways, therefore, banal acts of verification are 
performances of Somalilandness, and thus contribute to nation-making and the quest for 
recognition.  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  use	  this	  term	  of	  Althusser	  (1971)	  in	  his	  ‘hailing’	  sense.	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This argument is based on a key theoretical proposition that the incorporation of the 
‘synoptic’ power of clan elders into official schemes of identification is indicative of the 
underlying ‘identity architecture’ of social and bureaucratic norms and protocols in 
Somaliland. The conceptualisation of the ‘identity architecture’ constitutes an original 
theoretical contribution to the study of identification and registration systems. It captures 
the complex interlocking of different practices, forms of knowledge, and ways of working 
that are used to situate and make legible a particular set of persons; and which form the 
blueprint for the formulation and practice of a society’s identification system. These 
different symbolic resources, discourses, formal processes, and taken-for-granted practices 
come from various parts of a society’s cultural and political landscape. From this assemblage 
can be drawn narratives that help to make sense of and ascribe value to identities in society, 
and these form the basis of how identification can be conducted in meaningful ways. The 
norms that determine the grounds of authenticity and validity that enable verification are 
also grounded in this identity architecture.  
 
I have chosen the term ‘architecture’ because it captures the sense of a framework or 
blueprint that I am describing here. The identity architecture is more than one structure – 
rather, it is the set of conventions and underlying logic about how such things as official IDs 
and verification regimes are constructed. The notion of architecture is necessarily one of 
hybridity, since it assumes the connection of different resources, some of which comes from 
the ‘vernacular’ domain of social actors and practices, and some of which from the ‘official’ 
domain. However, whilst architecture suggests completeness and permanence, in fact I see 
this as a fluid and plural assemblage upon which more stable institutions (such as 
registration systems or citizenship laws) can be built.  
 
Crucially, therefore, this conceptualisation highlights that the normative and practical 
configuration of identification is more than a coincidental assemblage: there is conscious 
design, superintendence, and implementation (Sykes, 1982:45). The term architecture is 
therefore apposite because it invokes the agency that is required to engage with and 
interpret this set of norms and practices in order to construct the ‘buildings’ of identification 
systems. In architectural projects, we find financiers, designers, planners, surveyors, 
foremen, craftsmen and, ultimately, occupants; as well as many different kinds of materials 
and techniques. Similarly, Somaliland’s identity architecture involves multiple actors 
(including external donors, government ministers, clan elders, registration officers, and 
ordinary citizens), institutions and practices.  
 
In the chapters that follow, I apply this conceptual framework to the study of Somaliland’s 
‘routine functioning’ in the area of identification and registration policy, exploring the role 
of guarantors and biometric technology in the development of Somaliland’s official 
infrastructure since 1991. In the second half of this chapter, I set out my case study approach 
to Somaliland, and my research methodology.  
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Somaliland as a Case Study 
I chose Somaliland as the case study for this project because I see it as a significant case 
amongst the contemporary states that are introducing biometric identification schemes in 
an effort to develop and improve their registration and enumeration capabilities. 
Undoubtedly, its small size and contested juridical status makes it a special case. Like 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Transnistria, South Ossetia and 
Western Sahara, it sits outside the realm of de jure statehood (Lynch, 2004); however, 
unlike these, it has the dubious honour of not being formally recognised by a single state. 
This makes the undertaking of national registration and identification schemes – a tool of 
state-building and indeed state maintenance – puzzling and therefore interesting, 
particularly when the literature is dominated by the experiences of recognised states.  
 
However, though an outlier in these terms, it is also the case that Somaliland shares many of 
the infrastructural, capacity and resource constraints of other developing states, as well as 
historical legacy issues from colonial administration, the Cold War and conflict. Somaliland 
is a relatively neat case amongst these other examples because of its size (68,000 square 
miles and a population of just 3.5 million9) and the contemporaneity of its identification 
projects. Despite its significance as a case, however, few works on Somaliland interrogate 
the development of its official identification infrastructure; where they do, these focus on 
voter registration (notably Walls, 2014 and Bradbury, 2008). There has not been an in-
depth scholarly focus on ID cards, passports or other formalised identification systems in 
pre- or post-independence Somalia/land, or in Somaliland today, either within Somali 
studies or the literatures on African states or registration more generally. This thesis thus 
makes an original contribution to the political analysis of these structures and institutions in 
Somaliland.  
 
In doing so, I focus attention on the political development of Somaliland in a way that 
departs from some of the more standard readings of the country, in which it is described as 
an ‘island of stability’ (Gettleman, 2007) or a ‘role model for success’ (Lewis, 2010); ‘Africa’s 
best kept secret’ (Jhazbhay, 2003) or the ‘little country that could’ (Shinn, 2002).10 
Somaliland is often seen as a ‘laboratory’ (Renders and Terlinden, 2010) or ‘natural 
experiment’ (Balthasar, 2012) in contrast with the ‘failed state’ of Somalia. Rather than 
compare it with Somalia, I explore Somaliland as a significant case within the set of modern 
states that face verification problems in their official identification schemes. Of course, 
single case studies are sometimes considered to have drawbacks – as Seawright and Gerring 
quip, ‘the chosen case study is asked to perform a heroic role: to stand for (represent) a 
population of cases that is often much larger than the case itself’ (2008:294) – but case 
studies also ‘invite conceptual refinement’ and a focus on processes and patterns (Balthasar, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  UNPO,	  2008.	  This	  is	  about	  the	  same	  size	  as	  Uruguay.	  	  10	  See	  also	  Kaplan,	  2008;	  Jeffrey,	  2015;	  McConnell,	  2010;	  Mora,	  2015;	  Muchler,	  2012;	  and	  Pham,	  2012a	  and	  2012b.	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2013:32). The selection of Somaliland therefore permits in-depth, qualitative exploration, 
whilst adding crucial empirical material to a broader set of cases. 
 
The country study I present here is necessarily bounded in several ways. I focus on the 
identification of Somaliland nationals, and not internally displaced people, migrants, non-
Somaliland residents or foreigners living or working in Somaliland. I principally look at how 
the Somaliland state identifies and verifies its population, and not other authorities or 
organisations working in or on Somaliland, such as United Nations agencies, international 
NGOs or regional governments. Although I do draw on historical material, this is also an 
inquiry bounded by time, specifically to the current duration of the Republic of Somaliland: 
in other words, I begin in 1991 and end in 2015. Specifically, I focus on the period from 2008 
to 2014, when the most comprehensive registration efforts to date were undertaken.  
 
The Fieldwork 
The research presented in this thesis draws on primary material gathered during some six 
and a half months of fieldwork in Hargeysa, Somaliland over the course of four fieldwork 
trips: 10 to 21 April 2012;11 3 October to 8 December 2012; 10 March to 12 June 2013; and 3 
August to 5 September 2014. These multiple trips enabled me to fine-tune my research 
questions and undertake iterative data collection and analysis. I was also able to visit 
Hargeysa at different times of the year, thus I observed the preparations for and conduct of 
the local council elections in November 2012, joined in the Independence Day celebrations 
on 18 May 2013, experienced Ramadan in June 2013, witnessed the impact of the Gu and 
Dayr rains in 2013 and 2014 respectively, and attended the Hargeysa International Book 
Fair in August 2014. 
 
For logistical and security considerations I was based in Hargeysa almost exclusively. The 
British Foreign Office does not discriminate between Somalia and Somaliland, and advises 
against travel to both. Although SOAS did not prohibit my travel to Somaliland, my 
insurance provider would not permit travel east of Burco because of ongoing security 
concerns in the frontier zone with Puntland. My initial multi-sited research design had 
included phases of fieldwork in Hargeysa, Borama, Berbera and Burco, towns that differ in 
scale and situation and thus I felt would give me a range of material. However, the reality of 
the expensive and red-taped security measures required by the Somaliland government for 
travel beyond Hargeysa (not least armed escorts and sturdy 4x4 vehicles) made such trips 
prohibitive. Like other researchers to Somaliland, I thus conducted the majority of my 
interviews and participant observation in the capital city, though I did also visit Berbera, 
Oodweyne and Burco (as a member of a 2012 international election observer mission), and 
rural villages north of Hargeysa (in my role with UN-Habitat), which afforded me wider 
experience.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  twelve-­‐day	  scoping	  trip	  was	  conducted	  with	  the	  logistical	  support	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  Refugee	  Council.	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Hoehne (2015) warns that we need to be mindful of a ‘Hargeysa bias’ in the literature on 
Somaliland, since so much of the essential fieldwork is conducted in the capital, and thus 
refracted through encounters and experiences there. For this study, however, Hargeysa was 
the appropriate site for research. As the political capital, it houses the parliament, 
presidency, all ministries and agencies, and the electoral commission, and thus was essential 
for accessing these institutions and their officials. Moreover, as the capital, people from all 
over Somaliland live, work and visit there, offering a cross-section that would not have been 
emulated to the same degree elsewhere. Importantly, I had freedom of movement and 
personal security, and this enabled me to undertake a large array of interviews and 
observations.  
 
Methodological Considerations 
My research has been conducted from an epistemological-ontological position of 
constructivism, a set of ideas about the world and our knowledge that consists of a 
‘metatheoretical commitment’ to the mutual construction of social reality and knowledge 
(Pouliot, 2007:361). Constructivism lends itself to the theoretical inquiry of identification 
because of its concern with social meanings, structures and identities (see, for example, 
Brubraker and Cooper, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Mercer, 1995; Wendt, 1999). It emphasises 
intersubjectivity and relationality. This means that I did not presume that ‘data’ about the 
ways my interlocutors identify themselves and others, their attitudes towards identity 
documentation and technologies, and the other items under research ‘existed’, waiting to be 
uncovered, but rather that the insights and information generated during fieldwork were 
‘produced’ in dialogue between the researcher (me) and the researched (my interviewees 
and participants) (see Mahler, 2006:283). This study is therefore a construction of 
constructions, a presentation of ‘meanings about meanings’ (ibid:365; see also Geertz, 1973 
and Wedeen, 2008). My objective has not been to force a systematisation or codification of 
practices of vouching and verification in Somaliland, but to offer the interpretations I have 
made within the landscape of meanings and understandings that Somalis have of 
themselves – to put my interpretations of interpretations amongst others of that kind. These 
interpretations are of course not stable or unchanging, but born of their context: the specific 
time and place of my fieldwork, and my and my interlocutors’ identities and interactions.  
 
This epistemological position required a complementary methodological approach. My 
research project demanded, as Michèle Lamont puts it, an effort to get to the heart of ‘the 
taken-for-granted categories [informants] mobilize when interpreting and organizing the 
differences that surround them, without predefining specific dimensions of identity as 
particularly salient’ (cited in Miller-Idriss, 2009:21). Of course, Alfred Schutz’s ‘taken for 
granted’ conceptions are by definition resistant to excavation, for some notions and 
understandings appear so natural or inscrutable that they can ‘hardly be perceived, let alone 
expressed’ (Soss, 2006:133). Though the interpretivist approach is open to the different 
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meanings that a phrase, identity, event or object takes on in different contexts, it can be 
difficult to pin down which meanings apply where and when (ibid:139). My methodological 
approach was therefore designed to embrace variation, cacophony and the complexity of 
subjects; to not ‘sweep this confusion under the rug, but rather [hold] it up as an interesting 
find in itself (Thøgersen, 2009). I thus drew on the ideas of grounded theory, which 
emphasises interpretation, induction, iteration and flexibility; and political ethnography, 
which stresses immersion, richness and reflexivity. These fit well with a constructivist 
position; Kathy Charmaz (2014:13–15), for instance, influentially coined the term 
‘constructivist grounded theory’, and my work is animated by its principles of a dialogue 
between ‘data’ and analysis, a focus on actions and processes, a search for variation, a 
commitment to theory construction rather than description, and in particular the centrality 
of relativism, in terms of the relationality between knowledge and reality, between 
interpretations, and between identities.  
 
By design and instinct, my fieldwork was iterative and inductive: as I described above, I 
returned many times to the field, but I also repeatedly reviewed and revisited my 
transcripts, fieldnotes and memos, comparing and coding these to generate the analytical 
categories of vouching, verification and authentication that became central to the 
interpretation I present here. Importantly, it was this inductive process that provoked the 
move from an initial research interest in citizenship in Somaliland to the resulting work on 
identification and legibility when I realised that it was these themes and processes, and not 
the predefined and exogamous agenda of citizenship, that were emerging from encounters 
in the field. As Whyte reflects: 	  We	  go	  on	   living	  with	   the	  data	  –	  and	  with	   the	  people	  –	  until	  perhaps	  some	  chance	  occurrence	   casts	   a	   totally	   different	   light	   upon	   the	   data,	   and	   we	   begin	   to	   see	   a	  pattern	  that	  we	  have	  not	  seen	  before	  (1981:280).	  
 
By undertaking ‘data collection’ and ‘data analysis’ concurrently, these patterns could be 
observed, thickly described and then folded back into the research design. My fieldwork was 
therefore responsive and organic, using purposive sampling to explore and enrich the 
emerging codes and categories (Birks and Mills, 2011; Charmaz, 2014). Rather than 
developing or applying a theoretical proposition in the field as undertaken in other types of 
research design (Birks and Mills, 2011:10), the explanatory scheme has been informed by 
the fieldwork. It is in this way that I have met the positivist challenge influenced by Parr 
(1998:97) that adopting a flexible, grounded and ‘bottom-up’ methodology risks jettisoning 
an explanatory framework. Rather, it is precisely via the ‘bottom up’ that the explanation 
came.  
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This has been enhanced by the incorporation of an ethnographic ‘sensibility’ (Schatz, 2009) 
in my methodological approach. Ethnography draws on face-to-face interactions to yield 
rich material on the intimate lives of those under study (Fox, 2004:311), and is definitively 
immersive. Though I undertook relatively short fieldtrips and conducted many of my more 
formal interactions in English, my approach was more than what Fox calls ‘nonethnographic 
qualitative research that employs observation and interviewing methods in more 
circumscribed, short-term, distant, and “thin” ways’ (2004:311). Rather, a ‘readiness to be 
surprised’ (Enloe, cited in Berling and Bueger, 2013:118), and a commitment to interaction 
‘thickened’ my observations and interviews. I have ‘cared’, as Schatz puts it, ‘with the 
possible emotional engagement that implies – to glean the meanings that the people under 
study attribute to their social and political reality’ (2009:5). I have focused on trying to 
capture the complexity, ambiguity and multivalence of my informants’ perspectives and 
attitudes, and to fairly and sensitively portray my observations, experiences and 
interpretations as they actually occurred. Although I do not meet the call of critical 
ethnographers such as Vrasti to engage in ‘radical perspectivism’ (cited in Wedeen, 
2010:263), I prioritised reflexivity. ‘I’ am present in the thesis, and am aware of my 
partiality: of seeing the way I was seen, as Timothy Pachirat might put it (2009:158). On the 
whole, however, my reflexivity has been, as Wedeen suggests, on the side of epistemology – 
asking questions about boundaries of thinking, modes of inquiry and absurd possibilities 
(Wedeen, 2010:264), rather than revealing myself in each of my research encounters and 
experiences. Instead of extracts from my fieldnotes, I quote my interlocutors in order to give 
voice to their words, experiences and meanings, albeit within an authorially ordered 
interpretation.  
 
I collected data using qualitative research methods. The flexibility and variation of grounded 
theory seems to encourage eclecticism – Charmaz calls it a ‘constellation of methods’ 
(2014:14) – and I therefore considered a range of different tools, including Q-methodology, 
photo-elicitation, and focus groups, alongside more conventional data-collection pathways, 
in order to find the most appropriate tools for the research, the site and the researcher. For 
reasons of intelligibility, logistics and expense, I ultimately chose a triumvirate of qualitative 
interviewing, participant observation, and archival work, which I conducted in tandem 
throughout my fieldwork. Utilising overlapping methods enabled me to uncover different 
meanings, crosscheck interpretations and foster richness. In what follows, I discuss the 
design and implementation of these three tools of research.  
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Interviews 
Interviews proved to be the richest and most significant source of material for this thesis. In 
total, I undertook 128 formal interviews, predominantly in English and almost all in 
Hargeysa. 12  In this thesis, I avoid the conventional division of structured and semi-
structured interviews, since this does not accurately cover the types of meetings I had in the 
field, but under this rubric of formality I count those interviews that I arranged in advance 
with the purpose of exploring a particular set of topics. These included meetings with 
government officials, ministers, director-generals, and parliamentarians; civil society 
leaders, including the heads of local NGOs and professional associations; clan leaders; and 
other senior figures. The interviews were tape-recorded or noted by hand, and took place in 
the informant’s office or in a public place such as a restaurant or hotel lobby.  
 
These interviews were of the information-gathering and explanatory kind, used primarily to 
understand sequences, processes and timelines. The format was typically based upon a pre-
prepared question schedule, and were often facilitated by, or at least accompanied by, a 
research assistant (discussed below). These topic guides changed over time, as I tested and 
retested questions. However, overall I prioritised open-ended questions to give interviewees 
space to articulate their responses and organise their answers within their own frameworks 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002:674). Like Fife, I saw these interviews as spaces in which the 
‘person being interviewed has the “right” to interpret the question and take it any place he or 
she pleases’, and not as a format for replicating colonial relationships of the past where an 
outside ‘authority’ sets the terms of engagement (2005:93). Notwithstanding this, most of 
these interviews were directed and shaped by my interests, and although I sought a more 
conversational dynamic, the use of translators in some interviews impeded the rhythm of 
dialogue. In other cases, explicit or implicit hierarchies in gender relations meant that male 
interlocutors sometimes dominated the interview, intellectually marginalising my research 
assistant and myself. Such encounters prompted me to repeat the interview where possible, 
and certainly to triangulate the material with other sources. Even when this was not the 
case, I repeated interviews with some civil servants and government officials in order to 
clarify key issues or discuss new developments. 
 
I also met more informally with local researchers, members of civil society, and senior 
figures in their private capacity. Although these were more loosely structured encounters, I 
count these as interviews because I steered the topic choice, and took notes of what was said 
in order to probe particular themes and ideas. These types of interviews are sometimes seen 
as limited in terms of reliability and generalisability, compared with uniformly asked 
questions in a more controlled situation (Soss, 2006:139). Rather, their value lies in their 
specific interpretivist function – as a source of insight, not hypothesis-testing (Leech, 
2002:665). These interviews were important opportunities to articulate my observations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  A	  list	  of	  interviews	  is	  available	  in	  the	  Bibliography.	  Notes	  that	  not	  all	  the	  interviews	  I	  undertook	  appear	  there	  because	  some	  of	  these	  were	  insubstantial	  or	  captured	  instead	  in	  fieldnotes.	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and put assumptions to the test; as the research developed, I also engaged in theory-testing 
with key interlocutors. As Lane notes, such exchanges are valuable for ‘testing whether or 
not the first impression gained was the correct one, for reflecting back the sense of what was 
said’ (cited in Soss, 2006:135). Crucially, these interviews, together with many more 
informal conversations and encounters, produced opportunities for triangulation – though 
of course, as Balthasar also notes, sometimes this ‘manifested rather than diminished the 
cacophony of narratives’ (2012:41).  
 
On Language and Translation 
The language for many of my research encounters in Hargeysa was English, my native 
tongue and the second language of Somaliland, spoken widely by government officials, 
researchers and professionals, many of whom have lived abroad in the diaspora. Prior to 
fieldwork, I undertook twelve months of Somali language training (around 150 hours) with 
Dr Martin Orwin at SOAS, University of London, from October 2010 to April 2011 
(Elementary), and October 2011 to March 2012 (Intermediate). This helped me greatly to 
understand not only the grammatical construction of Somali, but also its complex and 
epigrammatic character. However, I was not able to conduct more than basic conversations 
in Somali, and hence relied upon translators in interviews with Somali-speaking informants. 
 
I engaged a series of research assistants in Hargeysa, who worked primarily as ‘fixers’ and 
translators, helping to organise and conduct interviews.13 In almost all cases, these were 
formal arrangements, with a written agreement and daily remuneration. Translation has 
important methodological and epistemological implications, with consequences for 
representation and the construction of meaning. Such translation goes beyond verbal 
communication to include non-verbal cues and references, gestures, etiquette and body 
language. The view of social reality that animates this thesis holds that meaning is 
constructed rather than expressed by language; and as such ‘there is no neutral position 
from which to translate’ (Temple and Young, 2004:164). Reflexivity about the challenge of 
translation requires laying bare the power dynamics between languages. As Temple and 
Young (ibid:167) point out, English is often used as the yardstick for meaning, but this 
disguises or obliterates the nuance and complexity of meaning that comes from other 
languages, in this case Somali.  
 
My assistants’ willingness to reflect on the interviews and consider ways of understanding 
what was said was an invaluable collaboration. Most importantly, they helped me reconsider 
and adjust my approaches and techniques; and provided a source of support, both logistical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	  November	  2012,	  this	  was	  Roda,	  a	  young	  woman	  from	  Birmingham,	  who	  was	  visiting	  Somaliland	  after	  graduating	  from	  her	  BA	  degree	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  now	  working	  as	  an	  administrator	  in	  Burco	  and	  Hargeysa.	  In	  March	  and	  April	  2013,	  I	  worked	  with	  Tawfiiq,	  a	  local	  graduate	  who	  aspired	  to	  undertake	  an	  MA	  in	  neighbouring	  Ethiopia	  the	  following	  year.	  In	  August	  2014,	  I	  was	  helped	  by	  Rooble,	  a	  man	  who	  had	  worked	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  researchers	  and	  NGOs;	  Abdiweli	  from	  the	  APD;	  Inshaar,	  an	  IT	  graduate	  from	  a	  local	  university;	  and	  Ashkir,	  a	  British	  diaspora	  man,	  now	  teaching	  English	  in	  Hargeysa.	  I	  extend	  my	  deep	  thanks	  to	  all	  of	  them.	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and emotional. However, it was also the case that simultaneous and verbatim translation is 
very difficult, and I could not find or afford anyone in the field to provide such a service. The 
desire on both sides to ensure a relatively ‘normal’ conversation experience meant that 
sometimes my assistants sought equivalence or assimilation of the words and ideas in each 
language, making them an interpreter of the texts on each side (see Temple and Young, 
2004:170; Berman and Tyyskä, 2010:182). These choices of language were difficult to 
capture, and meant that my notes and transcripts were often in the voice of my translator 
rather my interlocutor. However, I adopted the recommendation of Edwards, Temple and 
Young, and others who advise that cross-language research should involve actively bringing 
the translator into the research process, seeing him/her as a co-participant, co-researcher or 
key informant – as someone who co-produces meaning, with translation occurring ‘with, 
rather than through’ them (Edwards, 1998:197, 203). Although I have not been able to show 
where informants and participants’ words were not those they themselves used (for the 
reasons above), I have clearly indicated in the List of Interviews (Bibliography) which 
conversations were translated, and note this also in the in-text citations, so as to make the 
act of interpretation visible as far as possible.  
 
Snowballs and Vouches 
I initially selected interviewees by identifying key informants according to their role in 
citizenship-related activities, and later in more specific registration and documentary 
activities – a purposive sampling approach. As time went on, I was able to meet people via 
the recommendations and connections of my interviewees – a form of snowball sampling. 
Since networks are so important and vibrant in Hargeysa, this mirrored the way that people 
locate themselves and others, as I describe in this thesis. Bjork also notes this type of rich 
networking in the Somali community of Finland: ‘when I encountered a new person in the 
field, I often used names of their relatives in order to establish trust. … Jama said to me, 
“You are smart. You meet Somalis through relatives; this is the way Somalis meet each 
other”’ (Bjork, 2007). This was an important way of confirming whether I was meeting 
relevantly situated individuals, and I used these suggestions as ways of mapping the political 
terrain on certain issues. Many of these interviews flowed from one another, and I often set 
these up myself or asked my interlocutors to help make an introduction to someone they 
knew or recommended.  
 
When I worked with a research assistant, I sometimes asked him or her to make initial 
contact, and they invariably used connections and introductions to facilitate such phone 
calls – indeed this was the way that I had been introduced to my research assistants, who 
were recommended to me by people I knew. This system of endorsement and 
interconnectedness is part of the practices of vouching that I elucidate in this thesis. My 
assistants used their own ‘name’ and connections to vouch for me to prospective 
interviewees, who then took on the task of connecting me to members of their own network. 
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This was a more modest version of the vouchsafing that permitted William Foote Whyte to 
undertake his famous study of a North End neighbourhood of Boston in his Street Corner 
Society (1981 [1943]). He is introduced to ‘Doc’, later his principal informant and 
collaborator, by a social worker; and Doc agrees to be his ‘sponsor’ almost immediately:  	  I’ll	  take	  you	  around.	  I	  can	  take	  you	  to	  the	  joints	  –	  gambling	  joints	  –	  I	  can	  take	  you	  to	  the	   street	   corners.	   Just	   remember	   that	   you’re	   my	   friend.	   That’s	   all	   they	   need	   to	  know.	   I	   know	   these	   places,	   and,	   if	   I	   tell	   them	   that	   you’re	  my	   friend,	   nobody	  will	  bother	  you.	  You	  just	  tell	  me	  what	  you	  want	  to	  see,	  and	  we’ll	  arrange	  it.	  (1981:291)	  
 
Doc explains his ‘sponsorship’ in the idiom of friendship, agreeing to extend his own 
reputation to cover Whyte. More contemporaneously, Scott Brooks (2004) has written about 
his experiences of being ‘vouched for’ by Chuck, a basketball coach, thus facilitating his 
entrée into the Philadelphia basketball scene that he wanted to study. He describes this in 
similar terms to those of Doc: 	  He	  was	  willing	  to	  be	  a	  sponsor	  for	  me	  to	  others	  or,	  as	  Chuck	  and	  others	  say	  at	  the	  league,	  to	  ‘put	  his	  blessings	  on	  me.’	  Vouching	  for	  my	  ability,	  whether	  that	  ability	  was	  real	  or	  not,	  was	  a	  way	  of	  showing	  closeness.	  He	  was	  ‘speaking	  for	  me’	  just	  as	  he	  and	  members	  of	  his	  informal	  network	  spoke	  for	  each	  other	  (Brooks,	  2004:83).	  
 
The vouching by Doc and Chuck enabled Whyte and Brooks to enter closed networks of 
people that would otherwise have been off-limits to researchers. I was not seeking entrance 
into such a group or site, but nevertheless found that vouching was closely related to 
‘snowballing’. Like rapport, I consider it one of the essential ‘taken-for-granted practices’ of 
fieldwork. Of course, this did not mean that I was validated by such instances of vouching. 
My character was unknown, but I became implicated in chains of recommendation that gave 
people some assurance that there was at least an implied endorsement from the previous 
person in the chain. To ‘earn’ the trust of my new acquaintance required the passing of a test 
of credibility and trustworthiness. Meeting this was thus a critical part of the vouching 
process, and I return to this in the section on ethics below, and in Chapter 3. 
 
Participant Observation and Ethnography 
To the notes and recordings of my interviews, I added countless conversations, encounters 
and observations. These emerged from both more structured periods of observation of 
particular configurations and contexts, in which I was also a participant; and daily 
observations of everyday life in Hargeysa. Participant observation is a key tool in the 
ethnographer’s apparatus, complementing interviewing with ‘hanging out’ and conversing 
(Dewalt with Wayland, 1998:260–61). It offers the possibility of tacit cultural knowledge 
that is usually reserved for ‘insiders’; and is a useful research strategy because it helps the 
researcher come into direct contact with the processes she is seeking to examine, rather than 
‘filtering that knowledge through other people’s testimony, written records, and or artifacts 
of … interaction’ (Tilly, 2006:410).  
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Despite the advantages of this method, emic life was elusive. I was firmly in the public 
sphere, and though I was able to move freely within this, I was not invited to people’s homes 
or into their leisure activities. Moreover, the public sphere that I was confined to was 
stratified and gendered, and my femaleness impeded the kind of publics I could access. 
Many of my interlocutors were male, and we met in their offices or in public places such as 
the gardens of the Maan-Soor Hotel or the Imperial Hotel. As a single woman, it was very 
difficult, if not impossible, for me to be invited to any other spaces: in situ observation of 
everyday teashop discussions and khat chews, such as Lisa Wedeen has done in Yemen 
(Wedeen, 2007), though theoretically interesting, was methodologically challenging and 
practically impossible because of language and gender barriers. 
 
For this reason, I undertook participant observations in invited settings, such as the 
workshops and meetings of local NGOs, and also as a consultant with UN-Habitat (see 
below) and a volunteer at SONSAF, where I fell in with the circadian routines of its staff and 
engaged in undirected conversation at break times. I also spent time in coffee shops, 
restaurants, and shops in downtown Hargeysa and Jigjiga-Yar, the neighbourhood in which 
I lived, which afforded me ethnographic opportunities to observe everyday life at close 
range. In this way, my approach took the form of open-ended and unstructured ways of 
‘learning to listen’ rather than direct observation or spot sampling (Bernard, 1988:280); and 
was a rich source of insight and contextualisation for my interview and archival material. 
Information and insights gained from my observations are referenced in this thesis by the 
shorthand citation ‘Fieldnotes’.  
 
Archives and Grey Literature 
In light of the relatively late development of centralised governance (from the 1920s 
onwards) and a written script (in 1974), there are few autobiographical or bureaucratic 
records of early Somaliland life other than those included in story, poem and song handed 
down between generations. For reasons of access, language and verifiability, however, these 
traditions, though rich, are unfortunately only few in my thesis. Rather, I prioritised first-
hand qualitative research conducted in the field; and secondary literature and archives for 
historical and background work.  
 
In terms of archival work, it is important to note that Somali historiography is dominated by 
the colonial telling, which offers some useful material but also has serious drawbacks. First, 
local histories are most often excluded in favour of certain (outsider) perspectives, meaning 
that memories about, for instance, the trauma of the counter-colonial resistance or the 
inter-clan power politics that followed, are not present (Barnes, 2006a). Secondly, colonial 
records are limited, both in content, for instance to big-game hunting (Swayne, 1895) or 
technical details of public works programmes; and in volume: an anti-imperialist consensus 
in both academia and public opinion in the decolonisation era meant that there was little 
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appetite for accounts of Empire, and many papers and colonial records were shredded 
(Millman, 2013:1–3). Nevertheless, for Britain’s policies and attitudes towards Somaliland 
identity, they are relevant sources, and Chapter 4 includes some of my research from the 
British Colonial and Foreign Offices’ papers held at the UK’s National Archives at Kew.14  
 
If archives in Somaliland existed prior to the war, they have since been destroyed, hidden or 
unattended. Despite a project by international donors in 2013 to create a repository of 
government documents in Hargeysa (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2013), there remains no 
national archive. Papers from previous administrations are kept in the homes of former 
ministers or SNM leaders as private collections; and I reviewed some of these as well as the 
small library at the Academy for Peace and Development (APD). To this work, I added 
reviews of newspapers in Hargeysa. These were of limited value, since there are no private 
newspapers, and many of the stories are pirated from international news sources; 
accusations of libel or censure by the government (including the periodic imprisonment of 
journalists) also makes investigative reportage rare. Newspapers, particularly the English 
language ones, therefore tend to offer a monotonous, pro-government, pro-Somaliland line 
that obscures the variety of voices and perspectives in Somaliland (Hoehne, 2008). 
Although some of the newspapers offer an online archive from the mid-2000s, I was not 
able to review publicly available print media from the early post-war period. Nevertheless, 
through the acquisition, review and analysis of these materials where available, I was able to 
enrich my observations and transcripts from the field, the interpretations of which I present 
in the chapters that follow. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
My daily mode of engagement endeavoured to be friendly, open, and transparent. I 
conducted interviews demonstratively in public with pre-agreed interlocutors and often in 
the company of others. My conspicuousness as a foreign female researcher conducting a 
particular kind of inquiry meant that it was often clear which ‘traplines’ I had been tending 
(Simons, 1995) – in this sense, my research was always going to have a ‘public face’. 
Nonetheless, I also had to ensure that my interlocutors were able to speak freely and 
confidentially, and I addressed this in three ways. 
 
Firstly, I sought to ensure that my informants consented to their participation in my 
research project. So as not to create a distinction between literate and illiterate informants, I 
relied on oral rather than written consent. I therefore began each interview with a short 
introduction that explained the nature of the research and that the content of our 
conversation would be written about in my thesis and possibly published. I asked 
permission to pose a series of questions, and invited interlocutors to demur answering or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  These	   are	   cited	   in	   Harvard	   short-­‐form	   in	   the	   text	   and	   included	   as	   full	   references	   in	   a	   separate	   section	   in	   the	  Bibliography.	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quit the interview at any time.15 In interactions with government ministers, civil society 
leaders and other members of the elite, the notion of consent was familiar and understood; 
indeed, in many cases, they already knew what was involved having agreed to be 
interviewed. With other individuals, I had to be more patient and explicit; and my research 
assistants and I worked hard to ensure that consent was informed and uncoerced.  
 
Consent was, of course, more difficult to secure during participant and non-participant 
observation. My intractable foreignness signalled my outsideness to my interlocutors, 
whether formal interviewees, colleagues or the cast of players whom I met on a daily basis: 
taxi drivers, waiters, bus passengers, remittance company employees, and shopkeepers. It 
would have been tempting to assume that this meant that any interactions were consent-
laden and thus legitimate material for my research: that I came with a ‘warning’ sign that 
meant it was clear who I was and what talking to me meant. But in fact this was not the case, 
and I was often mistaken for an international consultant or NGO worker (further 
complicated, of course, by my work at UN-Habitat described below), and thus I had to be 
particularly aware of research interactions I had outside of ‘working hours’, since for me, the 
ethnographic part of my research never stopped, although my interlocutors and those in my 
sight would not have known this. I therefore often relied on overtly ‘performing’ the role of 
researcher – a notebook near at hand, a patter in Somali about being a student at the 
University of London, SOAS business cards freely given – so as to make it clear who I was 
and what I was doing.  
 
However, I was always mindful of the ethics of non-participant observation and ‘covert’ 
ethnography. In the spring of 2013, I worked for three months as a communications 
consultant for an EU-funded, UN-Habitat-led civil engineering project at the Hargeysa 
Water Agency. The role gave me unmediated access to government work, sitting in on 
meetings between the international consultants and ministers, in which I was able to 
observe relationships up close and absorb current news and information that I was isolated 
from as a lone researcher. However, because the material was gathered ‘covertly’ and not as 
a researcher (Davies, 1999:7), the information I collected during this role does not appear 
explicitly in the final thesis (though of course it informs the interpretations I have made). In 
this way, I sought to protect the people and information I encountered.  
 
Indeed, across all my fieldwork in Somaliland, I endeavoured to secure the safety of those 
who appear in my fieldnotes and interview transcripts through anonymisation, the second 
ethical consideration. Although I did not interview any members of at-risk or vulnerable 
groups, I made the decision to change all the names of my interlocutors in this text. 
Although no one directly insisted on anonymity, some people spoke fully and unguardedly 
about matters (such as clan politics) that are often regarded as sensitive. I was fortunate to 
meet with a range of ministers, director-generals, civil servants and prominent civil society 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  When	  the	  interview	  was	  conducted	  in	  Somali,	  this	  waiver	  was	  translated	  by	  one	  of	  my	  research	  assistants.	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leaders, some of whom I spoke to in their public guises, but others where the line between 
official scripts and personal opinions was blurred. All interviewees have thus been given one 
name from a list of Somali names I compiled. This assignation is arbitrary, and might mean 
that someone from one part of the country has a name more commonly used in another: this 
is all for the best in terms of anonymisation. Although in reality I met and interviewed a 
number of people with the same names, I have not duplicated any pseudonyms for 
simplicity’s sake. In the list of interviews on pages 237–40, I note a truncated form of my 
interviewees’ occupations in order to show the range of people that I met, and to help with 
identification within the thesis. In the text, I include this and the pseudonyms of my 
interviewees in lieu of a more standard arrangement (such as ‘interview with civil servant’ or 
Interview No. 26), which reflects my desire to maintain the human element as far as 
possible in my research.  
 
The list of corresponding pseudonyms and real names is private and confidential, related to 
my third commitment to data protection. All my field notebooks and interview transcripts 
were kept securely by me and not made available to the public. As noted above, I recorded 
most of my interviews by hand in a series of notebooks, and sometimes used an audio 
recorder when my interviewee gave explicit permission. In some cases, the recorder acted as 
a device for creating spaces of official and unofficial revelation, but this created a disjuncture 
in the documentation and sometimes made it difficult to be certain when the ‘off-the-record’ 
conversation had begun. Most often, the recorder made people feel uneasy, and therefore I 
relied upon handwriting my notes during each meeting, and then reviewing, supplementing 
and annotating the notes afterwards. I made it clear in my notebooks which were my 
informants’ words and which my notes, so as to ensure all the data was correctly attributed.  
 
In addition to these standard protection and safety protocols, I offer two final reflections on 
ethics and research integrity of significance to this particular case study. First and foremost, 
is the fact that my work explores head on the themes of clanship and genealogy that Ahmed 
(1995), Besteman (1996a, 1996b, 1998), Aidid (2015) and others deplore as a fixation of the 
scholarship on Somali society. Right from the start of my research, I kept the words of 
Ahmed (1995:160) at the forefront of my mind: ‘Just as divide and conquer has always been 
a vital aspect of colonial policy, so too have dissection, redivision, inventory taking, and 
classification of Somali society been the mainstay of research on Somalia, and have, in 
effect, defined Somalia’. In light of this critical observation, it is important to acknowledge 
that because this thesis focuses analytically on the way that Somalilanders’ many and varied 
identities are registered, documented and formalised, it contributes in some way to such 
classification and stabilisation. My intention, however, has not been to reproduce power-
laden practices of categorisation or to offer a reductive ‘clan-based’ argument, but to 
scrutinise the ways in which modes of identification situate Somaliland citizens and non-
citizens in configurations of power, and to be aware of the content and conduct of my 
research in a critical and reflexive way. I draw on the work of Ioan M Lewis, the early 
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anthropologist and ‘doyen of Somali Studies’ (Hoehne and Luling, 2010; Samatar, 1988), 
but do so aware of the critique that has flowed from his emphasis on clanship. As Walls 
advises, my approach has been one of ‘critical-Lewisism’ (2014:36). Ultimately, I have 
undertaken this research with the belief that it is only by interrogating the narratives of 
which identities ‘count’ and what constitutes ‘authentic’ identities that we are able to move 
beyond the assumption that identification is a technical, bureaucratic or ‘scientific’ 
procedure, and to recognise it as a deeply political process that affects people’s lives.  
 
My final point is about the issue of recognition. A predominant motif in many of my 
interviews with senior officials was Somaliland ‘public relations’: interviewees invariably 
wanted to make a case for Somaliland’s recognition, and pushed to see where I stood on this 
issue. Sometimes this was a gentle petition, but other times it was much more forceful. ‘We 
are very disappointed’, decried a member of the opposition at the start of our interview. 
‘Why has Britain not recognised us? Why has Britain not invited us to the Commonwealth? 
They have forgotten us but they are the closest we have!’ (Gulaid, interview, 2014b) Jean 
Rath notes that qualitative research encounters are not dyadic communications between 
researcher and participant(s), but contain ‘imagined listeners’: ‘an interview is not purely a 
private conversation between the interview partners, but … is, in a sense, public’ (cited in 
Bergold and Thomas, 2012:18). Research participants are hence always ‘performing’ to their 
wider cultural audience. Indeed, appeals such as Gulaid’s were not only to me, but also to an 
audience of foreign policymakers and local nationals through my work and me. As Balthasar 
(2012:40) has also noted, working in Somaliland inevitably requires one to be clear about 
where one stands on the issue of recognition.  
 
In this sense, I have been mindful of the ethical and political implications of my research for 
Somaliland’s state-building and democratisation projects, for the themes of the research 
topic are intimately connected to issues of identity and recognition.  Many of my informants 
wanted to be reassured that this work would benefit Somalilanders: that I would 
communicate ‘what I have seen about Somaliland’. Through this thesis, I have sought to do 
just that.    
 
Chapter Overview 
In this first chapter, I have therefore set out the terms of my inquiry into verification and 
legibility in Somaliland, introduced my conceptual framework of the ‘identity architecture’, 
and elaborated on the research design and methodology of the project. In Chapter 2, I frame 
the project in terms of relevant debates from the literature on registration and identification. 
Since previous work on Somaliland’s processes and experiences of registration and ‘official’ 
identification is limited to a small handful of texts, I bring in theoretical material drawn 
from other cases to articulate the conceptual terrain of this research project. This second 
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chapter thus sets up the theoretical framework for the analysis of the empirical material that 
follows.  
 
I then unfold my argument over four empirical chapters. The third chapter explicates the 
social norms and practices at work in everyday identification, and explores the way that 
personal genealogy and clan identity work as a ‘grid of knowability’. I argue that 
genealogical situatedness works as a form of everyday identification, and show that in many 
quotidian encounters, one’s name, lineage and clan appear to constitute sufficient and 
effective ID – except for those who are elided and excluded from the genealogical idiom and 
the hegemonic image of authenticity contained therein, particularly ‘minority’ clans, people 
with ‘illegitimate’ parentage, and, to some extent, women. Notwithstanding these important 
variations, I argue that for most Somalilanders forms of genealogical situatedness are part of 
the ways in which they identify themselves and others. These vernacular practices of 
relationalisation and triangulation create the grounds for authentication and legibility 
within Somaliland’s identity architecture. In this chapter, I also elaborate upon how these 
‘ways of seeing’ intersect with those of the state by introducing and problematising the role 
of clan elders as ‘authenticators’ of identity, setting up the discussion of the following 
chapter.  
 
In Chapter 4, I review the development of ‘official legibility’ in Somaliland, beginning with 
the antecedents of contemporary state identification in the pre-1991 period. I grapple with 
the different ways that the boundaries of the Somaliland population have been articulated in 
law and in practice, and in particular analyse the 2002 citizenship law, which brings 
together genealogical and territorial conceptions of belonging. I also consider the emerging 
contours of Somaliland’s official ID infrastructure, specifically citizenship certificates, 
municipal IDs, driver’s licenses and passports, and lay out how these demonstrate synthesis 
between state-led forms of identification and those provided by the genealogical idiom. In 
this chapter, I particularly focus on the prominence of guarantors in each of these 
identification protocols, and show how the post-2008 shift towards biometric technologies 
is manifested.  
 
In Chapter 5, I review Somaliland’s schemes of voter registration from 2002 to 2015. In 
particular, I delineate a case study of the biometric scheme of 2008–10, considered a 
landmark in Somaliland’s development. This process was fatally undercut by weak political 
will, poor technical and logistical resources, unrealistic timelines, and vested political 
interests that did not address the underlying politics of enumeration. The development since 
2014 of a new project of voter registration has been an attempt to ‘learn lessons’, but has 
been caught up again in complicated political agendas related to the timing of elections. This 
chapter works together with Chapter 6, in which I review the development of the new 
national ID card – a biometric smart card designed to explicitly address the ongoing 
‘verification problem’ faced by the Somaliland state. Notwithstanding the incorporation of 
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expensive biometrics technologies, I show again in this chapter that vouching and 
verification practices by guarantors remain critical to the state’s ability to identify and verify, 
highlighting the ongoing importance of the hybridised identity architecture to the formation 
of identification techniques in Somaliland. I also show that there is ambiguity and 
multivalence in Somaliland’s identification practices, and that there are conflicting attitudes 
towards the imposition of formal ID, on the one hand, and the endurance of genealogical 
situatedness on the other, for instance amongst those who reject these frames of 
identification in favour of those based on merit and autonomy.  
 
In the seventh and final chapter, I offer my conclusions to the thesis, connecting my findings 
to the themes and puzzles of the project. I set out my main theoretical contributions and 
situate my findings in relevant bodies of scholarship. Finally, I reflect on the successes and 
limitations of the account I present here, and present productive areas for further research.
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Chapter	  2	  	   Registration,	  Verification	  and	  Legibility	  in	  the	  Modern	  State	  	  If	  the	  political	  is	  to	  exist,	  one	  must	  know	  who	  everyone	  is,	  who	  is	  a	  friend	  and	  who	  is	  an	  enemy,	  and	  this	  knowing	   is	  not	   in	   the	  mode	  of	   theoretical	  knowledge,	  but	   in	  one	   of	   practical	   identification	   (Schmitt,	   cited	   in	   Muller,	   2010:279;	   emphasis	   in	  original)	  	  There	  is	  a	  case	  …	  for	  focusing	  not	  strictly	  on	  identity	  as	  though	  it	  could	  be	  a	  fixed,	  settled	   and	   accessible	   domain,	   but	   instead	   on	   the	   practices	   and	   modes	   of	  identification	   that	   make	   an	   identity	   claim	   possible.	   (Amoore,	   2006:22;	   my	  emphasis)	  	  
In a question reminiscent of Althusser’s hailing, Amoore queries: ‘who is authorized to ask 
“identify yourself”?’ (2006:22) In this thesis, I examine the processes of identification by the 
authoritative entity of the state, which has the powerful ability to ‘attach [an individual] to 
his own identity’ (Foucault, cited in Faubion, 1994:331). Through a particular presentation 
of biographical facts, each person is identified in time and space according to standardised 
rules of classification (Van der Ploeg, 2013), and thus their legal and political statuses (and 
the corresponding rights and duties) are determined. Official identification is therefore part 
of the essential apparatus of the modern state, enabling the definition of the population that 
makes up a ‘nation-state’, and constituting the bureaucratic procedures by which it 
communicates and interacts with these individuals (Caplan and Torpey, 2001:12).  
 
This requires that a state develop the infrastructure and functional capabilities to recognise, 
classify and regulate the identities of its citizens. This has certainly been the experience of 
states in history, which have developed complex systems of Weberian-style record-keeping 
and documentation over time, in an effort to make the human and physical world ‘legible’ 
(Scott, 1998). Contrastingly, African states have struggled to describe their populations and 
broadcast their power (Herbst, 2000:3), and thus seem to be characterised more by myopia 
than sight. To enable the ‘practical identification’ of citizens, these states therefore utilise the 
‘vernacular’ resources of cultural and social domains that are encapsulated in the underlying 
‘identity architecture’.  
 
This is particularly the case for verification, the central strut of my inquiry. In this chapter, I 
therefore explore the theoretical literature on verification, and the related subjects of 
identification, registration and documentation, in order to understand how verification 
works, and, in particular, how this can be delivered by ‘vernacular’ practices such as 
guarantors. I argue that the use of witnesses and guarantors is not a deviant practice of 
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undeveloped or fragile states, but integral to trustworthy and credible identification, and 
hence can be found across many different kinds of historical and contemporary official 
systems. Nonetheless, guarantors are particularly important in African identity-
management systems, including Somaliland, and I therefore consider three intersecting 
explanations for this prominence. I argue that whilst both weak state capacity and hybrid 
political logics are significant factors, the most powerful explanation arises from guarantors’ 
ability to index social narratives of authenticity that buttress notions of belonging and 
therefore the terms of identification.  
 
In this chapter, I therefore present the key conceptual themes of my thesis and provide 
theoretical sustenance for my argument that the development of Somaliland’s official 
identification schemes can be understood by attending to the underlying identity 
architecture: the synthetic construction of official and vernacular practices that shape 
systems of identification and verification.  
 
Identification and Verification 
What does it mean to identify someone? Primarily, it means to ask ‘who are you?’ and to 
receive an intelligible answer, either directly or indirectly. Identification may be undertaken 
in the presence of the person to be identified (‘X’), in which case the question is also one of 
determining authenticity: is this person who they claim to be? (Groebner, 2001:19) It can 
also be conducted in the absence of person X, in which case the task is to determine the 
identifying marks and characteristics by which others recognise them as X, and thus to 
establish means of establishing their identity.  
 
Integral to identification is thus confirmation that a person and their identity are one and 
the same: a process called verification. This is a catchall term for a number of different kinds 
of identity-checking at both the initial stage of confirming identity during registration or 
official recognition; and later stages of proving identity against credentials, such as ID cards. 
Since names, birthdays, addresses and other biographical details are not unique, verification 
involves a process of triangulation and cross-referencing: weeding out a particular John 
Smith by bringing to bear other facts to establish a true match; and then ensuring that this 
John Smith is the same ‘John Smith’ that different people or institutions have encountered. 
Since self-assertion is fallible, and physiognomic or cognitive checks might be prone to error 
or imposture, identification systems usually rely upon checks to ensure that person X in real 
life is the same as person X in documents or paperwork – what Martin and Whitley call 
checking someone’s ‘biographical footprint’ (2007:69). This is sometimes called ‘1-to-1’ 
matching, and can be done by face-to-face corroboration; using shared secrets (such as 
personal identification numbers or passwords); or cross-referencing with other records or 
forms of knowledge, such as common experiences or personal facts (Simpson, 1996).  
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In Chapter 1, I set out what I called the ‘verification problem’, which captures the difficulty 
of assessing a person’s identity when formal confirmatory processes do not exist or are 
unreliable. In everyday life, we use existing relationships, testimony, and other forms of 
social triangulation to ascertain whether someone is who they say they are. Alternatively, we 
just have to ‘take someone’s word’ for it. Authorities and formal institutions like states, 
however, cannot do this – there are too many people and insufficient information and 
processing power. Gelb and Clark (2013:5) note, for instance, that there are around 50,000 
‘John Smiths’ in the United States alone. 
 
The identification of citizens by states therefore presumes the existence of officially 
sanctioned and socially accepted unique identities. The creation and reproduction of such 
identities emerges from Scott’s puzzle that I introduced in Chapter 1: ‘How is a state to 
associate a name, however unique and unambiguous, with an individual?’ The state can (in 
theory) easily and unambiguously recognise an individual only if their public identity is 
comprehensible to it – hence the historical demand for permanent patronyms in particular 
formats (Caplan, 2001; Scott, 1998; Scott, Tehranian and Mathias, 2002). In other words, 
although people may have multiple identities, the distant and ambivalent mechanisms of 
bureaucracy require a single, unique identity: John might call himself Mickey Mouse, but he 
can only be identified as such by state institutions if his official documentation reads 
‘Mickey Mouse’ and not ‘John Smith’. 1 
 
This may, of course, create a disjuncture between the ‘official’ identity of state encounters 
and the ways in which someone identifies him or herself in their private lives. This dilemma 
is captured in the following interview with Israeli-American mathematician Robert Aumann. 
The interviewer asks ‘what should I call you? Yisrael, Bob, Johnny?’, to which Aumann 
replies:  	  You	  usually	  call	  me	  Yisrael,	  so	  why	  don’t	  you	  continue	  to	  call	  me	  Yisrael.	  But	  there	  really	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  my	  given	  names.	  I	  have	  at	  least	  three	  given	  names	  –	  Robert,	  John,	  and	  Yisrael.	  Robert	  and	  John	  are	  my	  given	  names	  from	  birth	  and	  Yisrael	  is	  the	  name	   that	   I	   got	   at	   the	   circumcision.	  Many	  people	   call	  me	  Bob,	  which	   is	   of	   course	  short	  for	  Robert.	  …	  [M]y	  wife	  went	  to	  get	  approval	  of	  having	  our	  children	  included	  in	  her	  passport.	  She	  gave	  me	  the	  forms	  to	  sign	  on	  two	  different	  occasions.	  On	  one	  I	  signed	  Yisrael	  and	  on	  one	  I	  signed	  Robert.	  The	  clerk,	  when	  she	  gave	  him	  the	  forms,	  refused	   to	  accept	   them,	   saying,	   ‘Who	   is	   this	  man?	  Are	   there	  different	   fathers	  over	  here?	  We	  can’t	  accept	  this.’	  (Hart,	  2005:2)	  
 
Aumann’s predicament points to the issue of the multiplicity of contextualised ‘identities’ 
that may be used to signify a person, but where only one counts as the official identifier. The 
clerk insists that he must be Yisrael or Robert (or John) Aumann. This intransigence is tied 
up with the assumption that individuals have only one name in a standardised format, and 
that this is the name that the state has agreed to recognise (and in turn, the person has 
agreed to be recognised by). Aumann might be known as Yisrael in the synagogue and at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Thanks	  to	  Caplan,	  2001,	  and	  Higgs,	  2009	  for	  this	  formulation	  using	  Mickey	  Mouse.	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university, Bob by his friends, John by others of his acquaintance. These all relate to 
different social settings, but they are irrelevant for administrative legibility. For the state, 
only ‘Robert’ Aumann counts.  
 
Formalising Identity: The Creation of ‘Official’ Identities 
We can call this name one’s ‘official identity’: a form of stabilised, formalised, and 
permanent biographical information that is comprehensible to, and produced by, state 
institutions and processes. Gelb and Clark (2013:5) define official identity as the ‘attributes 
(both static and mutable) that individuals can use to identify themselves when interacting 
with formal institutions like governments, employers and banks’. Primarily, this is a 
person’s name, supplemented by triangulating information such as date and place of birth, 
parents’ names and residential address (Marx, 2001). The key characteristic is that it is 
formalised and officially sanctioned, boiling down complex, multivariate, and changeable 
personal identities into a core of authorised biographical attributes. 
 
Of course, people can and often do have multiple names and even multiple identities – as I 
noted above and as found in the custom of women’s maiden and married names, or the use 
of pseudonyms. However, authorities, in particular state institutions, do not want a 
population of citizens with complex, heterogeneous, and personal autobiographies: for 
administrative convenience, states seek to easily and unambiguously name and recognise 
their citizens. This suggests that official identity is disciplinary, since it requires conformity 
and resists variation: people are seen by the state in one way only – one name, one gender, 
one age, one race. In the spotlight of the panoptic gaze, Aumann is only Robert. Official 
identities therefore reduce and simplify the complexity of personal identity and 
interpersonal relations into data that can be ‘read’ by bureaucratic processes of organisation. 
As legal scholar Sobel has argued, ‘[r]ather than constituting an inherent part of personhood 
and dignity, ersatz-identity becomes an attribute of bureaucratic and computerized systems’ 
(2002:320). There is thus a stabilising and conformist element to the production and 
replication of official identities. Indeed, in some states official names are permanent: once 
an original determination has been made (for instance, on a birth or marriage certificate), 
individuals cannot choose to change their identity (Szreter and Breckenridge, 2012:29).2  
 
Importantly, therefore, naming, identification and control are closely related (Caplan, 
2001:58; Foucault, 1979). However, the administrative fiction of a single official identity is 
not necessarily the result of coercion. 3  Szreter and Breckenridge argue that, unlike 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  statutory	  ‘freezing’	  of	  identity	  (Gutwirth,	  2009:126)	  can	  be	  detrimental,	  as	  transgender	  and	  trans-­‐border	  people	  find	  when	  they	  are	  required	  to	  have	  fixed	  and	  singular	  genders	  or	  abodes	  in	  official	  systems	  (Hague	  Colloquium,	  2015).	  3	  Identification	  and	  enumeration	  can	  be	  painful	  and	  damaging,	  not	  least	  the	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  classifications	  used	  in	  Nazi	  Germany,	   colonial	   and	   post-­‐colonial	   Rwanda	   (see	   Longman,	   2001),	   apartheid	   South	   Africa,	   segregated	   America	   and	  present-­‐day	   Myanmar	   (see	   Stuart	   et	   al,	   2015	   and	   Snaing,	   2015).	   These	   show	   the	   intensely	   political	   agendas	   that	  naturalise	  some	  categories	  of	  differentiation	  and	  delegitimise	  others.	  Underlying	  identification	  is	  therefore	  a	  process	  of	  classification	   that	   rests	   on	   normalisation	   and	   reduction,	   and	   the	   presumption	   and	   production	   of	   archetypes,	   as	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enumeration which forces identity into pre-set categories, the fixing of identities in 
registration is the result of a ‘bilateral’ process of negotiation between official and private 
identities (2012:19).4 In other words, Aumann agrees to be ‘Robert’ in his dealings with the 
state, but does so in a way that does not negate his other identities, which co-exist with his 
official identity, coming to the fore in different scenarios.5  
 
Nevertheless, as Scott, Tehranian and Mathias put it: ‘the greater the frequency of 
interaction with the state and state-like institutions … the greater the sphere of public life in 
which the official name is the only appropriate identity’ (2002:31). In an important way, 
therefore, acts of formal recognition produce an identity that is then attached to an 
individual. Certainly it is the case that people without formal paperwork face difficulty, 
marginalisation and even statelessness when they are not recognised in state processes of 
recognition, registration, and documentation; in some cases, this means that, whilst they 
have personal and social identities, they do not have a ‘legal identity’ in terms of an officially 
authorised name and nationality (see Manby, 2009; Elumalai, 2016). Indeed, official 
identities, not least those of the citizen and the national, seem to gain facticity by being 
inscribed in legal paperwork (see Gordillo, 2006).6 Piccolino, for instance, argues that 
processes of registration in Benin produce citizens by recording their legal status and 
officially recognising them as citizens (2015a:270; see also Whitley and Manby, 2015). 
Torpey also notes that the imprinting of names in documents ‘discourage[s] people from 
choosing identities inconsistent with those validated by the state’ (2000:166). Similarly, 
Dardy writes that, ‘For each and every one of us, our identity – at least a certain kind of 
identity – is enacted and re-enacted, stamped and affirmed in these papers’ (cited in Caplan 
and Torpey, 2001:6). ID cards, certificates of origin, and other such paperwork are the 
evidence of these repertoires and techniques of inclusion and belonging that operate in a 
state, signification of what Fourchard and Segatti call ‘the everyday manufacture of 
difference and commonality’ (2015:6).7 They are the artefacts of processes of categorising, 
labelling, and naming, and in this way present the facts considered authoritative. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Foucault’s	  work	  on	  the	  mad/sane,	  sick/healthy,	  criminals/‘good	  boys’	  shows	  (Faubion,	  1994:326).	  These	  assumptions	  often	  underlie	  official	  categorisation:	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  censuses,	  see	  Leibler,	  2004;	  Maktabi,	  1999;	  and	  Mezey,	  2003.	  4	  Assuming	  that	  the	  possibility	  exists	  to	  renegotiate	  at	  a	  later	  date,	  otherwise	  ‘freezing’	  might	  take	  place.	  	  5	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  Almond	  and	  Verba’s	  finding	  in	  their	  influential	  study	  of	  civic	  culture	  (1989)	  that	  being	  a	  citizen	  does	  not	  negate	  one’s	  other	  identities.	  	  6	  Brewer,	  Menzies	  and	  Schott	  argue	  that	  ‘legal	  identity	  exists	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  registered	  (or	  further,	  documentation	  exists	  for	  such	  registration)’	  (2015:2),	  suggesting	  that	  legal	  identity	  precedes	  official	  recognition	  (for	  instance,	  via	  registration).	  Others,	  like	  Piccolino	  and	  Gordillo,	  argue	  that	  legal	  identity	  comes	  from	  recognition.	  This	  issue	  draws	  on	  a	  deeper	  debate	  about	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  ‘right	  to	  identity’,	  since	  political,	  civil	  and	  social	  rights	  cannot	  conceivably	  be	  extended	  to	  or	  claimed	  by	  ‘anonymous	  crowds’	  (Mordini	  and	  Ottolini,	  cited	  in	  Gutwirth,	  2009:125).	  7	  For	  instance,	  Tawil-­‐Souri	  (2011:68)	  has	  written	  about	  how	  Israeli	  identity	  cards	  evidence	  distinctions	  in	  legal	  status	  through	  colour	  coding,	  enabling	   the	   immediate	  parcelling	  of	   individuals	   into	  units	   that	   can	  be	  counted,	  documented,	  monitored	  and	  controlled.	   In	  South	  Africa,	   the	   infamous	  passbooks	  were	  used	  as	  ways	   to	  enforce	  restrictions	  on	   the	  movement	  of	  the	  black	  population,	  and	  thus	  to	  control	  and	  discipline	  their	  bodies	  (Breckenridge,	  2012).	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File-Making as State-Making 
In his essential text Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998) persuasively argues that these 
documentary functions are part of the broader agenda of the ‘high-modernist state’ to 'see’ 
the human and physical landscape. Through administrative simplification, measurement 
and homogenisation, the state gains, in his thought-provoking term, ‘legibility’ (1998:77–
79). This is an artificial, stylised and abridged view, erasing difference and variation in order 
to simplify and standardise the facts about the world into grids of intelligibility (1998:169; 
see also Anderson, 2006). Through the simplification and formalisation of civic status, each 
person in a state’s territory becomes implicated in these grids – Steinwedel hence describes 
these processes as ‘the leveling of the governed’ (2001:68). In this way, states can undertake 
taxation and conscription, distribute welfare payments, monitor and constrain mobility, 
regulate labour and social interactions such as monogamous marriage, and, crucially, 
undertake surveillance (see, for instance, Agar, 2001; Noiriel, 2001; Torpey, 2000).  
 
The schemes that Scott (1998) reviews as part of his argument – of creating surnames, 
establishing population registers, standardising language and drawing maps – operate with 
the assumption that information is available to the state, or that it can be made available via 
power-laden practices of data collection and organisation. The means to unambiguously and 
comprehensively identify particular people requires not only technical infrastructures of 
registration, document-making and distribution, but also laws and regulations to enforce 
participation and adjudicate claims, and deeper ideological schemes that articulate 
‘sameness’ and ‘difference’. Crucial to the idea of legibility, therefore, is the ‘monopolisation’ 
of the ability to see and make visible (Torpey, 2000:2). The state seeks the ‘synoptic’ and 
‘panoptic’ view from a centralised vantage point (Scott, 1998).  
 
Significantly, these processes not only substantiate people as citizens, but also instantiate 
the state in a mutual process of legibility. Weber’s much-cited notion of the modern 
bureaucratic state holds that the management of the modern public office is based upon 
written documents (‘files’), prepared by a staff of officials and scribes (Weber, 1968: 956–
57). Indeed, this ‘paperwork’ is, in many ways, definitive of the political state, for it is in the 
repeated and routine actions of making ‘files’ (managing records, stamping papers and 
authorising documentation) that the state is partly produced and reproduced. These files are 
artefacts of the official decisions of state institutions, created by officials and scribes and 
according to bureaucratic and legislative rules, about the permissible identities of the public 
domain. They are, in other words, material evidence of who counts and how as a member of 
the political community; and thus represent the state’s ability to organise, observe and 
control the actions of the public domain – who can make claims, who can use state services, 
who can move freely across the territory (Breckenridge, 2014; Mezey, 2003). Significantly, 
these banal procedures of documentation instantiate the claim made by the modern state to 
be the authority to identify and verify those under its purview. In accepting this paperwork 
2	  –	  Registration,	  Verification	  and	  Legibility	  
	   36	  
and the assignation of unique official identities, citizens thus recognise the documentary 
power of the state, and in so doing, make it visible to them.  
 
Of Births and Deaths: The Civil Register  
Central to these activities of identity-making is the registration of official identities, and thus 
their ‘attachment’ to unique individuals. There are many different kinds of registration 
systems, provided not only by states but also by commercial, religious and civic 
organisations, for a great range of purposes and for different kinds of eligible persons (see 
Szreter and Breckenridge, 2012:25; Gelb and Clark, 2013). Traditionally, the most important 
process of identification and documentation by the state has been the creation of the civil 
register. This encompasses the whole set of documentary processes relating to vital events 
(birth, death, marriage, and divorce), which gives a reading of the ages, familial bonds, and 
lifespans of the whole population. Civil registration systems are complex and have long 
historical pedigrees reaching back to the Middle Ages in Britain (Szreter [2007:73] dates it 
to 1538 under Thomas Cromwell) and even earlier in Imperial China (Szreter and 
Breckenridge, 2012).8 In European history, they have been built up over centuries through 
the amalgamation and integration of various different kinds of registering activities, 
including religious and local records (ibid). Today, civil registers are supposed to be 
continuous, permanent, compulsory, and universal (Setel et al, 2007; Bah, 1999:48) and 
‘foundational’, by providing the basis from which ‘functional’ identity documents, such as 
voter cards and driver’s licenses, can be drawn (Gelb and Clark, 2013).9 Civil registration 
also enables the generation of vital statistics: the data on fertility, mortality, and causes of 
death that permits the monitoring of short- and long-term demographic changes, and thus 
effective resource allocation, planning, and service provision (Setel et al, 2007; World 
Bank/WHO, 2014). 
 
Civil registration systems require collaboration across different elements of state 
institutions, including local civil service capabilities under a ministry of interior or justice; 
the agencies of a country’s health system that reports births, deaths and mortality factors; 
and a national statistics office that compiles the data (World Bank, 2014). These multiple 
recording, registering, and archiving activities form the skeleton of national identity 
infrastructures. Indeed, civil registration systems are considered the ‘linchpin’ of the web of 
obligations and rights that binds states and citizens together (Szreter and Breckenridge, 
2012; Setel et al, 2007). Governments with vital statistics capabilities are seen as better able 
to engage in effective socio-economic policymaking, planning, and the implementation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	   also	   Caplan,	   2001;	   Groebner,	   2001;	   Higgs,	   2009;	   Noiriel,	   2001;	   and	   Torpey,	   2000	   on	   historical	   identification	  systems.	  	  9	  Systems	  of	  national	  ID	  systems	  tend	  to	  develop	  along	  ‘foundational’	  or	  ‘functional’	  pathways,	  with	  the	  former	  being	  a	  top-­‐down,	  general-­‐purpose	  platform	  that	  acts	  as	  the	  infrastructure	  for	  all	   future	  identification	  needs	  (typically	  a	  civil	  register);	   and	   the	   latter	   the	   bottom-­‐up	   creation	   of	   multiple	   and	   specific	   projects	   that	   over	   time	   may	   merge	   into	   a	  universal	   identity	   system	   (Gelb	   and	   Clark,	   2013;	  World	   Bank,	   2014).	   Each	   of	   these	   approaches	   has	   advantages	   and	  disadvantages,	  and	  the	  choice	  will	  be	  dependent	  upon	  funding,	  capacity	  and	  long-­‐term	  viability	  (ibid).	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critical development goals. This is why systems of centralised civil registration, universal 
birth certification, and national statistics reporting are framed as priorities for African states 
by governments, international agencies and donors (see, for instance, World Bank/WHO, 
2014), drawing on research that shows a positive correlation between gross national income 
per head and estimated coverage of civil registration systems (Setel et al, 2007).  
 
However, as I noted in Chapter 1, many African states do not have these capabilities, making 
them functionally ‘myopic’ rather than ‘panoptic’. Of course, while we should be wary of 
generalisations, it is clear that many post-colonial African states have been unable to 
develop the deep institutional structures of a civil register or other forms of demographic 
registration and enumeration. There are often strong historical factors behind this. Though 
colonial officials mapped genealogies, classified tribes and demarcated boundaries, and 
censuses and other kinds of surveys were sometimes conducted (Anderson, 2006), more 
complex infrastructures of identification (such as civil registers) were only weakly or not at 
all established, in part because of financial frugality, and in part because ‘native’ populations 
were subjects, not citizens, meaning that administrators did not need to accurately identify 
individuals as rights-holders (Piccolino, 2015a:275; see also Gelb and Clark, 2013, and 
Szreter and Breckenridge, 2012). The enormous pressures of the post-independence period, 
particularly meagre economies and conflict emergencies, later inhibited governments in the 
establishment of registration infrastructures that connect together patchy repositories of 
civil information, such as parish birth registers or other local documents (Breckenridge, 
2010:645).  
 
Today, multiple and competing pressures to develop social, economic and political sectors 
simultaneously and sustainably mean certain agendas are prioritised at the expense of 
others. State functions such as national statistics, civil registration and national identity 
documentation suffer from long-term underdevelopment and under-investment. Those 
states that do have legacy civil registers from the time of colonialism must bring them up to 
date, whilst others must build them from scratch.10 Of course this is not just the case in 
Africa. In many developing countries, the infrastructure for data collection, record-keeping 
and information dissemination is geographically patchy, technically poor, and deficient in 
expertise and full-time staff (World Bank/WHO, 2014). These challenges mean that when 
registration programmes are undertaken, they are typically built onto mediocre or 
unreliable systems or repeatedly initiated, wasting money and resources (Gelb and Clark, 
2013). These ongoing capacity, expertise and funding struggles are a leading driver of the 
‘biometric explosion’ that I described in Chapter 1, as states in sub-Saharan Africa attempt 
to build comprehensive, state-centred capacities for registration and identification.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  Second	  Conference	  of	  African	  Ministers	  Responsible	  for	  Civil	  Registration	  in	  2012	  stated	  that	  civil	  registration	  is	  important	  and	  desirable,	  providing	  data	  on	  population	  dynamics	  on	  a	  continuous	  basis	  at	  lower	  administrative	  levels,	  and	  is	  the	  best	  route	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  vital	  statistics.	  Where	  civil	  registration	  is	  inadequate,	  governments	  can	  use	  censuses,	  sample	  surveys,	  or	  facility-­‐based	  records,	  but	  the	  ministers	  noted	  that	  these	  are	  merely	  snapshots	  (Economic	  Commission	  for	  Africa,	  2012).	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Describing the Electorate: The Voter Register 
Principal amongst these new schemes are programmes of voter registration. The ‘third wave’ 
of democratisation that launched in Africa with the end of the Cold War and the drive 
towards multi-party elections in the early 1990s, has made the construction of 
comprehensive and effective electoral-management institutions a critical task for African 
states. Of these, voter registration is one of the most important. It is the process of 
registering eligible voters in a specified electoral constituency in order to produce a voter 
register, against which voters on election day are checked in order to permit those eligible to 
vote to do so, and prohibit those who are not. Unlike civil registers, it is not universal – only 
eligible citizens are supposed to be included. Voter registration can be conducted as a 
complete, one-time exercise (active registration), or the voter roll can be extracted from 
other demographic databases such as a civil register (passive registration); the list of eligible 
voters can then be updated on a periodic (for instance, just before an election) or continuous 
basis (possibly in tandem with the civil register) (Evrensel, 2006:22). Whilst actual voting 
behaviour is determined by a number of interlocking factors, particularly socio-economic 
ones, eligibility to vote comes typically from citizenship and age: voters must be over the age 
of majority, and a full citizen, omitting visitors, temporary migrants and non-naturalised 
residents.11 These formal constitutional criteria make it clear who is legally entitled to vote: 
whether they can actually do so depends in most cases on being a registered voter. Voter 
registration is therefore an integral part of exercising the right to vote on both equity and 
exclusion grounds: it delineates eligible voters from non-eligible persons, and enables every 
eligible voter to vote once and only once.  	  
By circumscribing who may do what, voter registration is an important tool of power 
through which a public is defined and managed. Electorates are what Kelley, Ayres and 
Bowen call artefacts of political decisions: ‘within limits, they can be constructed to a size 
and composition deemed desirable by those in power’ (1967:375). Thus what appears to be a 
neutral bureaucratic procedure in which electorates are described is in fact a political 
process in which they are produced.12 As political objects, voter registers can become the site 
of political dispute, since they are intimately related to the creation of winners and losers at 
election time. As Young remarks, ‘elections make people aware of numbers, their numbers, 
in a way they often were not before’ (1993:308; emphasis in original). This is why voter 
registration drives, designed ostensibly for inclusion, are often accompanied by the 
mobilisation of citizens by political entrepreneurs, and why in weak systems, this can lead to 
multiple registrations.13  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 	  There	   are	   also	   sometimes	   country	   and	   electoral	   district	   residence	   minimum	   requirements.	   In	   a	   majority	   of	  democratic	  countries	  surveyed	  by	  Blais	  et	  al,	  citizens	  residing	  abroad	  may	  vote	  (2001:	  54–57).	  12	  Literacy	  tests,	   long	  periods	  of	  residence	  and	  obdurate	  bureaucratic	  procedures	  have	  all	  been	  used	  to	  make	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  certain	  parts	  of	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  electorates	  to	  register,	  particularly	  in	  periodic,	  active	  systems	  where	  the	  costs	  of	  registration	  for	  individual	  voters	  are	  high	  (Atkeson	  et	  al,	  2010).	  Even	  in	  well-­‐organised	  systems,	  the	  requirement	   for	  physical	  appearance	  at	  government	  offices,	  onerous	  validity	  standards	  for	  documentation,	  and	  weak	  civic	  education	  all	  create	  barriers	  of	  access	  for	  potential	  registrants	  (Blais	  et	  al,	  2010).	  13	  As	  in	  Somaliland,	  as	  I	  explain	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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As Map 2 in Chapter 1 shows, around half of African countries have introduced some form of 
hi-tech voter registration in recent years in an effort to deliver ‘free and fair’ elections and 
thus enhance their democratic credentials. These new biometric voter registers are designed 
to overcome historical deficiencies in electoral management, in which same-day or paper-
based registration was often vulnerable to fraud in the form of tampering, the creation of 
‘ghost’ records, and multiple registrations. These impoverished lists often became lightening 
rods for contestation over voter eligibility arising from complex and unresolved citizenship 
debates (for instance, see Breckenridge, 2010, and Piccolino 2015b), and thus highly 
politicised. As with the recent addressing of civil registration deficiencies, new programmes 
of voter registration in sub-Saharan Africa face considerable technical, financial, and 
logistical challenges.  
 
Political and Technical Questions 
Both civil and voter registration lead to the production of credentials, such as ID cards, and 
the creation of information databases to be used as the basis of future documentation or 
authorisation (such as electoral rolls). Registration in both these cases is designed to 
stabilise identities in ways that are legible to state authorities via the administrative 
fabrication of official identity. Although voter registers do not ‘produce’ identity in the same 
way as civil registers – in which one’s name is recorded and fixed at birth – the act of 
registering as a voter is similarly a performance of one’s official identity. In both cases, 
therefore, civil and voter registration are deeply political undertakings that articulate and 
enforce legal and administrative boundaries between insiders and outsiders. The politics of 
these programmes is thus essential to understand, requiring empirical investigation of the 
ways that discourses of inclusion and citizenship are invoked and underpin the design and 
implementation of registration.  
 
The construction of ‘official identities’ is intimately connected to social narratives about 
belonging and the boundaries of in- and out-groups. Citizenship is a legal category 
constituted by the state, but is intimately connected to other political and social identities. 
As Kerber has explained: ‘It is in citizenship that the personal and political come together, 
because citizenship is about how individuals make and remake the state’ (1997:854). To 
date, the dominant conceptualisations of citizenship have been framed in terms of the 
experiences of Western societies (Halisi et al, 1998:338). The liberal conception of the 
‘consumer-citizen’ dominates, influenced by the post-war rights-based approach of T H 
Marshall. In a classic formulation, Zubaida (1999:389) states this as: ‘Citizenship and legal 
rights, in so far as they are enforced, liberate the individual from the tyranny of primordial 
groups, and promote more voluntary forms of sociability’. This of course raises thorny 
questions about how group membership and individual rights can be reconciled; but also 
leads us to ask whether norms like obligation, reciprocity, and relationality, of particular 
relevance in many African societies, should not also be included (Halisi et al, 1998; Ekeh, 
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1975). As Chatterjee (2004), Hindess (2004) and others have noted, ‘the citizen’ is not 
necessarily a dominant or even possible political category for the majority of the world’s 
population who enact themselves politically through identities that do not fit into Western 
civic concepts. However, if we take Yeatman’s position (2008) that citizenship can tell us 
simply about how participants in social life are constructed, citizenship can obviously be 
politically salient and analytically useful in non-Western contexts. Certainly when it comes 
to questions about state regimes of identification, citizenship is an essential lens for 
understanding how boundaries are constructed and enforced, and the dominant narratives 
of the ‘good’ or authentic citizen. Citizenship laws are also integral parts of the statecraft of 
African states, and contain important clues about the grounds of authentication at work 
(Manby, 2009).  
 
It is also important to investigate the technical and administrative processes involved in the 
creation or upgrading of civil and voter registers, uncovering how procurement decisions are 
made, which companies are hired, and how these schemes are executed. In doing so, we can 
get a sense of how issues around privacy and data security, sustainability, and partnership 
with foreign contractors are managed.14 Crucially, these studies must also investigate what 
Hecht calls ‘technopolitics’, the ‘strategic practice of designing or using technology to 
constitute, embody, or enact political goals’ (2009:56). 15  As I explained above, the 
construction of voter registers can have significant political outcomes, for instance in terms 
of electoral constituency demarcation, voter education, and voter turnout. However, as 
Young (1993:304) has observed, despite the great energy expended in running and 
analysing elections in Africa, understanding of their effects and processes is surprisingly 
incomplete. More than twenty years later, elections, democratisation and democracy 
consolidation form a considerable part of the research undertaken on African states, but 
there remains very little scholarship on African elections as technical processes, particularly 
voter registration (Piccolino, 2015a:270). Opening up the political and bureaucratic 
decisions and activities involved in processes of registration will therefore give us greater 
insight into how these systems are developed, and what implications they have for the 
construction and consolidation of national political communities.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Breckenridge	  (2010:645)	  reports	  the	  ‘sordid’	  allegations	  of	  official	  bribery	  by	  the	  multinational	  ID	  company	  Sagem	  in	  Nigeria	  formed	  the	  background	  to	  it	  winning	  the	  bid	  to	  deliver	  the	  Ghanain	  project.	  In	  both	  cases,	  mounting	  financial	  and	  administrative	  costs,	  and	  technical	  failure	  followed	  (ibid:648).	  The	  furore	  around	  the	  involvement	  of	  Mastercard	  in	  the	  Nigerian	  national	  ID	  card	  (see	  Court,	  2014)	  provokes	  similar	  questions	  about	  the	  economy	  of	  identification.	  	  15	  I	   use	   this	   definition	   which	   fits	   the	   context	   of	   technical	   registration	   better	   than,	   say,	   Timothy	   Mitchell’s	   use	   of	  technopolitics	   which	   he	   describes	   as	   an	   ‘alloy’	   that	   emerges	   from	   technical	   projects	   that	   seem	   to	   be	   led	   by	   human	  agency,	  but	  which	  are	  in	  fact	  ‘overrun	  by	  the	  unintended’	  (2002:42–43).	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Verification 
Within this host of issues lies an extremely important component of identification. Civil and 
voter registers are meaningless if the state cannot ensure that a person is who she says she is 
before that identity is permanently fixed to her. However, as will be clear from the preceding 
discussion, without birth certificates, national identity documentation, or other forms of 
official certification, it is extremely challenging for authorities to do this. In Chapter 1, I 
termed this the ‘verification problem’, and posited that overcoming this dilemma requires 
the construction or improvement of a state’s identity-management infrastructure, or the 
utilisation of other resources in society, such as witnesses and ‘guarantors’. In this section, I 
thus elucidate the issue of verification in the context of official identification, exploring 
‘vernacular’ verification in particular, and offering three explanations as to why these 
practices are prominent in registration and documentation protocols.     
 
In this thesis, I discuss three main avenues of verification. The first is the use of the state’s 
file-making functions at the point of birth, in which officials record and fix a child’s identity 
with a birth certificate that, in the global north, typically becomes part of a system of civil 
registration. Birth certificates are considered the essential document for legal identity 
(World Bank/WHO, 2014; World Bank, 2014), and universal birth certification is enshrined 
as a human right in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is the first document in the 
verification chain, and is thus used to obtain other kinds of identity documentation. For this 
reason it is sometimes called a ‘breeder document’, defined as ‘an ID document issued to 
support a person’s identity and used to obtain another document or privilege of greater 
perceived value’ (Mercer, cited in Ministry of Health and Sanitation, 2014). However, birth 
certificates are vulnerable to fraud, 16 and part of a complex system of registration that is not 
instituted in all countries: over half of children in sub-Saharan Africa are not registered at 
birth (UNICEF, 2005). Indeed, many people lack any kind of authoritative documentation 
that affirms their age, place of birth or nationality – key attributes of ‘official’ identity. For 
this reason, authorities can use a person’s body to check that they are who they say they are, 
for instance through particular defining marks, such as birthmarks or gestures; or 
increasingly through biometric checks: this person is X because their 
fingerprint/blood/DNA matches the record for X. This constitutes the second avenue of 
verification.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 	  Their	   ‘gatekeeping’	   function	   means	   that	   birth	   certificates	   are	   often	   fraudulently	   obtained	   to	   initiate	   genuine	  documentation.	  Even	  in	  advanced	  states,	  keeping	  track	  of	  birth	  certificates,	  and	  ensuring	  their	  security	  and	  credibility,	  can	   be	   difficult:	   in	   the	   US,	   for	   instance,	   over	   14,000	   different	   versions	   of	   birth	   certificates	   were	   found	   to	   be	   in	  circulation,	   issued	  by	  6,422	  different	  entities,	  with	  records	  easily	  publicly	  accessed	  and	  purchased	   in	   thirteen	  states,	  opening	   up	   significant	   opportunities	   for	   fraud	   (Office	   of	   Inspector	   General,	   2000:ii–iii).	   Since	   the	   birth	   certificate	   is	  considered	  the	  single,	  originating	  source	  of	  official	  identity,	  the	  concern	  about	  fraudulent	  birth	  certification	  is	  therefore	  that	   it	   verifies	   functional	   identity	   documents	   that	   do	   not	   pertain	   to	   an	   officially	   recognised	   person.	   Triangulation	   is	  therefore	   increasingly	   used,	   drawing	   on	   other	   sources	   of	   identification	   including	   commercial	   data,	   since	   birth	  certificates	  are	  not	  infallible	  (Lyon,	  2001:295).	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Biometric Authorisation 
‘Biometrics’ refers to the physical characteristics of the human body that can be used to 
establish identity (World Bank, 2014:8); and technologies that collect and analyse this data 
are increasingly being used to supplement paper-based administrative verification. The 
basic physical characteristics of appearance have always been used to distinguish people 
from one another and identify particular individuals (Gelb and Clark, 2013:1). The body has 
also long been central to official identification, evident from historical disciplinary practices, 
such as branding, that marked delinquency (Foucault, 1979); the search for the 
anthropometric indicators of recidivism by nineteenth-century sociologists and 
criminologists (Sekula, 1986:33; see also Becker, 2001); the use of photographs and 
fingerprints in administration from the early twentieth century on (see Breckenridge, 2005, 
2014 on the South African case; and Joseph, 2001 on Edwardian Britain); and the relatively 
modern use of forensic technology, such as blood, DNA and genetic testing (Higgs, 
2009:352; Sankar, 2001). Today, biometric technology collects ‘automatically measurable, 
robust and distinctive’ data about physical characteristics (typically, facial features, 
fingerprints and iris pattern)17 that, when connected to personal information, creates a 
unique identity profile (Gelb and Clark, 2013:8). Biometric data is therefore unique 
information about a person, and in this sense offer greater security and credibility than 
more traditional kinds of identity information. Typically, biometric technologies look for 
patterns in fingerprints, irises and facial structure, and use these to create algorithms 
specific to each person, enabling their identity to be established and fixed to them within 
corresponding databases (World Bank, 2014). In these techniques, therefore, the body, or 
part thereof, is surrendered for examination: instead of the person, an abstracted ‘machine-
readable’ body (Van der Ploeg, 2013) is submitted as a means of answering ‘who are you’.  
 
Two key assumptions of identification are uniqueness and singularity: there is only one of a 
person X, and X can be verified as X.18 Biometrics are therefore useful for de-duplication 
(the process of checking whether a person has already enrolled in an identification system, 
and thus minimising errors or fraud); and for automating processes that would otherwise be 
channels for extortion and bribery, or for unwanted intrusion or scrutiny (Gelb and Clark, 
2013). However, the potential benefits of these systems are only as good as the data they 
collect: fingerprint scans, for instance, although probably the most common and well-
established form of biometric data, can be of poor quality because of degradation from 
manual labour and age, affecting the ability of computer software to accurately match the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Other	   less-­‐typical	   features	   include	  voiceprints,	  retinal	  scans,	  vein	  patterns,	   lip	  movements,	  gait	  and	  DNA	  (Gelb	  and	  Clark,	  2012:8).	  	  18	  We	  also	  find	  basic	  postulations	  of	  stability	  (that	  people	  do	  not	  change	  over	  time);	  and	  normality,	   found	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	   standard	  units	  and	  measurements	   (for	   instance,	   ten	   fingers,	   two	  eyes),	  but	  also	   in	   terms	  of	   fitting	   into	  pre-­‐chosen	  categories.	  This	  emerges	  from	  the	  use	  of	  commonality	  as	  the	  central	  parameter	  for	   identifying	  criteria,	  which	  has	  the	  peculiar	  effect	  of	  effacing	  individuality	  in	  favour	  of	  general	  and	  standardised	  categories	  of	  meaning.	  This	  idea	  of	  the	  body	  reduced	  to	  its	  readable	  parts	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  Foucault’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  state’s	  use	  of	  statistics	  and	  the	  science	  of	  population	  as	  tools	  of	  surveillance	  and	  control;	  of	  the	  panoptic	  power	  of	  the	  state	  ‘to	  supervise	  the	  conduct	  of	  each	  individual,	  to	  assess	  it,	  to	  judge	  it,	  to	  calculate	  its	  qualities	  or	  merits’	  (Foucault,	  1979:143).	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data points to verify individuals’ prints.19 Most importantly, biometrics can only confirm 
that particular biological data matches the person whom it came from (1-to-1 verification) or 
matches a person already registered within a database (1-to-many identification) (World 
Bank, 2014:29). It cannot determine the identity of voters, for instance, unless the proof of 
eligibility (such as citizenship, age and residence) is also included in the profile (Evrensel, 
2006:43). In fact, even more fundamentally, argue Whitley and Manby (2015), biometrics 
‘cannot address the fundamental question of whether a person is who they say they are … 
only whether the person holding the relevant ID card is reasonably certain to be the person 
to whom the card was issued’. Biometric data is thus intended to work in concert with other 
forms of identity verification, such as civil registers and ID cards – it is not a surrogate (Gelb 
and Clark, 2013).  
 
Vernacular Verification  
This is a critical point because it brings us back again to the need for triangulated 
verification. The reality is that even sophisticated biometric systems (at least in their current 
form) require an originating chain of verification to ensure that a person is who they say 
they are, and, crucially, to determine eligibility. However, where ‘breeder documents’ such 
as birth certificates, voter cards or driver’s licenses are not available as artefacts of effective 
registration processes, verification must use other forms of ‘metadata’, which the World 
Bank (2014:9) recognises as ‘community affidavits, (including those from religious 
institutions), certificates from educational institutions, and other proofs of identification 
or use of name and social reputation, and/or may include self-declarations of applicant 
collected by a trained agent during enrollment [sic]’.20  
 
I term these forms of testimony and vouching ‘vernacular’ verification, which I 
conceptualise as a set of practices in the local idiom – they are ordinary, social (as in shared 
and relational), and situational actions that draw from understandings of ‘the way things are 
done’ (Bourdieu, 1977; De Certeau, 1984). Of course, testimony is not excluded from other 
avenues of verification – parental attestation is essential to birth certification, for instance – 
but it is often seen as either an alternative (as in the provision of ‘metadata’) or a safeguard 
or stopgap for these. Vernacular practices of verification are, however, viable and important. 
Indeed, in places where record-keeping is weak or patchy and comprehensive national 
systems of registration do not exist, these practices of testimony are critical to verification. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Iris	  scans,	  although	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  reliable,	  are	  also	  not	  stable	  over	  time	  (as	  previously	  thought),	  and	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  eye	  conditions	  such	  as	  cataracts	  (Bowyer	  et	  al,	  2009).	  DNA	  is	  the	  only	  stable	  physical	  characteristic	  but	  this,	  together	  with	  other	  biometric	   characteristics,	   is	   expensive	   to	   incorporate	   into	   identification	  systems	  and	   thus	   rarely	  used	  (ibid).	  	  20	  The	   use	   of	   religious	   or	   customary	   records	   (such	   as	   those	   that	   mark	   baptisms)	   or	   affidavits	   by	   local	   officials	   has	  historically	  been	  very	  important	  to	  the	  development	  of	  registration	  systems.	  For	  instance,	  Szreter	  (2007:72)	  has	  shown	  that	   parish	   registers	   in	   medieval	   Britain	   acted	   as	   an	   early	   system	   of	   national	   identity	   registration	   and	   public	  information	   enabling	   the	   ‘routine,	   low-­‐cost	   and	   reliable’	   verification	  of	   identities	   (see	   also	  Higgs,	   2009).	   Szreter	   and	  Breckenridge	   (2012:29)	   argue	   that	   theoretically	   self-­‐declarations	   are	   not	   a	   form	  of	   verification;	   however	   the	  World	  Bank	  (2014)	  accepts	  that	  self-­‐authorisation	  may	  be	  the	  only	  available	  form	  of	  identification.	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Guarantors 
The ‘metadata’ produced by vernacular verification is typically provided by key individuals 
in society. In procedures of official identification, this is usually someone with some kind of 
authoritative status. Such ‘guarantors’ have long been part of many states’ identity 
management systems. In revolutionary France, for instance, ‘common-knowledge’ 
depositions (acts de notoriété), drawing on local knowledge, were used to prove age (Noiriel, 
2001:38). According to Higgs, most credit transactions in England were performed before 
witnesses well into the nineteenth century; whilst in the early twentieth century, the British 
welfare system used a ‘recommender system’ to identify claimants, in which a person with 
official status in the local community vouched for a person’s identity through 
countersignature, or a signed ‘life certificate’ attested by a religious, administrative or 
political officer (2009:350).  	  
Many contemporary states also use ‘guarantors’ for official documentation in situations in 
which previous IDs are problematic or someone’s physical appearance has dramatically 
changed. In the US, the public notary system enables the use of accredited persons to 
administer oaths and witness signatures. Lawful notarisation requires that the notary 
affirms the identity of the signer, either through personal knowledge ('regular interaction 
over time has given the notary a deep-seated belief in the person’s identity') or through the 
presentation of identity evidence, such as a driver's license (American Society of Notaries, 
nd). In other countries, such as the UK and Australia, the guarantor must know the 
applicant, be enumerated or documented themselves in official systems (such as passports 
or social security), and be prepared to endorse the applicant's identity in writing, by 
telephone or sometimes in person. Importantly, they must also belong to one of a specified 
number of occupational groups (commonly lawyers, teachers, elected representatives, 
medical practitioners, security personnel or financial agents) or be a person of 'standing' in 
the community (such as ministers of religion).21  
 
In other states, the rules governing who can be a guarantor are less specified, or else 
accommodate ordinary citizens under specific conditions, such as the permitting of already-
registered voters to vouch for the residency of someone registering on election day in some 
US states.22 In Benin, Piccolino (2015a:280) reported that over a quarter of citizens in 
Benin’s pre-voter registration census were unable to present identification documentation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  UK	  Passport	  Office	  (2013:11)	  gives	  examples	  of	  counter-­‐signatories	  with	  'standing'	  as	  'bank	  or	  building-­‐society	  officials,	   police	   officers,	   civil	   servants,	   ministers	   of	   religion	   and	   people	   with	   professional	   qualifications	   –	   teachers,	  accountants,	  engineers,	  solicitors’.	  The	  Australian	  Government's	  Department	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade	  (nd)	  lists	  the	  following	  guarantor	  occupational	  groups	   in	  cases	  where	   the	  applicant	   is	   from	  overseas	  and/or	   is	  unable	   to	  name	  an	  Australian	   guarantor	   who	   has	   known	   them	   for	   more	   than	   two	   years:	   chartered	   accountants,	   bailiffs,	   barristers,	  solicitors	  and	  patent	  attorneys,	  bank	  managers,	  chartered	  engineers,	  clerk	  of	  courts	  and	  petty	  sessions,	  dentists,	  elected	  representatives,	  salaried	  holders	  of	  statutory	  offices,	   judges,	  marriage	  celebrants,	  members	  of	  the	  Australian	  Defence	  Force,	   chartered	   company	   secretaries,	   pharmacists,	   police	   officers,	   postal	   managers,	   public	   servants,	   medical	  practitioners,	   nurses,	   tax	   agents,	   veterinary	   surgeons,	   sheriffs,	   stipendiary	   magistrates,	   teachers.	   Many	   of	   these	  professionals	  have	  to	  be	  registered	  with	  the	  relevant	  body,	  or	  have	  served	  continuously	  for	  five	  years	  in	  that	  post.	  	  22	  This	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   all	   voters	   engaging	   in	   same-­‐day	   registration	   are	   able	   to	   fulfill	   the	   requirement	   to	   prove	  residency	   without	   having	   to	   provide	   documentation	   they	   do	   not	   have	   (for	   instance,	   people	   without	   permanent	  addresses).	  See	  National	  Conference	  of	  State	  Legislatures,	  2015.	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(including the newly distributed birth certificates), and were therefore registered on their 
own declaration or that of the family head.23 Eggen (2011:320) has shown how villagers in 
Malawi depend upon chiefs for the ‘confirmation of identity, which is necessary to open a 
bank account or obtain a driving license or passport … and the court will usually only handle 
cases if brought forward by the police or if the complaint is accompanied by a letter from the 
chief’.  
 
In each of these cases, guarantors act as important gatekeepers of identity, mediating 
between authorities and citizens. Guarantors enable states to overcome issues arising from 
the lack of documentation and constrained bureaucratic infrastructure, whilst 
undocumented citizens are able to access benefits that require official identification, often in 
ways that enable informal bargaining and loopholes (Gelb and Clark, cited in Piccolino, 
2015a:283). Guarantors also facilitate access for groups that would otherwise be at risk of 
being excluded by time-consuming, restrictive, distant or discriminatory procedures 
(Marko, 2015).  
 
A puzzle emerges, however, since a state that uses guarantors with which to ‘see’ its 
population gives part of its centralised, synoptic view to alternative powerbrokers. These 
individuals may, benignly or malevolently, ‘interpose their own particular interests’ in their 
mediation between state and society (Scott, 1998:78). This would therefore seem to be a 
singular challenge to the legibility that Scott posited as a critical characteristic of state 
power. So how do we explain a state’s use of guarantors? In the remaining part of this 
chapter, I therefore review theoretical and empirical literatures to posit three possible 
explanations. Firstly, that dependence upon guarantors is a sign of weak state capacity, and 
can be expected in places where the ‘broadcasting’ of state power is feeble. Secondly, and 
pertinent to the African context, that guarantors are a legacy of indirect rule and continue to 
play a mediating role into the present because of political economies based on 
neopatrimonial and hybrid logics. Thirdly, that guarantors are used because they enable 
trustworthy verification of individuals as social actors, a form of authentication that the 
state alone cannot provide, and which reinforces notions of belonging and nationhood.  
 
Weak State Capacity  
It might be easy to dismiss a weak state explanation for the use of guarantors out of hand 
since, as I noted above, many ‘modern’, ‘developed’ states utilise forms of testimony, 
witnessing, counter-signature, and vouching within their systems of official identification. 
Having a teacher, priest, or lawyer sign the back of one’s passport photograph in the UK to 
confirm your identity, or permitting a person with no known address to be vouched for on 
election day as the US, does not make them weak states. However, this may be because they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  I	  note	  that	  Szreter	  and	  Breckenridge	  (2012:29)	  argue	  that	  theoretically	  self-­‐authorisation	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  verification.	  However,	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2014)	  accepts	  that	  self-­‐declarations	  may	  be	  the	  only	  available	  form	  of	  identification.	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are regarded as Weber’s administratively capable and bureaucratically efficient ‘file-making’ 
states, generally able to recognise, identify and document their citizens. The use of 
guarantors might therefore be explained away in terms of safeguards or double-checking. In 
contrast, many African states seem to lack Weber’s officials, scribes, records and stamps; 
and the procedures of filing, ordering, classifying and authorising needed for effective 
legibility. They are not regarded as operating in an ‘information-rich context’, lacking the 
ability to ‘track the individual body or understand the dynamics of the social body’ (Cooper, 
cited in Breckenridge, 2014:5).  
 
The problems African states have faced in constructing sustainable and comprehensive 
systems of registration and identification are often subsumed under general accounts of 
their ‘low capacity’ and problems ‘broadcasting’ power over the human and physical 
environment (Evans et al, 1995; Herbst, 2000).24 Piccolino (2015a; 2015b), for instance, 
writes that African states’ limited registration capabilities can be analysed as an outcome of 
their weak ‘infrastructural power’, the ability of state networks to penetrate and coordinate 
society through logistical and organisational techniques as theorised by Mann (1984, 2008). 
Explanations for this administrative weakness are given in terms of pre-colonial cultures 
(such as the endurance of tribal rule); the legacy of colonialism (which prioritised extractive 
economics, superficial administration and partial politics over the development of 
sustainable and sustained institutions); or the notion of the state as a mirage or façade (the 
failure of implantation), hollow (eviscerated by corruption) or hybridised between 
‘traditional’ institutions and ‘modern’ ones (for instance, Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Olivier de 
Sardan, 1999; Mamdani, 1996). Rather than being structurally autonomous from society 
(Forrest, 1988), contemporary African states are characterised by little or no functional 
separation between politics and the socio-cultural relations of everyday life (Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999; Ekeh, 1975). In place of the precision, speed and orderliness that characterises 
Weberian bureaucracy is corruption, nepotism and ambiguity. Widespread patronage and 
the circumlocution of official channels make it extremely difficult for mundane processes of 
state to be conducted in technically efficient and politically neutral ways (Van de Walle, 
2003). The functioning of the state is interrupted, complicated, dispersed and impeded by a 
variety of social, political and economic actors who seek to extract personal or collective 
benefits.  
 
Such generalised images of African states as ineffective, dependent and corrupt are of course 
unhelpful and inadequate. They are not uninterested in identification or enumeration: 
Herbst argues that the determination and delineation of ‘who belongs’ is a central concern of 
African states (cited in Dorman, 2014:163). Importantly, such readings of weakness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Indeed,	  African	  states	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  congenitally	  weak,	  soft,	  limited,	  fragile	  or	  otherwise	  in	  crisis:	  see	  Clapham,	  1998;	  Forrest,	  1988;	  Gros,	  1996;	  Jackson,	  2002;	  Jackson	  and	  Rosberg,	  1982;	  Milliken	  and	  Krause,	  2002;	  Putzel	  and	  Di	  John,	  2012;	  Rotberg,	  2004;	  and	  Zartman,	  1995.	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  statehood	  that	  draws	  on	  European	  historical	  experiences	  and	  the	  ‘OECD	  state’	  or	  colonially	  derived	  juridical	  state,	  and	  from	  which	  African	  states	  are	  ‘deviant’	  cases.	  See	  Boege	  et	  al,	  2008;	  Hagmann	  and	  Hoehne,	  2009;	  Menkhaus,	  2006;	  Sangmpam,	  1993.	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perpetuate an idea of a comprehensive, hegemonic, and monolithic ‘state’ that does not 
stand up to empirical realities, in Africa or elsewhere (Balthasar, 2012; Hagmann and 
Hoehne, 2009). Rather than attributing weak functionality to the whole ‘state-idea’ 
(Abrams, 1988), it is important to look closely at ‘the state’ in terms of a whole series of 
‘dispersed, networked and polymorphous’ institutions, actors, processes, practices and 
organisational procedures (Ajana, 2012:855). To that end, we can break down the 
assignation of ‘weakness’ into discrete assessments of dysfunction, inexperience or scarcity, 
asking whether the use of guarantors is a pragmatic response to underfunded and ineffective 
government departments, undertrained personnel, and poor technical infrastructures. For 
instance, are guarantors used because a particular ministry or programme needs to fill the 
gaps in its expertise? Is the devolution of legibility to authorised individuals simply cheaper 
and easier?  
 
Certainly it seems that in some contemporary cases, pragmatism can explain the utilisation 
of vernacular practices by states that confront gaps and weaknesses as they attempt to 
update their identification systems. Piccolino (2015a:277) writes that peer testimony was an 
essential backstop for Benin’s voter registration in the early period of democratisation, as 
the relevant ministries faced problems arising from the weak economy, extensive 
corruption, and heritage of weak institutional capacities. When the government initiated a 
complex and expensive biometric registration in the late 2000s, it experienced serious 
problems from the fact that many citizens remained undocumented; an administrative 
census aimed at providing citizens with birth certificates had to be interrupted due to lack of 
funding, and thus the use of testimony and witnessing continued (ibid:279). In post-conflict 
Côte d’Ivoire, Piccolino (2015b) similarly explains that the creation of a new biometric voter 
register also encountered problems from the ‘deficient’ civil registration system and the 
resultant dearth of birth certificates, leading the government to permit the attestation of 
citizenship by witnesses before mobile courts (audience foraines). Comparable problems 
have also been encountered in Ghana, a country generally considered to have managed a 
rather positive development trajectory, but whose births and deaths registry was dogged by 
underfunding, poorly qualified personnel, and a lack of resources such as computers and 
transport even into the late 1990s (Breckenridge, 2010:646). When the Ghanaian National 
Identification Authority embarked on an ambitious programme of biometric identity 
registration in 2001, it was forced to face up to the fact that very few Ghanaians had birth 
certificates to prove their citizenship. Instead, writes Breckenridge (ibid): 	  [T]he	   Ghanaian	   state	   ended	   up	   relying	   on	   the	   temporary	   workers	   to	   make	   a	  decision	  about	  nationality	  based	  on	  discussions	  with	   ‘your	  parents,	  head	  of	   family	  and/or	   local	   traditional	   leaders’	   	   …	   In	   practice	   long	   queues	   and	   production	  pressures	   meant	   that	   those	   with	   anything	   resembling	   a	   case	   for	   Ghanaian	  citizenship	  generally	  got	  it.	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In this sample of cases, we therefore see how gaps in a state’s identity-management 
infrastructure, in particular the civil register, accumulated over decades of inattention and 
under-resourcing, force states ‘to establish special procedures to allow those who do not 
carry documents to register, particularly through some form of oral testimony’ (Piccolino, 
2015b:6). In this thesis, I therefore consider whether the lack of resources, experience, and 
personnel, poorly formulated bureaucratic processes, or even ineptitude within state 
institutions explains the use of guarantors in Somaliland’s official identification procedures; 
and whether this constitutes a sufficient reason for the continued prominence of guarantors.  
 
Intermediaries and Hybridity 
A second explanation for the use of guarantors for verification can be drawn from the 
scholarship on intermediaries, brokers, and agents more generally. This is a particularly 
strong theme in the scholarship on African states, which grapples with the role of seemingly 
anachronistic ‘traditional authorities’ (chiefs, elders, clan leaders, headmen, religious 
leaders, and ‘big men’) in modern politics. Their involvement with state institutions was 
consolidated during the colonial period in which much of the day-to-day administration was 
undertaken by intermediaries embedded in society, often via the mechanisms of indirect 
rule which either preserved existing authorities or empowered new ones (Herbst, 2000:82–
84). This was considered the most efficient and effective means of communicating with and 
controlling local populations in the face of logistical and financial parsimony. The degree to 
which colonial officials manipulated and altered existing power structures, and the long-
term legacy of these actions on the form and pluralism of such institutions, is subject to 
extensive debate in the African studies literature (ibid). Some studies focus on the 
‘manufacture’ of groups and their chiefs, driven by colonial administrators’ predilection for 
favouring and fortifying one particular line of power to ensure security and control; and 
through which more fluid forms of mediation and brokerage became codified (Van Dijk and 
Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1999; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Other areas of 
scholarship highlight the way that ‘traditional’ authorities used this interstitial role to boost 
their own position, accumulating gains from the foreign powers at the cost of being regarded 
as co-opted and tainted by their own communities (for instance, Mamdani, 1996).  
 
At independence, many African leaders found that they faced the same dilemmas of the 
imperial administrators: how to extend power over their territories in the face of often-
massive geographies yet only partial administrative structures and limited national 
infrastructures (Herbst, 1998:97). In many countries, the post-independence period was 
characterised by concerted efforts to modernise state and society, often by breaking with 
previous power arrangements that were seen as having buttressed colonial rule.25 In the era 
of the one-party state, many African leaders consolidated power through economic statism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  In	  Somalia,	   for	   instance,	  the	  focus	  was	  very	  much	  on	   ‘detribalising’	  society	  under	  the	  socialist	  government	  of	  Siyad	  Barre	  (Brons,	  2001;	  Samatar,	  1998).	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centralisation and elite politics (including presidentialism), and authoritarian governance 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). However, chieftaincy, tribal leadership and kinship 
politics demonstrated persistence and resilience (Beall, Mkhize and Vawda, 2005; Logan, 
2013), and these actors continued to operate at the interface between state and society. 
Traditional authorities have thus been analysed as part of neopatrimonial and clientelistic 
social economies in which ‘the business of politics’ is conducted via power-laden, 
personalised, and ‘infra-institutional’ relations (Chabal and Daloz, 1999:xix); and where 
effective political actors are those that operate simultaneously in different political spaces 
(Ekeh, 1975:93).  
 
Neopatrimonialism inspires considerable debate as an explanatory framework for 
contemporary African politics. Bratton and Van de Walle call personal relationships the 
‘foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa’, arguing that the logic of 
patrimonialism provides essential ‘operating codes’ to how power is allocated within the 
rational-legal institutions of the modern state, and that therefore ‘parallel and unofficial 
structures may well hold more power and authority than the formal administration’ 
(1997:62–63). Certainly post-independence states have had to rely upon the variegated 
category of ‘chiefs’ to broadcast power into rural areas, in a relationship sometimes 
characterised by ambiguity, jealousy and struggle (Herbst, 1998:173–80). For whilst these 
leaders draw their authority from ‘tradition’, their legitimacy often comes from effectively 
managing issues around land tenure, local services, and conflict resolution, and extracting 
benefits from the central state for their community (Logan, 2013). This also means that they 
do not necessarily function in the ‘traditional’ idiom. Eggen (2011:320) notes, for instance, 
how some chiefs in Malawi ‘proudly presented themselves as “civil servants”, an 
administrative gatekeeper role in which they felt they ‘represented’ the government 
(although without the attendant accountability).26 Since the introduction of multi-party 
politics in the early 1990s, new attention has consequently been paid to these ‘traditional’ 
institutions, with the literature declaring a ‘resurgence’ of their relevance and authority, not 
only in terms of their prominence within local configurations of power, but also as units of 
analysis (Englebert, 2002; Goodfellow and Lindemann, 2013; Logan, 2009, 2013; Santos, 
2006; Williams, 2004). This new focus moves away from weak state accounts, seeing 
traditional authorities and non-state actors not as aberrations, substitutes or interim 
solutions for developing state processes, but as meaningful, resilient and legitimate sources 
of political order.27  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Similarly,	   Buur	   and	   Kyed	   (2006)	   also	   argue	   that	   traditional	   leaders	   in	   Mozambique	   act	   as	   both	   state	   agents	   and	  representatives	  of	  local	  communities	  at	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  ‘tradition’-­‐‘modernity’	  boundary.	  Logan	  proposes	  that	  chiefs	  and	  elected	  officials,	  instead	  of	  occupying	  their	  own	  domains,	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  ‘common	  players	  in	  a	  single,	  integrated	  political	  system,	  rather	  than	  opponents	  in	  a	  sharply	  bifurcated	  one’	  (2009:103).	  She	  argues	  that	  both	  kinds	  of	  leaders	  are	  assessed	  by	  the	  same	  criteria	  by	  citizens,	  an	  interpretation	  supported	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Karlstrom	  in	  Uganda	  (cited	  in	  Logan,	  2009:12	  –23)	  and	  Williams	  (2004)	  in	  South	  Africa,	  who	  recount	  that	  their	  informants	  see	  traditional	  leaders	  and	  elected	  councillors	  as	  part	  of	  the	  same	  spectrum	  of	  political	  activity.	  	  27	  See,	   for	   instance,	   Acemoglu	   et	   al,	   2013;	   Buur	   and	   Kyed,	   2006;	   Goodfellow	   and	   Lindemann,	   2013;	   Logan,	   2009;	  Meagher,	  2012;	  Santos,	  2006;	  Williams,	  2004.	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Identity guarantors might therefore be understood less as stopgaps for weak state 
administration, and more as integral parts of the forms of governance that have emerged in 
the post-colonial period. Traditional leaders, chiefs, and other societal actors are present 
and powerful, and thus must be accommodated within bureaucratic structures. Not only 
does contracting such agents as verifiers acknowledge their locally legitimate role, it 
enhances the state’s ability to ‘see’ the population because of their proximity to citizens. 
Such an interpretation fits with the popular conceptual frame of ‘hybridity’, which views 
customary forms as adaptable and adaptive institutions that co-exist with the processes, 
agencies and norms of the liberal democratic state.28 As Boege et al write:  	  Dominant	  approaches	  to	  state-­‐building	  today	  rest	  on	  a	  narrow	  understanding	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  our	  own	  political	  and	  social	  order.	  The	  reality	  is	  that	  state	  institutions	  co-­‐exist	  with	  and	  depend	  on	   the	   family,	   religious,	   economic	  and	  cultural	   institutions.	  (2008:17)	  
 
We see this hybridity in the neopatrimonialist approaches to the African state, particularly 
in terms of the way that personal relations penetrate the rational-legal system to create a 
‘mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination’ (Erdmann and Engel, 
2007:105). However, emerging scholarship regards hybridity as more than co-existence, 
‘nesting together’ (Menkhaus, 2006), ‘mixed government’ (Sklar, cited in Englebert, 2002) 
or ‘institutional multiplicity’29 (Putzel and Di John, 2012). Instead, it is characterised by 
synergy – what Boege et al call ‘a genuine partnership’ (2008:8) – or even synthesis. This 
analytical precision about the way that we use hybridity is important because otherwise we 
risk conceptual stretch.30 Hybridity is not, as Goodfellow warns, ‘more or less any situation 
in which non-state actors play a significant role’ (2013). Rather, like a hybrid car, the parts 
must work together to gain momentum: each may have their own function, but they are part 
of an integrated system. Such synergism takes place in a diverse range of sites, including 
different processes, institutions and actors. 
 
These theoretical considerations fit with other themes in the literature on states and state-
building, for instance, those which emphasise the interrelationship between actors and 
institutions of the social system and the ‘state-system’ (Abrams, 1988).31 In such readings, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Hybridity	  has	  become	  a	  popular	  concept	   in	   the	  social	  sciences:	   indeed,	  Meagher	  has	  described	   it	  as	  representing	  a	  ‘Gestalt	   shift’	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   political	   order	   (2012:1076).	   	   The	   term	   can	   be	   found	   in	   studies	   as	   diverse	   as	   the	  relationship	  between	  hard	  and	  soft	  law	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (such	  as	  Maher,	  2007);	  the	  colonially	  bequeathed	  legal	  hybridity	  of	  African	  states	  (Lawan,	  2014;	  Santos,	  2006);	  or	  the	  analysis	  of	  patrimonial	  capitalism	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  economies	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  (Robinson,	  2013).	  In	  political	  theory,	  hybridity	  emerged	  as	  a	  lens	  on	  statehood	  as	  a	  riposte	  to	  the	  state	  failure	  paradigm	  that	  read	  African	  political	  order	  as	  ‘pathological’	  (Hagmann	  and	  Peclard,	  2010)	  –	  although	   it	   is	  not	  a	  new	  concept	   in	  African	   studies,	  having	  been	  used	   to	  describe	  power	   relations	  under	   colonialism	  (Iliffe,	  2007).	  	  29	  This	   is	  a	   theoretical	   framework	  that	  challenges	  the	   idea	  that	   there	   is	  only	  one	  authority	  providing	  the	   ‘rules	  of	   the	  game’	   (North,	   1990).	   Rather,	   like	   Ekeh’s	   1975	   conceptualisation	   of	   domain	   mobility,	   actors	   are	   able	   to	   move	  ‘strategically	  from	  one	  institutional	  universe	  to	  another’	  (Crisis	  States	  Research	  Centre,	  cited	  in	  Balthasar,	  2012:23).	  30	  Brubaker	   and	  Cooper	   (2000:1)	   describe	   this	   in	   their	   influential	   article	   on	   identity	   as	  what	   happens	  when	   a	  word	  ‘tends	  to	  mean	  too	  much	  (when	  understood	  in	  a	  strong	  sense),	  too	  little	  (when	  understood	  in	  a	  weak	  sense),	  or	  nothing	  at	  all	  (because	  of	  its	  sheer	  ambiguity)’.	  31	  Scholars	  such	  as	  Mitchell	  (1991,	  2006),	  Painter	  (2006,	  2011)	  and	  Risse	  (2011)	  all	  criticise	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  monolithic	  body	  apart	  from	  society.	  Migdal	  (2001)	  has	  likewise	  influentially	  argued	  that	  the	  state	  exists	  in	  society,	  not	  apart	  from	  it.	  Similarly	  Frödin	  (2010)	  critiques	  ‘objectivist’	  readings	  of	  the	  state,	  arguing	  that	  the	  state	  is	  not	  a	  coherent	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‘political’ and ‘social’ domains are regarded as co-constituted and interconnected by acts 
(and actors) from different milieux. Additionally, we can make connections with the 
scholarship that tries to break down the ‘invidious distinction’ between ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’ (Bendix, cited in Galvan and Sil, 2007:3). Guarantors are therefore neither of 
the traditional/informal/social landscape or the modern/formal/state one, or floating 
‘somewhere in the middle’, but one of many different actors in a heterogeneous landscape of 
power and authority (Van Dijk and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1999:5). 
 
These ideas can productively be applied to the role of guarantors and vernacular verification 
in Somaliland, especially because Somaliland is described as a textbook case of a ‘hybrid 
political order’ (for instance, Balthasar, 2012; Boege et al, 2008; Hoehne, 2013; Renders, 
2007, 2012; Walls and Kibble, 2010). The nature of the Somaliland HPO is often quickly 
ascribed, but under-theorised and evidenced, remaining at the level of a general systemic 
designation. By focusing in on the syncretic role32 of the caaqil, the clan elder who typically 
undertakes verification in formal identification processes, we not only understand more 
about the mechanisms of these intercessory relationships, but also augment the hybridity 
literature with fine empirical detail about the interoperability of different norms and rules, 
and the different levels at which hybridity works. 
 
Unpacking Verification: Trust and Relationality   
This account of hybridity certainly seems to be persuasive in explaining the prominence of 
the guarantee and testimony of particular actors in developing identification systems. 
However, like the weak state argument, it does not fully address the act of verification, but 
merely explains the institutional space for vouchsafers. A third explanatory approach is 
therefore to unpack identification as a set of processes and ideas connected to relationality 
and trust; and thus to go deeper into what is meant by verification.  
 
Earlier in this chapter, I defined official identities as the standardised biographies 
recognised by the state, designed to permit stable and predictable recognition. These 
constructions are not about the essential ‘self’ of personal identity, what Ricoeur called the 
‘ipse’ or reflexive self, but privilege the ways in which bodies are ‘read’ and named in order 
to objectify the self as something that can be classified, interacted with, and administered: 
the ‘idem’ or sameness self (cited in Gutwirth, 2009:124–25). The answer to ‘who are you?’ 
thus seems not to reveal who you really are (i.e. an ‘essential’ self) or a tautologous self-
presentation (I am I),33 but a construction of signs and synecdoches that offers a ‘front stage’ 
persona relevant to the time, place and interlocutor (Goffman, cited in Higgs, 2009). In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  administrative	  and	  coerces	  apparatus	  but	  a	  series	  of	  institutions	  that	  exist	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  ‘systematically	  activated’	  in	  social	  relations.	  32	  For	   instance,	  Van	  Rouveroy	   van	  Nieuwaal	   (1999:21)	  describes	   some	  kinds	   of	   contemporary	   chiefs	   as	   a	   ‘syncretic’	  leader	  who	  brings	  together	  ‘antagonistic	  forces	  stemming	  from	  different	  state	  models,	  bureaucracies	  and	  world	  views’.	  33	  A	  formulation	  from	  Higgs,	  2009:347,	  drawing	  on	  Caplan,	  2001:51.	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case of state identification, this persona is supposed to be the official identity as recorded in 
files and ledgers.  
 
However, we can problematise this thin reading of identity, and argue instead for seeing 
identity as highly contextual and responsive.34 Amoore, quoting Hall, writes that ‘there can 
be no singular “identity”, but only multiple “unstable points of identification” that 
temporarily and arbitrarily “position” us’ (2006:22). Though these points might be 
‘permanent’ – such as in the case of biometric data-points or facts of birth as reckoned in 
genealogies – the way in which various biographical details are brought in and out of relief 
depends on different forms of positioning. This is thus to conceptualise identity as 
relational, drawing on Gutwirth (2008), Lyon (2001), and others who argue that identity ‘is 
not something that resides in individuals but in the social interactions in which they take 
part’ (Higgs, 2009:346). As Marx nicely puts it, ‘we are all ambulatory autobiographies’ 
(2001:314), which can be read and interacted with.   
 
The consequence of this conceptualisation is thus to see identification as an interpersonal 
process of recognition (Taylor, 1989) in which certain distinctive attributes (physical, social 
and cognitive) are taken as a sign of a particular person, through physiognomic 
interpretation, the reading of cues, gestures and other symbols, the performance of 
credentials or status, or the presentation of artefacts or tokens (Goffman, 2010; Higgs, 
2009). Atick (2013) has argued that ‘how identity fits into communities significantly informs 
ID knowledge’, and that linking identity credentials to reputation (through social memory, 
‘identity gossip’, institutional reputations, and family history) makes identity useful, credible 
and powerful. As noted above, the World Bank identified social reputation as part of the 
‘metadata’ available for identification in situations of patchy or non-existent paperwork, 
stating that:  	  Identity	   is	   what	   binds	   a	   person	   to	   his	   or	   her	   reputation,	   and	   reputation	   is	   what	  earns	   that	  person	   trust	  within	   the	  community	   […]	  The	  cycle	  of	   identification	  does	  not	  end.	  As	  we	  conduct	  more	  actions,	  the	  volume	  of	  our	  reputational	  data	  increases	  and	  our	   trust	   level	   is	   continually	   adjusted	   through	   the	   judgment	  of	   the	  prevailing	  social,	  moral,	  and	  legal	  codes.	  (World	  Bank,	  2014:9)	  
 
This ‘reputational data’ is produced and reinforced by a person’s actions, and can be used to 
identify them. Giddens (1991:80), drawing on Goffman, calls such relations ‘facework’ 
commitments that depend upon co-presence in time and space, as opposed to the ‘faceless’, 
anonymous relations of abstract systems. Such identification not only names a person but 
includes an implicit assessment of trustworthiness: ‘A’ engages in an interaction with person 
‘B’ only if they know who they are and can be sure that they will do what they say they will 
(see Hardin, 2006). At its most basic, trust is the belief that someone, free to act in any way 
they choose, will act in an expected or desired way that is beneficial or at least benign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  These	  different	  ways	  of	  reading	  identity	  led	  Brubraker	  and	  Cooper	  to	  famously	  decry	  the	  concept’s	  stretching	  (2000;	  see	  also	  Abdelal	  et	  al,	  2006).	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towards the trusting party at some relevant future time (Gambetta, 2000; Hardin, 2006). 
Trust is necessary because of ignorance and uncertainty about other people’s behaviour, and 
the possibility of their not acting in expected ways (Gambetta, 2000:218). In this sense, trust 
is essential for co-existence in communities since none of the members ‘can know each 
other’s future actions but all of whom must in some measure rely upon each other’s future 
actions’ (2000:83; my emphasis). Since perfect knowledge of the actions of others is 
impossible, effective social co-existence must therefore rest on some relatively well-founded 
expectations about the conduct of free others. The belief that others will act in particular 
ways draws on trust: in this way it is ‘a policy apt for conditions where knowledge is 
unavailable’, and for ‘coping with uncertainty over time’ (Dunn, 2000:85, 73). 
 
Vouching  
It follows that verification also involves assessments of trustworthiness and relationality, 
since it is the process of corroborating a person’s claim to be who they say they are, and thus 
evaluates whether someone is speaking the truth. We see this strongly in ‘vouching’, a form 
of ‘facework’ in which someone (the vouchsafer) not only confirms that the name and other 
biographical details of a person (X) are correct, but guarantees that they are so. Vouching 
requires the vouchsafer to verify the identity claim of X and, in doing so put their own 
reputation down as assurance. Scott Brooks, whose ethnographic work within the amateur 
basketball league in Philadelphia I introduced in Chapter 1, has described vouching as 
involving a loan of a vouchsafer’s credibility – ‘to risk losing some respect or status by 
putting their reputations on the line to bolster a friend’s status’ (2004:83). Brooks’ entrée 
into the guarded world of the basketball court was facilitated by the endorsement of the 
coach Chuck, who claimed Brooks was ‘good’ – in other words, trustworthy and reliable. 
Trust and verification are thus entwined in the practice of vouching.  
 
Vouching is one of the practices that I term ‘vernacular’ verification in this thesis. It may 
take place in everyday and unremarkable settings, such as a basketball court, and by non-
authoritative persons whose guarantee is given through friendship or professional 
acquaintance. However, as I noted earlier in this chapter, vouching can also be undertaken 
by guarantors with some kind of official or authoritative status. This suggests that a third 
explanation for the use of guarantors by states is because guarantors qua vouchsafers are 
able to undertake the ‘facework’ that bureaucrats cannot. Teachers, lawyers, and religious 
leaders trusted with vouching for a person’s identity have bonds with other citizens and 
residents. They are not faceless bureaucrats who see only the identical Fordist citizen-
workers of high modernism, or the ‘blank pieces of paper’ upon which states seek to write 
(Scott, 1998: 336–41), but socially embedded actors with relationships to those they are 
verifying. Crucially, through acts of vouching, guarantors situate people as individuals 
within social contexts, making them visible not via the centralised administrative sight to 
which modern statecraft aspires, but through what I term ‘metic legibility’: the ways of 
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seeing that come from what Scott formulated as ‘mētis’, the plastic, local and divergent 
practices of knowledge distinct from the monolithic, sterile and static knowledge of 
statecraft (Scott, 1998:323).35  
 
Hence we begin to open up why states incorporate guarantors in their identification 
infrastructures. Guarantors are not (only) stopgaps in otherwise weak or patchy capabilities, 
or traditional intermediaries in hybridised political terrains, but essential parts of ‘seeing 
like a state’. Through the testimony of individuals in society, the distant bureaucratic gaze is 
brought into proximity with the citizens that states need to see: not only can a registered 
person be unambiguously attached to their ‘data double’ (Haggerty and Ericson, cited in 
Donovan and Martin, 2012), and distinguished from other people across time and space, but 
they can be positioned within relevant social fields and frames of meaning. The use of 
guarantors thus enhances surveillance through information-gathering and corroboration at 
the micro-social level, and enables states to emulate administrative legibility.  
 
Authentication 
These practices of vouching and endorsement have another critical function in state-society 
relations: the reproduction of norms and narratives about inclusion, authenticity, and 
belonging. Guarantors do not merely verify the identity of registrants and citizens, but in 
many cases also authenticate them. At its most basic, authentication is ‘the process of 
establishing confidence in the truth of a claim’ (Harbitz and Kentala, 2015:6), but I 
understand it as more than corroboration. Rather, authentication is about locating a person 
within the category or group to which they belong: as Caplan and Torpey capture it, ‘The 
question “who is this person?” leaches constantly into the question “what kind of person is 
this?”’ (2001:3) Authentication does not verify X against herself (1-to-1 verification), 
therefore but locates X within a shared identity – what I conceptualise in this thesis as 1-in-
many verification.  
 
Official identities like nationality and ethnicity have hegemonic narratives and rules that 
determine whether someone authentically belongs. In some cases, these narratives of 
‘authenticity’ are used as a political tool for the casting of an ‘internal other’ (Dorman, 
Hammett and Nugent, 2007:10). We have seen this in, for instance, racialised notions of 
‘Zimbabwean-ness’, Katangan citizenry, and the Hutu ‘nation’ (ibid); and in the 
autochthonous versus ‘allogenous’ distinction in Côte d’Ivoire that has led to great grievance 
and exclusion (Bah, 2010; Marshall-Fratani, 2007). These boundaries of belonging are 
reproduced every time the paperwork of citizenship, nationality, and voter eligibility is 
made, and are often encoded into these artefacts. Cutolo, for instance, has written about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35 	  For	   Scott,	   his	   lengthy	   explanation	   of	   mētis	   serves	   to	   reinforce	   his	   observations	   about	   the	   controlling	   and	  appropriating	   impulses	   of	   bureaucratic	   administration	   and	   capitalism.	   He	  writes	   that	  mētis	   resists	   the	   assimilation	  project	  of	  statecraft,	  and	  hence,	   in	   that	  utopian	  design,	  will	  be	  replaced	  by	   ‘standardized	  formulas	   legible	  only	  to	  the	  center’	  (1998:336).	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how the obligatory ‘foreigner’ ID card introduced in Côte d’Ivoire ‘represented an 
unprecedented materialization of nationality in the public space’ (2010:530), marking out 
‘strangers’ from nationals in the emerging ideological narrative of Ivoirité.  
 
Processes of verification and identification do not only distinguish citizens and non-citizens, 
however. As in Côte d’Ivoire, applicants for forms of ID may find that their claims to be 
members of a particular group are subject to authentication tests – they must prove not only 
that they are the person they say they are, but also that they are really of a certain kind: a 
citizen, a kinsman, a descendent. In his study on Nigerian certificates of origin, Fourchard 
(2015) reveals that applicants must ‘prove’ their indigeneity by revealing authentic 
knowledge about their place of birth. An Ibadan official told him: ‘You first give your family 
name. We know common names of true Ibadan man. You need to know the name of your 
family compound (ilé), and its exact location (the name of the street is not sufficient)’ 
(2015:46–47). Fourchard writes:  	  If	   the	   official	   is	   not	   convinced	   of	   the	   applicant’s	   status,	  more	   tricky	   questions	   are	  asked	   to	   check	  whether	   the	   applicant	   is	   a	   true	   indigene	   or	   not.	   For	   instance	   […]	  “What	   are	   the	   main	   traditional	   festivals	   in	   Ibadan?	   Where	   is	   the	   shrine	   in	  Okebadan?	  Could	  you	  recite	  a	  few	  verses	  of	  an	  Oriki	  [poem]?”’	  (ibid)	  	  
 
He notes that this means that applicants must have a name and ancestral narrative that fits 
officials’ expectations; those without these must abandon hope of gaining a certificate or 
must try to invent a life story that will pass muster (2015:51, 54). This therefore reinforces 
the certificate as a technique of indigeneity since only ‘indigenes’ will be able to manufacture 
the requisite authenticity. In post-secession South Sudan, Marko has also shown how, 
following the ‘ethnic turn’ in its citizenship regime, voters in the referendum had to 
demonstrate that they were a member of an indigenous tribe; if they lacked sufficient 
credentials, ‘identifiers, usually old ladies from a variety of tribes, had the task to tell, if 
someone is really a Sudanese [sic]’ (2015:673). In the citizenship office established after 
2010, applicants must give their clan name, and provide a witness; and, if needed, also 
provide a ‘recommendation letter’ from a traditional chief as ‘decisive evidence’ that they are 
truly a South Sudanese and a trustworthy citizen (ibid:674).36  
 
Such interpretive powers can have significant consequences, as Lochery’s work on the 
screening of Kenyan Somalis in 1989–90 shows. There, clan elders were central to 
verification: their assessment of whether someone was really from a particular clan was 
seemingly as important as the presentation of documentary evidence (Lochery, 2012:629–
30). She writes that this process assumed that ‘the elders could provide “living testimony” to 
the genuineness of citizenship’ (ibid). The screening was criticised as humiliating and 
politicised: although the panels were supposed to be representative, they were underscored 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Marko	   (2015:679)	   also	   notes	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   proof	   of	   correct	   ethnic	   heritage,	   applicants	   may	   be	   subject	   to	  questions	  about	  their	  race	  –	  whether	  they	  are	   ‘black	  enough’	  or	   ‘too	  black’	  –	  adding	  another	  layer	  to	  the	  narrative	  of	  authentic	  South	  Sudaneseness.	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by clan politics, meaning that being from the ‘wrong’ lineage could lead to in-authentication 
(and the failure of citizenship claims).37 Vernacular verification is therefore not necessarily 
an impartial act, and it is possible that guarantors will give false testimony for political or 
financial gain, or to service nepotism and the lubrication of connections (see 
Marko,2015:676, 680).  
 
These three cases demonstrate that processes ostensibly about verifying someone’s identity 
are embedded in deeper questions about citizenship and belonging. Authentication is 
maintained by narratives and their gatekeepers – in accounts of African politics, this is often 
the figure of the ‘traditional authority’ acting as intermediary between citizen and state, who 
acts as a final word on the authenticity of someone as a particular ‘kind of person’. This third 
explanatory approach to the role of guarantors in state systems of identification thus turns 
on the issues of trust, relationality, and authenticity. Not only are guarantors useful and 
credible agents in the verification process because of their own willingness to give their 
name as credit, but through them, the state has a more direct connection to its citizens. 
Moreover, the use of testifiers enables state administrators to not merely verify identity but 
also to assess whether applicants ‘belong’ by triangulating whom they are related to, which 
group/clan/tribe they are a member of, and therefore whether they are a ‘good’ citizen. In so 
doing, the incorporation of vernacular practices works as a technique of inclusion and 
exclusion, reinforcing narratives of authentic belonging and bounded citizenship. In this 
thesis, I argue that these are powerful reasons for the use of guarantors by states, and thus 
explore how authentication by guarantors reproduces histories and images of what it means 
to be a Somalilander.  
 
Conclusion  
In this thesis, I examine how the Somaliland state, through the development of its official 
identification system, is trying to make its population ‘legible’. To do so, it must address its 
historical ‘verification problem’. In this chapter, I have looked closely at the meaning and 
function of verification within processes of identification. Drawing on theoretical and 
empirical material from a diverse range of scholarship, I have shown that ‘vernacular’ 
verification – practices of testimony, vouching and guarantee – are a feature of most, if not 
all, official identification systems, but are critical in states that lack comprehensive identity-
management infrastructures. Three interlocking factors of weak institutional capacities, 
hybrid political logics, and narratives of authentic belonging can explain the importance of 
these practices. In each of these areas, vernacular practices, part of the synthetic assemblage 
of the identity architecture, provide pragmatic and symbolic solutions to the verification 
problem.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Lochery	  notes	   that	   these	  practices	   of	   clan-­‐elder	   verification	  have	   endured	   into	   contemporary	  Kenya,	  with	   ‘vetting	  committees’	   assessing	   applications	   for	   identity	   cards	   for	   Kenyan	   Somalis	   (2012:636;	   see	   also	   Kenya	   National	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  2007:22–23).	  	  
2	  –	  Registration,	  Verification	  and	  Legibility	  
	   57	  
This chapter sets up the framework of inquiry for the following substantive chapters by 
elucidating two main conceptual findings. I have argued that official identity is not simply 
an administrative fabrication as theorised in conventional accounts of the bureaucratic 
state, but a negotiated category that is rooted in social frames of meaning. Effective 
verification is consequently more than checking biographic facts: it is authentication, 
situating the ‘1’ in the ‘many’, in a way that draws on the resources, norms and actors of the 
identity architecture. In the next chapter, I develop this argument through an exploration of 
the local, informal and quotidian practices of identification that constitute the vernacular 
meshwork of the identity architecture in Somaliland.   
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Chapter	  3	  	   Genealogy	  in	  Practice	  Identification	  and	  Situatedness	  in	  the	  Everyday	  	  [T]he	  multiple	   facets	   of	   social	   reality	   are	   inscribed	   in	   names.	   (Zonabend	   cited	   in	  Bestard-­‐Camps,	  1991:31)	  	   Transformative	  power	  resides	  not	  in	  the	  map,	  of	  course,	  but	  in	  the	  power	  possessed	  by	  those	  who	  deploy	  the	  perspective	  of	  that	  particular	  map	  (Scott,	  1998:87)	  	  	  
David Simpson describes situatedness as ‘being in place’ and ‘knowing one’s place’ (2002:2). 
These two ideas animate my discussion in this chapter, which explores the ‘genealogical 
idiom’ of Somaliland society, and reflects upon everyday forms of identification and, 
specifically, identity verification. I consider the processes of relationality and triangulation, 
which work to situate people within a complex biographic system whereby ‘one’s place’ is a 
node in a many-place network. My research in Somaliland suggests that social processes of 
identification rely on almost continual relativising; and that access, favours and 
opportunities all depend upon verification of these relationships, most notably through 
triangulation and ‘vouching’.  
 
This chapter is organised thematically around the norms and practices of everyday 
identification, which constitute the vernacular resources of Somaliland’s identity 
architecture. I discuss the forms of knowledge, norms and values that situate and 
contextualise people in terms of vertical lineage and horizontal networks, which I term the 
‘genealogical idiom’. Rather than the ‘idem’ (sameness) self that official identity is 
concerned with (see Chapter 2), these forms of ‘facework’ presume identity to be relational 
and contextual. I explicate the notions of trust and authenticity that arise from this, in order 
to show how these ideas are integral parts of the identification regime in Somaliland, in 
which the confirmation of identity entails a complementary process of authentication as a 
Somalilander. These claims of authenticity obviously draw boundaries around in-groups and 
out-groups, and in this chapter I set out how the structural logic of genealogy and clanship 
reinforces the marginalisation of so-called ‘minority’ clans, people with ‘illegitimate’ 
parentage, and, to some extent, women. In this chapter, I also examine closely the way that 
people say they use intermediaries and vouchsafers, including caaqils: important authorities 
in socio-political life, and the guarantors most often called upon by the state to verify 
identity. The caaqil’s genealogical situating of an applicant for identity documentation is 
crucial to the production of civic and voter status, and, as I will discuss in the following 
chapters, has been systematised into the official verification process for voter and national 
ID.  
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Genealogy as Legibility 
As Walls notes early on in his book, ‘any examination of political development or of peace- 
and state-building in Somali territories must be grounded in an understanding of customary 
Somali socio-political systems’ (2014:31). This is not as straightforward as it seems, 
however. Clan and kinship – the basis of that customary system – are complex institutions 
with multiple meanings over space and time; and the scholarship on Somali state and 
society has grappled with trying to explain these sufficiently and appropriately. The now-
standard anthropological account provided by I M Lewis has been criticised for perpetuating 
an idea of the unity of Somalis based in nomadic pastoralist culture without reflection on 
class and race (Besteman, 1996a; 1998); and for ‘the fiction of a self-reproducing Somali 
society, rooted in a rigid kinship system and with traditions unaffected by historical process’ 
(Aidid, 2015; see also Mansur in Ali, 1995). The functionalist ‘clan paradigm’ that Lewis 
drew from his observations of nomadic pastoralist lifestyles has now been joined by 
accounts that demonstrate the significant cleavages of class, gender, occupation, race, status 
and language in Somali society (Besteman, 1996a; 1996b; Luling, 2002), but debates about 
the essentialisation and reification of clan life continue (see Aidid, 2015). Luling, who called 
such debates ‘barren’, suggests that a productive focus is instead how clan is developed and 
used in different contexts (2006:478). 
 
This is therefore my approach in this thesis. My position in this chapter is that the social 
practices of contemporary Somaliland society (particularly those of situating, connecting 
and vouching), though they may index the norms of Somali pastoralist society, are rather, as 
Kapteijns notes, the artefacts of ‘completely new political, social, and economic realities’ 
(1991:13). Certainly in Hargeysa, clans are one only part of people’s everyday lives. Religion 
is a central part of Somaliland life, and the rituals, ceremonies and celebrations of Islam 
punctuate the quotidian rhythm of everyone’s lives. People are of course also shaped by, and 
identify with, collective formations along economic and political lines (such as class), and 
there is a territorial dimension to belonging, particularly in the cities (Barnes, 2006). 
However, lineage politics and clan relations do also seem to be a significant aspect of the 
way that identities are negotiated and identification undertaken. This does not mean that 
they are ‘rigid’ or ‘traditional’. Indeed, it is clear from empirical accounts of Somali socio-
political life that kinship and clanship is valorised in some settings and by some actors, and 
denigrated in others, as I show in this chapter and in Chapter 6.  
 
As structuring logics, however, genealogy, lineage, and clanship do seem to be standardised 
and taken-for-granted categories of meaning that have can be used by various actors to 
organise political and social life. Indeed, as I argue in Chapter 4, genealogy – in terms of 
personal lineage and clan identity – has had a profound shaping effect on the emerging 
Somaliland nation-state, in terms of citizenship and contemporary political relations 
between different groups in Somaliland society. At the everyday level, these aspects of clan 
membership are invoked when needed and in ways that demonstrate fluidity and diversity. 
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At the same time, this does suggest that ideas about lineage, descent, naming, and 
relationality that come from the ‘genealogical idiom’ are shared and systematised forms of 
knowledge. Certainly, in the way my informants discussed these issues, genealogy seems to 
be a ‘grid of knowability’ that helps to make identity intelligible and legible, and which 
provides a cognitive map of the relationships between people to enable ‘wayfinding’ (O’Neill, 
1991). It is the way that these ideas and practices work as the basis of identification, and 
specifically authentication, that I draw out in this chapter.  
 
Narrating Identity 
At its most basic, a genealogy is a list of names. In Somaliland, a person typically has a triad 
of names that constitute their given name, their father’s first name and their grandfather’s 
first name. These three names are in fact the beginning of a much longer chain of names 
that constitute a person’s patrilineal genealogy, and in which one’s own identity is 
inscribed.1 For example, a child of Ahmed, and grandchild of Ibrahim, might be Mohamed 
Ahmed Ibrahim (male) or Quman Ahmed Ibrahim (female). Mohamed’s child might then be 
Omar Mohamed Ahmed (Ibrahim …); Quman’s child would take the names of her husband 
– there is no Omar Quman Ahmed, for instance.  
 
In this way, each person is embedded not only in a line of patrilineal descent, but also a web 
of blood relationships: from one founding ancestor comes multiple branches and shoots.2 
Someone’s personal genealogy is therefore but a small branch of the ‘tree’ of the clan system 
in Somaliland. The significant nodes represented by key forefathers are called jilbo (sg. 
jilib), which literally mean ‘knees’, and are used to refer to the points of clan and sub-clan 
segmentation.3 By recalling these in the recounting of their name and those of their fathers, 
Somalis give also the history of their family, their lineage and ultimately their clan, since five 
or so generations make up a lineage, several lineages a sub-clan, several of these a clan until 
ultimately one reaches the clan’s founding father (Lewis, 1961:127–37; Luling, 2006:473). 
Genealogy is thus a historical catalogue of key progenitors. 
 
And yet genealogy does more than simply record one’s ancestors, since in the branches and 
offshoots of blood and marriage come multiple lines of relations. In Somali, the name for 
genealogy is tol, which comes from the verb ‘to sew together’. This etymology is suggestive of 
the binding together of individuals within webs of interpersonal relations. This interweaving 
creates networks of reciprocity that constitute an important part of the quotidian life that I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  first	  name	  is	  given	  personally	  to	  the	  child.	  The	  second	  name	  or	  surname	  is	  that	  of	  the	  father’s	  first	  name,	  whose	  own	  surname	  –	  the	  first	  name	  of	  his	   father	  –	  becomes	  the	  traditional	  third	  name,	  and	  so	  on.	  For	  an	  example,	  see	  the	  recitation	  by	  Nabiil	  on	  page	  74	  or	  the	  example	  of	  Rooble’s	  lineage	  on	  pages	  179–80.	  Note	  that	  the	  common	  proclivity	  for	  nicknames	  –	  often	  useful	  for	  distinguishing	  those	  with	  an	  identical	  triad	  of	  names	  –	  falls	  out	  of	  the	  formal	  genealogy:	  though	  someone	  may	  be	  called	  by	  another	  moniker	  for	  all	  their	  life,	  children	  do	  not	  inherit	  this	  name.	  2	  Hence	  the	  term	  ‘lineage	  segmentation’	  is	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  genealogical	  systems	  of	  this	  kind,	  and	  is	  favoured	  by	  Lewis	  (1961:7;	  1994:19).	  3	  Luling	  suggests	  this	  might	  reflect	  the	  Arab	  tradition	  of	  figuring	  kinship	  as	  the	  human	  body	  (2006:474).	  It	  may	  be	  that	  it	  refers	  to	   ‘joint’	  more	  broadly,	  giving	  an	   image	  of	  an	  articulated	  mechanism	  (natural	  or	  not)	   in	  which	  there	  are	  key	  nodes	  of	  connection	  –	  an	  appealing	  metaphorical	  device,	  since	  it	  captures	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  Somali	  clan	  system.	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observed in Hargeysa, and which form the bedrock of social relations and a structure of 
predictability that is essential in the context of Somaliland’s legal limbo. 
 
In Somaliland, the practice of reciting one’s genealogy is known as abtirsiino, which means 
literally ‘counting fathers’ but which is often translated as genealogy or lineage (Lewis, 
1994). Designed for the infrequent yet vitally important encounters in pastoralist life, two 
individuals meeting would be able to recite their abtirsiino in order to establish what 
relationship exists between them, permitting strangers to find the point of connection 
(Lewis, 1994). Counting back to find the node at which lineage branches come together, the 
degrees of separation can be deducted, and hence obligations or sanctions, terms of 
marriage or inheritance, and grounds for friendship or feud can all be reckoned (Gardner 
with Warsame, 2004:154). This reading of genealogy thus works in tandem with customary 
legal decisions and the pragmatic configurations of alliance on which Somali pastoral 
clanship traditionally depended. Lewis argued that descent gives each person an ‘exact place 
within society’; in doing so, ‘most corporate activities are contingent upon it … and politics 
stem from it’ (1994:19): blood connections are not only preferable for emotional security, 
but essential for physical protection and welfare. This account of the abtirsiino does of 
course draw on the pastoralist paradigm, which is of less immediate relevance in the urban 
environment. As Dacaad, a researcher and activist who I interviewed in Hargeysa, put it: 
‘You need abtirsiino in rural areas to catch imposters. [You must] narrate your lineage’ 
(Interview, 2014). Dacaad’s implication was that this is less necessary in city life where face-
to-face encounters are more common, and people are bound together in multiple networks 
of associational life. However, even in Hargeysa, certain kinds of identification still draw on 
what Cassanelli has termed ‘thinking and acting genealogically’ (2010:56), as I demonstrate 
here and in the following chapters.  
 
Many Somalis do therefore learn their personal lineage at a young age, so that throughout 
life they can recite as many as twenty or so generations of paternal names back to the 
founding ancestor of their clan.4 Idil, a young woman recently returned to Hargeysa from 
the diaspora, told me: ‘I remember I was five years old when I learnt the names. I knew 
them all – even now. It’s burnt into your brain so that you know it your whole life’ 
(Interview, 2013). However, none of my Hargeysa interlocutors said that they used 
genealogical reckoning in their quotidian encounters in the city. It is a handy mnemonic for 
ancestry, used to reveal genealogical closeness or distance in the present day, but one’s 
abtirsiino is not widely known – or shared. Inshaar, a young IT graduate who I talked at 
length with about this, described one’s abtirsiino as a ‘privilege’:  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Of	  course,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  patrilineal	  reckoning,	  women’s	  names	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  abtirsiino	  and	  common	  ancestors	  may	  only	  appear	  higher	  in	  the	  list	  or	  not	  at	  all,	  but	  boys	  and	  girls	  appear	  to	  learn	  it	  just	  the	  same	  (Tawfiiq,	  interview,	  2012).	  This	  issue	  of	  gendered	  elision	  is	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  chapter.	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When	  you	  meet	   someone	  who	  knows	  you	  but	  not	  well,	   then	  maybe	   they	   say,	   ‘are	  you	  the	  son	  of	  Mohamed?’	  You	  use	  that	  kind	  of	  information	  as	  a	  privilege.	  And	  you	  say	   ‘yes	   I	   am	   Inshaar	  Mohamed’	   as	   a	   confirmation	   that	   you	   are	   that	   person.	   But	  strangers	  do	  not	  ask	  you	  because	  they	  don’t	  know	  you.	  …	  That	  kind	  of	  information	  is	  only	  for	  people	  who	  know	  you.	  (Interview,	  2014b)	  
 
Inshaar here explains that one’s genealogical biography is for those who ‘know’ you, who are 
related, and for whom this information is meaningful. However, whilst the string of paternal 
names may be ‘insider’ information, the abtirsiino is only one part of the broader 
genealogical idiom that includes lineage, clan identity and family obligations, and which can 
work as a powerful form of situatedness. 
 
‘Of the Clans I Am Caught Between’5 
These conventions around the abtirsiino, and the way in which it works as an undercurrent 
to identification, have important implications for women’s status in Somaliland. Women do, 
of course, have lines of genealogical descent via their fathers and their father’s fathers, and 
so on; and mothers are arguably a very strong identity within the clan, because lineages (and 
hence clan strength) are derived through the bax (uterine) lineages (Dacaad, interview, 
2014). Women do therefore have a personal lineage to narrate. However, women’s own 
names are not passed on in the abtirsiino, and women in this sense are completely elided 
from the genealogies that are learnt and reproduced.  
 
Within the formal structure of genealogy, therefore, women’s identities are read only in 
terms of their relationship to men: who is their father? Who is their husband? This is related 
to women’s interstitial role in the clan system. Whilst women’s primary clan identity is that 
of their father’s, upon marriage a woman becomes a ‘guest’ of her husband’s clan. Her 
children, and particularly her sons, will be of their father’s clan, meaning mothers and their 
children do not share the same clan. Women therefore have an ambivalent status within 
their own (father’s) clan since their sons are likely to be members of another mag-paying 
group – and thus potentially enemies (Lewis, 1994; Gardner with Warsame, 2004). Women 
are thus assumed to have conflicting loyalties, leading Ifrax, a prominent civil society leader 
in her fifties, to declare that ‘we [Somali women] don’t have any clan identity. We are 
between clans’ (Interview, 2014). This is one of the reasons why so few women have been 
elected in Somaliland.6 ‘They [the clan] always question the loyalty, where does she belong 
to. So that makes it difficult for a woman to fully participate,’ said Nasteho, one of the 
trailblazing women who kickstarted Hargeysa’s vibrant civil society (Interview, 2012).7 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  From	  a	  poem	  recited	  by	  Dudi	  Ahmed	  to	  Siham	  Rayale	  in	  Rayale,	  2013:9.	  6	  The	  Quranic	  proscription	  on	  female	  leadership	  is	  also	  cited	  as	  an	  important	  factor.	  	  7	  On	  the	  changing	  roles	  of	  Somali	  women	  in	  history,	  see	  also	  Abdi,	  2007;	  Abdullahi,	  2007,	  2010;	  Ahmed,	  1999;	  Aidid,	  2010;	   Gardner	   and	   El	   Bushra,	   2004;	   Jama,	   1994,	   2007;	   Kapteijns,	   1994,	   2009;	   Rayale,	   2012,	   2013;	   Timmons,	   2004;	  Tungaraza;	  2008;	  Van	  Hauwermeiren,	  2012;	  Warsame,	  2002.	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Notwithstanding this, women’s interstitiality has theoretical advantages. Their cross-clan 
positionality (in which they are connected to the clans of their father, their husband, their 
daughter-in-law and their son-in-law) gives them a much broader network of significant 
relationships than men, spanning several different lineage and clan divisions (Gardner with 
Warsame, 2004:163).8 These can be useful in everyday life as I discuss below. Hargeysa 
women are also seeking to claim narratives of their identity that emphasise agency rather 
than chattel-like subjectivity (Ahmed, 1995).9 Nonetheless, it is the case that as a form of 
legibility, genealogy simplifies and generalises, and can fix people in unfavourable 
relationships of power, as many women in Somaliland find.  
 
‘Reading’ Clan 
The complex considerations involved in genealogically writ identities mean that clan 
identities are also complicated performances that have a range of scripts. Many of my 
interlocutors claimed that clan is not foregrounded in encounters and interactions. Gardner 
and Warsame wrote in 2004 that ‘Under normal circumstances … it would be considered 
rude and provocative for people to refer explicitly to their own or others’ clan identity’ 
(2004:154). In the years since then, clan politics has become much more conspicuous in 
Somaliland, and people try hard to avoid allegations of qabiilism (‘tribalism’). A number of 
my interviewees were adamant that asking about clan suggests that you are someone who 
cares about it in a competitive or political way, which is a ‘tribalist’ way of thinking. Whilst 
taking pride in your own clan is valued, it seems that is just ‘not done’ to bring out clan 
affiliations in public (Sagal, interview, 2014). Indeed, Ifrax and Inshaar both argued that it is 
‘shameful’ to ask directly about clan, with Inshaar adding that he thought it was 
unprofessional and even strange to do so (Ifrax, interview, 2014; Inshaar, interview, 2014a). 
Inshaar, a Hargeysa University graduate running an IT business, thought that older 
generations often do ask directly about clan, using it to identify people, but that for younger 
people, particularly in the city, this is not appropriate (ibid). In contrast, Ifrax, a 
professional in her forties or fifties, claimed that her generation do not make inquiries about 
clan, but that the young people sometimes use where people are from to determine clan 
(Interview, 2014). These two accounts show the different stories people tell about the 
importance of clan. It also shows that, even if the social conventions around discussing clan 
are complicated, it is still a relevant frame of meaning.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For	   this	   reason,	  women	   have	   traditionally	   played	   roles	   as	   go-­‐betweens,	   leveraging	   influence	   on	   both	   sides	   should	  conflict	  arise.	  As	  the	  Somali	  novelist	  Nuruddin	  Farah	  has	  put	  it,	  ‘women	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  multiplicity	  of	   connections	   the	  warring	   communities	   have,	   seeing	   themselves	   now	  as	  mothers	   to	   children	   of	   one	   family,	   now	  as	  daughters	  of	  another,	  and	  on	  remarriage,	  as	  mothers	  to	  offspring	  from	  yet	  another	  lineage’	  (cited	  in	  Affi,	  2004:106).	  9	  For	  instance,	  women	  activists	  in	  Somaliland	  are	  interrogating	  the	  linkage	  between	  women’s	  status	  and	  tradition,	  and	  engaging	   in	   debates	   over	   Quranic	   interpretation	   of	   female	   roles	   (for	   instance,	   about	   female	   leadership)	   as	   well	   as	  customary	   norms	   (for	   instance,	   regarding	   inheritance	   and	   divorce)	   (Fieldnotes,	   Hargeysa,	   2012;	   see	   also	   McGown,	  2004).	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Figure 2: Somali clan genealogy.! ! 
 
 
 
 
!HIIL!
!SAMALE! !SAB!
!
Isaaq!
!
Dir!
!
Darood!
!
Hawiye!
!Ogaden!
!Marehan!
!Harti!
!Warsengeli!
!Dhulbhante!
!Majerteen!
!Gadabuursi!
!Issa!
!Habar!Awal!
!Habar!Jaallo!
!Garhajis!
!Arap!
!Habar!Yonis!
!Eidagalle!
!Cisse!Muse!
!Sacad!Muse!
!
Jibril!Abokor!
!
Maxamed!
!
Digil!
!
Rahanweyn!
!Mirifle!
Source: Balthasar, 2012:334 (adapted from Lewis, 1961); my illustration.!
!FOUNDING!FATHERS!
!
Clan!Family!
!Clan!
!SubaClan!
!
SubASubAClan!
Figure 1: An abridged versi n of the Somali 
clan genealogy.	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However, just because it is not openly discussed does not mean that clan identity is not 
useful or relevant. A number of my interlocutors emphasised that clan is, in many ways, the 
most significant basis for identification because ‘everybody has it’ and ‘everybody knows it’ 
(Muxudin, interview, 2014). In the absence of a comprehensive formal system of official 
identification (as discussed in Chapter 4), clan identity is considered useful and valuable 
when trying to locate a person, and in key social encounters such as marriage, death and 
commerce (Muxudin, interview, 2014; Yaasmiin, interview, 2014). ‘The only ID you have for 
that person [you meet] is qabiil’, argued Baxsan, an accounting graduate. ‘It is the only thing 
we can rely on – telling clan is the only thing we have’ (Interview, 2014; translated by 
Inshaar). 
 
Clan thus forms part of the information one expects to have about new (and old) 
acquaintances, either gained indirectly from other people or from ways of ‘reading’ the 
person or the situation. This reading is similar to what Allen Feldman describes as ‘telling’, 
in which the body of the other is read in order to determine ‘of which sociohistorical space 
the encountered body is a synecdoche’ (1991:157). In Somaliland society, the synecdoche is 
the clan, and the body is a kinsman. Signs upon the body are used to ‘read’ it and thus 
identify it, and these include accent and dress (see Bjork, 2007). Particularly in Hargeysa, 
where tastes are cosmopolitan and the fashions include Western-style dress, it is difficult for 
an outsider to read these small signs. However, ‘insiders’ claim special knowledge. Daacad, 
an educated man working for a prominent NGO, boasted that he could tell someone’s region 
(a euphemism for clan) by listening to clues in the voice, evaluating their manner and 
demeanour, and looking at what they ate because of purported cultural differences between 
east and west Somaliland (Interview, 2014). When pressed, he admitted that these were 
little more than stereotypes,10 but these and other signs (such as mobile phone number11) 
are used as ways to guess clan when more revealing features are not apparent.  
 
The use of birthplace is also a common cipher for clan since, despite the urbanisation, 
mobility and displacement of recent decades, the territorial geography of Somaliland 
remains largely clan-based. ‘People ask where you are born, where are you from, and then 
that gives you an answer’, explained Inshaar, who was running a computer repair company 
as well as helping me with translation (Interview, 2014a). This form of ‘knowing’ was 
repeatedly described to me as a ‘postcode’: in other words, a systemised way of locating a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	   instance,	   the	  Habar	   Yonis	   are	   apparently	   called	   ‘lions’	   because,	   explained	   researcher	  Daacad,	   their	   traditional	  lands	   in	   the	   Haud	   and	   Togdheer	   were	   once	   lion	   habitats,	   and	   also	   for	   their	   aggression	   in	   taking	   land	   and	   their	  dominance	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers.	  The	  Habar	  Jaallo	  are	  ‘foxes’	  because	  they	  are	  regarded	  as	  cunning,	  and	  the	  ‘Iise	  Muuse	  are	  ‘monkeys’	  because	  monkeys	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Sheikh	  mountains,	  their	  traditional	  clan	  territory	  (there	  may	  also	  be	  character	  traits,	  which	  I	  was	  not	  privy	  to).	  11	  Rooble	  claimed	  that	  you	  could	  sometimes	  tell	  where	  people	  were	  from	  because	  of	  their	  mobile	  phone	  number	  since	  different	  area	  codes	  are	  assigned	  to	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  for	  instance,	  440-­‐442	  in	  Hargeysa,	  443	  for	  Burco,	  444	  for	  Berbera,	  446	  for	  Borama	  and	  449	  for	  Laascaanood	  (Fieldnotes,	  Hargeysa,	  2014).	  Sadaaq	  confirmed	  that	  he	  also	  used	  this	   sometimes	   to	   know	   where	   someone	   was	   from	   (interview,	   2014).	   However,	   since	   there	   are	   different	   mobile	  operators	   in	  Somaliland	  (although	  these	  codes	   from	  Telesom	  are	  predominant),	  and	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  have	  more	   than	  one	  sim	  card,	  we	  might	  be	  skeptical	  about	  this	  as	  a	  form	  of	  identification.	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unit within the entire demographic field. 12  Since there are no formal postcodes in 
Somaliland,13 offices, public buildings and homes are all found in the same way as a person: 
juxtaposition with a known unit (landmark/relative), and then asking for directions. It is in 
this way that the clan becomes part of the way of situating a person, just as profession or 
residence might have been used as a suffix in pre-modern Europe (Scott, Tehranian and 
Mathias, 2002). For instance, a fellow researcher once described to me how she had visited 
an office in Hargeysa to see a girl named Zahra (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2013). Asking at the 
front desk, ‘can I speak to Zahra?’, the receptionist’s flatly replied ‘which Zahra?’ Nimco 
replied that she did not know her other names, and so the receptionist asked ‘what’s her 
tribe?’ Also unknown, the receptionist declared: ‘How can you find someone if you don’t 
know their tribe?’ Similarly, Farhan, a civil servant at the electoral commission, said 
offhandedly to me, as we drove through the lunchtime rush: ‘I know everybody in Hargeysa. 
If I need to find anyone, I just find out his clan, and then I ask someone who asks someone’ 
(Interview, 2014).  	  
According to Farhan, therefore, clan can work as an identifier, although only if a person’s 
clan can be discovered, clues of which may be in their name. Despite the tribalist 
connotations, clan is therefore sometimes asked about directly. As in the remarks by 
Muxudin and Baxsan above, my interlocutors argued that clan identity is the basis of 
identification. ‘You should use qabiil [clan] for identifying people or knowing who they are 
… Qabiil will always be there’, argued Kulane, a construction worker in his early thirties 
(Interview, 2014; translated by Ashkir). Inshaar, the IT graduate, explained that: ‘qabiil is 
very important because everyone knows it. It is the identity. If you don’t know a person, he 
asks your name, your clan, sub-clan, then that person knows you’ (Interview, 2014b). These 
mundane ways of identifying people thus reinforce the idea that identity in Somaliland has 
an important relational quality, and that it is through relations and connections that a 
person can be known and verified.   
 
‘Yaad Tahay?’ 
The question ‘yaad tahay?’ in Somali means ‘who are you’.14 An intelligible answer would 
therefore most likely be one’s three names, but my interlocutors suggested that this question 
is not simply asking who you are, but is a coded way of asking about clan, and thus the 
relationality of the questioner and the respondent. Ashkir, a teacher in his twenties recently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  explanation	  was	  typically	  used	  by	  urbanites,	  often	  those	  who	  spoke	  excellent	  English	  and	  sometimes	  had	  spent	  time	  in	  the	  diaspora,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  may	  have	  been	  offered	  because	  of	  their	  own	  experience	  with	  postcodes,	  or	  the	  awareness	  that	  this	  would	  be	  a	  useful	  metaphor	  for	  me.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  ways	  clan	  is	  spoken	  about,	  postcode,	  even	  if	   not	   so	   called,	   captures	   the	   idea.	   Lewis	   notes,	   for	   instance,	   that	   ‘a	   person’s	   address	   in	   Europe	   is	   his	   pedigree	   in	  Somaliland’	  (1994:97).	  	  13	  The	  nomadic	  nature	  of	  the	  rural	  areas	  obviates	  a	  fixed	  system,	  whilst	  in	  the	  cities,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  census	  or	  household	  survey,	  coupled	  with	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  postal	  system,	  means	  that	  homes	  and	  offices	  are	  located	  in	  alternative	  ways,	  such	  as	  proximity	   to	   landmarks	   (for	   example,	   ‘behind	   the	   school’,	   ‘near	   the	  UN	  compound’)	   or	  by	  district	   (‘Bad	  Cas’	   [Red	  Sea],	   ‘June	   26’).	   In	   2015,	   the	  municipal	   council	   unveiled	   a	   city	  map	   of	   Hargeysa,	   but	   this	   still	   does	   not	   have	   zoning	  (Somaliland	  Sun,	  2015b).	  	  14	  This	  is	  the	  translation	  that	  I	  was	  given.	  Lewis	  noted	  the	  versions	  ‘Tol	  maad	  tahay?’	  (what	  is	  your	  agnatic	  group?)	  or	  ‘Qolomaad	  tahay’	  (‘what	  group	  are	  you?’)	  (1961:135).	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returned to Hargeysa from growing up in the UK, had had to quickly come to terms with 
what this question was really about. He explained: 	  First	  you	  ask	  ‘yaad	  tahay?’	  which	  means	  you	  are	  asking	  ‘what	  is	  your	  qabiil	  [clan]	  or	  
jilib	  [sub-­‐clan]?’,	  then	  you	  ask	  ‘yaad	  ka	  sii	  tahay?’	  which	  means	  ‘who	  are	  you	  within	  that	  jilib,	  that	  group?	  Then	  when	  they	  give	  you	  an	  answer,	  you	  ask	  again	  ‘yaad	  ka	  sii	  tahay?’	  until	  you	  get	  to	  the	  level	  you	  know.	  (Ashkir,	  interview,	  2014c)	  
 
In the way Ashkir explains it, a question that is seemingly about personal identity (who are 
you?) is actually designed to ascertain membership within a collective (essentially, which 
group are you?). This method of inquiry is, according to Ashkir, colloquially called tooyasho 
(‘information-gathering’), a way of gathering information15 that seeks to establish someone’s 
relative location within the shared genealogical terrain, and which occurs at the relevant 
level required: it may be sub-sub-sub-clan in close quarters, or sub-clan or clan in other 
circumstances. Rooble, my research assistant in 2014, similarly told me that ‘who are you’ is 
not asking you what your name is, but what your clan is (Interview, 2014a). Inshaar, the IT 
graduate, similarly explained that a general question – about clan, or more likely region –
elicits information with which to develop the appropriate situating strategy: ‘[if someone 
replies] Hargeysa or Burco – a place with mixed clan – then they ask which clan, then if it is 
the same clan [as them], they ask the sub-clan’ (Interview, 2014a).  
 
This tooyo (‘information’) therefore maps someone within the broad genealogical terrain of 
Somaliland and, crucially, offers a shorthand for their relationships with others. Within this 
practice of tooyasho, clan identity becomes a ‘password’: it unlocks certain layers of identity 
to the casual acquaintance – to go further, to make the answer to ‘yaad ka sii tahay?’ 
meaningful, one has to be within the next concentric circle of identity – in other words, the 
same clan or sub-clan. Most people know the principal clans and sub-clans of Somaliland – 
such as the Arap, Dhulbahante, Habar Awal, Habar Jaallo, Habar Yoonis, Issa, Gadabuursi, 
Garhjajis and Warsengeli (see Figure 1) – and therefore they can quickly get past the first 
question. It is in the next layers in which genealogical proximity comes to be meaningful: for 
instance, as Rooble put it, if you know someone is in the same layer, you might say: ‘don’t 
you know me? Our fathers are third cousins. Do you know me now?’ (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 
2014) In Somaliland, therefore, layers of information are encoded within names, and how 
these are activated depends on the relationship between people. In this sense, there is no 
definitive answer to ‘yaad tahay’ since the relational nature of the question means that the 
answer depends upon who is asking the question.16 
 
It is through this kind of patterned interaction, in which people are interpellated in different 
layers of identity and networks of connections, that genealogy and clan function as a mode 
of identification. There are different levels of intelligibility, with the clan name acting as 
postcode, since it is widely understood and known. The identity of the lower jilbo, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  From	  the	  verb	  tooyo	  to	  mean	  ‘inquire	  or	  seek	  some	  information’.	  16	  Thanks	  for	  Giulia	  Liberatore	  for	  helping	  to	  phrase	  this	  point.	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meanwhile, are not readily shared with people outside the clan, nor are they demanded in 
identification encounters, the reasons for which appear to be multi-layered. On a basic level, 
the information is not expected to have much utility, since once it is established where the 
genealogical commonality (if any) lies, additional information does not fit within each 
other’s grids of intelligibility: ‘it would be unknown and not structurally equivalent’, wrote 
Lewis (1961:136). This means that unless you share a sub-clan or below, someone’s claim to 
belong to a certain clan cannot be immediately verified, since most people do not know the 
lower jilbo of other clans or do not have a ready way of triangulating by relatives.17 
 
What is the value of this as a form of identification then? As an outsider, it seems that if 
one’s interlocutor does not have the relevant idiomatic knowledge, one could claim to be 
anyone (up to a point). My interviewees were unperturbed by my questions about how one 
could really know what someone’s clan was or who someone was. The responses were all 
similar, and adamant: there is no reason for somebody to lie, people are proud of their clan, 
you always know (or rather, you can always find out) (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2013–14). 
Ugbaad, a political-party official, claimed that a common saying is ‘Your face is your 
passport’ (Interview, 2014). Having lived in the UK and in Hargeysa, she argued that 
identity fraud was not possible in Somaliland society. ‘No one can come and say they are me. 
There is no other me’ (ibid). She argued that this was because people are connected within 
webs of interpersonal relations, meaning that just as there is always someone who can 
‘speak for you’, in other words, there is someone who will know that you are not who you 
claim to be. Constant processes of triangulation mean that this information can be 
discovered through a well-placed phone call or personal inquiry. ‘If you don’t know 
someone, you know someone who is related’, was the constant refrain in answer to my 
questions (for instance by Dacaad, interview, 2014).  
 
These claims about the ease and accessibility of situating people via the mental map of 
shared genealogy do, of course, need to be problematised because they over-simplify social 
relations and social identification. There is great fluidity in the personal invocation of 
identity: people use the level of clan at which they can access protection, whether that is the 
mag-paying group for one situation or the clan for another. This means that political 
identification is also enormously supple with people using networks derived from different 
configurations of clan based on paternal and maternal kin, as well as relationships more 
tenuously genealogically defined. As I have emphasised above, the practical transactions and 
activities of everyday life in the city throw people together in acquaintance and friendship, 
meaning genealogical relations or clan fellowship may not even figure as the primary frame 
of meaning. Certainly Somalilanders identify themselves and others in multiple and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  To	  explain	  it	  another	  way,	  if	  I	  did	  not	  live	  in	  London,	  your	  explanation	  of	  which	  neighbourhood	  you	  live	  in,	  or	  indeed	  the	  location	  of	  your	  home,	  would	  be	  meaningless	  because	  I	  do	  not	  have	  the	  requisite	  knowledge	  or	  the	  relevant	  frame	  of	  meaning.	  Indeed,	   it	  would	  be	  strange	  to	  share	  such	  specific	   information	  with	  someone	  you	  did	  not	  know	  well,	  and	  possibly	  even	  dangerous.	  However,	   if	  we	  were	  both	  Londoners	  and	   indeed	   living	   in	  north	  London,	  your	  answer	   that	  you	  live	  in	  Camden	  town	  would	  have	  meaning	  for	  me	  and	  we	  could	  perhaps	  establish	  how	  far	  we	  live	  from	  one	  another	  and	  whether	  we	  know	  any	  intermediate	  people.	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different political, economic, social and cultural ways. However, it also seems that lineage 
can act as an important identifier – one’s name, in the form of one’s first name followed by 
the string of paternal names, can be used a simple and standardised text of identity, and 
thus can be ‘read’ in order to verify identity. Farah made exactly this point when he claimed: 
‘the genealogy is the real ID. You do not need ID. Someone will say, “I know your uncle”, 
and then he knows you’ (Interview, 2013). 
 
Powerful Narratives: Genealogical Elision and Exclusion 
This practice of triangulation via clan and lineage appears simple, mundane and universal. 
However, not everyone in Somaliland gains visibility via the ‘metic legibility’ of genealogy, or 
if they do, this ‘visibility’ is prejudiced and politicised. Identifying someone through 
tooyasho not only seeks to verify their identity according to genealogical structures, but also 
involves claims of authentication: are they a member of one’s own sub-clan, clan, or clan 
family (or perhaps even ‘nation’), and can this be authenticated against the standard frame 
of meaning (genealogy)? In other words, not only are they who they say they are, but can 
they be located in relation to other (authentic) people?  
 
This undercurrent of authenticity comes from narratives and beliefs implicit in the use of 
genealogy as a structuring device for both official and vernacular identification. Lewis 
argued that unlike other segmentary lineage societies, where the genealogies are akin to 
parables (based in some loose way on history but actually mnemonic devices for present 
social relationships) the Somali system is a historical (or quasi-historical) record that 
conserves and stabilises bloodlines (1994:96). As we have seen above, we have to be aware 
of the hegemonic image of pastoralist society in Lewis’ work. That is the case here also. 
Genealogies appear to be emblematic texts that remember and commemorate actual, named 
ancestors. Even if we accept, as Lewis did, that Somali genealogy draws on real rather than 
fictive agnatic lineages, this does not mean it is free of mythology, as he himself recognised 
(ibid). Importantly, there is no source of verification of these storylines other than in the 
genealogies themselves. 18  Rather, their credibility seems to be underwritten by three 
powerful narratives relating to time, authenticity and unity. These reinforce the power of 
genealogy to structure interpersonal life in Somaliland and create important gaps, elisions 
and invisibilities, which affect how genealogy and clanship are used as sources of identity 
verification. 
 
The Genealogical Present 
Like other genealogical systems, genealogy in Somaliland operates within a particular 
temporality that brings the past into the present (Shklar, 1971:144). This genealogical time is 
an imaginary in which multiple dimensions interact, and different conceptions of time 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Thank	  you	  to	  Felix	  Berenskoetter	  for	  this	  point.	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conjoin into a synthetic notion of uninterrupted time. Synchronic, ‘genealogical time’ 
smoothens breaks, shifts and divisions, creating a sense of continuity over time. This finds 
form in the linearity of the genealogical recitation that gives the blood chronicle the 
appearance of a single authoritative text. Genealogies also erase the transitions between 
different documentary techniques (Weigel, 2007).19 Instead, a genealogy seems to be a 
spoken text unchanged since historical times, in which ancestors and contemporaries alike 
recite the same words, and each can reach forward or back in history to the other. In this 
way, the special temporality of genealogy permits bloodlines to exist together in ‘a state of 
complete presence’ (Czerwinski, cited in Weigel, 2007). This ‘time map’ enables a particular 
kind of collective memory and social story telling (Zerubavel, 2003) that can reinforce 
particular narratives in the present, as I argue below. 
 
The Image of Unity 
These ideas about the temporal and genealogical proximity of one’s ancestors and relations 
translates into a powerful narrative that a person is linked to a great number of individuals 
both within their clan-family and with other clans with whom inter-marriage has taken 
place over generations. For instance, when discussing genealogy with Bilal, an electoral 
commissioner and businessman, he claimed: ‘I know everyone around me. I have some sort 
of linkage with them. I know where we meet in the tribal tree’ (Interview, 2013). When I 
asked Fawzia, a professional woman in her forties, whether she would call someone from the 
same sub-clan a relative, she responded: ‘in a way, all Isaaq are related, all Somalilanders 
are related’ (Interview, 2012). The implication of this shared ancestry is that certain clans 
are claimed to fit within a ‘total genealogy’, thus sharing an original history (Lewis, 1994). 
 
The hegemonic idea of total relationality – what Luling described as the idea that 
‘relationships must be there if only one can establish them’ (2006:474) – is, of course, not 
an inclusive one. This is particularly demonstrated by the marginalisation of the Gabooye, 
the ‘occupational’ groups that are often (misleadingly) called ‘minority clans’.20  Their 
genealogies are set apart from those of the ‘majority’ clans, meaning that the tools of 
relativisation that Ashkir, Inshaar and other mentioned above are constrained – it is 
difficult to undertake tooyasho when the frames of reference are segregated.  
 
Authentic Heritage 
This leads to a third powerful narrative inherent in genealogy about authenticity. The 
temporal compression of genealogy enables contemporary representatives to call into 
discursive being not only distant ancestors but also the founding fathers of the clan-families. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  For	  instance,	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  storytelling	  to	  colonial	  enumeration	  to	  the	  written	  Somali	  language.	  20	  The	  ‘Gabooye’	  is	  an	  umbrella	  category	  for	  a	  number	  of	  Somaliland	  clans	  that	  are	  marginalised	  and	  denigrated.	  Having	  traditionally	   undertaken	   ‘unclean’	   tradecrafts	   such	   as	   haircutting	   and	   leather	   tanning,	   they	   have	   been	   historically	  stigamtised.	  Although	   there	  have	  been	   improvements,	   their	  options	   for	  economic	  and	  educational	   integration	  within	  wider	  society	  are	  limited,	  with	  constraints	  on	  who	  they	  marry,	  where	  they	  live	  and	  what	  work	  they	  can	  do	  (Hill,	  2010).	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Each genealogical tracing ends with a sheikh or saint whose name the clan bears: men 
reputedly of noble Arabian families descended from the Prophet, who married into northern 
Somali clans (Lewis, 1994:102–03). In this way, certain ‘noble’ clan-families (those called 
bilis [‘noble’] or majority) claim an essential link to Islam (via a blood pedigree) and to 
Arabia (rather than Africa). Counting back ancestors to the clan fountainhead thus connects 
certain people to the relatives of the Prophet who are named at the top of the genealogical 
chain. By asserting an authoritative linearity from founding fathers to the present day, and 
claiming a place for each (authentic) Somalilander, genealogy has an extraordinarily 
powerful ability to call into being ‘a people’, and to make the relations between them seem 
‘natural’ (despite being a cultural product) and stable (despite containing many different 
chronologies) (Lewis, 1963:491; also see Bouquet, 1996:60). The effect of this is to give 
genealogical place a taken-for-granted quality, thereby making distinctions in status appear 
axiomatic, with implications for how the national community’s internal and external 
boundaries are drawn.  
 
This again distinguishes the Gabooye. Gabooye do trace their ancestral lineages back 
through time, and thus situate contemporary kinsmen within a narrative that references 
legacy and longevity (Mowliid, interview, 2012). However, they are not able to make the 
same claim to prestigious beginnings as the Isaaq, Dir and Darood, and are instead said to 
have originated from magic and witchcraft or to have Jewish ancestors (ibid; Dacaad, 
interview, 2014; see also Lewis, 1961:263).21 If asking ‘who you are’ is also revealing of 
genealogical pedigree, then such practices of identification may serve to reinforce inequality 
and exclusion, since they reference deeper sociological narratives. Of course, in reality there 
is much more ambiguity in everyday relations, but the rhetorical power of authenticity 
creates the image of fixed social facts, which contributes to the social immobility 
experienced by the Gabooye. It is in this sense that finding out who someone not only 
identifies them but authenticates them, since ‘knowing clan’ brings with it encoded 
assumptions about status and social location.  
 
There are also claims of superiority and inferiority within the ‘majority’ clans, which have 
implications for contemporary interactions. We can see this in the claim that some clans 
exhibit greater genealogical bifurcation and segmentation than others. These so-called laan 
dheer (‘long branch’), as opposed to laan gaab (‘short branch’) lineages are believed to 
contain a greater number of generations, and hence a greater fighting strength at the clan or 
sub-clan level (Lewis, 1994:100). A greater number of relatives also make for a broader 
network for patronage, favours and blood-money payments, and it is in this sense that 
numerical strength is a key indicator of political status. As with all genealogies, whilst 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  so-­‐called	  Yibir	  (derived	  from	  ‘Hebrew’)	  strongly	  reject	  this	  origin	  tale	  (Mowliid,	   interview,	  2012).	  Ahmed	  Jama	  Hersi,	  a	  suldaan	  of	  the	  Yibir	  in	  Somalia,	  told	  a	  US	  reporter	  that	   ‘stories	  passed	  down	  from	  his	  forefathers	  have	  it	  that	  they	  came	  as	  Arabic-­‐speaking	  teachers	  more	  than	  1,000	  years	  ago’	  –	  a	  similar	  descent	  story	  to	  the	  other	  Somali	  clans	  (Fisher,	   2000).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   stigmatisation	   continues,	   with	   Ahmed	   saying	   ‘Even	   our	   young	   people,	   they	   are	  ashamed	  when	  you	  ask	  them	  what	  tribe	  they	  belong	  to.	  They	  will	  not	  say	  Yibir’	  (ibid).	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personal lineages might name the fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers and so on of a 
person, the branches of relatives that come off these are subject to ‘the click of secateurs, the 
sawing, hacking and crashing of fallen branches, the killings off’ of history (Bouquet, 
1996:60). In other words, there is often a process of editing in genealogical accounts – what 
Lewis calls ‘genealogical elision’ (1994:100) – which may explain why some lineages appear 
longer or shorter. This is not a popular interpretation; rather, those who come from laan 
dheer take great pride in the number of generations in their lineages. Over breakfast in the 
garden of one of Hargeysa’s popular hotels, Roda, a young woman working in the Burco 
local government, unselfconsciously explained it to me in this way:  	  
Laan	   dheer	   is	   when	   you	   have	   more	   grandfathers	   back	   to	   the	   founding	   father.	  Twenty	  or	  twenty-­‐one	  is	  the	  most,	   I	  have	  eighteen	  or	  nineteen;	  fourteen	  or	  fifteen	  means	   fewer	  generations	  and	  a	  smaller	  size.	  Some	  people	  have	  more	  history	   than	  others.	  (Interview,	  2012)	  
 
Roda’s claim here – that one can have ‘more’ or ‘less’ history – reveals the current of 
authenticity that runs through the genealogical idiom in Somaliland: contemporary status is 
informed, in part, by one’s ancestral history. A Somaliland person is connected to history – 
an authentic history – by his or her lineage: the number of grandfathers gives real political 
meaning in the present, by endorsing the authenticity and identity of the contemporary 
lineage members. Just as with the idea of genealogical unity, the notion of authentic 
histories is a powerful tool of politics in the present day by creating grounds for inequality 
and by legitimating barriers to inclusion for the Gabooye in particular.  
 
‘Made-Up Names’ 
The Gabooye are not the only circumscribed group in Somaliland. Garacyo (illegitimate 
children, sg. garac)22 also fall out of these majoritarian terms of reference, and thus find it 
difficult to situate themselves genealogically, and thus be authenticated as Somalilanders.    
 
The patrilineal naming system that I described above means women do not give their own 
names to their offspring, but only those from the paternal line. Rooble, my research 
assistant with young children, was very clear about this when we discussed it: ‘Sometimes 
people adopt these children, but they do not take the man’s name or his fathers: you cannot 
give him your name’ (Interview, 2014b). Children without a known or named father (born of 
rape or out of wedlock) thus carry a lifelong burden of not having their ‘true’ (i.e. paternal) 
lineage recorded in their name – they have no abtirsiino. Garacyo are not situated via the 
‘metic legibility’ that comes from the dominant Somaliland genealogical idiom.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Although	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   find	   firm	   statistics,	   an	   estimated	   10	   percent	   of	   Somaliland’s	   children	   are	   orphaned	   or	  vulnerable	  (ANPPCAN-­‐SOM,	  nd).	  The	  majority	  are	  taken	  in	  by	  extended	  family	  members	  or	  neighbours,	  but	  350–400	  orphans	   live	  at	   the	  Hargeisa	  Orphanage	  Centre,	   the	  only	  national	   institution	   for	  destitute	   children	  dating	   from	  1954	  (Fieldnotes,	  Hargeysa,	  2014;	  Hargeisa	  Orphanage	  Centre,	  nd;	  Rajo	  Foundation,	  nd).	  Whilst	  young	  girls	  who	  live	  there	  may	  be	  adopted,	  boys	  and	  young	  men	  face	  spending	  their	  whole	  childhood	  at	  the	  state	  orphanage,	  often	  well	  into	  their	  early	  twenties	  because	  of	  the	  discrimination	  and	  stigma	  attached	  to	  the	  status	  of	  garacyo	  (Hargeisa	  Orphanage	  Centre,	  nd;	  Wargane,	  2015).	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The status of illegitimate children is therefore ambiguous at best. Whilst Islamic teaching 
regards any child born out of wedlock as innocent – for instance, verse 38 of the Surah al-
Najm ‘No soul shall bear the burden of another’ (Al-Islam.org, nd) – discussions about the 
appropriate arrangements for ‘halaal’ (permissible) babies (for instance, SomaliNet, 2010) 
show that there are a range of attitudes about illegitimacy. The increasing incidence of rape 
(and its reporting) in Somaliland also complicates perceptions of garacyo. 23  The 
stigmatisation of rape victims means that victims have traditionally been married to rape 
perpetrators so that any resulting child is born within the boundaries of marriage; 
otherwise, young women and their children face marginal status (Samiira, interview, 2012; 
Somaliland Sun, 2013a). Lawyer and human rights expert Fuaad told me frankly: ‘orphans 
do not have a role in society – that’s how it is’.  	  If	  the	  father	  is	  not	  known,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  be	  legitimised.	  You	  may	  get	  citizenship	  but	  [you]	  may	  not	  get	  a	  social	  position	  because	  of	  the	  barrier	  of	  legitimacy	  …	  [garacyo	  are]	  living	  in	  an	  isolated	  island	  with	  no	  political	  rights.	  (Interview,	  2012)	  	  
 
The court gives children at orphanages new identities, including paperwork that enables 
them to attend school and apply for government documents (Halgan, interview, 2014). This 
is not, however, enough to give them currency within the clan system: they remain, in 
Fuaad’s words, ‘third-class citizens … behind minorities’ (Interview, 2012). So whilst 
garacyo can claim legal status in Somaliland, the reality is that without a clan, there is no 
source of mag (blood money) and no fungible identity. ‘Society insults them’, Halgan, a 
senior staff member at Hargeysa orphanage told me, ‘they say, “you’re not anyone, you have 
no identity”’ (Interview, 2014). As adults, sometimes orphans do well, completing their 
education, finding work and getting married, but the prospects for most without clan 
backing are poor: he must be ‘enough for himself’, Halgan said (ibid). 
 
In order to have a credible identity therefore, garacyo sometimes conduct research into 
their background and find their actual clan, or are adopted by the clan of a friend, but ‘few 
are able to do this’, said Halgan (ibid). Others claim to be from a different region (so that the 
triangulation opportunities are more limited), or even nominate a clan as their own 
(Fieldnotes, 2014). Reciprocation, in which clans claim a garac, is rare however, according 
to Halgan (Interview, 2014). Even those who take these routes to assert a legible identity 
find it difficult to overcome the stigma. In a sense, therefore, garacyo are nameless. As 
Rooble said bluntly: ‘they have no name. These are made-up names and the names refer to 
no one. There is no lineage’ (Rooble, interview, 2014b). These attitudes makes identification 
within a system that draws on lineage, connections and networks very difficult, and show 
how vernacular practices are not necessarily inclusive or equal.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Gang	   rapes	   and	   the	   rape	   of	   children	   have	   been	   reported	   in	   areas	   with	   high	   numbers	   of	   vulnerable	   people,	   in	  particular	  Hargeysa’s	  IDP	  camps	  and	  minority	  neighbourhoods	  (Somali	  Current,	  2013;	  Fieldnotes,	  2012).	  24	  The	  prospect	  of	  credible	  documentation	  under	  the	  new	  civil	  registration	  scheme	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  6	  may	  shift	  these	  attitudes	  in	  time,	  but	  for	  the	  time	  being	  a	  garac’s	  exclusion	  from	  the	  genealogical	  idiom	  renders	  him	  invisible	  via	  the	  vernacular	  frames	  of	  verification	  that	  are	  at	  work	  in	  Somaliland.	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‘The Clan at My Back’ 
These narratives of inclusion and authenticity therefore shape notions of belonging and 
situatedness in Somaliland and are supported by the significance of clan membership to 
personal and social status. Nabiil, an MP, explained the utility of the abtirsiino one early 
evening at the Maan-Soor Hotel, where we had met for tea as the dusk settled, the swallows 
emerged and the call to prayer began to softly drift over the evening air. 	  I	  am	  Nabiil,	  my	  father	  is	  Muuse,	  Hussein,	  Adam,	  Mustafe,	  Abokor,	  Ahmed,	  Mukhtaar,	  Shermarke,	  Hassan,	  Abdullah,	  Mohamed,	  Mohamed,	  Ali,	  Carab,	  Isaaq.[25]	  So	  it	  is	  that	  ladder.	  And	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  problem	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  solve.	  So	  I	  will	  call	  the	  help	  of	  certain	   parts	   of	   the	   ladder,	   you	   don’t	   need	   the	   rest.	   But	   if	   the	   problem	   [affects]	  others,	  you	  go	  up	  the	  ladder:	  you	  go	  to	  increase	  your	  security,	  your	  assistance.	  It’s	  going	  like	  this	  [gesturing]:	  it’s	  dividing	  up,	  then	  going	  down,	  then	  coming	  together.	  (Interview,	  2012)	  
 
Its value, he argued, was that it offered a way to comprehend the layers of protection that 
come from the different levels of clan identity. The array of connections afforded by family 
and clan act as established conduits for favours and financial assistance, motivated and 
obligated by blood, reputation and charity. Even though some people are able to draw upon 
a variety of productive relations because their personal wealth, social position or profession 
affords them such breadth, the dominant frame in which connections are made and duties 
discharged is that of clan. It is these interactions that give flesh to the framework of 
genealogy since, as Jama argues, tolnimo (group feeling) does not come from genealogy 
alone (2007).  
 
The ladders that Nabiil describes are part of the networks of solidarity that animate 
everyday life, situating people within complex interpersonal webs. Many quotidian 
encounters and exchanges are thus structured by the logic of clanship: ‘you are a member of 
a community, you are a member of a clan: that sets you up, your parameters. How you deal 
with others is always determined by your clan’ (Nabiil, interview, 2012). In important ways, 
the relationship between state and citizen is mediated via the clan, both in terms of social 
services, which are delivered via a ‘social contract’, and in terms of legibility.26 In the 
absence of a capable state, for many Somalilanders the clan is the source of justice, welfare 
and security: it is ‘insurance’ in the face of uncertainty and anarchy, since the state cannot 
provide such assurances. As Aniso, a female lawyer working in a downtown legal clinic, put 
it, ‘your clan follows for you’ (Interview, 2012). 
 
Through conventions of reciprocity and protection, clan structures provide ways of meeting 
the needs of everyday life, drawing on the survival politics of traditional pastoralist life: at 
times of difficulty, your brother and cousin look after you; at times of plenty, you share in 
return (Ashkir, interview, 2014a). Central to this is, of course, the enduring practice of mag, 
in which all eligible males (and now often women) contribute to compensatory funds for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The	  names	  of	  the	  first	  ten	  grandfathers	  have	  been	  changed	  to	  protect	  Nabiil’s	  identity.	  26	  On	  the	  idea	  of	  this	  relationship	  as	  a	  ‘social	  contract’,	  see	  Leonard	  and	  Samantar,	  2010.	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crimes of their kinsmen.27 This institution is regulated by xeer, the customary contracts and 
agreements between clan groupings that set out how crimes committed by and against them 
will be resolved, and what levels of mag apply.28 Whilst women have a complicated status in 
clan relations (as discussed above), here interstitiality is an advantage since women gain 
security and legal recourse along two routes, as they fall under the formal protection of their 
husband’s clan, but their father’s clan claims mag should they be harmed. 
 
In my interviews, the scenario of accidental or intentional murder was the default way of 
explaining the protection provided by clan. For instance, discussing this one day together, 
my research assistant Rooble quipped, ‘Why do I need [sic] for someone else’s crime?’ His 
answer: ‘I know that if something happens to me then that murderer will pay for me’ 
(Interview, 2014c). That is not to say that there is not a criminal investigation bureau, local 
police stations and courts in Hargeysa, and that some crimes are not punished through the 
criminal justice system,29 but these institutions are considered weak, unaccountable and 
unpredictable. They do not have the legitimacy and proximity of the decentralised and often 
intimate customary and Sharia arrangements (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009; see also Logan, 
2013 and Menkhaus, 2006).30 In comparison, the clan is always there, argued Nasteho, the 
chief representative of a Somaliland NGO:  	  [I]f	  a	  soldier,	  a	  policeman	  badly	  beats	  somebody	  else,	  an	  ordinary	  person,	  or	  maybe	  people	  like	  me,	  do	  I	  know	  where	  to	  go?	  And	  if	  I	  know,	  can	  I	  get	  a	  fair	  trial	  on	  that?	  Can	  I	  sue	  the	  police	  commissioner?	  Can	  I	  sue	  the	  policeman	  himself?	  Can	  I	  get	  some	  sort	  of	  compensation	  on	  that,	  whatever	  it	  is?	  No,	  no.	  Those	  rights	  are	  not	  [there]	  –	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  are	  not	  protected	  in	  other	  words.	  I	  can	  be	  easily	  beaten	  in	  town	  and	   then	  my	  clan	  will	   come	   in	  and	   there	  will	  be	   some	   traditional	  agreement,	   clan	  agreement.	  Not	  a	  civic	  one!	  (Interview,	  2012)	  
 
In addition to the expense and weakness of the secular legal system,31 the dominance of 
customary conflict resolution is also explained by the idea of justice as a collective good that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  A	  mag-­‐paying	   group	   contains	  between	  300	  and	  2,000	   families,	  with	   groups	  bifurcating	   into	   smaller	   groups	   as	   the	  population	  grows	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  ties	  durable	  (Dacaad,	   interview,	  2014).	  Schlee	  (2013:261)	  notes	  that	  small	  groups	  may	   enter	   into	   contractual	   relations	   with	   distantly	   related	   groups	   to	   share	   the	   burdens	   of	   protection	   and	  compensation,	  since	  small	  groups	  are	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  against	  large	  groups	  who	  individually	  pay	  proportionately	  less.	  Women	  do	  not	  traditionally	  pay	  mag,	  although	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  labour	  market	  has	  meant	  that	  sometimes	  women	  are	  the	  only	  breadwinners	  and	  hence	  must	  make	  a	  contribution	  (Hammond,	  2010:140).	  	  28	  This	  is	  standardly	  100	  camels	  for	  the	  murder	  of	  a	  man,	  50	  for	  a	  woman,	  and	  various	  denominations	  of	  these	  sums	  for	  lesser	   injury,	  and	  draws	  on	  Sharia	  and	  also	  negotiation	  and	  precedent.	  The	  many	  contracts	  and	  oral	  agreements	  that	  make	  up	  xeer	  exist	  at	  the	  many	  levels	  of	  the	  clan	  system,	  and	  can	  change	  over	  time.	  As	  Bradbury	  notes	  (2008:17),	  the	  nature	  and	  application	  of	  xeer	  is	  debatable,	  and	  includes	  permutations	  and	  innovations,	  which	  cannot	  be	  covered	  here.	  Schlee	   (2013)	   has	   a	   useful	   overview	   of	   the	   negotiations	   and	   variations	   of	  mag,	   noting	   that	   relative	   strength	   and	  genealogical	  proximity	  can	  all	  affect	  the	  actual	  amounts	  due.	  	  29	  For	  instance,	  six	  men	  tried	  for	  murder	  were	  controversially	  executed	  in	  April	  2015	  in	  the	  first	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  death	  sentence	  in	  decades	  (Somaliland	  Sun,	  2015a).	  30	  The	  Somaliland	  constitution	  explicitly	  draws	  on	  the	  Sharia	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2001).	  The	  tripartite	  legal	  system	  of	   Sharia,	   British	   common	   law	   (including	   the	   Indian	   penal	   code)	   and	   customary	   law	   is	   not	   formally	   defined,	   but	  different	  matters	  are	   conventionally	  dealt	  with	  by	  different	   corpora,	  notably	   family	  matters	   (including	  marriage	  and	  inheritance)	  under	  Sharia,	   and	   criminal	  proceedings	  under	   common	   law	   (see	  Battera	   and	  Campo,	  2001).	   Sometimes	  cases	  can	  begin	  in	  the	  secular	  court	  and	  then	  be	  settled	  by	  recourse	  to	  customary	  mediation	  or	  vice	  versa	  (Fieldnotes,	  Hargeysa,	  2012).	  See	  also	  Schlee,	  2013	  and	  Tungaraza,	  2008.	  	  31	  According	   to	   Aniso,	   a	   lawyer	   undertaking	   pro-­‐bono	   work,	   in	   addition	   to	   hiring	   a	   lawyer,	   taxes	   must	   be	   paid	  depending	  on	   the	   value	  of	   the	   case,	   for	   instance,	   an	   initial	   cost	   of	   $7	   for	   a	   family	   law	   case,	   together	  with	   $7	   for	   the	  judgement,	  and	  $3	  to	  deliver	  legal	  paperwork	  to	  the	  other	  party	  (Aniso,	  interview,	  2012).	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  the	  low	  end	   of	   estimates,	   likely	   because	   Aniso	   was	   working	   for	   a	   legal	   clinic.	   Balthasar’s	   estimates,	   for	   instance,	   are	   much	  higher:	  ‘One	  informant	  estimated	  that	  a	  case	  of	  USD	  5,000	  in	  value	  costs	  about	  USD	  1,000	  to	  settle	  –	  some	  USD	  200-­‐400	  for	  the	  court,	  some	  USD	  300	  for	  the	  lawyer,	  expenses	  for	  transport	  and	  witnesses,	  etc’	  (2012:228,	  note	  598).	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is provided by communal institutions rather than state ones. ‘Most people believe security is 
in our hands’, said Tawfiiq, a university graduate and the son of a prominent politician 
(Interview, 2012). Shire, a senior lawyer, argued that the preference for customary 
mediation is not arcane or exotic, but one of community balance: ‘Justice means where both 
parties are united and happy, where there is no revenge, no deaths, where there is peace and 
harmony’ (Interview, 2012; translated by Roda). This idea of justice commends the 
importance of situatedness within clan networks – of knowing one’s relatives, and 
supporting them as they support you. ‘In the West, you don’t even know your fourth father 
because you don’t rely on them. You believe you can go to the police. Here you cannot do 
that’, said Rooble, my research assistant (Interview, 2014a). Even when people do pursue 
legal cases through the secular courts or try to hold the government accountable for its 
actions, the clan is still appears to be regarded as the primary channel (Nabiil, interview, 
2012). Without fully functioning state institutions, clan law and the governance of caaqils 
provides accountability and a mechanism for an even-handed, commonly accepted outcome, 
which can be enforced across the country, even where the Somaliland state does not reach. 
Inshaar, an IT graduate also helping me with my interviews, told me over tea one day: 	  Until	   we	   will	   get	   the	   society	   that	   will	   allow	   the	   rules	   are	   in	   place	   and	   the	  government	   that	   is	  ready	  to	  cover	  everything	  and	  the	  community	  aware	   that	   they	  need	  to	  go	  through	  that	  kind	  of	  system,	  until	  we	  find	  that	  community,	  caaqil	  is	  very	  important.	   Because	   without	   caaqil,	   no	   two	   will	   talk	   together.	   Every	   day	   in	   the	  Somali	  community,	  there	  is	  an	  accident,	  there	  is	  a	  war	  between	  two	  persons,	  maybe	  there	  is	  a	  knife	  and	  there	  is	  damage.	  So	  the	  caaqils	  go	  to	  the	  family	  and	  that	  family	  and	  says	  calm	  down.	  The	  government	  can’t	  because	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  resource,	  lack	  of	  police,	  so	  caaqil	  is	  very	  important	  in	  that	  kind	  of	  situation.	  […]	  	  We	  do	  not	  have	  a	  registry;	  we	  do	  not	  have	  a	  record.	  If	  I	  go	  to	  Laascaanood	  and	  kill	  someone	  there	  is	  no	  record,	  there	  is	  no	  security	  camera.	  But	  there	  is	  someone	  who	  knows	   me.	   He	   says	   that	   guy	   who	   killed	   someone	   is	   from	   that	   clan.	   There	   is	   no	  security	  camera,	  there	  is	  no	  ID	  card,	  but	  that	  clan	  will	  automatically	  contact	  my	  clan	  and	  say	  that	  guy	  is	  from	  your	  clan	  and	  he	  came	  to	  Laascaanood	  and	  killed	  someone.	  (Interview,	  2014b)	  
 
Inshaar expressed the idea that clan identity enables situatedness and triangulation because 
it is a form of ID already. It is via genealogy not state administration that people are made 
legible, and hence accountable to the law. Clan is also a significant conduit for political 
access and power, as demonstrated particularly at election times, when candidates rely 
heavily on the support of their kinsmen for funding and, importantly, endorsement. 
Although greater regulation of political parties has been introduced, it remains extremely 
difficult to obtain office without the endorsement of one’s clan, which is of more practical 
and symbolic significance than the political party (see Walls, 2014). Once in politics, the 
need for clan support does not go away. ‘Even the government is saying, “Where is your 
clan?”’ claimed Rooble, my research assistant (Interview, 2014a). The government utilises 
the leverage civil servants, MPs and government members have with their clans in order to 
fill the gaps in their own capacity, he argued. When someone can no longer act as a conduit 
for their clan, their political effectiveness is called into question. ‘Even when the president is 
appointing ministers, he appoints them on how [much] influence they have within the clan’, 
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Nabiil, a senior parliamentarian, told me. ‘That minister, let him be a very brilliant 
administrator or whatever it is, or very able apparatchik, if he doesn’t have influence with 
the clan, he is not of use to him’ (Interview, 2012). As a report by local research institute the 
Academy for Peace and Development notes: ‘Clan ties are routinely mobilized in support of 
locally driven projects, including fund-raising and political lobbying. Indeed, many 
Somalilanders are sceptical of initiatives that fail to activate kinship dynamics’ (SCPD, 
1999:77).  
 
The significance of one’s situatedness in the clan thus becomes clear. Even if one never has 
cause to activate a substantial network of kin and acquaintance, the promise of support 
remains. ‘They know the clan will speak for them’, said Nasteho, the civil society leader and 
activist (Interview, 2012). ‘The clan will automatically protect the integrity of that person’ 
(ibid). It is no surprise, therefore, that identification carries with it an assessment of 
guarantee – that when people’s identity is verified, it is with reference to clan, which gives a 
guarantee of their genealogical location, and thus indicates whether duty or sanction 
structures the relationship. Clan identification is significant because as one moves within 
the concentric circles of clan identity, trust, reciprocity and safeguarding increase 
correspondingly. This is why I argue in the thesis that identifying someone in terms of their 
clan is a form of authentication, as well as identification. It carries with it an assessment of 
the quality of relatedness between actors, which may lead to the activation of certain kinds 
of duties and guarantees. 
 
Networks of Reciprocity 
Such duties are the lifeblood of social networks, and giving money in particular is one of the 
obligations of clan situatedness, as evidenced by the enormous volume of daily transactions 
in the xawaalad (money transfer) industry (Adeso, 2012; Hammond, 2010; Lindley, 2007). 
There is a strong redistributive ethic amongst Somalis deriving from the duty of zakaat 
(charity), one of the five pillars of Islam, as well as mag, based on a key principle of survival 
in pastoralist society: at times of difficulty, your brother and cousin look after you; at times 
of plenty, you share in return (Ashkir, interview, 2014a).32 There are also well-established 
norms of assistance found in the institution of qaadhaan, the clan-based equivalent of 
collective fundraising and support. At clan meetings, members will donate for particular 
projects – for instance, political campaigns or university scholarships – which benefit their 
members and thus have a corporate value. Qaadhaan can also be used to support young 
couples in their marriage, for instance by giving six months’ rent money, and within families 
if there is a death or someone loses their job (Ifrax, interview, 2014). Such donations are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Mag-­‐paying	  groups	  are	  typically	  constituted	  by	  relatives	  with	  shared	  patrilineal	  descent,	  although	  Schlee	  (2013:261)	  notes	   that	   small	   groups	  may	   enter	   into	   contractual	   relations	  with	   distantly	   related	   groups	   to	   share	   the	   burdens	   of	  protection	   and	   compensation,	   since	   small	   groups	   are	   at	   a	   disadvantage	   against	   large	   groups	   who	   individually	   pay	  proportionately	   less.	  Women	  do	   not	   traditionally	   pay	  mag,	   although	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   labour	  market	   has	  meant	   that	  sometimes	  women	  are	  the	  only	  breadwinners	  and	  hence	  must	  make	  a	  contribution	  (Hammond,	  2010:140).	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arranged via collective accountability mechanisms – everyone gives – based upon the 
principle of reciprocity in which one pays for others because one day they will pay for you.33  
 
These payments are also made less formally on a case-by-case basis. ‘There are actually 
many forms of assistance going on amongst us guys’, Saalim, a well-known and respected 
director of a local NGO, told me. ‘Sometimes for example if you lose your property or your 
livestock, they [the clan] will help you. If you get married and you are broke, they will help 
you. If somebody dies from your family, and you cannot bury, they will help you’ (Interview, 
2013). The MP Nabiil gave a similar list of assistance, although this time from the 
perspective of the beneficiary: ‘Nowadays, when I am getting married, the clan will pitch in. 
At birth, when a new baby [arrives], the clan will come and say, “what can I do for you?” 
They will even line up to give blood for my wife if she is ill. You call them in and they come 
voluntarily. I am going to a surgery to have my appendix removed, and three or four people 
will come and say, “Ok, do you need blood?”’ (Interview, 2012)  
 
This logic of reciprocity operates banally and broadly in many African societies, both as a 
functional and normative necessity, filling the administrative gaps of weak regulatory 
systems, and forming the basis of solidarity (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:41; see also Chabal, 
2009). Dacaad, a thoughtful man in his late fifties or early sixties who had worked for a long 
time in Hargeysa’s civil society, told me bluntly: ‘You can’t survive without networks. The 
more networks you have, the better you are’ (Interview, 2014). Granovetter describes 
reciprocity as one of the four characteristics of strong interpersonal ties (1973:1361). Indeed, 
reciprocity is the lubricant of the networks that I describe in this chapter, exacting 
obligations and offering recourse. In Olivier de Sardan’s words:  	   One	   cannot	   refuse	   a	   service,	   a	   favour,	   a	   bit	   of	   string-­‐pulling	   or	   compliance	   to	   a	  relative,	  neighbour,	  party	  comrade	  or	   friend.	  Nor	  ought	  one	   to	   refuse	   the	  same	   to	  someone	  who	   is	   ‘sent’	  by	  any	  of	   the	  above.	  The	  circle	  of	   individuals	   to	  whom	  one	  feels	   obliged	   to	   render	   services	   is	   thus	   astonishingly	   wide.	   One	   must	   add	   the	  converse,	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  great	  number	  of	  persons	  to	  call	  upon.	  (1999:40)	  
 
This reservoir of social capital is built up over time and is regulated by the norms of 
Somaliland kinship. Relations as reckoned by tol are the obvious recipients of service, favour 
and money, but often these are long or tenuous chains of relation. For instance, I asked 
Saalim, the NGO director I introduced above, to explain who it is who helps him, and who 
he himself helps:  	  It	   is	   so	   difficult	   to	   describe.	   It	  may	   sometimes	   be	   one	   sub-­‐sub-­‐clan.	   Sometimes	   it	  may	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  the	  status	  of	  the	  group	  asking	  you.	  Sometimes	  you	  never	   know.	   In	   some	   situations	   there	   may	   be	   rules	   or	   traditions	   of	   helping,	   for	  example,	  my	  name	   is	  Saalim	  Yusuf	  Khalif	   Ismaacil,	   and	   there	  may	  be	   fifty	   families	  also	  from	  Ismaacil.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  two	  days	  ago	  I	  gave	  $300	  to	  someone	  whose	  son	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  This	   sort	  of	   coordinated	  action	  made	  possible	  via	  norms	  of	   reciprocity	  and	  networks,	   and	  without	   legal	   sanctions,	  might	   be	   described	   as	   a	   form	   of	   interpersonal	   or	   social	   capital.	   However,	   my	   goal	   here	   is	   not	   to	   examine	   the	  mechanisms	   by	  which	   communal	   goals	   (such	   as	   the	   community	   road-­‐building	   projects	   in	   Hargeysa	   and	   Burco)	   are	  facilitated,	   which	  might	   draw	   on	   social-­‐capital	   theories,	   but	   rather	   to	   consider	   the	   interpellating	   outcomes	   of	   such	  practices,	  which	  such	  accounts	  do	  not	  fully	  illuminate.	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had	  eloped.	  [His	  father]	  is	  Faisal	  Khadar	  Khalif	  Osman,	  so	  Khalif	  is	  the	  grandfather.	  We	  are	  cousins,	  maybe	  a	  bit	  distant	  cousins.	  …	  So	   this	  guy	  didn’t	  have	  any	  money	  and	  so	  this	  is	  why	  I	  gave	  him	  money,	  because	  we	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  family.	  People	  may	  think	  of	  us	  badly,	  that	  this	  family	  is	  not	  good.	  It’s	  just	  like	  you	  because	  you	  have	  some	  cousins.	  It’s	  not	  obligatory	  but	  for	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  family.	  So	  things	  like	  that	  happen	  every	  day.	  So	  you	  are	  bound	  to	  help	  them.	  …	  The	  closer	  the	  person	  is	  to	  you,	   the	   greater	   the	   pressure	   he	   or	   she	  may	   put	   to	   you	   to	   help	   them.	   (Interview,	  2013)	  
 
Saalim here reveals two levels of assistance at which he is obliged to help. The first is that of 
the sub-sub-clan or the first jilib, which may number a few hundred people, to whom he 
gives financial assistance in emergencies, particularly in those instances where there might 
be an impact on clan reputation or cohesion. Saalim notably uses the first few rungs of his 
abtirsiino to explain the circumference of the group that this obligation extends to. This is 
what might be termed one’s ‘extended’ network (Granovetter, 1973:1370). The second is at a 
more personal level: one’s ‘effective’ network (ibid). Saalim told me that he spends up to a 
$1000 a month helping people with medical prescriptions, education fees and other costs. 
These payments are what the English teacher Ashkir called biil: the small, regular amounts 
of money that help relatives out with school bills and petrol. ‘The going rule is $100 a 
month’, he claimed (Interview, 2014a). Research on financial flows in Somaliland by Studio 
D frames these payments in terms of the ‘frictionless financial interdependence’ within 
families and sub-clans: unlike the discrete family units of typical ‘Western’ families, there 
are strong financial ties and few barriers to the movement of money between different 
branches of the same family (2015:23–25). ‘Money moves from those who have it to those 
who need it without guilt or expectation’ (ibid:25). 
 
Saalim’s rationale for assistance was grounded in the reputation of the family: that they did 
not get a bad name as those who could not meet social obligations, but also to help those 
directly related to him. ‘There is a “family chain of assistance”’, he said. ‘You don’t think just 
for you or your children, also you think your father, children of your brother, children of 
your sister, children of your cousins’ (Interview, 2013). In the highly networked community 
of Hargeysa, in which people are embedded and through which identity is verified, 
connections valorised and promises made, personal reputation is important.34 ‘Everyone has 
got a reputation’, said Dacaad, the civil society leader; ‘it is like credit value in the West’ 
(Interview, 2014). If you do not help, Saalim told me: ‘Some people may say, oh you are a 
bad man, you met so-and-so here, you could have helped him, but you didn’t help. They will 
not find you, they will not punish you, but it gives a signal that you are not a nice man’ 
(ibid). Similarly, people must also give, and not just take. Writing of her observations in 
Mogadishu, Simons notes how people ‘had to weigh the value of bothering someone too 
much against the value of what it was they were bothering that person for’ (1995:118). 
Whilst formal clan sanctions may be rare except for egregious behaviour, there is 
nonetheless a normative expectation that genealogical connections are meaningful and that 
they will be used judiciously.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	  utility	  of	  social	  reputation	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  identification	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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As a prominent member of civil society, Saalim has a regular income, and so many people 
are dependent upon him. The obligation does not fall on him only because of his personal 
wealth, but also because of his social standing. In her article about the burden of 
remittances on senders in Maine in the United States, Hammond (2010) includes the story 
of Mohamed, whose uncle is a senior sub-clan leader, requiring him to raise funds for those 
in need within the sub-clan – regardless of their geographic location. The uncle’s status 
refracts obligations onto the other males in his immediate family. Hammond writes: 
‘Mohamed laments the fact that his uncle is so senior in the clan, for it means that he also is 
looked upon to provide for clansmen and women whom he might not be obliged to help if 
his family did not have such a high social standing’ (2010:139). Those at the apex of the clan 
socially and financially have a burden of responsibility towards relatives and kinsmen that is 
discharged in a highly personalised and informal way. As Saalim explained, ‘There is always 
allegiance. There is always some sort of attachment. For example, if somebody comes to me 
saying that I am from your tribe and that maybe I have this trouble or something like that, 
you may come to help him. It’s very important. I don’t know why. Maybe the way we grew 
up’ (Interview, 2013). 
 
This does not, of course, mean that these obligations are either always welcome or easy. One 
afternoon as we were sitting in his office in Jigjiga-Yar, Hargeysa’s northwestern 
neighbourhood, in September 2014, I asked Ashkir why his phone was ringing so much. ‘It’s 
the first of the month’, he replied simply. With salaries usually paid at the month’s start, 
Ashkir’s relatives – often distantly connected or unfamiliar – were calling to avail 
themselves of the obligation to share wealth. ‘I’m not picking up’, Ashkir said (Interview, 
2014b). Ashkir did eventually pick up, however, because these connections need to be kept 
alive and lubricated; and there are costs of non-compliance in terms of reputation and the 
‘give-and-take’ that Saalim and Inshaar describe.  
 
The array of connections afforded by family and clan therefore act as established conduits 
for favours and financial assistance, motivated and obligated by blood, reputation and 
charity. Even though some people are able to draw upon a variety of productive relations 
because their personal wealth, social position or profession affords them such breadth, the 
dominant frame in which connections are made and duties discharged is that of clan. As 
Nabiil put it, ‘It is accepted and it is expected. You relate to your clan in a way, you relate to 
others in a way’ (Interview, 2012). 
 
Trust and Credibility 
Implicit in these relationships of protection and reciprocity are basic assumptions about the 
trustworthiness of fellow clan members, and the maintenance of one’s credibility within 
these circles of trust. By capturing the vagaries of family life, the genealogy is in some way a 
record of trust decisions. ‘Each level is a trust level’ agreed Dacaad, a member of Hargeysa’s 
3	  –	  Genealogy	  in	  Practice	  	  
	   81	  
civil society (Interview, 2014). It shows the alliances of marriage and the breaks of divorce, 
the coming together and division of families. At the most fundamental level of mag-paying 
solidarity, Dacaad told me that one trusts one’s relatives with ‘life, knowledge and 
reputation: if they betray you, they betray themselves’ (ibid). These assumed moral and legal 
obligations derived from blood and contract form an integral part of socio-political 
organisation in Somaliland, by giving political meaning and value to certain blood 
relationships, and excluding others. These contracts come into play at moments of union 
(for instance, marriage) and discord (crime, conflict and dispute), but they do not seem to 
govern day-to-day relations in quotidian life in the city. 
 
The generalised norm of reciprocity found within clans that I discuss in this chapter 
assumes that the costs of cooperation are set and managed by these institutions. The norms 
of clan cooperation create the conditions for the ‘encapsulated interests’ that Hardin 
(2006:17) argues are integral to trust, since there are mutual interests in the maintenance of 
relations between the trusting parties. The assumed mutual adherence to clan norms of 
cooperation means that the initial ‘sizing up’ (ibid:37) of people as trustworthy can be 
quicker or more informed. In this way, the norms and networks of reciprocity within clans 
provide ‘scripts of trustworthiness’. These ‘scripts’ are pre-written and assume that within 
clans there is ‘familiarity and understanding’, as Warfa, a livestock trader working in 
Hargeysa, put it (Interview, 2014; translated by Ashkir), which can create the grounds of 
trust. Or as Muxudin, a young journalist, explained: sharing an identity with one’s clan 
means that you can share ‘secrets and special information’ with them (Interview, 2014). 
 
This is not to claim that clan relationships are automatically trustworthy or valuable. As my 
research assistant Inshaar put it: ‘Knowing someone’s clan does not give you good 
information about that person. It doesn’t give you how exactly that person is’ (Interview, 
2014b). In this, Inshaar echoes Hardin’s observation that even with the presence of social 
factors to encourage trusting someone, the decision to trust depends upon personal 
assessments (2006:36). As I have already noted, clanship, derived from genealogy, is 
characterised by fluidity, which Luling captures clearly with the observation that: ‘Who I am 
may be inescapably laid down, but to whom I turn for support, whom I will support in my 
turn, with whom I ally myself, is by no means so’ (2006:474). My point here is not, 
therefore, that clan identities create rigid frameworks of trust and confidence, constraining 
transactions between people. Clan identity does seem, nevertheless, to support particular 
kinds of interactions amongst those who share genealogical fellowship. If we accept the 
argument that on-going uncertainty and weak state provision in Somaliland continues to 
necessitate rich webs of interrelationships based within the genealogical idiom, then certain 
assumptions about the trustworthiness of those bound by blood and contract do seem to 
follow. The connection to my broader argument about verification is that the identification 
of people within this frame of metic legibility contains an implicit ‘sizing up’ that is 
connected to deep narratives of authenticity.  
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Vouching  
The scripts of trustworthiness and guarantees of protection that I have described above are 
part of what Scott described as the second map of activity beneath formal grids of 
intelligibility, which consist of ‘tracings, as in a time-lapse photograph, of all the unplanned 
movements … far more complex than the first, [it] reveals very different patterns of 
circulation’ (1998:347). In Somaliland, these ‘unplanned movements’ include local and 
informal practices of vouching, by which people guarantee, and take on guarantees for, the 
identity of acquaintances, friends, kinsmen and even, in some cases, strangers. Even though 
these acts do not require shared clan or kin, I argue that the logic of genealogy qua a chain 
of verifiable identity is still nevertheless at work as a background condition to these 
exchanges.  
 
As I reflected in Chapter 1, most of my research in Somaliland was possible because friends, 
colleagues, officials and interviewees vouched for me, giving their name as guarantee for 
mine so that I could meet new people and enter new sites. Sometimes, chains of vouching 
enabled me to do my work: someone who I had only just met introduced me to a third party, 
on the basis of a recommendation or request from a first person. For a long time Somaliland 
citizens have not had effective forms of ID, and so practices of showing documentation as 
evidence of identity are either not in place or relatively unimportant. Instead, people are 
often situated in terms of clan (their postcode) and genealogy (their relatives), and their 
identity is authenticated by reference to whom you know and, ultimately, whom you are 
related to. Samatar, a university graduate living in Hargeysa, described to me how when he 
applied for a job, he was told to ‘bring someone you trust’ to vouch for him: this ‘sponsor’ 
would be responsible for his conduct at work – his own credentials were insufficient 
(Interview, 2014). Vouching is therefore a critical practice that involves identification based 
in trust and guarantee, and which utilises the webs of interrelationships in which people are 
embedded.  
 
In everyday contemporary life, the propinquity of the urban environment helps to facilitate 
the people-to-people connection that makes vouching possible. Hargeysa is a relatively 
small city, with a population of around 500,000 to 1 million depending on seasonal 
fluctuations (most notably when the diaspora descends in the summer months) (MoNPD, 
2013; UNFPA, 2014). Within professions, educational institutions, 35  mosques, 
neighbourhoods, and even remittance offices, it is possible to become known to one’s 
proximate peers, and men in particular benefit from this access since they typically conduct 
a more public life than women who undertake daily tasks, including prayer, at home. It is 
this constellation of linkages that Bourdieu called ‘practical kinship’, ‘whose boundaries and 
definitions are as many and as varied as its users and the occasions on which it is used’, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Phillips	   writes	   about	   how	   the	   graduates	   of	   the	   secondary	   schools	   at	   Sheikh	   and	   Amoud	   constitute	   a	   network	   of	  influential	   individuals	  who	   ‘continue	  to	  assist	  each	  other	  to	  navigate	  the	  (considerable)	  spaces	  between	  Somaliland’s	  formal	  institutions’	  (2013:74).	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opposed to ‘official kinship’ which is ‘single and immutable, defined once and for all by the 
norms of genealogical protocol’ (1977:34). 
 
The possibility of face-to-face interaction, combined with the widespread use of genealogical 
identification, means that one’s identity can be verified by other people. ‘People vouch for 
each other from friendship, experience or tribe’, Tawfiiq, a university graduate, told me 
(Interview, 2012). Or as Fawzia claimed: ‘I can go to Dahabshiil and ten people I don’t know 
will vouch for me because they will say “Fawzia, Ahmed, Mohamed, Cumar etc”’ (Interview, 
2013).36 In this sense clan identities are constructed ‘in the midst of everyday interaction’ 
(Bjork, 2007:112). Behind all these cases of vouching lies a certain kind of ‘knowability’. 
Fawzia is an influential civil servant from a prominent family: she could be known to 
strangers, who would then affirm her identity. However, this does not seem to be atypical. 
My interlocutors often recounted similar stories of identities being public knowledge. Dirie, 
a journalist in Hargeysa, told me matter-of-factly that ‘here [in Somaliland] a minister can 
sit with a waiter and talk together’, before relating me the story of being in a hotel in 
Hargeysa and seeing the waiter berating a minister on the issue of the talks with Somalia 
(Interview, 2012). Tawfiiq also had a similar story: ‘I was in the Oriental [hotel], and the 
receptionist was reading the paper and it said that the head of the intelligence agency had 
gone [defected] to Somalia. The guy was sitting right there, so he went to him and showed 
him the newspaper. The intelligence chief said, “It’s not true. I’m right here!”’ (Interview, 
2013)  
 
The reality of course is that not everyone can go up directly to important individuals. 
Although distinctions between backgrounds and fortunes may be concealed within sub-clans 
and sub-sub-clans, between the major clans and Somaliland’s ‘minorities’, there are clear 
divisions based on class and occupation, meaning interactions are less frequent and more 
conscious. It is also the case that, although proximity in social spaces enables kinsmen to 
mingle, unsolicited encounters are rare: although someone might be ‘known’ genealogically, 
they are in fact ‘unknown’ in personal terms. Hence even those from prominent families can 
usually only take advantage of blood relationships via intermediate connections that ‘vouch’ 
for their identity and trustworthiness. 
 
Conduits and Bridges 
Earlier, I noted that the senior MP Nabiil had used the metaphor of a ‘ladder’ to describe 
how he utilised the different genealogical nodes from his abtirsiino. Warfa, the livestock 
trader living in northern Hargeysa, offered a similar image of jaraanjaro (stairs) when 
discussing how he used his networks: ‘I would use ‘stairs’: someone who knows someone 
who knows someone’ (Interview, 2014; translated by Ashkir). For instance, when I asked 
him how he would contact his clan elder, he responded: ‘I would begin with my family, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The	  names	  of	  Fawzia’s	  lineage,	  as	  her	  own,	  have	  been	  anonymised.	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after three flights of stairs would be the caaqil’. These two images reveal the value of the 
practice of genealogical identification: through the ‘steps’ of intervening relatives, one can 
‘work’ networks to access those unknown or unfamiliar.  
 
The ability to navigate the levels of clan identity, and recognise the appropriate interface for 
interaction, comes with experience and also the reading of subtle clues, such as the 
neighbourhood one lives in or the company one keeps. It also comes from asking others for 
insider information and utilising intermediate connections in order to ‘bridge’ genealogical 
gaps. At the quotidian or micro level of interaction, the use and management of such 
connections is the way business is done. This ‘economy of connections’ (Simons, 1995) is 
based on access and reference, both of which use vouching based on finding points of 
interconnection. This seems to be a widespread practice. Lindley, for instance, has shown 
that certain individuals in diaspora communities, who she calls ‘conduit people’, help to 
identify needs, raise funds and facilitate remittance payments (2007:13). These are not 
anonymous brokers, but key family members in the ‘geometries’ of remittance relationships 
who maintain contacts between home and abroad (ibid). In Hargeysa, such conduits are also 
utilised in a whole host of private and public transactions. As Dacaad, the long-time activist 
and civil-society leader quipped, ‘ID will open the door slightly, but you need to bring 
someone to get [through]’ (Interview, 2014).  
 
Sitting over coffee one evening in 2012 in the Maan-Soor Hotel, Sharif, a director-general of 
one of Somaliland’s ministries, and I talked about the ways in which these intermediary 
relationships often work. He complained that ‘No one comes to me directly. They always 
bring someone with them who knows me. I say, “I’m here to serve you”’ (Interview, 2012). 
Sharif’s lament often falls on deaf ears, he said, because ‘public service is rare’: the spectre of 
nepotism hangs over people’s encounters with the government, and the expectation is that 
connections are required. When I interviewed Sharif again in 2014, his opinion had not 
changed:  	   Whenever	  people	  try	  to	  come	  to	  me,	  they	  are	  asking	  people	   ‘what	  clan	  is	  he?	  Who	  knows	  him?’	  I	  say	  to	  them	  ‘you	  cannot	  lose	  or	  gain	  by	  bringing	  others.	  If	  you	  come	  with	  others	  that	  won’t	  influence	  me.’	  But	  they	  will	  never	  listen.	  They	  will	  ask	  each	  other:	  ‘what	  did	  you	  do?	  How	  did	  it	  go?’	  They	  don’t	  want	  to	  make	  a	  mistake	  so	  they	  have	  to	  do	  their	  homework.	  Everyone	  will	  try	  to	  make	  a	  connection	  with	  you	  –	  they	  will	  try	  to	  find	  some	  way	  of	  being	  connected.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
Through genealogical relationality, people are able to utilise resources within the social 
networks of everyday life. Sometimes these are intervening people, but sometimes this is 
also simply shared clan. For instance, Haweeyo, a prominent activist and civil society leader, 
told me this story about how she utilised a genealogical connection to meet with someone 
she did not know in a UN agency in the 1990s:  
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I	  tried	  to	  see	  the	  officials.	  It	  was	  for	  the	  first	  three	  days	  impossible,	  even	  to	  enter	  the	  compound.	  But	  I	  found	  out	  that	  there	  was	  one	  guy	  from	  my	  tribe	  who	  was	  working	  inside,	  somebody	  told	  me,	  and	  I	  said,	  ‘ok,	  I	  don’t	  know	  him	  but	  I	  will	  use	  his	  name’.	  I	  was	  sitting	  under	  a	  tree	  outside	  and	  was	  talking	  to	  the	  guards,	  and	  saying	  I	  want	  to	  see	  that	  guy	  …	  he	  looks	  at	  me	  and	  he	  says	  ‘Do	  I	  know	  you?’	  I	  said	  ‘No,	  no,	  you	  don’t	  know	  me;	  it’s	  just	  that	  I	  want	  to	  go	  in.	  I	  just	  want	  to	  share	  information	  with	  you,	  so	  just	  take	  me	  in.’	  [Once	  inside]	  he	  said,	  ‘do	  I	  know	  you?’	  And	  I	  said	  ‘no,	  but	  I’m	  from	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  a	  tribe’.	  And	  he	  said,	  ‘oh	  ok’.	  (Interview,	  2012)	  
 
Haweeyo was able to convert her tribal connection with the UN officer into a favour. She 
used clan to make herself legible to this stranger, and thereby enable him to ‘speak for’ her 
and endorse her entry into the compound. In her research in Mogadishu, Simons also noted 
the use of names for access: ‘Although money may have bought access on the lowest level – 
for example, entrance past a guard at the ministry gate – one always had to know who to 
approach in order to reach the person who could ultimately provide the desired service or 
assistance’ (1995:118). In contemporary Hargeysa, similar processes appear to be at work. 
For those who are able, access to official institutions is either direct – insiders are personally 
known – or indirect, facilitated by a phone call to a relative or, sometimes a friend or 
colleague, who can make the introduction or smooth the encounter by prefacing the matter 
with the relevant official.  
 
In our discussion, Sharif and I talked about the relationships 
between these intermediaries and the other parties. Visualised in 
Figure 2, we discussed how intermediaries (I) are those who have 
not only relevant relationships with parties A and B (likely clan-
related but not necessarily), but also represent the most direct route 
between them. There may be alternative ways to connect A and B, for 
instance by going through other people, but ‘I’ creates what 
Granovetter calls a ‘local bridge’: a likely, efficient and cost-effective 
path (1973:1364). These bridges enable people to access members of 
their clan that they do not personally know: shared clan, in other 
words, provides the background condition for a connection.  
 
The continued effectiveness of vouching as facilitating access means that this practice 
endures. It is the reason that ministry waiting rooms are often populated by close or distant 
kin of the minister, and members of the respective sub-clan, who seek assistance with a 
problem related to the minister’s portfolio or oftentimes with business relating to another 
area of government to which they do not have access. As Sharif put it, people ‘feel that if you 
go to the institutions direct, you might miss out’ (Interview, 2014). In Somaliland, the 
apportionment of ministries based on clan, and the corollary clan-based appointments 
within them, means that, especially for the smaller clans, a minister might be the sub-clan’s 
only representative within the government. Regardless of his portfolio, his unofficial role is 
as a conduit for those in his network. This is the function for which he has been appointed in 
the eyes of most of those who supported his parliamentary campaign or, in the case of non-
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urban environment helps to facilitate the people-to-people connection that makes vouching 
possible: ombined with genealogical situatedness, one’s ide tity can be verified not by a piece 
of paper, but by other people.21 ‘People vouch for each other from friendship, experience or 
tribe’, Tawfiiq told me (Interview, 2012). And a  Fawzia put it: ‘I can go to Dahabshiil and ten 
p ople I don’t know will v uch for me becau e they will say “Fawzia, Ahmed, Mohamed, 
Cumar etc”’ (Interview, 2013).22 Fawzia is an influential civil servant from a prominent family: 
she can be known to strangers, who then affirm her identity, more easily than most. Although 
proximity in social spaces enables kinsmen to mingle, for most people unsolicited 
identification is rare: although someone might be ‘known’ genealogically, they are in fact 
‘unknown’ in personal ter s. Hence even those from prominent families can usually only take 
advantage of blood relationships via intermediate connections that ‘vouch’ for their identity 
and trustworthiness. 
 
The Use of Intermediaries 
The networks of vouching and ‘trapline’ practices 
that I described earlier in this chapter depend upon 
clan as the lingua franca within the ‘economy of 
connections’. ‘ID will open the door slightly’, s id 
Dacaad, ‘but you need to bring someone to get 
[through]’ (Interview, 2014). Intermediaries (I) are 
those who have not only relevant relationships with 
parti s A and B (likely clan-related but not 
necessarily), but also represent the most direct route 
between them (see Figure 3). There may be other 
ways to connect A and B, for instance by going through other people, but ‘I’ creates what 
Granovetter calls a ‘local bridge’: a likely, efficient and cost-effective path (1973:1364). These 
bridges enable people to access members of their clan that they do not personally know: 
shared clan, in other words, provides the background condition for a connection. Sharif, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21!Hargeysa! is! a! relatively! small! city,! with! a! population! of! around! 500,000! to! 1! million! depending! on! seasonal!fluctuations! (most! notably! when! the! diaspora! descends! in! the! summer!months)! (MoNPD,! 2013;! UNFPA,! 2014).!Within!professions,!educational!institutions,!mosques,!neighbourhoods,!and!even!remittance!offices,!it!is!possible!to!become!known!to!one’s!p oximate!peers,!and!men!in!particular!benefit!from!this!access!since!they!typically!conduct!a!more!public!life!than!women!who!undertake!daily!tasks,!including!prayer,!at!home.!In!particular!men!are!able!to!part cipate! in! the! city’s! limited! public! space :! the! teashops,! restaurants,! hotel! gardens,! and! the! sitting! places! in!which!khat!is!chewed.!22!The!names!of!Fawzia’s!lineage,!as!her!own,!have!been!anonymised.!!
Figure!3: Vouching interactions. 
B!
A!
I!
Source:!my!illustration. 
Figure 2: Vouching 
interactions.	  
3	  –	  Genealogy	  in	  Practice	  	  
	   86	  
elected officials, who continue to endorse his position within the ministry. The ability of 
ministers and MPs to act as clan representatives – and hence to represent and mediate these 
interests – makes them two-way channels. Sharif noted also that sometimes intermediaries 
help for commercial reasons, rather than just clan obligation; but in both cases, this is 
‘legitimate networking’ because ‘you cannot Google them’: they have to be identified by 
someone he already knows. Daacad of one of Hargeysa’s civil society organisations had a 
similar understanding, suggesting that an intermediary is necessary when ‘you don’t know 
the person, to ensure he is saying the truth. That person is the guarantor: they are taking 
responsibility for the outcome’ (Interview, 2014). In other words, A does not have to trust B, 
but only I, whose vouchsafing draws on the relational accountability inherent in the clan 
system. Significantly, therefore, although an act of vouching may involve only a small 
number of people for a specific favour, it is part of the ‘generalised reciprocity’ that exists 
within clans (and also sometimes between them), meaning that identity can be verified, and 
trust shouldered, without expectations about future behaviour or reciprocated favours. 
Although personal reputations are involved, these are embedded within the reputation of 
the clan as a whole: when you take a meeting, do a favour, pay a bill for someone, ‘you’re not 
just supporting this guy, you’re supporting the whole group’ (Dacaad, interview, 2014). 
 
Guarantors 
Just as practices of vouching index the genealogical guarantee of clanship, so do the more 
formalised roles of guarantors. This institution appears to draw on traditional ideas of 
sponsorship in pastoralist society. In the past, travellers and caravans sought protection 
through hostile or unknown territory through the institution of abbaan (protector, patron). 
In exchange for payment or gifts, an abbaan would guarantee the safe travel of an individual 
or group through the territories of his lineage (and promise to retaliate should they be 
harmed), by temporarily extending to them his own connections. Like the accounts of 
vouching from Whyte and Brooks that I discussed in Chapter 2, an abbaan would consent to 
have his name invoked as a badge of protection, whereby he would temporarily extend his 
reputation to include those he had promised to protect.  
 
Today this ‘guarantor’ role is found in the figure of the dammiin (literally, bail or guarantee) 
who acts as a witness to significant transactions outside the guarantees of the clan 
framework, for instance the purchase of property, the registration of land, or the taking out 
of a loan (Inshaar, interview, 2014b; Sagal, interview, 2014). The important principle, 
according to Inshaar and Ashkir, is that the dammiin is not your caaqil, the head of your 
mag-paying group. ‘Dammiin should be someone who knows you exactly even if he is not 
your clan … Your boss can be your dammiin, your friend can be your dammiin. It must be a 
well-known person. Even if you see him in the street, and you can convince him (“there is an 
urgent situation, please help me”), even if he doesn’t know you before, [he may help you]’ 
(Inshaar, interview, 2014b). Ashkir argued that an effective dammiin is someone who is 
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from the same clan but ‘higher up’ than the caaqil, typically wealthy, prominent 
businessmen (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). For transactions on a more mundane level, the 
dammiin appears to be any credible person that can take on a trust for you. This dammiin 
practice is therefore similar to the types of counter-signatory and witnessing that I described 
in Chapter 2 as typical of guarantors. However, in Hargeysa, the use of the dammiin does 
not seem to be explicitly related to identification. Rather, this formal role is given to caaqils. 
 
Caaqil Authentication 
Caaqils are the ostensible head of the mag-paying group, the smallest unit of the Somali clan 
system. These groups raise blood money (mag) for crimes committed by one of their 
members, and distribute compensation when a crime is committed against them; and are 
typically composed of relatives with shared patrilineal descent (Lewis, 1994). The caaqil is 
considered to have the best genealogical knowledge since he must collect blood money from 
all eligible males within his constituency. Since he ‘knows’ his charges – or at least their 
relative genealogical positioning – the caaqil is able to act as an identity verifier. Caaqils are 
expected to know ‘the political relationships, and the social relationships between clans (like 
my grandmother comes from that clan), [as well as] genealogy and the relationships 
between genealogies’ (Daacad, interview, 2012). Whilst not all elders have a firm grasp of 
the great breadth of kin relationships within their particular lineage group (which can run 
into the thousands), they do memorise the key nodes and junctions so that they are able to 
settle disputes and disagreements, and help facilitate marriage and other negotiations. 
Caaqils therefore give an answer not only to ‘who are you’ but also ‘who do you claim to be’, 
since they are able to situate those within their group within the web of interrelationships 
that make up the genealogical identity system.  
 
As I make clear in the following chapter, caaqils are incorporated into the verification 
protocols for a number of formal identification schemes, for which they ‘convert’ 
genealogically writ identity into ‘official identity’ that can be used as the basis for the 
government’s sight (Van Dijk and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1999:5). It is not only 
genealogical knowledge that makes caaqils key authorisers of identity, however, but their 
role in social life. For instance, the caaqil’s endorsement is essential for authenticating a 
man who seeks to marry. Laughing, Inshaar, my research assistant in his early twenties, 
exclaimed: ‘If I say I am going to marry a lady, and I call my friends who are the same age as 
me, everybody [will] say “what’s wrong with you? Where’s your family?” (Interview, 2014b) 
He added: ‘You need your clan in every situation of your life. Her father wants to know who 
are you, who is your family, where are you belong’ (ibid). In other words, caaqils not only 
verify identity but authenticate it too. For instance, when Idil, a woman in her late twenties 
who ran her own shop in Hargeysa, sought to adopt a baby from Hargeysa’s main 
orphanage, she had to bring her caaqil to prove who she was – in spite of her European 
passport and driving license. Her caaqil’s vouch was not (only) to identify her, it was to 
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endorse her as a member of his group, and someone who was supported by her clan should 
it be required (Interview, 2013). This is a reference to the norms of insurance and protection 
in the clan system that I discussed above. Caaqils manifest this guarantee in their vouching, 
which goes beyond simply confirming someone’s identity: there is a claim of belonging as 
well, even of family ties. For instance, Saahid, another young journalist and a friend of 
Inshaar’s, told me that if the caaqil were to verify his identity, he would say ‘he is my son’ 
(Interview, 2014).37  
 
For many people, however, a personal relationship with one’s caaqil is rare. Some of my 
interlocutors told me that unless they had had an incident that required intervention, they 
did not know their caaqil (for instance, Sagal, interview, 2014; Ashkir, interview, 2014b). 
Inshaar told me that he thought that the ‘caaqils are not open to everyone. They always say, 
“we are a representative to the clan community”. But there is a small group who is already in 
that circle, who have the advantage, who can meet happily every time and ask whatever they 
want’ (Interview, 2014b). He noted that in most cases you need someone to mediate for you: 
to call the caaqil or his family, and convince him to speak with you. Inshaar told me that he 
thought that ‘knowing the caaqil or needing the caaqil is the reason that goes you [sic] to 
know your family. It’s connected’ (ibid). In other words, being able to know and manage 
connections within family and clan enables one to find the relevant ‘stairs’ of intervening 
people. Similarly, Idil told me: ‘I know my caaqil because I know his son, and my father and 
he are close. If our families weren’t close, I probably wouldn’t have known him. I don’t think 
many people personally know their caaqil’ (Interview, 2013).  
 
In the cases of identification that I am describing here, however, caaqil authentication does 
not technically require that he knows a person (in terms of acquaintance or friendship), but 
that he knows their situatedness within the clan lineage. ‘Who you are’ is defined according 
to ‘whom you are related to’. This is particularly so for women. One of Hargeysa’s chief 
caaqils explained to me how he verifies the identity of women in the mag-paying groups of 
his sub-clan. ‘I know their husbands or their fathers’, he replied (Maxamed, interview, 
2014). Even though some women in Hargeysa do now pay mag (a reflection of the increase 
in female-headed households and employment opportunities in the post-war period), this 
only increases the visibility of these women to the caaqil. For other women, it remains a 
mediated legibility. Nevertheless, their genealogical place can still be reckoned, enabling 
their authentication as a member of a particular clan, and thus as a beneficiary of the norms 
of reciprocity and protection.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  However,	  this	   is	  not	  a	  benign	  or	  sentimental	  practice:	  caaqils	  expect	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  their	  services.	  Samatar,	  a	  young	  man	  in	  his	  mid-­‐twenties,	  told	  me	  that	  if	  you	  need	  something	  from	  your	  caaqil,	  you	  are	  expected	  to	  ‘pay	  his	  lunch,	  car	  fuel	  and	  khat,	  and	  his	  followers’	  (Interview,	  2014).	  Liibaan,	  another	  young	  man	  working	  for	  a	  local	  charity,	  felt	  that	  in	  the	  city,	  assistance	  by	  clan	  leaders	  has	  become	  a	  business.	  ‘Things	  have	  changed.	  [Before]	  the	  tribal	  leader	  comes,	  you	  set	  a	  nice	  sheet	   for	  him	  [on	  the	  ground],	  and	  that’s	   it’	   (Interview,	  2012).	  Now,	  he	  complained,	   ‘they	  want	  bribes	   too,	  they	  want	  money.	  They	  want	  a	  lot	  of	  money;	  it’s	  not	  just	  small	  money.	  They	  are	  there	  for	  a	  business;	  they	  are	  not	  just	  there	   to,	   you	  know,	   “let	  me	  help	  my	   community”’	   (ibid).	  With	   the	  Ministry	  of	   Interior	   increasingly	  paying	   caaqils	   to	  provide	  ‘authentication’	  (discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter),	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  are	  an	  important	  topic	  for	  future	  research.	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Caaqils therefore authenticate identity by drawing on the genealogical idiom and 
interpreting it in ways that are ‘socially acceptable and emotionally compelling’ (Galvan and 
Sil, 2007:17). This is part of what Van Dijk and Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal have called the 
‘chiefly domain’ of ritual and symbolism, in which traditional authorities can ‘help foster a 
sense of primordialness and authenticity’ (1999:7). However, this does not mean that their 
role in identification is uncontested. For instance, in a documentary made by the Academy 
for Peace and Development, Jama, a business owner from Togdheer, decried the Somaliland 
government’s use of elders as ‘the colonial approach to governing this society’ (Fieldnotes, 
Hargeysa, 2012). In individual cases of verification, people told me that the caaqil was a 
trustworthy source of validation. However, when the stakes are high – such as at election 
time – using caaqils to authenticate identity may open up such processes to vested interests, 
feuds, or corruption. Politicised processes of identification thus mean that the personal 
vouching relationships that turn on integrity and the ‘facts’ of genealogical place may be 
shifted towards the norms of collective support and reciprocity. It is these considerations 
that come to the fore in the case study of voter registration that I elucidate in Chapter 5.  
 
Conclusion 
Identification in any society is highly intricate and complex, drawing on evaluations of 
trustworthiness and credibility, and involving triangulation and relative assessment. In this 
chapter, I have identified genealogical emplacement, clan identification, and vouching as 
key norms and practices that make up Somaliland’s identity architecture.  As I explained at 
the start of this chapter, my intention has not been to reduce identity in Somaliland to clan 
identity or to one imbued only with genealogical meaning. Neither have I focused on the 
genealogical idiom because I see it as all encompassing or singularly important, or because I 
am offering a reductive or primordialist account. Certainly, Somalilanders use a range of 
identity markers and resources to know one another, and these have different valences at 
particular times and in certain spaces. My approach is therefore not to discount other forms 
of identity or belonging, but rather, as I noted in Chapter 2, to elucidate the ‘unstable points 
of identification’ rather than the multiple, shifting and sophisticated identities that people 
have. 
 
I have argued in this chapter that genealogy provides a framework of relationality in which 
knowing-one’s-place means knowing how one is related to other people’s ‘places’, and the 
pathways between them. Genealogy appears to function as both a highly relative 
construction that shifts depending upon who you are talking to (as in the conventions of 
‘yaad tahay?’); and a social knowledge structure that fixes relations to ancestors and key 
relatives. People therefore find that their identity is made legible to others – for 
identification, the mapping of connections, and the use of intermediaries – by reference to 
their genealogical position and their relationality to other people. Ugbaad, a politician who 
lived many years abroad, told me that she would ‘value an ID that says my name is X. But to 
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the population, I am the daughter of X, and the wife of X and the mother of X. When I was 
in the UK, I didn’t understand that’ (Interview, 2014). 
 
In this chapter, I have described how these genealogical relationships enable vouching, a 
mundane though significant practice in which people’s identity is corroborated according to 
their relationships with others (1-in-many verification) and the context at hand. Vouching in 
Somaliland is possible because of norms of trust, reciprocity, and connectedness, and which 
similarly underwrite vernacular forms of verification. However, this does not mean that 
these practices are necessarily inclusive or fair. In this chapter, I have argued that the 
invocation of genealogy in identification is highly power-laden, creating grounds for 
exclusion and inequality in Somaliland society. I discussed how the genealogical idiom 
produces notions of ‘authentic’ Somalilandness based on ancestral recitation, prestigious 
descent, and generational breadth, which disregard certain groups that are placed beyond 
these majoritarian frames of reference. When identification utilises, explicitly or implicitly, 
genealogical situatedness or clan identity, these encoded meanings about authenticity, 
status and prestige are reproduced, enhancing the exclusion of marginalised groups. There 
are therefore important implications for equality and inclusion if official proof of identity 
requires that your ancestors, elders or kinsmen must vouch for you and, more specifically, 
verify and validate your place within the genealogical frame.  
 
In the chapters that follow, I explore how genealogical situatedness, clan identity and caaqil 
authentication work in the context of official identification schema. In the next chapter, I 
trace the integration of these practices over time, and show how ID card programmes in 
Somaliland actively incorporate caaqil guarantors as a pragmatic solution to the verification 
problem. I argue that the narratives of authenticity, unity and temporality underlying the 
genealogical idiom that I explicated in this chapter are essential to broader state-building 
and nation-building efforts that serve to present a convincing case of Somaliland’s 
authenticity. However, this does not mean that this is unproblematic, and I therefore 
highlight the complex and highly political ways that the vernacular and the official work 
together in Somaliland’s identity architecture 
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Chapter	  4	  	  State-­‐Building	  and	  Legibility	  in	  Somaliland	  	  A	  meshwork	  of	  regular	  or	  sporadic	  interactions	  and	  negotiations	  is	  in	  place	  whose	  unfolding	  depends	  as	  much	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  different	  institutions	  involved	  as	  it	  does	  on	  the	  initiative	  of	  citizens	  and	  social	  groups	  (Santos,	  2006:66–67).	  	  	   Passports,	   green	   cards,	   or	   driver’s	   licenses	   are	   worthless	   without	   the	   social	  relations	  that	  produce	  them	  (Gordillo,	  2006:173)	  	  	  
In this chapter, I trace the development and institutionalisation of different forms of official 
‘legibility’ in Somaliland as part of its state-building and political consolidation. I show how 
processes of naming and delineating by state authorities have important implications for 
how Somalilanders are seen by the state, and indeed how the nation-state itself has been 
constructed on the basis of genealogically derived notions of belonging.  
 
I begin by tracing the dynamics between clan and state institutions during Somaliland’s 
history, arguing that official legibility has been repeatedly undergirded by genealogical logic, 
not least in the way that clan identity worked as the principal ‘text’ of identity in the 
aftermath of the civil war, when identity documentation was lost, mistrust and insecurity 
was high, and verifiable claims of belonging had to be made. Since 1991, clanship and 
genealogy have become important aspects of Somaliland’s political system. This is 
particularly notable in the citizenship regime, which is framed explicitly by these historical 
and political factors, formalising genealogy as the basis of Somaliland nationality, and thus 
inscribing ideas of authentic Somalilandness within the formal frameworks of official 
legibility.   
 
In the second part of the chapter, I lay out the components of the contemporary state’s 
documentary infrastructure, briefly examining each form of ID in turn, and showing how the 
state substitutes its lack of official legibility with the ‘metic’ legibility of guarantors, most 
notably caaqils. Some people do, of course, have documents or other ways of establishing a 
‘chain of verification’ that state officials can use to verify identity. In general, however, 
Somaliland’s identity-management infrastructure is fragmentary and under-resourced, 
making vernacular practices of identification particularly prominent and important. To gain 
the synoptic sight of modern statecraft, the Somaliland state must therefore address the 
disconnected terrain of official identification through the development of new techniques 
and technologies of identification. The discussion in this chapter thus sets up the extended 
case study of biometric voter registration in Chapter 5 and the discussion of the new 
national ID card in Chapter 6, which analyse how Somaliland’s political actors have sought 
to address the state’s verification problem. 
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Between Clans and the State: Ruptures and Continuities 
The significance of genealogy as a way of making Somali society ‘readable’ has ebbed and 
flowed in history depending on the environmental conditions of security and stability, and 
its invocation or rejection by different authorities as the principal lens of identification.1 It 
has, however, appeared to be a resilient and powerful framework for identification that has 
endured longer than nationalism and pan-Somali solidarity (Cassanelli, 2010:56). 
 
The Colonial Period 
Genealogy and clan identity was arguably the most important frame for identification in the 
first decades of the British Protectorate (1884–1960). This form of minimalist colonial 
administration had emerged in the late nineteenth century in an effort to secure livestock 
exports for the British garrison at Aden. In signing friendship and protection agreements 
with clan ‘representatives’, the British administrators demonstrated that they saw Somalis 
in the territory principally in terms of ‘tribes’. From around 1893 onwards, the resident 
administrators undertook ethnographic studies and geographic surveys of the coastal areas 
and internal caravan routes, by which to better understand the lay of the land (see, for 
instance, Swayne, 1996). These endeavours sought principally to demarcate tribal areas, 
with loose ‘dotted lines’ sketching the extent of each clan’s domain to understand who 
resided where (see Map 3). This was in part to determine which protection agreements 
applied when caravans moved through different parts of the interior towards the main 
trading port of Berbera. It was also part of the colonial authorities’ obsession with order: of 
creating manageable ways of ‘reading’ the local population and territory so that it could be 
controlled by recourse to regulation and rule, rather than the sparse resources of money and 
arms. As Scott has argued, the colonial administrators did not ‘merely describe, observe, and 
map’, but sought to ‘shape a people and landscape that … fit their techniques of observation’ 
(1998:82). Today these ‘regions’ are acutely political designations, not least because of the 
way they map onto electoral constituencies and how power has become distributed in the 
Somaliland political system. 
 
The British administrators also recorded genealogies in order to understand the 
interrelationships between different groups. Their dependence upon genealogy for 
identification of Somalis – not only in terms of personal identity, but whether they were in 
fact ‘Somaliland’ clans and hence under their purview – made this a primary scheme of 
legibility (Cassanelli, 2010). However, the recording of orally transmitted lineages could not 
capture the great flexibility of genealogical relationships, and so only gave limited insight 
into how the Somali clan system really worked. The segmentary nature of Somali nomadic 
pastoralism means that clan relationships are constantly in flux, as marriage, contract and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  do	  not	   include	  a	   formal	   ‘historical’	  overview	  of	  Somaliland’s	  pre-­‐colonial,	  colonial	  and	  post-­‐independence	  periods.	  This	  has	  been	  done	  fulsomely	  and	  effectively	  by	  a	  number	  of	  existing	  accounts,	  and	  I	  refer	  readers	  to	  these,	  particularly:	  Balthasar,	  2012;	  Bradbury,	  2008;	  Samatar,	  1988;	  Walls,	  2011	  and	  2014.	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alliance (as well as idiosyncratic historical and personal relations) bring sub-clans together 
in shifting configurations. ‘[C]olonial anthropology could find no other alternative but to 
rely too heavily on the genealogical table’, states Jama (2007:241). But this dependence was 
myopic, he argues: ‘How could one fix it as a chart if it is not fixed and if it is always already 
in flux?’ (2007:241) The point of such legibilising endeavours was of course to fix the 
population in order to provide a synoptic view of the Somaliland clans, and clan identity was 
understood as the key to identifying whether someone was a resident and hence a British 
subject (see Cassanelli, 2010). 
 
The British Protectorate was governed via indirect rule. In keeping with the overall 
parsimony towards the territory, British Somaliland was maintained by a stripped-down 
administration,2 relying instead on ‘native’ forces and friendly clans, particularly those of 
the Isaaq (Bradbury, 2008:2). In other parts of Africa, the British worked through 
representatives or intermediaries, but in the predominantly acephalous nomadic society of 
Somaliland, there were no such individuals. Rather, the ‘elders’ of the clan were men of 
many ages and sorts who engaged in temporary councils when disputes or other matters 
needed to be resolved. The British administration thus continued the Ottoman practice of 
compensating cooperative suldaans as clan chiefs, and appointing and paying 
representatives of mag-paying groups called caaqils (Gundel, 2006; Lewis, 1958:249). 
Together with Islamic judges and armed tribesmen who served as ‘rural police’, this 
invented position of caaqil (chief) created a layer of intermediary governance between the 
sparse British administration and the clans (Bradbury, 2008:28), and in this sense the 
approach was more similar to the French in West Africa who made new appointments at the 
level of chefs de canton and chefs du village (see Conklin, 1997).  Caaqils became channels 
of access and patronage, with the colonial administration using them as gophers for tax 
collection, conflict management, law enforcement and transmitted authority; whilst the 
caaqils extracted subsidies and special privileges in return, and solidified their positions as 
titled elders (Bradbury, 2008:28–29; Lewis, 2002; Renders, 2012:36).  
 
The British colonial authorities thus depended upon caaqils to make the Somaliland people 
‘legible’, and in doing so, contributed to making caaqils the gatekeepers of identification, 
and genealogy its idiom. The prominence of caaqils in the colonial administration’s 
structures of authority established a precedent that has found purchase in Somaliland’s 
contemporary state-building practices, as I described in the previous chapter, and which will 
again be prominent in my account of the 2008–10 voter registration.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Indeed,	   the	   Protectorate	   was	   not	   a	   typical	   colony,	   but	   a	   minimalist	   intervention,	   with	   much	   less	   extraction	   and	  taxation	  than	  in	  the	  Empire’s	  other	  interests.	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From Cousin to Comrade 
The period from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s reflects a long ‘continuity’ in which 
clans were considered the principal repositories of identity by the state.3 When it finally 
elucidated Somalilanders’ legal status in the inter-war period, the Protectorate used a 
territorial conception of legal identity drawing on the 1934 British Protected Persons (BPP) 
Order, according to which a person ‘belonged to the territory’ if they were born within the 
territory without some other nationality, or born to a father who himself was born within the 
territory (UK Border Agency, nd). This was not of course citizenship, but it opened the door 
to a conceptualisation of official identity that was not based on the clan. The issuance of 
passports to BPPs formalised this status with accredited paperwork. This therefore marked a 
shift towards identification based on personal rather than clan identity, reflected also in the 
first citizenship law of 1960 which gave Somalis legal status as individuals and not as clan 
members (Protectorate of Somaliland, 1960).  
 
This shift seemed to be cemented by the independence of Somaliland from colonial rule in 
1960.4 Overnight people became citizens of a new state – and in fact citizens of a larger 
republic when Somaliland united four days later on 1 July with the former Italian colony of 
Somalia. However, Somalia and Somaliland had been governed very differently under 
colonialism, with different legal systems, currencies, educational and taxation systems, 
varying organisational frameworks for the armed forces and civil service, and different 
approaches to the co-option of traditional power structures (see Battera and Campo, 2001; 
Lewis, 2002; Walls, 2014). With union, the idea of Somalilandness that had developed 
under the Protectorate came into juxtaposition with the notion of Somaliness developed 
under Italian colonialism. Although this was a time of nationalist fervour, with calls for 
Somaliweyn (Greater Somalia) heralding a pan-Somali ethnic solidarity, the north-south 
division remained resilient.5 Despite efforts to integrate, the different ‘rules of the mind’ that 
arose from decades of differential governance made it difficult to agree shared ‘rules of the 
game’ (Balthasar, 2012:98–101). Moreover, clannism (at the level of high politics at least) 
did not ‘wither away’ in favour of nationalism. Both the 1967 presidential and 1969 
parliamentary elections were fraught with internal politicking and corruption; and the 
proliferation of political parties that were no more than thinly disguised clan platforms 
promoting the interests of particular lineages (Lewis, 1958; 2004). The domination of 
particular clans in government institutions led to the politicisation of clanship as each sub-
clan vied to control key resources. Although government appointments were theoretically 
made on merit, Samatar and Samatar note that the tendency of people to visit their elected 
official in person created the impression that ministries were allocated along clan lines: ‘a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  more	  on	  Somaliland	  under	  the	  Protectorate,	  see	  Hall,	  1961;	  Lewis,	  2002;	  and	  Millman,	  2013.	  4	  See	  Colonial	  Office	  (1960),	  Hall	  (1961),	  Lewis	  (1958)	  and	  Millman	  (2013)	  on	  this	  period.	  5	  Northerners	   apparently	   disparagingly	   called	   southerners	   ‘weliweyn’,	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   village	   near	   Afgoye	   that	  returned	  an	  impossible	  90,000	  votes	  in	  the	  1964	  election,	  giving	  it	  an	  electorate	  larger	  than	  Hargeysa	  or	  Burco	  (Fowsi,	  interview,	  2014).	  This	  fraud	  was	  said	  to	  capture	  the	  character	  of	  the	  south.	  The	  southerners	  meanwhile	  called	  the	  north	  ‘qaldan’,	  meaning	   the	  wrong,	   ‘crazy’,	  mistaken	  Somalis,	   a	  dig	  at	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  north	  had	   joined	   the	  union	  without	  even	  asking	  for	  the	  presidency	  or	  the	  capital	  (ibid).	  See	  also	  Lewis,	  2002:169.	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false conclusion, but it appeared to be so’ (2002:61, note 16; emphasis in original). It 
seemed that the anti-clannist aspirations of the pre-independence nationalist movement 
had been fatally eroded: no longer ‘Africa’s First Democrats’ (ibid), Somalia became 
Dowladdii Musuqmaasuqa (‘the corrupt government’) (Ayfare, 2010:19).  
 
A military coup on 21 October 1969 was billed as the antidote to ‘the malicious system of 
tribalism in every form, and all other bad customs in state activities’ (Barre, cited in 
Samatar, 1988:85). The subsequent ‘Socialist Revolution’ was directed towards nationalism 
and self-reliance, and against clannism, which was likened to a primitive ‘disease’ that 
hindered progress. At a rally on Labour Day 1970, for instance, one of the speechmakers 
warned Somalis against a ‘weakness for tribal allegiance’, calling on them to ‘get rid of this 
immediately’ (Dawn Newspaper, 1970). New leader Major-General Mohamed Siyad Barre 
argued that competition between clans was based upon notions of superiority that, in 
keeping with socialist principles, were not found in nature or history: ‘Strong tribes force 
smaller ones to submit to subordination in the process of struggling for grazing and water. It 
is astonishing that even degree-holders believe in this myth of the superiority of birth’, he 
declared in the first year of the revolution (Speech to Senior Officials, 1970).  
 
The new Socialist Revolutionary Council (SRC) therefore initiated policies of 
collectivisation, urbanisation and modernisation, accompanied by an attempt to forge a 
‘citizen comrade’ in contradistinction to the clannish figure that had seemed to dominate 
politics in the brief period of civilian government after 1960. ‘Revolutionary youth’ 
embodied the ‘ideal new citizen whose dedication to his country was pure and untarnished 
by atavistic kinship allegiances’ (Lewis, 2002:209–12). Citizens of the Somali Republic were 
encouraged to display the hallmarks of socialism through political training at ‘orientation 
centres’; effigies representing ‘tribalism’ were burned or buried; and ‘traditional’ social 
events were shifted from the home and clan meetings to ‘orientation centres’ (Balthasar, 
2012:108; Brons, 2001:172–73; Lewis, 2002:209). Together with other far-reaching social 
changes, the SRC also continued the civilian government’s efforts to eliminate the practice of 
blood compensation (mag),6 shifting criminal responsibility from the collective to the 
individual, and abolishing – formally at least – that deeply embedded conflict resolution 
mechanism (Balthasar, 2012:98). Meanwhile, the caaqils and suldaans that had been 
empowered under colonialism, and who had been incorporated into the state after 
independence, were replaced by government-appointed officials or renamed nabad-doon 
(‘peacemaker’) (Lewis, 2002).  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  mag.	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On the face of it, these changes penetrated into all aspects of the clan system, with the 
ceremonial ‘burial’ of clannism in villages and towns, and the replacement of the traditional 
greeting ina’adeer (‘cousin’) with jaalle meaning ‘comrade’.7 The everyday reality was, 
however, farcical: Lewis (1994:88) notes that people, unable to ask directly about clan, 
talked about ‘exs’ (i.e. ‘ex-lineages’). But clans were still primary sites of identity, security 
and resources (Abbink, 2003:349). As Brons puts it, ‘the state did not succeed in replacing 
non-state institutions, falling far short of what the clan network offered to society’ 
(2001:173). For all Barre’s bluster against tribalism, nepotism, corruption and patronage 
coursed through the veins of the administration (Drysdale, 1992; Lewis, 1994:84). Indeed, 
in the post-1978 period (after a devastating drought and war in the Ogaden8), Barre openly 
relied on his paternal and matrilineal clans (Brons, 2001; Lewis, 2002; Walls, 2014).  
 
Although ‘Somalilandness’ might not have been a coherent political narrative at the time, 
the invocation of clan identity at the top levels of government resurrected the reading of the 
population in terms of clans, and thus resurrected a political distinction between northern 
and southern clans. This had important ramifications for the articulation of resistance and 
the strategies of repression that characterised the 1980s and eventually the civil war, since 
these were framed as actions by and against particular clans. In this way, although it is not 
the case that there was a consolidated Somaliland identity at this time, the power of these 
juxtaposing narratives served to bring into relief the enduring disparity between Mogadishu 
and the north. Asad, a former SNM officer I interviewed in 2012, argued that issues of 
identity and citizenship were major drivers for the war. Having now worked for a number of 
years with civil society and the government to build up the Somaliland state, he was 
adamant that:  	  You	  ask	  someone	  why	  they	  are	  fighting,	  and	  he	  will	  tell	  you	  because	  my	  basic	  rights	  have	  been	  violated,	  my	  father	  has	  been	  killed,	  Hargeysa	  has	  been	  demolished.	  Then	  there	  are	  some	  who	  would	  say	  I	  was	  fighting	  for	  my	  identity,	  I	  was	  fighting	  to	  be	  a	  proper	  citizen,	  to	  be	  a	  citizen	  of	  Somaliland,	  to	  be	  a	  citizen	  of	  Hargeysa.	  (Interview,	  2012)	  
 
Asad claimed people wanted to be ‘proper citizens’, pointing to differentiations in status 
despite formal civic equality that Migdal (2006) has called ‘graduated citizenship’. This is 
the idea that there are different levels of formal rights and obligations, but also that there 
are different affective expressions of belonging: some groups feel they really belong, whilst 
other groups do not; some groups feel the state is theirs and not others’ (ibid). Although 
formally northern Somalis were incorporated into the state, their actual abilities to claim the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  salutary	  term	  adeer	  (uncle)	  or	  ina’adeer	  (cousin)	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  patrilineal	  kin	  of	  the	  same	  generation	  and	  also	  for	   strangers.	  Lewis	   reports	   that	  up	   to	   its	  decline	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1970s,	   jaalle	   ‘enjoyed	  a	   certain	  official	   currency	  on	   the	  radio	  and	  in	  written	  documents’,	  but	  in	  public,	  people	  did	  not	  tend	  to	  use	  it	  (1994:84,	  87–88).	  	  8	  A	  severe	  drought	  in	  1974–75,	  which	  put	  the	  regime	  under	  pressure,	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  1977–78	  war	  for	  ‘Western	  Somalia’,	  which	  was	  a	  military	  and	   financial	   failure.	  Ogaden	  Somalis	   fled	  Ethiopia	   leading	   to	  a	  massive	  refugee	  crisis	  (described	  at	  the	  time	  as	  the	  worst	  in	  the	  world,	  Balthasar,	  2012:124).	  The	  channelling	  of	  these	  refugees	  into	  the	  north	  created	   great	   resentment,	   particularly	   amongst	   the	   Isaaq	   who	   felt	   threatened	   by	   the	   influx	   of	   pro-­‐Barre	   Ogadeni.	  Balthasar	   argues	   that	   these	   three	   events	   led	   to	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   national	   identity,	   accompanied	   by	   a	   ‘re-­‐tribalisation’	  of	  Somaliland	  society	  (ibid:124–25).	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entitlements of citizenship were affected by geographical and psychological distance from 
the capital. Asad argued that the supposed inclusiveness of the definition of a citizen of the 
Somali Republic (see below) was false, and that being from Hargeysa made him a second-
class citizen. For instance, he told me that it was extremely difficult to obtain a passport 
under the Barre regime, since these were closely controlled by the central government. But 
as an Isaaq it was doubly difficult, if not impossible – in fact, one had to falsify documents, 
writing that one was born in, for example, the Ogaden (where Barre’s matrilineal clan was 
based), rather than Hargeysa. ‘You could see how you’d feel in such a situation when you’re 
really a citizen of Hargeysa and they tell you to write that you were born in Jigjiga? Why 
shouldn’t I write that I am from Hargeysa?’ (Interview, 2013a)  
 
This abjuration of northern identity increased after 1981, particularly after the shift towards 
authoritarianism by the regime in Mogadishu saw the appointment of an army chief who, as 
‘virtual governor of the north’, authorised disappearances and imprisonments (Mohamed, 
2010:32). The ostracism of many northern people from the regime was symbolised by the 
targeting of a group of doctors and teachers who had been engaged in ‘self-help’ activities to 
redress the poor state of local public services (Brons, 2001:62). After fundraising for 
hospital supplies for the Hargeysa Group Hospital and organising for other social projects, 
the so-called Hargeysa Group was accused of sedition and crimes against the state: they 
were detained, tortured, subjected to a show trial, and imprisoned for years in solitary 
confinement (Mohamed, 2010; Jama, 2003). During the trial, huge student demonstrations 
became riots in which the students threw rocks at the assembled security forces, who then 
returned fire, killing some and arresting hundreds of others. That day, 20 February 1982, is 
known as ‘Dhagax Tuur’ (stone-throwing) and signalled the beginning of organised 
resistance against Barre. Although the thirty years between Somaliland’s two independences 
did not include active nation-making by political actors in Somaliland, my argument is that, 
rather than producing legibility, the Barre regime’s crude efforts at standardisation and 
homogenisation, actually made it short-sighted towards its periphery, which fertilised the 
soil for the articulation of Somalilandness when neglect turned to cruelty in the late 1980s.  
 
Barre’s late leadership had reconstituted clan as the primary conduit for political power and 
prestige, and it was in these terms that opposition was mounted by the Majerteen, 
Warsengeli and Dhulbahante clans forming the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), 
and members of the Isaaq clan assembling as the Somali National Movement (SNM).9 By 
1990, Somalia was embroiled in chronic violence and warfare. Virginia Luling, present in 
Afgoye in August 1989, wrote ‘things were falling apart and everybody knew it’. One man 
said to her, ‘Everything is uncertain, there is no respect for the law. We are like people in the 
dark’ (2002:37). As the civil war escalated, the fight that had been between Somalia’s largest 
clan-families descended into bloody conflict within clans and even within sub-clans, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   establishment	   and	   actions	   of	   the	   SNM,	   see	   Balthasar,	   2012:133–34,	   139–41;	   Bradbury,	  2008:60–73;	  Brons,	  2001:185,	  202;	  Walls,	  2014:150–51.	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resulting in unpredictable, localised and internecine squabbles and struggles that devolved 
warfare to the lowest levels of society (Menkhaus, 2004:30; Kusow, 2004). 
 
The ‘Passport’ of Clan Identity  
In the post-independence period we thus see a tension between ideological opposition to 
clan structures as the grounds of political mobilisation and identification, and their sensible 
utilisation in the face of power struggles. Certainly in choosing between remaining in the 
fight for a united Somali republic and withdrawing to build a new state, the SNM fighters 
and northern political leaders chose the latter strategy of pragmatism. Instead of decrying 
clan and lineage as the nationalists had done in the run-up to 1960, the (re)constitution of 
Somaliland was undertaken with the explicit incorporation of clan elders, who sat as 
representatives of the different northern groups at a series of successive conferences in 1991, 
1993 and 1997. These established the institutions of a new state, including political organs 
and processes, economic management, security and a justice system.10 During the war, an 
ad hoc council of clan elders (guurti) had helped to resolve conflict amongst the SNM 
leadership.11 Now convocations of clan representatives used traditional consensus-building 
to bring non-Isaaq (and pro-Barre) clans into the political fold, negotiated a broad amnesty 
and disarmament, 12  and enabled the power-sharing that continues to structure 
contemporary politics. Renders (2010:728). Similarly, Balthasar argues that it was the 
power of the clan elders to shape and obtain political agreement that confirmed their 
inclusion in – and indeed centrality to – the emerging leadership, which became ‘hostage’ to 
the elders (2012:143). Such an account contravenes the common political narrative that the 
SNM sought to blend together traditional and modern forms of political organisation 
(Bradbury, 2008:69); however, whether by design or default, it is clear that collaboration 
between clan and ‘political’ institutions was forged into the DNA of Somaliland’s new state 
blueprint. 
 
Despite the formal inter-clan and SNM-clan co-operation at the level of national mediation, 
it remained the case that deep reservoirs of inter-clan mistrust remained at a societal level. 
Northern kinsmen had been declared co-nationals in a new republic, but that did not ease 
the emotional burden of co-existence. ‘During the conflict, members of communities who 
had grown up together as families, but belonged to different clans, had found themselves on 
opposing sides, at war with one another’ (SCPD, 1999:24–25). The level of fear, mistrust and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Hagmann	   and	   Hoehne	   (2009:51)	   make	   a	   similar	   argument.	   On	   the	   details	   of	   the	   conferences,	   see	   APD,	   2008;	  Balthasar,	  2012:152–54;	  Bradbury,	  2008:95–105,	  124–27;	  Walls,	  2014:165–204.	  	  11	  Balthasar’s	  research	  suggests	  that	  the	  guurti	   is	  not	  a	  ‘traditional’	  institution	  but	  one	  formed	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s	  as	  an	  advisory	  body	  to	  the	  SNM	  because	  ‘the	  young	  officers	  who	  had	  deserted	  the	  SNA	  [Somali	  National	  Army]	  for	  the	  SNM	  had	  very	  little	  idea	  about	  how	  the	  clan	  system	  worked’	  (2012:142).	  This	  reinforces	  the	  point	  made	  in	  Chapter	  2	  that	  the	  ascription	  of	  ‘traditional’	  or	  ‘modern’	  must	  be	  done	  carefully	  and	  mindfully.	  	  12	  The	   SNM’s	   doctrine	   of	   ‘clan	   self-­‐determination’	   held	   that	   no	   clan	   could	   liberate	   or	   subjugate	   another	   (Balthasar,	  2012:137;	   Bradbury,	   2008:79).	   An	   amnesty	   was	   agreed	   with	   representatives	   from	   the	   non-­‐Isaaq	   clans,	   preventing	  recriminations	  and	  revenge	  attacks	  (although	  some	  fighting	  did	  take	  place).	  Balthasar	  suggests	  that	  this	  was	  more	  from	  pragmatism	  than	  principle,	  however,	   since	   the	  SNM	  could	  not	  hold	  non-­‐Isaaq	   territories	  and	  did	  not	  want	   to	   foment	  anti-­‐Isaaq	  opposition	  (2012:137–38).	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insecurity during the civil war had important implications for Somali identity, not least in 
terms of how to identify oneself. With people coming from the south, from Ethiopia and 
displaced within the north, the task of identifying who was who was enormous. In the chaos 
of secession, violence and displacement, who, indeed, was a Somalilander?  
 
In the years leading up to and after 1991, tens of thousands of northern Somalis fled the 
fighting in Mogadishu and the repercussions of the conflict’s clan factionalism, seeking the 
home territories of maternal or paternal clans. An estimated 400,000–500,000 northern 
Somalis fled to Ethiopia, whilst another 400,000 were internally displaced (World Bank, 
cited in Harris with Foresti, 2011:5). In the context of the violence and ‘cleansing’ that was 
taking place between clans in the brutalising civil war (Kapteijns, 2012: Hoehne, 2015), clan 
identities became ‘passports’: to come under the protection of the northern clans, one had 
had to prove one’s lineage. Genealogy thus acted as a social password to Somaliland 
belonging. For those who could not make this claim, or did not know it, their identity could 
not be verified. For instance, in an apocryphal tale recounted by Yusuf (2008), two young 
men of the Darood clan-family seek to escape the vengeance and persecution of the dying 
Barre regime in Mogadishu to head to the safe haven offered by their mother’s clan, the 
Isaaq. However, despite her protestations, the brothers refuse to learn their mother’s 
abtirsiino, which would enable them to authenticate themselves as Isaaqs. The young men 
consider themselves to be ‘modern’ Somalis, and deride the genealogy as ‘the names of a 
bunch of ancestors who’ve been dead for centuries’ (Luling, 2006:476). However, after a 
long journey and upon finally approaching Burco, the car in which they are travelling is 
pulled over by armed guards, and everyone is ordered to identify themselves. The other 
passengers name their clans and sub-clans, and also recite ‘a list of their forefathers’ names 
in reverse order – the same way their mother tried to teach them’ (Yusuf, 2008:58). The 
brothers cannot do so, and, unable to prove their Isaaq identity, the brothers are executed as 
spies. ‘True’ Somalilanders were thus not only from northern lineages, but could recite their 
ancestors and knew their own history. 
 
Such was the levels of distrust, anger and confusion in the context of the conflict that it was 
vital for new arrivals or returnees to display the hallmarks of northern-ness or 
‘Somalilandness’. This included having the ‘northern’ accent. In 1972, the SRC had 
undertaken a civic nation-building programme with the development of an official Somali 
script13 and an ambitious crash course to educate first urban civil servants, ministers and 
teachers, and then the entire country via pioneering students who took to the countryside to 
tutor the rural and urban population (Lewis, 2002:217). Barre described the literacy 
campaign as ‘the weapon to eradicate social balkanization and fragmentation into tribes and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  Somali	   language	  –	   the	   syntax	  of	   an	  oral	  people	  –	  had	  never	  had	  need	  of	   inscription;	  and	  colonial	  officials	  had	  worked	   in	  English	  and	   Italian.	  Competing	  scripts	  had	  emerged	  based	  on	  Arabic	  and	  Roman	  alphabets,	  and	   the	   latter	  was	  ultimately	  chosen	  as	  the	  Somali	  common	  hand	  in	  1972.	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sects’ (ibid).14 It had also served another purpose, which was to delegitimise English as a 
national language of politics. This is important because English had been the language of 
government in the British Protectorate, and until this time had been an official language of 
Somalia and was still used in Somaliland (Gaani, interview, 2014). This language politics 
was thus a move to assert control over the definition of Somaliness, simultaneously 
redefining aspects of Somalilandness.  
 
Despite the authoritarian imposition of the new script, dialects still divided Somalis, not 
only in terms of vocabulary and grammar but also simply in terms of accent. Upon the 
secession of Somaliland in 1991, it quickly became clear who had been living in the ‘south’ 
and who in the north once people opened their mouths. For instance, Qasim, a civil servant, 
told me his story about ‘proving’ his northern credentials. He had fled Mogadishu with his 
family in 1990, spending a year in a UNHCR camp in the Somali region of Ethiopia, before 
finally coming to Hargeysa at the end of 1992. In 2013, he quietly told me how he had been 
required to abandon his Mogadishu accent through ‘re-education’ amongst nomadic 
relatives: 	  It	   was	   a	   very	   dramatic	   change.	  When	  we	   came	   to	   the	   refugee	   camp	   in	   1991,	   the	  Hargeysa	   people	   [had	   already	   come]	   to	   Ethiopia.	   We	   were	   using	   the	   Mogadishu	  accent.	   Our	   relatives	   there	  were	   becoming	   too	   angry:	   ‘why	   are	   you	   speaking	   this	  accent?	  They	  are	  the	  people	  who	  have	  destroyed	  our	  homes.	  Why	  are	  you	  speaking?	  You	   should	   change	   that	   accent.’	   They	  were	   saying	   to	  mum	  and	   father,	   ‘please	   tell	  your	   children	   to	   speak	   our	   accent’.	   That	   is	   the	   reason	  my	   father	   took	  me	   to	   the	  countryside.	   I	  did	  not	  understand	  [why	  I	  had	  to	  go],	  but	  my	  father	  told	  me	   later.	   I	  asked	  him	   ‘why	  did	   you	   take	  me	   to	   the	   countryside	   at	   that	   time?’	   I	   told	  him	  very	  horrible	  stories	  of	  the	  wild	  animals.	  A	  little	  child	  who	  came	  from	  Mogadishu,	  it	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  beautiful	  cities	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  then	  going	  to	  the	  countryside.	  It	  was	   really	   a	   very	   bad	   state.	   So	   I	   asked	   him	   ‘why	  were	   you	   endangering	  myself	  Dad?’	  He	  told	  me	  the	  reason	  was	  ‘to	  change	  your	  accent,	  to	  become	  a	  Somalilander.	  These	  are	  your	  people.’	  (Interview,	  2013)	  
 
This conception of the Somalilander identity that Qasim describes draws very much on 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) narratives of authenticity and trust in the face of insecurity 
and vulnerability. The traumatic experiences of the war, in particular the clan-based 
violence, brought clan to the fore as a principal marker of identity and political affiliation. 
The use of this social institution, complete with identities, norms and rules, was an 
important coping mechanism – minimising risk and increasing predictability – and 
demonstrates the adaptation that characterised Somaliland’s post-war reconstitution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  It	  was	  a	  blunt	  tool	  of	  nation-­‐building,	  however,	  excluding	  the	  other	  languages	  spoken	  in	  Somalia,	  not	  least	  Af-­‐Maay	  (also	   called	   May	  May)	   spoken	   in	   the	   inter-­‐riverine	   area	   of	   southern	   Somalia.	   Commonly	  mislabelled	   a	   dialect,	   it	   is	  considered	  a	  different	  language,	  unintelligible	  to	  most	  speakers	  of	  standard	  Somali,	  which	  is	  drawn	  from	  the	  northern	  pastoralists,	   in	   a	   relationship	   similar	   to	   Spanish	   and	   Portuguese	   (Lewis,	   2002;	   Lewis,	   2008:3).	   In	   addition,	   the	  Bravanese,	  the	  people	  of	  the	  former	  city-­‐state	  of	  Barawe,	  speak	  their	  own	  dialect,	  a	  version	  of	  Swahili;	  the	  Kibajuni	  also	  speaks	   another	   type	   of	   Swahili,	   whilst	   the	  Mushunguli	   traditionally	   speaks	   a	   Bantu	   language	   (Menkhaus,	   2010:93).	  These	   minority	   languages	   were	   not	   granted	   official	   status,	   even	   under	   Barre’s	   relatively	   enlightened	   approach	   to	  minorities,	  and	   the	  codification	  of	  Af-­‐Somaaliga,	   the	   language	  of	   the	  Samaale,	   further	  entrenched	  a	  boundary	  around	  the	   ‘noble’	   clans	   of	   the	   Issa,	   Gadabuursi,	   Isaaq	   and	   Hawiye,	   separating	   them	   from	   the	   Sab,	   the	   oft-­‐denigrated	  descendants	  of	  a	   separate	   founding	  ancestor	   in	   the	  national	  genealogy.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  development	  of	  a	   standard	  script	  and	  its	  widespread	  adoption	  is	  one	  of	  Barre’s	  enduring	  legacies;	  despite	  the	  bloody	  divisions	  of	  recent	  history,	  it	  remains	  the	  official	  language	  across	  all	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Somali	  governments.	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(Menkhaus, 2006). In particular, it makes a clear case for why the nascent state leveraged 
clan identity as a frame of legibility.  
 
‘All the Background of People was Lost’ 
As I described in Chapter 1, returning to Somaliland after the war required a hazardous 
journey during which people lost or were robbed of everything of value, and were at risk of 
illness, injury and death. Paperwork – government-issued ID or passports – was of 
ambiguous use on the road from collapse to chaos, and those who had it often had left it 
behind or had it taken from them. ‘They took everything, even my birthday certificate. Now I 
do not have it’, recalled Qasim (Interview, 2013). Nur, a retired immigration official now in 
his sixties who had also been in Hargeysa in Somaliland’s first years, pressed home the 
impact of the civil war and the way it stripped people of ways of proving their identity:  	  This	   country	  was	  destroyed,	   and	  all	   the	  documents	  were	   lost	  or	  destroyed	  by	   the	  civil	  war.	  The	  people	  who	  used	  to	  hold	  these	  documents	  have	  passed	  away.	  In	  1991,	  there	  was	  no	  kind	  of	  life	  in	  Hargeysa	  –	  no	  schools,	  no	  buildings	  for	  offices	  to	  work	  in,	  no	  homes	  to	  live	  in.	  All	  the	  background	  of	  the	  people	  [was]	  lost.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
Nur pressed home the impact of the civil war and the way it stripped people of their material 
welfare and also their ‘backgrounds’. People were no longer citizens of the Somali Republic; 
this official identity was indeed lost. However, another ‘background’ remained: Nur 
confirmed what other people had told me, which was the key to identity verification was 
knowledge of one’s clan and lineage. ‘Clan was the only system and we were prepared to use 
it’ (ibid). Clan identity was the principal form of identity authentication for officials of the 
early administration even in cases where it attempted to use more formalised 
documentation. For instance, in the mid-1990s, the government of Muhammad Haji 
Ibrahim Egal, in conjunction with the UN and the Ethiopian government, undertook a 
process of tirakoob (literally, rounding up of figures, or generally census or statistics). Using 
border-crossing numbers and UNHCR documentation, the administration attempted to 
enumerate its new population. However, it was extremely difficult, noted Yaasmiin, a 
businesswoman I interviewed about this period: ‘A lot of people were living in other places, 
a lot of people were missing, a lot of people were dead’ (Interview, 2014). As a population 
estimate it might have had some crude utility;15 however, as a form of identity registration, it 
did not, since there was no paperwork trail – no chain of verification – with which to assess 
nationals’ identity or document ‘Somalilander’ status. Yaasmiin recollected that agents of 
the tirakoob neither created nor demanded identity documentation. Rather, it was clear that 
the process of making Somalilanders legible depended upon genealogical and linguistic 
verification: ‘‘All the reer [people, nation] Somaliland know each other [and] know the 
language, so they knew who was a Somalilander’ (Yaasmiin, interview, 2014; translated by 
Ashkir). Hence we again see the importance of the informal ways of verifying identity that I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Gaani,	  a	  senior	  civil	  servant,	   told	  me	  that	  the	  population	  figure	  of	  3	  million	  that	  became	  Somaliland’s	  demographic	  benchmark	  came	  from	  this	  process,	  but	  was	  based	  on	  estimates	  and	  thus,	  he	  implied,	  statistically	  unreliable	  (Interview,	  2014).	  A	  figure	  of	  3.5	  million	  is	  more	  commonly	  quoted	  today,	  but	  this	  is	  also	  based	  on	  projected	  estimates.	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introduced above, and which form the basis of the vernacular legibility that I discussed in 
the previous chapter.  
 
Genealogical Citizenship 
These emerging conceptions of the Somalilander identity drew very much on implicit (and 
sometimes explicit) narratives of authenticity and trust in the face of insecurity and 
vulnerability. The traumatic experiences of the war, in particular the clan-based violence, 
brought clan to the fore as a principal marker of identity and political affiliation. The use of 
this social institution, complete with identities, norms and rules, was an important coping 
mechanism – minimising risk and increasing predictability – and demonstrates the 
adaptation that has characterised Somaliland’s post-war reconstitution (Menkhaus, 2006). 
 
It is therefore not surprising that these identities should figure prominently in Somaliland’s 
citizenship law, a core statement about how it sees the legal members of the state, and thus 
integral to its construction of official legibility. The Somaliland government first formally 
defined Somaliland citizenship in Article 4 of the 2001 constitution, stating that a citizen is: 	  Any	  person	  who	  is	  a	  patrial	  of	  Somaliland	  being	  a	  descendant	  of	  a	  person	  residing	  in	  Somaliland	  on	  26	  June	  1960	  or	  earlier	  shall	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  citizen	  of	  Somaliland.	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2001)	  
 
Further codification of Somaliland’s citizenship regime came in Law No. 22/2002. It was ‘an 
essential constitutional duty that should have been undertaken much earlier’ (Ibrahim, 
personal correspondence, 2013); and was allegedly rushed and uninformed, without lawyers 
on the drafting committee (Shermarke, interview, 2013). Unlike previous citizenship laws 
which defined a citizen as ‘any person who by origin, language or tradition belongs to the 
Somali Nation shall be considered a "Somali"’ (Republic of Somalia, 1963: Article 3),16 the 
2002 Somaliland law reflected a desire to separate ethnicity and nationality. ‘Somali’ would 
now be an all-encompassing ethnicity that could apply to both Somalilanders and those of 
the Somali Republic – and indeed, those of Somali ethnic origin living in the near and far 
diaspora. ‘Somalilander’, on the other hand, was explicitly a national identity, the contours 
and parameters of which would be defined genealogically and territorially. The essential 
characteristic of the 2002 law was therefore the emphasis on descent as the key criterion for 
citizenship. Like Article 4 of the constitution, Law No. 22/2002 defines a Somaliland citizen 
as: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  temporary	  Somaliland	  law	  in	  1960	  defined	  a	  citizen	  as	  ‘any	  person	  whose	  mother	  tongue	  is	  the	  Somali	  language	  and	  who	  follows	  Somali	  customs’	  (Draft	  Somaliland	  Ordinance,	  1960:7(ii);	  also	  Protectorate	  of	  Somaliland,	  1960).	  In	  co-­‐defining	  citizens	  and	  co-­‐ethnics,	  the	  citizenship	  laws	  thus	  had	  clear	  political	  implications	  for	  who	  would	  be	  included	  in	  the	  new	  Somali	  nation.	  Indeed,	  the	  union	  citizenship	  law	  drew	  on	  this	  language,	  coming	  into	  force	  on	  22	  December	  1961.	   British	   Foreign	   Secretary	   Selwyn	   Lloyd	   wrote	   to	   the	   British	   Consulate-­‐General	   in	   Mogadishu	   in	   March	   1960	  expressing	  concern	  that	  the	  new	  Somali	  Republic	  law	  contained	  a	  ‘regrettable	  absence	  of	  definition,	  and	  indeterminate	  words	   and	   phrases	   such	   as	   “Somali”,	   “established	   residence”,	   “native	   of	   the	   territory”	   can	   only	   lead	   to	   unnecessary	  misunderstanding’	  (Circular	  Savingram,	  1960a,	  1960b).	  In	  fact,	  Somaliland’s	  citizenship	  law	  was	  similarly	  ambiguous.	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An	   individual	  who	  descended	   from	  persons	  who	  were	   resident	   in	   the	   territory	  of	  Somaliland	   on	   26	   June	   1960	   or	   before,	   …	   [or]	   a	   person	   who	   had	   Somaliland	  citizenship	  conferred	  on	  him	  lawfully.	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2002:	  Article	  1)	  
 
Like the constitutional article, this is a key statement about not only the identity of 
Somaliland citizens, but about the identity of the Somaliland nation as a whole. Dorman 
notes that attitudes towards citizenship are shaped by the political culture and historical 
experience of countries (2014:170); certainly in Somaliland’s case, the formulation of its 
citizenship scheme, and the way it is digested and enacted, shows the imprint of its past. A 
literal reading of these articles suggests a jus solis interpretation, which fits with the 
assertion of territorial contiguity with the British Protectorate on which Somaliland’s claim 
to statehood rests. The British Protectorate had used a territorial conception of legal identity 
when it finally elucidated Somaliland status after the Second World War. According to the 
1934 British Protected Persons [BPP] Order, a person had ‘belonged to the territory’ if they 
were born within the territory without some other nationality, or born to a father who 
himself was born within the territory.17  
 
However, there is obviously also a strong emphasis on descent, and the use of the term 
‘patrial’ makes clear the ‘genealogical logic’ at work. This genealogical basis is part of the 
boundary-making function of citizenship in which states ‘make strangers’ in order to ‘make 
the nation’ (Dorman, Hammett and Nugent, 2007). In this case, the drafters of the 
Somaliland citizenship law sought to move away from the ethnic basis of previous Somali 
citizenship rules in order to legally demarcate Somaliland citizens from those of Somalia. No 
longer were citizens to be ‘any person who by origin, language or tradition belongs to the 
Somali Nation’ (Republic of Somalia, 1963) – Somaliland citizens were those who effectively 
came from the northern clans, excluding Somalis with other lineages.18  
 
Of course, Somaliland was not in 2001, nor is it today, a politically and socially coherent 
nation in light of the long-lived contestation of this dominant imagining of Somaliland by 
people in Sool, Sanaag and Awdal. Building genealogy into citizenship nevertheless creates a 
narrative of authentic nationhood, which has been a significant part of the recognition 
campaign. In particular, the assertion that Somaliland people lived in the territory before 
1960 is an explicit framing of Somaliland as a ‘successor state’, suggesting that it has 
legitimacy and longevity. As Dorman, Hammett and Nugent note about similar cases, ‘the 
defence of national boundaries is predicated upon a claim to historical legitimacy’ (2007:13). 
The genealogical claim of Somaliland’s citizenship law contributes to this legitimacy making. 
Josep Llobera writes that ‘genealogies are a form of memory which helps the understanding 
of the lines of rupture and correspondence’ (cited in Bestard-Camps, 1991:xiv). I argued in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17 	  For	   an	   announcement	   of	   the	   Order	   in	   the	   London	   Gazette,	   18	   May	   1934,	   see	   <http://www.london-­‐gazette.co.uk/issues/34051/pages/3194/page.pdf>,	   accessed	   30	   January	   2014.	   The	   British	   Protectorates,	   Protected	  States	  and	  Protected	  Persons	  Order	  1949/140	  specifically	  listed	  the	  Somaliland	  Protectorate.	  	  18	  See	  Chapter	  3	   for	  a	  discussion	  of	   the	   importance	  of	  authentic	   lineages	   to	   the	  genealogical	   idiom,	  and	   its	  attendant	  exclusions.	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Chapter 3 that the genealogical idiom contains a particular form of temporality, which has 
become, in some sense, woven into Somaliland’s national biography.19  
 
Clan Citizenship 
The emphasis on descent as the key marker of Somaliland citizenship also roots ‘official’ 
identity in clan identity. Sharif, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Education, argued 
that this makes clan the basis of national identity:  	  The	  thing	  about	  the	  citizenship	  law	  is	  that	  to	  be	  a	  Somalilander	  means	  you	  are	  not	  born	   in	   it,	   but	   born	   to	   it.	   You	   have	   to	   be	   born	   to	   the	   clan	   –	   it	   is	   citizenship	   by	  association.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
As I argued in Chapter 3, in many key aspects of people’s ordinary lives, clan institutions 
and relations provide more meaningful engagement than the state, making the status of 
citizen seem to be less significant than clan identity in terms of accessing welfare and 
protection. Somaliland’s unrecognised de jure status also, of course, contributes to making 
the citizen-state relationship contingent: clan membership is predictable regardless of which 
state one lives in. A prominent civil society leader in her fifties, Nasteho, told me that ‘the 
question of citizenship is a very fake one here’ (Interview, 2012). She contrasted the lack of 
rights under the Barre regime with the insubstantial rights under the Somaliland state. 
‘There are rights and obligations. But the question here is [are] people aware of these rights? 
Is the government doing enough to provide those to the general, ordinary person? No’ (ibid). 
Asad, the old SNM officer and former minister, echoed this, when he told me ‘These rights 
[in the constitution] you get on a personal basis, but you better say that you should get it on 
the clan basis. […] At this stage of development that we are now in, you could hardly see a 
citizen getting his own rights, as a taxpayer or whatever. But you always have that shaded by 
the clan, by the tribe’ (Interview, 2012). It is for these reasons that people talk about ‘clan 
citizenship’ in Somaliland: for justice, welfare and security, citizenship is mediated via the 
clan, with clan leaders as key ‘convertors’ of identity. Descent is not just the basis of legal 
status; it also determines the nature of the relationship between citizen and state. 
 
This is important because the use of lineage as the basic structuring element of the 
citizenship regime brings with it differentiations in status based in traditional norms. 
Children born out of wedlock (garacyo) are granted formal legal status under the 2002 
citizenship law. It is notable, however, that whilst a foundling child born in Somaliland may 
receive citizenship under Article 11, a child born to a Somaliland woman but without a 
named father may only be granted citizenship via naturalisation (Article 4.2) – the same 
regulations governing aliens and refugees (Republic of Somaliland, 2002; 
SomalilandLaw.com, 2014). This rule arises from the distinctions made between male and 
female citizenship. According to Article 2.3, ‘Anyone born to a male Somaliland citizen may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  On	  the	  role	  of	  identity	  and	  time	  in	  national	  storytelling,	  see	  Bhabha,	  1990;	  and	  Berenskoetter,	  2014.	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acquire Somaliland citizenship, even if s/he is resident, refugee or citizen of another 
country’ (Republic of Somaliland, 2002). In other words, a child born to a Somaliland 
woman is not automatically granted citizenship.20 The emphasis on paternal lineage and 
citizenship comes from the heavily patriarchal nature of traditional Somaliland society, in 
which genealogy is traced via the father, and the father’s kin pays the mag. This genealogical 
citizenship is not legible via the mother. Women’s formal citizenship status is subject to 
sexist proscriptions that connect their ability to make claims to their intimate relations – 
whom they marry and whom they beget – yet it is only through the act of giving birth that 
the clan gains materiality. The 2002 law made an explicit distinction between male and 
female citizens, with women losing Somaliland citizenship if they marry a foreigner (Article 
13.3) even though Article 2.2 permits dual citizenship. The source of this is variably 
explained in terms of Somaliland culture and Islam, in that women are understood to join 
the family of their husband upon marriage and to leave the family of their father, hence 
Somaliland male citizens may freely marry foreign women without forfeiting their 
citizenship. The overt gender inequality of the law is recognised as problematic by members 
of Somaliland’s civil society, particularly women’s rights advocates. Two of Hargeysa’s most 
prominent lawyers, who I interviewed at length on the regime of citizenship in Somaliland, 
both reasoned that it could not have been drafted differently in the context of Somaliland 
culture (Shermarke, interview, 2013; Shire, interview, 2012). Though they might be on an 
equal legal footing, in practice women’s status is circumscribed by the genealogical idiom. 
 
This idea of the ‘clan-citizen’ reflects a predominant narrative in which the authentic citizen 
(and thus, perhaps, the ‘good’ citizen) is someone who has genealogical heritage and can be 
situated within frameworks of clan identity. There are of course other ‘norms’ of citizenhood 
in Somaliland: the Gabooye and garacyo that I discussed in Chapter 3 suffer a form of 
‘graduated’ or second-class citizenship; whilst amongst my diaspora interlocutors there was 
an overriding idea that they should be taken on their own terms, perhaps as the citizen 
individuals of Western liberal theory (see Chapter 6). These show the multiplicity of the 
discourses around belonging in Somaliland. The emergence of credible official 
documentation may contribute to bolstering this narrative of citizenship further amongst 
some groups in Somaliland, since ID cards can, as I noted in Chapter 2, produce civic 
subjectivity. However, as I note throughout this and the following chapters, the close 
connection of Somaliland’s current ID cards with genealogical verification may reinforce the 
ideas of ‘clan citizenship’ that I have discussed here.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Where	  the	  father	  is	  unknown	  or	  the	  child	  is	  orphaned,	  a	  person	  may	  apply	  for	  citizenship	  according	  to	  Articles	  10.1	  and	  11.	  This	   is	   to	  cover	   the	  position	  of	   those	  born	  out	  of	  wedlock	  who	   in	  most	  cases	  do	  not	  have	  a	  paternal	   lineage	  connecting	  them	  to	  clan	  genealogies	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4).	  Gender	  discrimination	  in	  citizenship	  law,	  particularly	  in	  terms	  of	  marriage,	  is	  common	  to	  a	  number	  of	  African	  states	  (Manby,	  2009;	  2014;	  see	  also	  Dorman,	  2014).	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Hard and Soft Borders 
As well as determining internal boundaries, genealogical logic also shapes ideas of national 
belonging and border-making. The legal and symbolic force of both descent and residence in 
the constitution underscores the ways in which the Hawiye and Darood clans of eastern and 
southern Somalia are not part of Somaliland: a clear rebuttal of prospects for reunification, 
and a conceptual encirclement of the ‘northern tribes’ that had formerly lived under the 
Protectorate and whose descendants now constituted Somaliland’s citizens. 
 
Renders and Terlinden argue that ‘the boundaries of statehood are the key object of 
[Somaliland’s] negotiations: on what terms and to what extent are clan segments willing to 
“belong” to the fledgling state?’ (2010:725) All of the major clan-families in Somaliland have 
populations beyond the national borders: the Dir (Issa) in Djibouti, the Darood (Warsengeli 
and Dhulbahante) in southern and eastern Somalia, and the Isaaq in the Haud and the 
Ogaden (Ethiopia’s Region V). Tracing citizenship through descent, as the constitution and 
the 2002 law state, means that many more Somalis claim Somaliland citizenship than reside 
in the territory, making the ‘mental map’ of Somaliland much larger than the territorial 
extent. In this sense, some people regard Somaliland’s boundaries as extending beyond its 
territorial circumscription to ‘the point at which something becomes something else, at 
which the way things are done changes, at which “we” end and “they” begin’ (Migdal, 
2004:5). A territorial conception of citizenship (jus soli) would not have covered the broad 
‘mental map’ of Somaliland belonging. As well as the substantial diaspora population, 
nomadic pastoralists and other semi-permanent residents criss-crossing the Ethiopian and 
Djibouti border demand the rights of citizenship, not least those of the voter (see Chapter 5). 
At the same time, people in the frontier zone between Somaliland and Puntland are 
embraced on both sides and yet also marginalised and peripheral, meaning the mental map 
is more constrained than the territorial demarcation claimed by Somaliland.21  
 
At the convention at Burco in May 1991, the SNM and the participating clan elders declared 
an independent state of Somaliland within the old colonial borders – a rhetorical return to 
the nomenclature of the former British Protectorate, and evocative of the historical 
precedent for both its identity and extent. A fundamental element of Somaliland’s claim to 
statehood is this assertion of historical and territorial continuity. However, Somaliland 
neither ‘inherited’ nor established boundaries protected by international law (Renders and 
Terlinden, 2010:725). Whilst Migdal (2004) argues that the time of seeing borders as 
‘immutably rock-like’ has changed since the end of the Cold War, for Somaliland 
international borders are ‘rock-like’ since they are regarded in a legal sense as extending not 
to the former Protectorate borders as the Somaliland state claims, but as reaching down as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Having	  asserted	  the	  resumption	  of	  the	  old	  Protectorate	  borders,	  the	  new	  Somaliland	  state	  claims	  to	  extend	  to	  the	  east	  of	  Laascaanood	   in	  the	  region	  of	  Sool	  and	  almost	   to	  Boosaaso	   in	  the	  autonomous	  republic	  of	  Puntland	  that	   lies	   to	  the	  east	   up	   to	   Cape	  Gardafui,	   the	   nib	   of	   the	  Horn’s	   triangular	   coastline	   (see	  Map	   1).	   Puntland,	   established	   in	   1998	   as	   a	  
primus	  inter	  pares	  state	  of	  a	  future	  Somali	  federation,	  claims,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  to	  extend	  deep	  into	  Sanaag	  and	  Sool,	  past	  Laasqorey	  on	  the	  northern	  coast	  and	  Buuhoodle	  on	  the	  Ethiopian	  border	  to	  wherever	  members	  of	  the	  Harti	  clan	  (who	  constitute	  many	  Puntlanders)	  live.	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far as Kismaayo to the south and Cape Gardafui in the east, tracing those of the Federal 
Republic of Somalia.  
 
At the same time, these boundaries are negotiable and contested. Migdal writes that 
‘[b]orders shift; they leak; and they hold varying sorts of meaning for different people’ 
(2004:5). This ‘leakiness’ is particularly apparent along the Somaliland-Ethiopian border 
across which nomadic citizens move. The question of whether to include the nomadic 
population under the terms of citizenship is an intensely political one, and demonstrates the 
power of the genealogical idiom to be at once circumscriptive and widely encompassing. 
‘Those within [Somaliland] say that those beyond the border are not Somalilanders, but 
those who have nomadic populations argue that they must be included’, Sharif, a senior civil 
servant, explained (Interview, 2014). Rooble, my research assistant in 2014, told me that the 
issue was very complex because of the dispersal of people with Somaliland lineage; that at 
the time of the citizenship law, people were arguing that everyone should be included 
because ‘there has been a war and people are stuck. We cannot punish them’ (Interview, 
2014a). Similarly, Asad argued that: ‘The Isaaqs decided in 1991 that all Region V people 
were Somalilanders. Those at the boundaries are disadvantaged. The Dhulbahante said, 
“Are we going to call all the Harti to come then?”’ (Interview, 2013a) The issue of whose 
nomadic populations would be included was thus a further divisive factor between the east, 
west and central clans of Somaliland. The dominance of the central clans (the Isaaq) in 
Somaliland’s political fortunes means that their demand to include Region V Somalis (who 
can trace their descent to the pre-1960 clans) within the Somaliland citizenry carries greater 
political and practical weight than similar claims made by the Dir (Issa) in the west22 and 
the Darood in the east.23 
 
Natural Citizens, Natural Strangers 
Although the independent state of Somaliland was declared within the old colonial borders, 
a territorial conception of citizenship (jus soli) would not have covered the broad ‘mental 
map’ of Somaliland belonging. Migdal has described such boundaries as ‘the point at which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	   Protectorate’s	   western	   border	   was	   determined	   by	   an	   Anglo-­‐French	   agreement	   in	   1888,	   declaring	   a	   border	  between	  Djibouti	  and	  Seylac,	  the	  respective	  ports	  of	  the	  French	  and	  British	  domains.	  Since	  Britain’s	  protection	  treaty	  with	   the	   Issa,	   like	  with	   the	   other	   Somaliland	   clans,	   had	   been	   only	   for	   protection,	   Britain	   had	   no	   claim	   to	   the	   Issa’s	  traditional	  lands	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  border	  (Lewis,	  2002:49),	  and	  thus	  was	  unable	  to	  bargain	  for	  the	  coherence	  of	  the	   Issa	   lands.	  The	  splitting	  of	   the	   Issa	  clan	  of	   the	  Dir	  clan-­‐family	  over	   the	  Djibouti-­‐Somaliland	  border	   is	  a	  particular	  source	   of	   contention	   at	   election	   time	   when	   members	   of	   the	   Issa	   clan	   on	   the	   Djibouti	   side	   cross	   to	   vote	   in	   Issa-­‐dominated	  areas	  of	  Somaliland;	  and	  vocalise	  political	  claims	  about	  self-­‐governance	  in	  the	  region.	  	  23	  The	  eastern	  boundary	  of	  Somaliland	  was	  claimed	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  Protectorate	  borders	  as	  agreed	  by	  an	  1888	  Anglo-­‐Italian	   agreement,	   which	   ran	   through	   the	   traditional	   territory	   of	   the	  Majerteen,	   a	   sub-­‐clan	   of	   the	   Darod	   that	  contains	  also	  the	  Warsengeli	  and	  Dhulbahante.	  The	  present	  boundary	   is	  challenged	  by	  the	  Puntland	  State	  of	  Somalia	  (see	  Map	  1),	  producing	  essentially	  a	   cold	  war	  between	  authorities	  on	  both	  sides,	  which	  occasionally	  breaks	  out	   into	  bloody	  conflict.	  In	  recent	  years,	  political	  and	  armed	  confrontation	  has	  made	  the	  frontier	  zone	  increasingly	  militarised	  and	  more	   sharply	   defined.	   Not	   only	   Puntland	   and	   Somaliland	   authorities	   lay	   claim	   to	   the	   land	   and	   the	   populations	  residing	  here,	  but	  Dhulbahante	  and	  Warsengeli	  groups	  have	  begun	  to	  articulate	  their	  own	  political	  futures.	  Conflict	  in	  the	   Golis	  Mountains	   and	   at	   Taleex,	   Buhoodle	   and	   Laascanood	   since	   the	  mid-­‐2000s	   has	   brought	   the	   Somaliland	   and	  Puntland	  armies	  and	  local	  clan	  militias	  into	  direct	  armed	  conflict,	  claiming	  hundreds	  of	  lives	  and	  wrecking	  the	  tolerable	  ambiguity	  that	  had	  permitted	  people	   living	   in	  these	  areas	  to	  conduct	  their	  daily	   lives.	  See	  Hoehne,	  2015	  for	  more	  on	  this.	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something becomes something else at which the way things are done changes, at which “we” 
end and “they” begin’ (2004:5). The ‘we’ in Somaliland includes in effect, everyone from the 
Isaaq (Habar Awal, Habar Jaalo, Habar Yoonis, Garhajis and Arap), Issa, and Gadabuursi 
clans, as well as the Gabooye, since all these clans were resident in Somaliland at the time of 
independence (see Figure 1). As well as the broad dispersal of people via the diaspora and 
migration, the transhumance of Somaliland’s nomadic pastoralists brings them seasonally 
within and beyond the borders, also making a territorially described state undesirable.24 
‘Those within [Somaliland] say that those beyond the border are not Somalilanders, but 
those who have nomadic populations argue that they must be included’, Sharif explained 
(Interview, 2014). Rooble told me that at the time of the citizenship law, people were 
arguing that everyone should be included because ‘there has been a war and people are 
stuck. We cannot punish them’ (Interview, 2014a). Similarly, Asad argued that: ‘The Isaaqs 
decided in 1991 that all Region V people were Somalilanders. Those at the boundaries are 
disadvantaged. The Dhulbahante said, “Are we going to call all the Harti to come then?”’ 
(Interview, 2013a) The issue of whose nomadic populations would be included was a further 
divisive factor between the east, west and central clans of Somaliland for the genealogical 
citizenship does not conceptually encircle the broader kin of the Dhulbahante and 
Warsengeli clans that live in the contested frontier zone with Puntland – rather they are 
included because of the territorial claims that the Somaliland state makes to the old 
Protectorate border.25 The Warsengeli and Dhulbahante therefore make a jus soli claim to 
Somaliland and jus sanguinis claim to Puntland, thus complicating the citizenship regime 
and codifying a trigger for conflict in the borderlands.26 
 
The expansive regime of Somaliland citizenship as covering all descendants of pre-1960 
residents makes for a flexible and broad conception of nationhood. Asad argued that he 
thought that:  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  believe	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  Somalilanders,	  that	  they	  are	   Ethiopians.	   So	   that’s	   the	   new	   concept	   of	   Somaliland.	   You	   see?	   Somalia	   is	   for	  Somalia,	   Djibouti	   is	   for	   the	   Djiboutians,	   Puntland	   is	   for	   the	   Puntland.	   This	  [gesturing]	  is	  for	  Somaliland.	  (Interview,	  2013a)	  
 
Here Asad invokes notions of soft and hard boundaries: Somaliland is for Somalilanders 
(and Somali Ethiopians). Even though Asad speaks in terms of territorial units (Somalia, 
Djibouti), he is working here with the supra-territorial notion of citizenship by descent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  In	  the	  original	  Somali	  text,	  the	  phrase	  about	  residence	  uses	  the	  word	  ‘deggenaa’,	  derived	  from	  the	  verb	  ‘deg’,	  which	  means	  dwelling,	  settling	  or	  camping	  in	  a	  place	  –	  permitting,	  in	  other	  words,	  nomadic	  conceptions	  of	  ‘residence’.	  Related	  is	  the	  word	  ‘degaan’	  that	  refers	  to	  a	  clan’s	  homeland	  (Hoehne,	  2015).	  25	  Hoehne	  argues	  that	  when	  Puntland	  was	  declared,	  the	  clans	  that	  straddled	  the	  border	  orientated	  eastwards,	  drawn	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  Hartinimo	  (Harti-­‐ness)	  on	  which	  Puntland	  was	  founded,	  which	  embraced	  the	  Warsengeli	  and	  Dhulbahante	  genealogically	  and	   ideologically	   (2015:56).	  Menkhaus	  similarly	  argues	   that	  Puntland	   is	  a	   ‘clanustan’	  explicitly	  drawn	  along	  Harti	  clan	  lines	  (2006:83).	  	  26	  In	  recent	  years,	  political,	  and	  later	  armed,	  confrontation	  has	  made	  the	  frontier	  zone	  increasingly	  militarised	  and	  more	  sharply	  defined.	  Not	  only	  Puntland	  and	  Somaliland	  authorities	  lay	  claim	  to	  the	  land	  and	  the	  populations	  residing	  here,	  but	   Dhulbahante	   and	   Warsengeli	   groups	   have	   begun	   to	   articulate	   their	   own	   political	   futures.	   Conflict	   in	   the	   Golis	  Mountains	   and	   at	   Taleex,	   Buhoodle	   and	   Laascanood	   since	   the	  mid-­‐2000s	   has	   brought	   the	   Somaliland	   and	   Puntland	  armies	   and	   local	   clan	   militias	   into	   direct	   armed	   conflict,	   claiming	   hundreds	   of	   lives	   and	   wrecking	   the	   tolerable	  ambiguity	  that	  had	  permitted	  people	  living	  in	  these	  areas	  to	  conduct	  their	  daily	  lives.	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whereby nomadic people are trans-nationals, moving freely over the leaky Somaliland-
Ethiopia border. This also draws on the deeper narrative of nationality as ethnicity that 
characterised the pan-Somali and socialist citizenship regimes that I discussed above, and 
which is at some level still operant. For instance, Omar, a director of an NGO in Hargeysa, 
made the following, seemingly paradoxical, statement: ‘I am a Somaliland citizen, a Somali 
citizen, Ethiopian citizen. … If you speak Somali, [you] are Somali – you don’t need 
citizenship’ (Interview, 2012). On the other hand, though the border might be poorly 
demarcated and functionally porous, conceptually it is a ‘hard’ boundary because it marks 
the separation between ‘Somalilanders’ and non-Somalilanders.  
 
The 2002 law includes the possibility of acquisition of citizenship by law (naturalisation): ‘a 
person who had Somaliland citizenship conferred on him lawfully’. However, the wording of 
Article 4.1, to which this refers, is an exercise in wishful thinking. A person must have been a 
‘lawful’ resident for an interrupted decade (thus excluding IDPs, whose legal status is 
ambivalent at best), be known for ‘good character and behaviour’, must not have 
‘participated in activities which were contrary to the sovereignty of Somaliland’ (both surely 
open to interpretation), and have been a taxpayer the entire period of their residence (even 
though taxpaying in general is sporadic). The conditions are so onerous that no one I met in 
my fieldwork ever confessed to knowing a naturalised citizen of Somaliland. Some people 
claimed to have heard that so-and-so from Ethiopia (i.e. a Region V Somali) had obtained 
citizenship, but most conceded that the only verifiable case was John Drysdale, the former 
protectorate officer and writer who had lived near Hargeysa almost continuously since 
independence, and who had been made an honorary citizen (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2012–
14). Unsurprisingly given the state of Somaliland’s statistical and record-keeping capacities, 
there appeared to be no publicly available figures on numbers of naturalised citizens; and 
the Ministry of Interior and Department of Immigration evaded my questions about how 
many people had met the criteria, filed an application or been awarded citizenship. 
 
This is revealing of the centrality of authenticity to Somaliland citizenship. ‘Natural’ citizens 
are those that can make a claim to descent within specific genealogical-territorial 
boundaries. The notion of naturalising non-Somali kinsmen – i.e. making them ‘natural’ 
members of the Somaliland nation – is obviously at odds with this blood-based citizenship. 
Rather, citizens of Somalia (including Puntland), refugees and IDPs, and migrants from 
Ethiopia are natural outsiders to the Somaliland nation. Over the course of my fieldwork, I 
encountered strong attitudes against immigrants in Hargeysa as part of a broader narrative 
of encroachment and vulnerability associated with elusive recognition. People spoke of their 
fear that the ‘Oromo’ (often shorthand for a range of immigrants) and ‘Xabarshi’ (a 
derogatory term for Tikrit people) would ‘overtake’ Somalis: ‘they can change this people if 
they increase their numbers’, argued Muxudin, a journalist I met at the Maan-Soor Hotel 
(Interview, 2014). ‘We are so small, if Ethiopia sends us 100,000 people a year, it will 
change the Somaliland demographics’, lamented Ismaaciil, a senior staff member at an 
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INGO (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). This apprehension was connected to economic 
uncertainty, with tropes familiar from immigration debates in other parts of the world, not 
least that the Oromo were ‘taking all the jobs’. ‘They send us poor and blind people, but we 
are poor’ added Ismaaciil (ibid). ‘They are doing small work in the land, taking rubbish. 
They are coming every day. If they walk [across the border], they are sent back, but some 
people put them in the [trunks of] cars for money. It’s like tahrib’, continued Muxudin 
(ibid).27 ‘They start off polishing shoes, then they do cars’, Ashkir told me. ‘They come here 
to do begging and they send it back’ (Interview, 2014a).  
 
Since the 1990s, the Somaliland government has periodically rounded up non-Somali 
Ethiopians and deported them back across the border, often for security reasons 
(Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2013–14).28 Although many of these individuals are categorised as 
illegal immigrants, in fact their status is often ambiguous: some have resident permits or are 
registered as foreign employees, others are asylum seekers and refugees, but may be without 
documentation as registration was paused between October 2008 (in the aftermath of the 
Hargeysa bombings) and 2012 (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Some of these Ethiopians, 
often Oromo escaping persecution, have lived in Somaliland for many years, if not decades, 
and thus may have become acclimatised to living in the IDP camps and other settlements 
around Hargeysa where they are usually based. The accent test, long used as a marker of 
origin, seems to be becoming a less certain method of identification as long-term IDPs and 
migrants are allegedly learning Somali with the ‘northern’ accent, and thus circumventing 
this informal yet widely used check. ‘They know Somali, they were born here, they look like 
us, so you can’t [differentiate]’, Asli told me. ‘I am not trying to be racist or anything like 
that but people should know the difference between Somaliland people, and Ethiopians and 
Oromo, and Somali Xamar [Mogadishu] – we should differentiate between them’ 
(Interview, 2014). ‘We just don’t know who’s who’, echoed Ashkir (Interview, 2014a).  
 
We see here therefore an effort to insist on the meaningful of boundaries, and indeed hard 
borders in Somaliland. The production of Somaliland’s borders (and boundary making more 
generally) is crucial to the socio-political spatiality of Somaliland’s present polity. Shifting 
borders have created zones of inclusion and exclusion that have contributed to defining the 
concepts of belonging and authenticity that undergird Somaliland’s contemporary 
citizenship regime. The desire to circumscribe interlopers and strangers – to make clear 
who’s who – is a strong driver of the national ID card scheme initiated in 2014 that I discuss 
in Chapter 6. Although the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs does issue permits to work 
for foreign migrants, the national ID card is the most comprehensive effort to date to create 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Tahrib	  is	  the	  illegal	  migration	  and	  human	  trafficking	  that	  moves	  people	  out	  of	  Somaliland,	  such	  as	  by	  land	  to	  Libya	  or	  Tunisia	  and	  on	  to	  Europe.	  	  28	  In	  2011,	   it	  was	  reported	  that	   the	  Somaliland	  government	  was	  seeking	  the	  departure	  of	  an	  estimated	  80,000	  illegal	  immigrants,	   mostly	   from	   Ethiopia,	   who	   would	   be	   deported	   if	   they	   did	   not	   leave	   of	   their	   own	   accord	   (IRIN,	   2011).	  Subsequent	   deportations	   have	   not	   been	   of	   such	   a	   great	   scale,	   but	   nonetheless	   remain	   frequent,	   for	   instance,	   42	  reported	   to	   be	   deported	   in	   August	   2014,	   allegedly	   to	   prevent	   tahrib	   to	   Libya	   (Somaliland	   Press,	   2014);	   190	   in	   July	  2015,	  allegedly	  because	  they	  suffered	  from	  contagious	  diseases	  (Somaliland	  Informer,	  2015);	  and	  780	  in	  January	  2016	  (Somaliland	  Nation	  News,	  2016).	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official documentation that distinguishes Somaliland nationals from other individuals 
within the state. Without variations of official documentation, however – for instance, 
residents’ cards – non-citizens will remain distinguishable by their lack of paperwork – a 
form of invisibility that highlights the limits of the Somaliland state’s ability to make its 
population legible. 
Proving Identity 
I have argued so far in this chapter that Somaliland citizens were variously and repeatedly 
interpellated by both clan and state institutions in the decades prior to Somaliland’s 
declaration of independence. After 1991, a more symbiotic relationship appeared to emerge 
in which clan identity and lineage was informally and then officially incorporated as the 
basis of official identity: Somaliland citizens are Somaliland clan members, and vice versa.  
 
In the years since independence, the Somaliland state has instituted a range of formal 
identity documents that are based on individual identity and eligibility. However, the 
verification dilemma has remained since the state has very few records on individual 
applicants and no comprehensive way to ascertain unique identity. In order to fill the gap in 
the chain of verification, and thus to try to meet the challenge of inclusion, different 
Somaliland institutions incorporate vouching by caaqils, the vernacular verification that I 
described in Chapter 3. Caaqils are called upon by officials of the state, most often at the 
Ministry of Interior but also by the National Electoral Commission, to authenticate 
applicants for identity documents. Their role as a guarantor of identity is codified in law and 
frequent in practice. In each of these projects of identification, we find therefore a form of 
syncretic adaptation, whereby the functional and procedural gaps are plugged by the 
incorporation of ‘traditional’ forms.  
 
Citizenship Certificates 
The dependence of official procedures upon the ‘metic’ legibility of societal actors is most 
noticeable in certificates of citizenship, a legislative requirement under the 2002 citizenship 
law (discussed above). These certificates are supposed to act as a form of ‘breeder’ 
document, verifying a person’s nationality so that they can apply for further documentation 
such as a passport; indeed, they appear to be mostly used for passport applications, and thus 
do not have wider currency.29 As a breeder document, it is assumed that applicants do not 
have an existing form of official documentation, and therefore the codified procedure is for 
self-declaration or testimony by their caaqil:  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  I	  could	  not	  access	  publicly	  available	  figures	  about	  the	  number	  of	  certificates	  that	  have	  been	  issued,	  but	  it	  is	  significant	  that	  rather	  than	  roll	  out	  this	  system	  on	  a	  national	  basis,	  the	  government	  has	  decided	  to	  create	  a	  new	  national	  ID	  card	  –	  a	  development	  that	  I	  analyse	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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The	   confirmation	   of	   proof	   of	   Somaliland	   citizenship	   may	   be	   obtained	   by	   an	  individual	  on	  the	  production	  of:	  a) A	  declaration	  relating	  to	  the	  individual	  made	  at	  a	  court	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Internal	   Affairs	   registered	   Akil	   (clan	   chief)	   of	   the	   individual’s	  community.	  b) The	  form	  designed	  for	  the	  purpose	  by	  the	  Citizenship	  Office	  and	  signed	  by	  the	  individual.	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2002:	  Article	  3)	  
 
The Somaliland government has therefore institutionalised the use of caaqils as guarantors 
in its procedures for state identity documents. The Ministry of Interior (formerly, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs) has registered over 900 suldaans and caaqils, many of whom 
are paid a retainer or fee for assisting with conflict resolution and security matters, as well 
as supporting bureaucratic processes relating to citizenship and migration (Abdullahi, 
interview, 2013; MoNPD, 2011:181). Caaqils are therefore required to testify in court that a 
person belongs to their mag-paying group. When they cannot appear in person, the 
applicant may submit a form: this, however, is essentially a letter that contains the citizen’s 
name, birthdate, place of birth, and is still connected to their caaqil, whose name must also 
be given in order to guarantee that the person is a member of their sub-clan (Fieldnotes, 
Hargeysa, 2012–13).  
 
The Ministry of Interior therefore uses caaqils as guarantors in the place of existing 
paperwork or more technical modes of identification, such as biometric verification. A 
senior official at the ministry explained to me that they must rely on the caaqils in the 
absence of centralised documentation, stating that ‘the caaqil system lasts because they can 
do the traditional counting from A to Z’ (Abdullahi, interview, 2013). Caaqils, in other 
words, can place applicants genealogically in the web of clan lineages, and by doing so can 
affirm whether he or she is a member of a Somaliland clan. This therefore is not simply 
verification of applicants’ biographical details, but a statement about their authenticity as a 
Somalilander. In effect, therefore, whilst the use of caaqils in the production of citizenship 
certificates might be explained in terms of pragmatism – they have knowledge of key 
segments of the population, and can authoritatively verify them, whilst the Ministry cannot 
– my argument is that there is a deeper vein of authentication at work here that reinforces a 
particular conception of citizenship in Somaliland.  
 
Municipal IDs 
The citizenship certificate is a national document of practical value only for those 
Somalilanders who need to prove their citizenship, most typically in the application for a 
passport. Since few people have the means or need to obtain a passport (discussed below), 
more local forms of documentation are more common in Hargeysa: the tessera and driver’s 
license.  
 
The Hargeysa local council produces a municipal ID (often called a tessera [Italian for 
card]) as part of the ‘family sheet’ system that records the name and number of people 
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within a family.30  City residents can apply for a simple plastic card that carries their name, 
mother’s name, place and date of birth, photograph, and the mayor’s signature. Dagal, a 
senior civil servant working at the municipality, claimed that over 17,000 municipal ID 
cards had been issued when I interviewed him in 2014 (Interview, 2014a).31 Although 
technically the ID is only a confirmation of residence, useful for school enrolment and other 
similar administrative processes, Dagal declared that the municipal ID was to ‘state that you 
are a citizen’, and that it was the ‘same as the UK system’ (Interview, 2014b; translated by 
Abdiweli). This therefore shows the degree of overlap and lack of specificity of the various 
intersecting forms of documentation, and the desire amongst some for an ID that acts as a 
‘symbol of statehood’ (a theme I address in Chapter 6). As with the certificate of citizenship, 
the caaqil is required for the corroboration of identity since applicants typically do not have 
any other form of documentation. As with the Ministry of Interior official, Dagal argued that 
the municipality used caaqils because ‘he knows his people’ (ibid). Again, therefore, we see 
how state institutions must ‘see’ citizens through the metic legibility of certain 
intermediaries, who enjoy proximity and knowledge.  
 
Birth and Death Certificates 
As I explained in Chapter 2, civil registers are repositories of information about a 
population’s vital events (birth, death, marriage, divorce), creating databanks of national 
statistics, and producing certificates that evidence these changes in identity and population 
size. To date, however, Somaliland has not had a comprehensive or systematic capability to 
produce vital statistics to inform the development and functioning of key social services, not 
least the health sector, as well as broader economic planning. This is a function of its under-
developed, under-funded and constrained administrative infrastructure.32 Whilst the British 
commissioner had introduced regulations for the registration of births and deaths in 1904,33 
this did not lead to the development of a statewide civil register infrastructure in the 
postcolonial period. A comprehensive system had not subsequently been built, meaning 
there is no national civil register in Somaliland. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Since	  I	  limited	  my	  fieldwork	  to	  Hargeysa,	  this	  section	  presents	  only	  information	  gathered	  about	  the	  registration	  and	  production	  of	  the	  family	  sheet	  and	  tessera	  in	  the	  Hargeysa	  municipality.	  Further	  research	  can	  explore	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  services	  are	  provided	  by	  other	  municipalities	  in	  Somaliland.	  	  31	  Creative	  Associates	  (2013)	  reported	  that	  the	  Hargeysa	  municipal	  ID	  cost	  S$20	  and	  that	  other	  municipalities	  were	  not	  producing	  similar	  documents.	  	  32	  The	   Central	   Statistics	   Department	   (CSD)	   responsible	   for	   national	   statistics	   has	   only	   been	   able	   to	   collect	   modest	  enumerative	   data.	   The	   CSD	   itself	   has	   stated	   that	   the	   level	   of	   qualifications	   and	   statistical	   knowledge	   of	   its	   staff	   is	  insufficient;	   and	   that	   the	   infrastructure	   and	   personnel	   for	   nationwide	   surveying	   is	   not	   available	   (CSD,	   2013:16).	  Although	   a	  May	  2008	  presidential	   decree	   established	  planning	   and	   statistical	   units	   at	   national,	   regional	   and	  district	  government	   level,	   a	   2012	   survey	   found	   that	   most	   of	   these	   only	   existed	   on	   paper	   (ibid:18).	   An	   annual	   booklet,	  ‘Somaliland	   in	   Figures’,	   containing	   official	   statistical	   data	   on	   social	   activities	   and	   economic	   sectors	   (MoNPD,	   2003–2013),	   draws	   on	   administrative	   records	   from	   ministries	   and	   agencies,	   but	   in	   many	   cases	   is	   in	   fact	   estimated	   or	  extrapolated	   from	   pre-­‐war	   statistics.	   Official	   figures	   for	   population	   growth,	   birth	   and	   death	   rate,	   and	   urban/rural	  residence	   in	   Somaliland	  have	   therefore	   remained	   unchanged	   largely	   since	   2003,	   despite	   evidence,	   for	   instance,	   that	  environmental	  changes	  are	  diminishing	  opportunities	  for	  pastoralist	  life,	  altering	  the	  urban/rural	  balance	  (Gitonga	  et	  al,	  2013).	  33	  According	  to	  Births	  and	  Deaths	  Registration	  Regulations,	  1904,	  registration	  was	  for	  all	  children	  born	  alive	  after	  the	  regulations,	  and	  compulsory	  if	  either	  one	  or	  both	  parents	  were	  of	  European	  or	  American	  origin	  or	  descent.	  Fathers	  of	  illegitimate	  children	  were	  not	  bound	  to	  register	  as	  such,	  in	  keeping	  with	  Somaliland	  custom.	  Similarly	  all	  deaths	  were	  to	  be	  reported	  to	  the	  respective	  district	  officer,	  which	  were	  to	  be	  noted	  in	  a	  record	  book	  provided	  by	  a	  newly	  appointed	  registrar.	  The	  particulars	  noted	  in	  the	  civil	  register	  included	  the	  name,	  sex,	  date	  of	  birth	  and	  nationality.	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In lieu of a national register, the Hargeysa municipality produces a document known as the 
‘family sheet’, which records the names and birthdates of parents and their children. On the 
one hand, it is a poor substitute for a civil register since it is only used to record 
relationships, and not to generate vital statistics. On the other hand, it can lead to the 
creation of an ID card, so in this sense may be seen as ‘foundational’ (Gelb and Clark, 2013). 
In addition, the Hargeysa municipality does produce certificates of birth for the price of 
60,000 shillings (approximately $10), drawn from the family sheet (Dagaal, interview, 
2014a; Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). However, very few people appear to have a birth 
certificate. I was told that the municipality had issued around 28,500 certificates by August 
2014 (Dagal, interview, 2014a): this is a small proportion of the capital’s estimated 1 million-
strong population, meaning many parents do not register birth either because they are 
unwilling or unable. Indeed, very few births take place in hospital (which exist in only a few 
urban areas), and because people prefer for traditional birth practices over Western 
medicine (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2013). Even where births do take place in a hospital, there 
is no standard provision for registration at the time of birth: most new parents receive a 
receipt for the fee paid for the natal care, and this acts as a form of birth record (Fieldnotes, 
Hargeysa, 2014). The low number of birth certificates produced in Hargeysa may also be 
because adults, like the civil servant Qasim I cited above, have not replaced the ones lost or 
stolen during the war. Significantly, birth registration is voluntary and since birth 
certificates do not appear to be compulsory for any other type of ID, as I explained above, 
they do not fulfil a ‘breeder’ function.  
 
There is also no national death registration in Somaliland. Islamic burials happen relatively 
quickly, and bodies go directly into the care of relatives without the intervention of 
mortuaries, meaning there is no access point for data collection. Moreover, I was told that 
the idea of recording the death is uncomfortable and a sensitive matter that does not fit with 
how things are traditionally done in Somaliland (Ifrax, interview, 2014). Ugbaad, an 
opposition politician, argued that there was no need for death registration: if Jamaac dies, 
‘we all know that there is no more Jamaac’ (ibid). ‘For what reason would you want to 
register death? He’s dead!’ (Ugbaad, interview, 2014) This cultural impediment is matched 
by institutional weakness in the provision of official channels for data collection.34  
 
Significantly, Ugbaad’s exclamation also points to another factor: the role of genealogical 
knowledge, held by every Somalilander who learns their lineage by heart and draws on clan 
connections and relations in everyday life.35 By orally recording births and deaths, these 
shared genealogies constitute a sort of ‘civil register’,36 which works in personal and social 
contexts to commemorate vital events. As Ugbaad claimed, ‘we all know’. And yet without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  See	  Rao	  et	  al,	  2004	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  death	  registration	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  35	  I	  discuss	  the	  significance	  of	  genealogy	  for	  everyday	  identification	  and	  vouching	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  36	  In	  Somali	  culture,	  women	  do	  not	  change	  their	  names	  at	  marriage,	  and	  so	  I	  have	  not	  discussed	  the	  issue	  of	  marriage	  certificates,	  since	  this	  does	  not	  pertain	  directly	  to	  the	  matters	  of	  identification	  and	  verification.	  	  
4	  –	  State-­‐Building	  and	  Legibility	  in	  Somaliland	  	  
	   115	  
civil registration, the state does not know. This is one of the motivations therefore for the 
new national ID card that I explain below and in Chapter 6.   
 
Driver’s Licenses 
For a long time the driver’s license in Somaliland consisted of a registration book that 
belonged, as it were, to the car: when the car was sold on, the document went with it 
(Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). Inside the small booklet were pages for each owner, giving 
their name and photograph. Primarily, this was therefore to prove ownership, rather than to 
identify someone. In 2013, the Ministry for Public Works announced that it was upgrading 
driver’s licenses to the plastic card familiar in other countries. Emblazoned with the 
Somaliland flag, this would indicate the driver’s name, date of birth, the date and place of 
issue, expiry date, the type of license (car, motorcycle or truck) and the license number, and 
be of the ‘European-style’ said the director-general at the time (Muse, interview, 2014).  
 
The motivation behind the new card is not primarily identification. Rather its rationale has 
been framed in three ways (Muse, interview, 2013). Firstly, to prevent counterfeit and fraud, 
and therefore the new card is made of sturdy plastic, and carries a hologram and an official 
stamp (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). Secondly, to try to better regulate drivers: Somaliland 
has an extremely high fatality rate from motorised vehicles, with staff at Hargeysa’s hospital 
saying that they receive an average of 15–20 victims of road traffic accidents a day, in part 
because of poor road quality and car repair, but also because of unlicensed drivers (IRIN, 
2012; Somaliland Sun, 2014b). A third reason appears to be to try to raise income: less than 
40 per cent of registered car owners paid the road levy in 2010, whilst only around 17 per 
cent paid their annual registration fee (Balthasar, 2012:237). A new ID not only brings 
drivers back into the Ministry of Public Works’ purview to enforce taxpaying but represents 
a substantial revenue stream: with the new license costing over 200,000 shillings (around 
$46), the ministry could expect an estimated revenue of over $2.6 million in the first three 
years should all drivers take up the new license, followed by $800,000 every three years 
from renewal fees.37  
 
The new driver’s license requires identity verification – a provision not needed when it was 
connected to car ownership – which, at the time of writing, was limited to the municipal ID 
described above, and a certificate from the Hargeysa Group Hospital, stating their blood 
type and their eyesight quality (Calas, interview, 2014).38 However, as I have noted above, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  These	  calculations	  are	  based	  on	  figures	  obtained	  from	  Calas,	  a	  senior	  civil	  servant	  at	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Works,	  who	  told	  me	  there	  were	  26,000	  light	  driving	  licenses	  to	  be	  registered	  at	  276,500.35	  shillings	  (around	  $46)	  each,	  and	  24,000	   heavy	   driving	   licenses	   at	   360,000	   shillings	   (around	   $60).	   Renewal	   fees	   were	   to	   be	   100,000	   shillings	  (approximately	  $16.5)	  (Interview,	  2014;	  Fieldnotes,	  Hargeysa,	  2014).	  The	  new	  cards	  are	  allegedly	  being	  created	  by	  a	  commercial	   firm	   in	   a	   public-­‐private	   partnership,	   although	   the	   senior	   official	   at	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Public	   Works	   was	  reluctant	  to	  tell	  me	  its	  name	  or	  the	  details	  of	  this	  deal	  (Muse,	  interview,	  2014).	  38	  Muse,	  a	  senior	  official	  at	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior,	  told	  me	  in	  2014	  that	  the	  expectation	  was	  that	  the	  new	  national	  ID	  card	  (described	  in	  Chapter	  6)	  could	  be	  used	  for	  identification	  (Interview,	  2014).	  Caaqil	  authentication	  would	  continue	  to	  meet	  the	  verification	  problem	  in	  the	  meantime	  –	  or	  perhaps	  perpetually.	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although Hargeysa residents may access the tessera, many people do not have it. When I 
pressed the civil servant responsible for the new driver’s license about its ID requirements, 
he admitted that ‘people often come with no ID and they argue and say, “I am a 
Somalilander”’ (Calas, interview, 2014; translated by Abdiweli). For this reason, caaqil 
authentication is also accepted. ‘We depend on the clan. We have to accept it. But he will 
sign and take responsibility, so any wrong information will be on his head’, added Calas 
(ibid). Here we see the way that formalised ID is backed up by the caaqil’s personal vouch, 
given meaning by the clan system. Vernacular verification thus constitutes a practical 
stopgap to overcome the ‘verification problem’ faced by the Ministry of Public Works. 
Significantly, it also works to reinforce the importance of clan membership and genealogical 
situatedness, in that the bearers of these licenses are not simply accredited drivers, but also 
authenticated Somalilanders. Even drivers’ licenses thus become artefacts of Somaliland’s 
‘stateness’, and contribute to embedding the importance of clan and genealogy into official 
structures, institutions, and processes.  
 
Passports 
Caaqil authentication is also used in the application process for a Somaliland passport. 
Officially, there has been a passport in Somaliland since 1996, a year after the establishment 
of the Department of Immigration (Dayib, interview, 2014). The motivation for the passport 
was as a mark of statehood and differentiation from Somalia: ‘it is a requirement for an 
independent country to have a passport’, said Nur, a senior immigration official (Interview, 
2014). Of course without recognition, it is formally accepted as an international travel 
document in only a few countries, principally Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya.39 As I described 
above, people have long been able to cross the land borders with Ethiopia and Djibouti 
without formal paperwork. ‘We used accent, region, clan address’, said Nur (Interview, 
2014), forms of situatedness that I explored in Chapter 3. Saadaq, a man in his twenties now 
working as a taxi driver, summed it up thus: ‘At Wajaale, the police say “just talk”’ 
(Interview, 2014) in order to check for a northern Somali accent (see Chapter 3). 
Increasingly, the emphasis has been on more formal procedures, however, primarily driven 
by security demands in the face of Al-Shabaab terrorism. For those who require a 
Somaliland passport, they must visit the passport office that squats at the back of the 
Department of Immigration in central Hargeysa. When I visited in the spring of 2013, access 
to the office was along an overgrown path running along the side of the department 
building. The office itself was a large, dark, bare room, containing a couple of computers; the 
back wall was lined by filing cabinets in which, according to the senior immigration official 
there, the paper records of some 11,000 applicants were stored (Dayib, interview, 2014).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  Somaliland	  Mission	  to	  the	  UK	  (nd)	  says	  that	  the	  passport	  is	  accepted	  in	  11	  countries.	  The	  news	  outlet	  Medeshi	  Valley	   reported	  eight	   countries	  as	  accepting	   the	  Somaliland	  passport	   for	  entry	   (Ali,	  2013).	   It	   is	   reported	  anecdotally	  and	  officially	  that	  the	  passport	  has	  been	  accepted	  in	  the	  UK,	  Belgium,	  France,	  South	  Sudan	  and	  Indonesia,	  although	  this	  sometimes	   must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   additional	   documentation.	   For	   travel	   beyond	   these	   countries,	   Somalis	   in	  Somaliland	   typically	   travel	   to	   Garowe,	   the	   capital	   of	   the	   Puntland	   state	   of	   Somalia,	   to	   obtain	   a	   Federal	   Republic	   of	  Somalia	  passport.	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The passport application is relatively straightforward, consisting of a competed application 
form, passport-sized photographs, and letters from the Criminal Investigation Bureau and 
the Attorney General confirming that the applicant does not have a criminal record. In 
terms of identity verification, since at least 2012, the applicant has also been told to bring 
their old 2010 voter registration card (discussed at length in Chapter 5), elevating it to the 
principal form of validating ID. Of course, this carries with it the assumption that all eligible 
passport applicants will also have been voters at the time of the 2010 presidential election. 
For those who were not of age in 2010 or did not obtain a voter ID card, their identity must 
be verified in another way. This may be a municipality ID card (described above), an existing 
record in the Immigration Department’s files, or evidence of an account with the Bank of 
Somaliland, Dahabshiil or Salaam Bank (Dayib, interview, 2014). Importantly, however, 
caaqil authentication is also required: the passport application form explicitly requires the 
name of the caaqil and his telephone number so that he can verify the applicant’s identity. 
 
Saahid, a journalist I met in 2014, related how when he applied for a passport, the officer 
asked him what his clan, caaqil and suldaan’s names were. He said ‘I realised my clan name 
is Somalilander!’ Whilst he wanted to be identified as a national, not a clan member, the 
officers insisted on knowing his caaqil’s name; when he gave it, they responded, ‘we know 
you well now’ (Interview, 2014). Saahid explained that he realised that ‘the biggest identity I 
have is my caaqil’ (ibid). It is through the caaqil’s endorsement that Saahid’s identity was 
authenticated – he was assured to be not only Saahid, but also a member of his clan and 
thus a Somalilander. Significantly, the caaqil ‘converted’ Saahid’s identity into an ‘official 
identity’ that could then be read by the state in its identification procedures. It is thus in this 
practice that we find not only the key to the caaqils’ ‘mutational work’ (Van Dijk and Van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1997), but also the site of the innovative synthesis that 
characterises Somaliland’s identity architecture. In Somaliland, guarantors, acting with the 
plastic, local and divergent practices of metic legibility, facilitate the state’s sight of its 
citizens.  
 
The role of caaqils as identity verifiers for passports comes from their routinised use by the 
Somaliland state, as established by the 2002 citizenship law and described above. It also has 
historical precedent from the British Protected Person (BPP) passport prior to 1960.40 To 
obtain a BPP passport, an individual had to produce evidence of his or his father’s birth, 
make a declaration as to the truth of the supplied information, and be vouched for by a 
person of standing. This information was checked against Protectorate records – 
requirements that the British embassy at the time felt were more than sufficient for assuring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Prior	   to	   this,	   letters	   of	   introduction	   from	   the	   colonial	   administrators	   and	   surveyors	   acted	   as	   a	   form	   of	   internal	  passport.	  Colonial	  administrator	  Harald	  Swayne,	  for	  instance,	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  that:	  ‘The	  possession	  of	  a	  bit	  of	  paper	  written	  on	  in	  English	  is	  believed	  to	  guarantee	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  bearer’s	  life,	  and	  we	  have	  often	  been	  begged	  for	  scraps	  of	  paper	  by	  men	  who	  wished	  to	  go	  alone	  by	  a	  short	  cut	  over	  disturbed	  territory’	  (1895:117).	  Here,	  interestingly,	  identity	  was	  not	  at	  stake	  and	  thus	  authoritative	  identification	  as	  a	  Somaliland	  tribesman	  was	  undertaken	  by	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  colonial	  power	  not	  the	  caaqil.	  
4	  –	  State-­‐Building	  and	  Legibility	  in	  Somaliland	  	  
	   118	  
the authenticity of applicants (Note from Embassy, 1956). However, this process was 
problematic. Embassy correspondence recorded the case of British passport-holder 
Muhammed Abdillahi, who also stated that he was born in Tefferi Bar in Ethiopia (ibid). The 
British embassy had a signed application form from Muhammed, but one that stated his 
birthplace within the Protectorate as certified by the local headman. It seemed, therefore, 
that Muhammed had been vouched for on both sides of the border, and that a definitive 
identity could not be verified because the Hargeysa and Harar registration directories did 
not tally. As a member of the British consular staff in Addis Ababa put it, ‘[i]t was because 
neither side knew what the other claimed, that life was so difficult for both’ (Confidential 
Note, 1956).41 In this case, it was not the lack of record-keeping that was to blame, but the 
difficulty of evaluating the authenticity of the claim of belonging. Here we thus have an 
anecdotal example of how a dependence on vernacular vouching exposes the state to risk if it 
cannot also verify the truth of a claim. Importantly, it also shows how traditional leaders 
have long been used as identity intermediaries, a legacy that I traced above.  
 
E-Passports 
For a long time, Somaliland’s passports were lo-tech desiderata of Somaliland’s efforts to 
materialise its statehood, and displayed ambiguity and incompleteness. However, together 
with the push towards biometric voter and ‘civil’ registration that I analyse in Chapters 5 
and 6, there has been an attempt to bring other aspects of Somaliland’s official identification 
up to the same level. Hence in September 2014, the Department of Immigration under the 
Ministry of Interior embarked on another ambitious identification programme by upgrading 
Somaliland’s passports (Dalsan Radio, 2014; Somaliland Sun, 2014a). From 2014, there 
were to be four types of ‘e-passport’ (ordinary, seaman, civil service and diplomat) at a cost 
of around $120 each (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014).  
 
The new ‘e-passports’ form part of Somaliland’s bid to have up-to-date attributes of a 
modern (recognisable) state. As reported on the Somaliland Mission to the UK’s website, 
‘Somaliland also hopes that E-passport holders will have better chances of getting visas from 
international embassies. … It is hoped that the new passport will further enhance 
Somaliland’s quest for international recognition as the country builds its institutions’ 
(Somaliland Mission, nd). The campaign to validate the new Somaliland e-passport as a 
credible travel document was supported by the Ethiopian government’s decision to review 
the entry visa fees at land border crossings, and to agree in conjunction with the Somaliland 
Department of Immigration that only the new e-passport would be accepted after December 
2014 (Geeska Afrika, 2014). Moreover, the introduction of the new passports can be seen 
within the context of the Somaliland-Somalia dialogue. In October 2013, Somaliland had 
announced that the Somalia passport would not be accepted as a valid travel document 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  It	   was	   necessary	   to	   identify	   Muhammed	   uniquely	   and	   unambiguously	   as	   either	   Ethiopian	   or	   a	   British	   Protected	  Person	   because	   Ethiopian	   regulations	   at	   the	   time	   forbade	   dual	   nationality.	   Today	   the	   legal	   cooperation	   between	  Ethiopia	  and	  Somaliland	  permits	  movement	  across	  the	  border,	  and	  dual	  nationality	  is	  possible.	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within Somaliland because of concerns about fraud (Somaliland Sun, 2013b). In 
comparison, Somaliland’s passport would be updated to meet international standards of 
electronic verification and fraud protection, thus emphasising its distinctness from the 
‘fraudulent’ passport of the Federal Republic of Somalia.  
 
The innovation of the new e-passports is the incorporation of an electronic photograph and 
the scanning of the fingerprints on the right and left hands. As well as ‘biometric’ 
registration, the verification procedures have been strengthened. Dayib, a senior civil 
servant in the Department of Immigration, informed me that as well as some form of ID, the 
applicant now has to provide information about their landlord or evidence of their property 
deed, and the names, addresses and telephone numbers of witnesses who had known them 
for five years (Interview, 2014). These requirements are seen as ensuring that only 
‘authentic’ Somalilanders are able to take the passport, with Dayib (ibid) emphasising that 
without the relevant ID, there would be no opportunity for ‘Ethiopians’ to acquire such 
documentation (an issue of migration politics I discuss in the following chapter).  
 
Rather than caaqils, the new e-passport thus calls on guarantors from a wider pool of social 
actors in the form of landlords and witnesses. Of course, Somaliland is not the only state to 
include guarantors in its verification procedures for passports. As I noted in Chapter 2, a 
great many states around the world require counter-signatories and witnesses, particularly 
in cases where there is no credible documentation or physical appearance has changed. It is 
notable in the Somaliland case, however, that despite the incorporation of hi-tech biometric 
registration into the new passport, there is still a place for vouching. In fact, for new 
applicants, this form of verification appears to have equal or even greater standing than 
other forms of paper documentation, emphasising the importance of the role of the 
guarantor in overcoming Somaliland’s verification problem.   
 
The Disconnected Terrain of Official Identification 
It is clear from my discussion above that there is currently no overarching state-led identity-
management system in Somaliland: no ‘ecosystem’ of official identification processes and 
artefacts, in which the parts interconnect and interact. Up to 2015, IDs in Hargeysa have 
been in many cases incipient or weakly formulated, and incoherent with one another. They 
have been produced for discrete purposes, often without any ‘back-office’ functionality, 
meaning that it is difficult to assess on a system-wide basis whether someone has applied 
before, and thus to ensure unique official identities. As I explained in Chapter 2, effective 
state legibility requires that identities be uniquely ascribed to individuals, and that these 
identities can be verified across different encounters with the state. In other words, the 
Mohamed Ahmed Ismail that has a driver’s license issued in Hargeysa is the same Mohamed 
Ahmed Ismail applying for a passport. However, to date the Somaliland state has not been 
able to connect up citizen’s identity across different kinds of documentation. The creation of 
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different systems and databases for voters, accredited drivers, passport-holders and citizens 
has led to a fragmented information landscape that is chaotic rather than panoptic. This 
means that they may not be seen as reliable or useful. For instance, Kinsi, a young woman 
recently graduated from the University of Hargeysa, argued that ‘In Dahabshiil they don’t 
trust ID; they want your clan elder’ (Interview, 2014). 
 
The difficulty in creating an integrated identification infrastructure is compounded by the 
fact that there are very few identity ‘encounters’ with the state in which official ID is 
required. There are no pensions or social security payments, for instance. One does not need 
ID to purchase a phone or sim card; very few people have bank accounts or pay taxes. 
Guarantors are thus not only used by the state, but also by commercial entities in order to 
overcome the verification problem that has arisen from the paucity of ID cards. For 
instance, Telesom, Somaliland’s large telecommunications company, requires a dammiin for 
a Zaad account, the mobile money platform (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). ‘If there is no ID, 
we solve that issue’, explained Abdirahman, a Telesom manager, by allowing someone to 
bring a guarantor (Interview, 2014).  
 
In all these forms of ID, we therefore see the importance of guarantors, in particular clan 
caaqils, as key intermediaries for the Somaliland state. In most of these cases, the process of 
verification begins from scratch because applicants typically do not have a pre-existing 
‘chain of verification’ in the form of another piece of paperwork: guarantors therefore 
become essential for certifying applicants’ identity to the state. This is even the case in the 
new biometric e-passport, which uses physical data to ensure 1-to-1 verification, but for 
which the initial authentication of applicants still requires the use of alternative forms of 
‘metadata’ (World Bank, 2014).  
 
The use of informal patches such as these is hardly surprising in the context of Somaliland’s 
ongoing, vastly under-resourced state-building project. With a relatively small national 
budget and enduring international limbo, it is little surprise that Somaliland’s technical and 
administrative infrastructure has capacity and resource gaps. At the national level, the state 
has weak penetration beyond the main urban areas, and faces the challenges of low 
population density, a scattered pastoralist population, porous and contested borders, and 
poor road and distribution channels, inhibiting its ability to ‘broadcast’ power (Herbst, 
2000). Significantly, the eastern frontier zone with Puntland is host to repeated skirmishes 
and disputes as separatist groups in Sool, Sanaag and Cayn continue to contest the 
Somaliland state’s authority in this region, making the extension of projects of national 
identity politically friable as well as logistically difficult.  
 
Within the government, administrative gaps also mean that there are strong factors in 
favour of pragmatic solutions, which may explain the use of guarantors as a form of 
outsourced labour. Archiving and record-keeping have suffered from the interregnum of the 
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war, and insufficient attention afterwards: there are no national archives in Somaliland, and 
ministerial papers have for a long time been kept haphazardly, including anecdotally in 
people’s homes (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2013). Much of state administration appears to be 
done on paper, in the form of handwritten memos and receipts; and at least until 2014, 
ministers had Gmail accounts rather than centralised email systems (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 
2013–14). The Somaliland state is therefore not a networked bureaucracy able to connect 
the actions of its citizens across different administrative encounters, but is characterised by 
informal practices of data management. Compounding the absence of Weberian file keeping 
and bureaucratic rules is the logistical weaknesses of Somaliland’s government offices (for 
instance, in terms of sufficient computers and trained administrators); and the lack of 
institutional memory because of oft-changing personnel. Importantly, competitive relations 
between ministries and agencies borne of political jostling for financing and prestige (as 
demonstrated by the tensions between the Ministry of Interior and the NEC I discuss in 
Chapter 6) makes collaboration in the form of data sharing and technical integration 
difficult and infrequent.  
 
Certainly, these issues of under-specified administrative procedures, weakly functioning 
institutions, undertrained personnel, and lack of funding have contributed to retarding the 
development of a well-organised system of identity management in Somaliland. This would 
seem to lend support to the ‘weak state’ explanation for the use of guarantors in 
Somaliland’s identity infrastructure that I discussed in Chapter 2.42 However, whilst these 
issues of disconnect and dysfunction do seem to offer an explanation for the pre-eminence 
of guarantors (borne of pragmatism), they do not adequately explain two important features 
of the Somaliland case: that the use of guarantors is clearly inscribed in official practices (for 
instance, the 2002 citizenship law), and therefore not simply an ad-hoc solution to 
weakness or inefficiency; and that these are not just any guarantors, but specifically clan 
elders.  
 
Hybrid Solutions?  
The importance of guarantors to addressing Somaliland’s verification problem might 
therefore be explained by the hybrid political logic at work in state institutions. The 
marriage between indigenous norms and those of the ‘modern’ state began during the early 
state-making conferences of the newly independent Somaliland (Bradbury, 2008:69). In 
subsequent political meetings throughout the 1990s, Somaliland’s government gradually 
evolved from a system based on consociationalism (clan power-sharing) to one comprising 
the institutions of liberal democracy, including an executive president, independent 
judiciary, elected lower house, and multi-party elections, and other ‘hybrid’ institutions, 
notably the Guurti, the clan-nominated upper house (ibid; APD, 2002). Explanations for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Additionally,	  we	  should	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  neopatrimonial	  practices	  at	  work	  in	  the	  Somaliland	  political	  sphere,	  in	  which	   political	   intermediaries	   are	   visible	   actors	   in	   government	   institutions;	   and	   ‘clannish’	   logics	   are	   blamed	   for	   the	  exchange	  of	  favours,	  appointment	  and	  contracts	  (see	  Ahmed,	  2013).	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emergence of a hybrid system in Somaliland follow a well-worn path that suggests that 
‘traditional’ governance was formally included in order to plug gaps in the ‘modern’ system 
that was in turn adopted for pragmatic and strategic reasons such as stability and security 
(Hoehne, 2009:259, 274). Clan-based institutions were seen as instilling ‘basic legitimacy’ 
(ibid:259) and principles of compromise, consensus, and inclusion into an otherwise 
winner-takes-all electoral system (Mohamed and Terlinden, 2010:77–78).43 
 
As with the Guurti’s clan representatives, caaqils may be seen as lending legitimacy to the 
workings of the modern state system, with the formalisation of their role in state protocols 
affirming them as trustworthy, capable and, indeed, essential cogs in the administrative 
wheels of governance. However, their incorporation in identification processes does not 
seem to be mainly driven by hybridity. If it were otherwise, we would arguably not have seen 
the diminishment of clan elders’ participation in official political life (Renders, 2012; 
Renders and Terlinden, 2010), or the development of biometric systems of verification to 
replace guaranteeing, since the political cost of doing so would be too high. Instead, I am 
arguing in this thesis that a combination of pragmatic and symbolic considerations explains 
the prominent role of caaqil guarantors.  
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I argue that the use of guarantors within Somaliland’s official identification 
schema enables not only the verification of identity, but also the authentication of claims of 
belonging. The attestation of age and nationality by clan elders in order to determine 
eligibility for official documentation interpellates Somalilanders as both citizens and 
kinsmen (a dual subject), and thus the ‘official identity’ by which the state recognises 
someone is underwritten by and imbued with the ‘metic’ legibility of the genealogical idiom. 
This means that the names and relations of genealogical situatedness constitute essential 
data for identification and verification, which has consequences for those citizens and 
residents of Somaliland who are not made legible by genealogy, or only in qualified ways. By 
reproducing a hegemonic narrative of authenticity in which ‘Somalilandness’ is articulated, 
acts of verification are more than the bureaucratic confirmation of sameness: they are 
nation-making.  
 
In this chapter, I set out the multifaceted architecture of identification in contemporary 
Somaliland, in which new forms of official documentation draw upon the genealogical idiom 
for verification. Faced with non-recognition and hence circumscribed external support, 
minimal economic resources, and the legacies of conflict, political actors have drawn on 
what works best, modifying existing institutions, innovating new processes, and marrying 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ norms in a ‘delicate balance’ (Walls, 2014:29; also see Bradbury, 
2008). I argued that essential aspects of the official legibility of land and population – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Phillips	  (2013),	  Harris	  and	  Foresti	  (2010)	  and	  Balthasar	  (2012)	  are	  amongst	  those	  who	  also	  make	  this	  argument.	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maintaining borders, asserting citizenship and enumerating the population – all display a 
complex interplay between state-led efforts at standardisation and formalisation, and 
informal particularity (and ambiguity). State-building in Somaliland therefore appears to 
have been inflected by the ‘vernacular’ dimension of clanship and genealogy at crucial 
stages. The configuration of official and vernacular practices in Somaliland’s various 
identification programmes has not been driven by either one side or the other of the 
‘tradition-modern’ dichotomy (a duality that itself must be problematised). Rather, it is an 
assemblage born of pragmatism and symbolism that works to overcome the verification 
problem in an innovative way, and fits with the ideological commitment to genealogy 
reflected in Somaliland’s clan-based politics and descent-based citizenship regime. The 
project to create a biometric-led voter ID card in 2008 offers an important case for further 
understanding these dynamics, and hence is the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter	  5	  	   ‘Numbers	  are	  Politics’	  Voter	  Registration	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Enumeration	  	  in	  Somaliland	  	  The	   best	   way	   of	   improving	   the	   electoral	   process	   is	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   a	   system	   of	  registration	  of	  all	   voters	  which	  will	   enable	  voters	   to	   cast	   their	  votes	  easily	  on	   the	  polling	  day.	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2007)	  	  If	  you	  put	   in	  bad	  data,	  you	  get	  bad	  results.	  The	  people	  put	   in	  bad	   information	  but	  they	  wanted	  a	  perfect	  list.	  (Farhan,	  interview,	  2014)	  	  
After Somaliland’s tense early years, the Hargeysa conference of 1997 initiated a period of 
rapid state-building that included the drafting and passing of a new constitution as well as a 
raft of legislation and institutionalisation.1 It also activated the transformation of the system 
of beel (community) representation, by which regions and sub-clans had deputised 
individuals to speak on their behalf at clan meetings and conferences,2 to a democratic 
multi-party system. However, despite the initiation of competitive elections in 2002, voter 
registration did not properly begin in Somaliland until 2008.  
 
In this chapter, I analyse Somaliland’s voter registration schemes from 2002 to 2014. I trace 
how the state’s ‘verification problem’ drove the introduction of biometric technologies to 
ensure 1-to-1 matching, but how vernacular practices, in particular caaqil authentication, 
were extremely significant for identifying eligible voters. In previous chapters, I have shown 
how the use of guarantors for practical and symbolic reasons has enabled the verification of 
applicants for official ID cards. Their presence in voter registration was, however, a different 
matter, linked to the ‘politics of enumeration’ by which concern for clan numbers and 
potential electoral spoils led to multiple registrations and the programme’s massive 
defrauding. In this chapter, I therefore show the highly politicised roles that guarantors can 
play, and the effect this can have on credible verification regimes and thus effective 
identification. Registration is not simply a bureaucratic matter, but one intimately related to 
the politics of identity by determining which identities matter, who counts, and who says so. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  more	  on	   this	   and	   the	   earlier	   conferences	   at	  Burco,	   Sheikh	   and	  Borama,	   see	  Bradbury,	   2008;	  Paice	   and	  Gibson,	  2013;	  Phillips,	  2013;	  and	  Walls,	  2014.	  2	  This	  was	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  system	  based	  on	  proportional	  representation,	  pluralism	  and	  also	  concessions	  to	  ‘minority’	  clans	  (Balthasar,	  2012:169).	  See	  also	  Lewis	  and	  Mayall,	  1995.	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Unlike other chapters that are arranged thematically, in this chapter I take a narrative, 
chronological approach in order to make clear the sequences of events and the knock-on 
effects of poor planning and politicised decision-making that undercut efforts to establish a 
comprehensive voter register. I therefore cover the aborted registration in 2002; the 
decision to introduce biometric technologies in 2007; the conduct of the 2008 registration, 
and the subsequent eighteen months of data scrubbing, political tension, and upheaval; and 
the post-election decisions of 2011. This chapter therefore also constitutes a case study of 
how identification schemes are actually constructed, particularly ‘from scratch’, and 
explicates the political challenges that face the draughtsmen of such projects. In Chapter 1, I 
noted the logistical and technical issues that have faced other African states in the rollout of 
biometric systems, including limited electricity access, poor training, and illegible 
fingerprints. We see this too in the story of voter registration in Somaliland. This case study 
shows that ‘technopolitics’ was central to the design and implementation of the 2008–10 
voter registration, and that therefore the technical and political dimensions must both be 
addressed in the construction – and analysis – of official identification schemes. 
 
Somaliland’s Early Registration Experiments 
From early on, Somaliland’s electoral stakeholders understood that a voter register was 
crucial for identifying eligible voters, and preventing impersonation and multiple voting. 
The 2001 law on presidential and local elections empowered the national electoral 
commission (NEC) to prepare a voter register in Article 14.9, although without specifying 
any of the details of the registration process or indicating where further elucidation was to 
come from (Ibrahim, 2010:8). During election planning in 2002, the NEC, supported by a 
European Union (EU) technical team, formulated an ambitious plan to register all eligible 
voters and create a computerised database, enabling the production of a voter list for 
election day (Gers and Valentine-Selsey, 2002:10). This was planned as the basis of a 
national voter database for future elections – in other words, a massive one-off enrolment 
that would create a continuous electoral roll.  
 
Registration began in autumn 2002, but was problematic from the start. Rolled out in seven 
of Somaliland’s urban areas (Berbera, Burco, Borama, Ceerigaabo, Gabiley, Laascaanood 
and Hargeysa), Somaliland’s pastoralist communities and remote rural areas were 
effectively excluded (Abdirashiid, interview, 2013a).3 Even within the areas that registration 
took place, however, difficulties emerged from the state’s ‘verification problem’. Without a 
census to provide a demographic estimate, the NEC used the turnout from the 2001 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  NEC	  had	  used	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  for	  voter	  education	  in	  advance	  of	  polling	  day,	  including	  drama	  groups,	  poetry	  competitions,	   and	   mobile	   loudspeaker	   teams	   (Bennett	   and	   Woldemariam,	   2010).	   However,	   these	   tools	   were	   more	  easily	   utilised	   in	   the	   central	   and	   western	   regions,	   with	   less	   coverage	   in	   the	   east	   –	   home	   to	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	  Somaliland’s	  nomads	  –	  since	  Radio	  Hargeysa	  could	  not	  broadcast	  far	  beyond	  the	  capital,	  and	  poor	  roads	  impeded	  travel	  (Gers	  and	  Valentine-­‐Selsey,	  2002:15).	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constitutional referendum (1.18 million votes) as a baseline.4 However, the absence of pre-
existing identity data meant that the NEC had no way of assessing who was eligible to vote 
or, indeed, who was registering, since there was no information with which to verify and 
cross-reference registrants. Despite the use of ‘indelible’ ink to mark registered voters, the 
process was bedevilled by multiple registrations, distorting the emerging voter list. One of 
the first NEC commissioners, Shukri Ismail, has stated that there was a ‘misconception’ that 
registration was enumeration: ‘People are [saying] my tribe is bigger than yours or we are 
more than you. So … people were thinking now in the election you have to be more’ (Bennett 
and Woldemariam, 2010:21). Similarly, Abdirashiid, another former commissioner from 
this period, told me: ‘If we make registration then maybe one tribe will be bigger and there 
will be conflict [with another tribe] if their numbers are less’ (Interview, 2013a). In order to 
bolster clan numbers – a key source of pride and traditional power – people therefore 
sought to register more than once where they could. As Shukri recalled: ‘we tried our best 
but we did not succeed in time. … [We were] giving the card and they would be coming back 
to you again and … in the same area they might be taking two, three, four’ (Bennet and 
Woldemariam, 2010:21). The widespread and obvious irregularities of registration made it 
clear that the resulting voter list would be inaccurate and unreliable. After just a week and 
the registration of around 330,000 people, Somaliland’s first voter registration was 
abandoned (Renders, 2012:236; Simkin and Crook, 2002:3).  
 
In its place, the NEC and the political associations that were to contest Somaliland’s first 
multi-party election agreed to utilise two safeguards for verification and deterrence on 
election day: indelible ink, and the vernacular practices that I outlined in Chapter 3 and 4 
(collective accountability, genealogical mapping and vouching), checking for lineage, 
appearance and accent. However, these proved insufficient to prevent multiple voting in the 
2002 local council elections, or in the elections that followed. These also did not ensure the 
inclusion of the whole electorate, for whilst voters had impunity to vote more than once in 
some parts of Somaliland, in Sool and Sanaag voting was continuously circumscribed and 
delayed.5  
 
At each of Somaliland’s early elections, donors and observers therefore called for a 
comprehensive process of registration to ensure proper electoral management and prevent 
disenfranchisement (for instance, Abokor et al, 2006; Abrar, 2003; IRI, 2005). However, it 
was not possible to muster sufficient political will and legislative energy to do so prior to 
2008. The close proximity of the 2003 presidential election to the 2002 poll (the first, of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	   figure	  was	  considered	  by	  some	  observers	   to	  be	   inflated	  and	  unverifiable	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  a	   census	   (Gers	  and	  Valentine-­‐Selsey,	  2002:13;	  also	  see	  Simkin	  and	  Crook,	  2002),	  and	  indeed	  it	  remains	  the	  highest	  turnout	  in	  Somaliland’s	  elections	  to	  date	  (see	  Table	  2).	  Nevertheless,	   it	  has	  been	  the	  implicit	  benchmark	  for	  electorate	  size	  since.	  This	  shows	  the	  difficulty	  of	  establishing	  credible	  numbers	  without	  effective	  enumerative	  tools,	  as	  I	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  	  5	  Polling	  stations	  here	  were	  closed	  for	  security	  or	  logistic	  reasons	  in	  the	  2002	  and	  2003	  elections.	  Skirmishes	  along	  the	  border	  with	  Puntland	  had	   indeed	  escalated,	   leading	   to	  a	  one-­‐day	  war	  on	  29	  October	  2004	   in	  which	  soldiers	  on	  both	  sides	  were	  killed,	  further	  militarising	  the	  border	  zone	  and	  leading	  to	  an	  extension	  of	  emergency	  law	  such	  as	  detention	  by	   the	   detested	   security	   committees	   (COSONGO,	   2002:9–10).	   However,	   there	  were	   serious	   concerns	   about	  whether	  ‘security’	   was	   being	   used	   as	   a	   way	   to	   control	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   Somaliland	   electorate	   by	   excluding	  members	   of	   the	  Dhulbahante	  and	  Warsengeli	  clans	  (Renders,	  2012).	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course, in Somaliland since 1967) offered a relatively credible justification for the absence of 
voter registration, since the priority was on delivering that important election. However, 
these reasons did not hold for the 2005 parliamentary election; rather this setback must be 
attributed to political reasons, not least the use of voter registration as a deferring tactic, 
part of the politics of delay that characterises Somaliland’s electoral landscape.  
 
The Numbers Gap 
After the first two elections, the government of the time expressed its intention to establish a 
voter register for the 2005 parliamentary election by making an explicit provision for it in 
the House of Representatives Law (Law No. 20-2/2005). However, registration was made 
hostage to two extremely controversial and politicised issues: the allocation of 
parliamentary seats, and the holding of a census. Somaliland’s MPs had been in post since 
the Hargeysa conference of 1997 on the basis of appointment. A parliamentary election thus 
required that constituency boundaries and the regional allocation of seats be confirmed. 
Protracted political squabbling over these contentious issues led to repeated delay in the 
drafting of the required electoral legislation; it also made it clear that the lack of 
demographic enumeration was inhibiting Somaliland’s efforts to effectively manage 
elections. Sensibly, Law No. 20-2/2005 thus made the allocation of seats dependent upon a 
pre-election census or voter registration (APD, 2006:21–29). In an ideal world, a census 
would have certainly been the answer, but it was clear that planning for one would take 
months if not years and could not be conducted in the time available.6 Similarly there had 
been no sustained planning on registration, let alone capacity-building, since the aborted 
efforts of 2002. In other words, this ‘deliberately unworkable’ law (Walls, 2014:236) 
effectively made the holding of timely elections impossible, and was blamed in part on 
intransigent MPs who wanted to postpone contesting their seat. Enormous public 
dissatisfaction ensued, with the threat of civil action making this a serious political crisis.  
 
The only way through the impasse seemed to be to abandon the commitment made in Law 
No. 20-2/2005 to pre-election enumeration. The principal stakeholders therefore agreed to 
base seat allocation on the 1960 parliamentary formula for regional quota,7 and to insert a 
‘sunset’ clause to the final law exempting the 2005 elections from voter registration 
(Ibrahim, 2005: note 1). Although this solution enabled parliamentary elections to take 
place in September 2005, it was only a temporary fix. There was no advance voter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  There	  has	  not	  been	  a	  census	  in	  the	  new	  Republic	  of	  Somaliland.	  A	  census	  was	  conducted	  in	  1975	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  national	   literacy	   campaign	   and	   supported	  by	   the	  UN.	  However,	   hindered	  by	  drought	   and	   incomplete	   national	  maps,	  coverage	  was	  poor	  even	  in	  urban	  areas,	  and	  most	  of	   the	  data	  was	  unpublished	  (Cross,	  1984;	  US	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  nd).	  A	  second	  census	  in	  1987	  was	  also	  geographically	  limited,	  and	  the	  Barre	  administration	  suppressed	  its	  publication	  (Hoehne,	  2015:16;	  Gaani,	  interview,	  2014;	  see	  also	  Cowan	  et	  al,	  1986,	  and	  UN	  Statistics	  Division,	  2015).	  The	  only	  firm	  demographic	   figures	   that	   the	   Somaliland	   government	   might	   therefore	   claim	   come	   from	   national	   projections	   (see	  Chapter	   4)	   or	   electoral	   turnout	   and	   voter	   registration,	   the	   latter	   of	   which	   I	   show	   in	   this	   chapter	   to	   be	   highly	  problematic.	  	  7	  This	  was	  not	  an	  uncontroversial	  decision,	  since	  some	  groups	  argued	  for	  greater	  representation	  (Walls,	  2014:237).	  The	  lack	  of	  resolution	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  seat	  allocation	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  repeated	  delay	  of	  the	  next	  round	  of	  parliamentary	  elections	  in	  2015.	  See	  also	  APD,	  2015.	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registration: voters self-declared their eligibility, and their name was manually entered into 
a registration book (IRI, 2005:20). This did not, of course, constitute ‘registration’ or 
‘identification’, nor did it prevent multiple voting. Instead, these elections were considered 
heavily ‘clannish’ (IRI, 2005; Walls, 2014:243–45), reinforcing peoples’ identification with 
their kin (Balthasar, 2012:212). The complicated mixed PR-majority electoral system agreed 
for the lower house election meant that voters chose their candidate directly. The pre-
election period was therefore characterised by widespread mobilisation along clan lines, as 
sub-sub-clans and their favoured candidate sought to secure support and generate backing 
with khat, dollars and feasts (APD, 2006). Rather than the (illusion of) clan balance that had 
held sway since independence, candidates openly utilised clan networks, with these being 
the deciding factor in political and financial support, and ultimately electoral success.8 
 
The Introduction of Biometrics 
As I noted in Chapters 1 and 2, biometric technologies can be a way of ensuring credible 1-
to-1 identification, and for this reason have been rapidly adopted for registration purposes 
across much of sub-Saharan Africa. In Somaliland, the decision to incorporate biometrics 
was taken in 2007 as part of the design of a new voter registration system. Multiple and 
underage voting had increased over the period of early elections because of a combination of 
factors, including the solvency of the ink,9 the lack of enforcement of criminal sanctions 
against repeated voting, enthusiasm about voting, fervour amongst political supporters, and 
encouragement by political parties, which flouted the transport bans on election day to ferry 
voters to multiple polling stations (Bradbury, 2008:211). The absence of a voter register 
meant that there was no data with which to verify eligible voters, and no way of recording 
who had already voted. The lack of registration or census information also affected the 
management of the elections: for instance, each polling station was sent the same number of 
ballot papers by default, regardless of the size of the local population, meaning that some 
polling stations ran out and others had a surfeit, risking ballot-stuffing (APD, 2012). The 
early elections therefore demonstrated the importance, indeed urgency, of effective 
registration within a framework of official legibility. 
 
In July 2007, the Somaliland government therefore drafted and passed Law No. 37/2007 on 
voter registration, which stated that registration should be ‘implemented’ at least six months 
prior to polling day and last no more than three months. Delays over installing a new 
electoral commission meant that the new NEC was only in post in September 2007, one 
month before the planned local council election, which was thus immediately postponed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	   Abokor	   et	   al,	   2006;	   Bennett	   and	   Woldemariam,	   2011;	   Bradbury,	   2008;	   and	   Walls,	   2014	   for	   more	   on	   these	  elections.	  9	  The	  two	   local	  organisations	   that	  undertook	  domestic	  observation	   in	  2003	  deplored	  the	   ‘removable’	   ink,	  noting	  that	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  three	  parties	  were	  ‘ink	  laundries	  for	  their	  supporters’	  (Abrar,	  2003:10).	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the following year. Assuming ‘implemented’ to mean ‘begun’, 10 this nevertheless meant that 
the new NEC had a window of just over two months to put in place a brand-new voter 
registration system. But whilst the first NEC had developed plans for voter registration (to 
draw from the manual records of voter names that had been taken in the 2005 election), the 
toxic political climate surrounding the end of its term had left almost no institutional 
memory. Political fighting between the president, political parties and the commissioners 
had led to the seizure of the NEC offices in March 2007: all paperwork had been embargoed 
by the government, so the new NEC allegedly did not have the documents, records or, 
importantly, plans of its predecessor (Gaani, interview, 2014; see also Bennett and 
Woldemariam, 2010:24). Added to this was the new commissioners’ inexperience: their 
appointment had been the result of political bargaining rather than meritocratic selection,11 
and none had the requisite proficiency for voter registration. As Gaani, a senior member of 
commission staff, said to me, ‘If the government had been serious about voter registration, 
NEC1 would have had an extension’ (Interview, 2014). 
 
In spite of these problems, the stain of multiple voting in previous elections had raised 
expectations that the new voter registration system would be highly effective: an invitation 
to biometric technologies. Although the first NEC had considered fingerprint data in its 
early planning (Gaani, interview, 2014), Law No. 37/2007 was not written with biometric 
data in mind. Article 8 specified that a photograph would be taken of the registrant, but this 
was for visual identification rather than use with facial recognition software (FRS).12 Indeed, 
the collection of fingerprints – the most common biometric data – was not specified within 
the registration procedure at all. The decision to incorporate fingerprint data was hence a 
significant deviation from the original 2007 law, and appears to have been motivated by at 
least two reasons.  
 
Firstly, it was hoped that biometric registration would eliminate the multiple and underage 
voting that had undermined the credibility of Somaliland’s previous elections. Multiple 
voting was now an entrenched behaviour amongst party stalwarts, coming to a head in the 
2005 parliamentary elections. Even with comprehensive civic education, however, it was 
believed that simple registration would not be enough to counter the impulse for multiple 
cards. The commissioners in favour of biometrics believed that only unique identifiers could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibrahim	   Hashi	   Jama	   notes	   in	   his	   translation	   that	   the	   Somali	   word	   for	   implementation	   can	   be	   read	   logically	   as	  referring	  to	  the	  start	  rather	  than	  the	  end	  of	  the	  registration	  process.	  It	  is,	  he	  admits,	  not	  clear,	  however,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  this	  clause	  was	  amended	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2007:8,	  note	  23).	  	  11	  The	  nominations	  were	  a	  lightning	  rod	  for	  unresolved	  imperative	  (and	  provocative)	  debates	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  clan	   balance	   versus	   expertise	   within	   political	   institutions,	   the	   decision-­‐making	   power	   of	   the	   executive	   versus	   the	  opposition’s	  legislative	  majority,	  the	  value	  of	  due	  process	  versus	  traditional	  mediation,	  and	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  local	  needs	  versus	  donor	  expectations.	  Since	  the	  2005	  parliamentary	  elections,	  the	  issue	  of	  clan	  balance	  within	  political	  institutions	  had	  become	  particularly	   fractious:	  every	   ‘region’	  (aka	  clan)	  had	  to	  be	  represented	  to	  dismiss	  charges	  of	   inequity	  and	  alleviate	  suspicions	  of	   ‘tribalism’	  i.e.	  the	  conduct	  of	  politics	  for	  clan	  interests.	  Since	  the	  nominations	  were	  split	  across	  the	  president,	  Guurti	  and	  the	  two	  opposition	  parties,	  this	  was	  a	  recipe	  for	  confrontation.	  Six	  months	  of	  political	  fighting	  over	  the	  nominations	  meant	  the	  sclerotic	  relations	  could	  only	  be	  repaired	  by	  traditional	  mediation	  in	  August	  2007.	  See	  APD,	  2007	  and	  Walls,	  2014.	  12	  FRS	  maps	  facial	  characteristics	  such	  as	  distance	  between	  the	  eyes,	  nose	  length	  and	  jaw	  angle,	  and	  its	  efficacy	  depends	  upon	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  photograph,	  and	  hence	  can	  encounter	  problems	  if	  photographs	  are	  not	  taken	  in	  good	  light.	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ensure one person, one vote. Farhan, one of the first permanent members of staff of the new 
commission, told me that ‘APD, Interpeace, NEC, the government and the parliament were 
all in favour of biometrics because they knew the issue: no ID and nomadic movement and 
also that people follow whatever the clan leaders say’ (Interview, 2014). 
 
Secondly, biometric registration was expected to ensure that only Somalilanders would be 
able to vote: a bureaucratic fix for Somaliland’s porous borders and fragmented 
identification infrastructure, and an explicit move away from the informal accent-and-
appearance test of previous elections. A 2009 editorial in Qaran News articulated the 
expectations that had been placed upon the biometric system: ‘We all know that Somali 
speaking people in the Horn of Africa look alike each other and [it is] difficult to distinguish 
between them; but the biometric system will filter out the non-Somalilanders’ (Al-Mutairi, 
2009a). As discussed in Chapter 2, biometric verification can only confirm that particular 
biophysical data matches persons already registered: it cannot determine the identity or 
eligibility of voters. However, even at the planning stage, expectations were high that 
biometrics would provide a failsafe proof of identity.  
 
These were strong arguments in favour of biometric registration. Behind closed doors, 
however, the NEC was split, pitting proponents against more cautious members who sided 
with Interpeace, the NGO tasked by the donors with supporting the elections, in favour of a 
more modest system. Nevertheless, the decision to go ahead with the biometric system was 
made. The scale of the task was considerable even for advanced democracies. Assuming a 
voting population of around 700,000 (based on the 2005 turnout), the timeline of between 
one and three months required by Law No. 37/2007 would mean that the commission 
would have to register between 9,000 and 27,000 voters a day, taking not only basic details 
but also high-resolution fingerprint scans for each person.13 This required a huge investment 
in properly trained personnel and technical equipment, since every part of the registration 
technology needed to be sourced, but at the time of the announcement the NEC had not yet 
issued the tender for the supply of registration equipment, opened any local offices or 
recruited any technical staff (Farhan, interview, 2014; Somaliland Times, 2008a). The East 
Africa Policy Institute was one of those that expressed concern about the tight timeline, 
questioning the wisdom of a ‘crash program’ in voter registration and issuing a prescient 
warning that the ‘unrealistic warp speed’ would lead to the postponement of elections, and 
‘rancor, outright chaos, [and] confusion’ (Gabose and Garuf, 2008).  
 
More importantly, key questions and basic issues had not been addressed, including how 
and where the nomadic population would be registered, whether communities living in 
Ethiopia’s Region V would be able to vote, or how members of the diaspora could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	   assumes	   a	   six-­‐day	  working	  week,	  with	   26	   days	   for	   one	  month	   and	   78	   days	   for	   three.	   The	   East	   Africa	   Policy	  Institute	  also	  attempted	   to	  estimate	   the	  daily	   rate	  of	   registration,	  putting	   it	  at	  15,555	  people	  every	  day	   (Gabose	  and	  Garuf,	  2008).	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registered whilst still abroad (ibid).14 Since the fitful efforts of 2002, there had been no 
progress on enumerating voters or demarcating electoral constituencies, meaning decisions 
about the size and shape of the electorate were based on political agendas wrapped up as 
security or logistical concerns. The coincidence of nomadic populations in the east of the 
country where polling had been suspended in previous elections meant that registration 
planning would have to pay particular attention to ensuring registration could take place in 
Sool and Sanaag, but this, like the complexity of the challenges of time, staffing and 
resources, was seemingly overlooked or deferred (see Renders, 2012), or the result of 
political decisions to shape the electorate (see Kelley, Ayres and Bowen, 1967). 
 
Importantly, it became clear that the legislative framework that had been put in place for 
voter registration, including the timeline, was unworkable. The NEC announced the tender 
for the procurement of the equipment in March 2008, only four months before the elections 
for local councils were supposed to take place, making delay inevitable. In an echo of 2005, 
voter registration had again become an impediment to timely elections rather than a boon. 
The commission therefore prepared an amended law in June 2008 for the House of 
Representatives, which formally enunciated the schedule for registration: a preparatory and 
awareness-raising phase of 25 days, core registration in each of the six regions for a 
minimum of five days each, and a supplementary period of 15 days for anyone who was 
unable to register during the core phase. 15 A second critical addition was the inclusion of an 
electronic scan of the registrant’s fingerprint. As noted above, although the NEC had 
announced biometric registration in February 2008, the original version of Law No. 
37/2007 had not required the collection of biometric data, meaning that there would have 
been none with which to develop a biometric database. This discrepancy was now resolved 
in the amended law, although new ambiguities were introduced since it was not stated which 
finger was to be scanned. There was also no further elucidation of the photograph 
requirement, meaning that the amended law did not rectify the failing of Article 18 to specify 
the process for photographing the registrant, an aspect of the database record that was to 
prove prone to abuse and error, and which the FRS was therefore only partially able to 
address. The failure to specify these aspects of the biometric data would have deleterious 
effects on the quality of data collected later in the year.  
 
After the political upheaval of the previous months, the NEC now rushed to complete its 
preparations in time. Recruitment for enumerators did not begin until 23 September 2008. 
When an attempt at open recruitment failed (police shots were fired in an attempt to control 
the crowds of hundreds of applicants according to Kuhlman, 2010), the NEC hired directly 
from the pool of recent graduates from Hargeysa, Amoud, Burco and Gollis universities. At 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Law	  No.	  20/2001	  permits	  overseas	  voting	  at	  Somaliland	  diplomatic	  offices	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2001:	  Article	  6.2)	  but	  the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  these,	  together	  with	  the	  additional	  logistic	  burden,	  meant	  that	  registration	  of	  diaspora	  voters	  was	  not	  feasible,	  and	  they	  were	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  registration	  unless	  present	  in	  the	  country.	  15	  The	  45-­‐day	  registration	  period	  announced	  by	  the	  NEC	  in	  February	  2008	  did	  not	  include	  the	  awareness-­‐raising	  phase,	  but	  the	  five	  days	  per	  region	  (30	  days)	  plus	  15	  supplementary	  days,	  although	  this	  has	  to	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  law.	  See	  Ibrahim’s	  annotations	  in	  Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2007.	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each site, candidates had to complete a handwritten test about their knowledge of IT 
processes (for instance, by describing the steps one should take if a printer stops working), 
with the top scorers being recruited (Ilyaas, interview, 2014). Successful applicants were 
given a basic introduction to the kit, troubleshooting tips, and a brief overview of the 
registration context. NEC team leaders and Ministry of Interior (MoI) legal advisers also 
received guidelines on conflict resolution in anticipation of problems at registration centres 
(Asli, interview, 2014; Ilyaas, interview, 2014). However, Farhan, a member of the NEC 
staff, observed that the three days of training was consumed with logistics and payment, 
particularly resolving disputes related to the expectations of a high fee, which the graduates 
had been led to expect (Interview, 2014). Testing, training and development was squeezed 
into just a few hours (ibid). Meanwhile, the NEC also had to take delivery of and organise 
the registration kits;16 complete the set-up of the NEC headquarters, regional and district 
offices; develop and confirm its own internal procedures; and undertake awareness-raising 
– all essential tasks that had been left to the last minute. The rush of the last month also 
meant that there was no formal testing of the equipment – a basic technical safeguard that 
might have anticipated, and therefore addressed, the problems that were to arise (Gaani, 
interview, 2014). 
 
The 2008 Registration It	  is	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  a	  Somali	  territory	  that	  the	  voters	  are	  registered.	  It	  is	  the	  big	  day	  …	  a	  really	  BIG	  DAY.	  (Somalia	  Online,	  2008a)	  
 
A year after the instalment of the second electoral commission, six months after its decision 
to utilise a biometric technical model, and six months after the presidential election should 
have taken place, voter registration, hailed as part of ‘the nation’s historical legacy’ (Jire, 
2008), finally began in Somaliland on 14 October 2008. Beginning first in Saaxil (see Map 
2), registration moved to Awdal and then to Majoodi-Jeex. Registration was interrupted, 
however, by the detonation of three vehicle bombs in Hargeysa on 29 October, which killed 
around 25 people, including two UN staff members, and injured several others. 17 
International staff working with the NEC were quickly withdrawn following the incident, 
and ECIL, the Indian technical contractor, removed its two management staff permanently 
from Somaliland, leading the NEC to announce the postponement of the registration 
process due to ‘technical difficulties’, which actually referred to the need to quickly adapt to 
the new technical configuration following ECIL’s departure (Farhan, interview, 2014; 
Garowe Online, 2008). After a five-week delay, registration resumed with the president and 
the leaders of the two opposition parties demonstratively registering to vote in Hargeysa on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	   kits	   consisted	   of	   a	   sturdy,	   waterproof	   briefcase	   containing	   a	   laptop	   pre-­‐installed	   with	   registration	   software,	  digital	  camera,	  fingerprint	  scanner,	  colour	  printer	  and	  mouse	  (Mathieson	  and	  Wager,	  2010:16).	  See	  Photo	  1.	  17	  It	  was	  the	  first	  such	  attack	  in	  Somaliland	  and	  was	  blamed	  on	  Harakat	  al-­‐Shabaab	  al-­‐Mujahideen,	  the	  jihadist	  network	  operating	   in	   the	   southern	   territories	   of	   Somalia	   since	  2006,	  motivated,	   it	  was	   assumed,	   by	   the	  desire	   to	  disrupt	   the	  regional	   talks	   taking	  place	   in	  Nairobi	   that	  day.	  The	  consequences	  were	   significant	   for	  Somaliland,	   since	   this	  was	   the	  first	   attack	   of	   its	   kind.	   It	  was	   roundly	  denounced,	   and	   there	  was	   a	   concerted	   effort	   to	   seek	  out	   the	   remnants	   of	   the	  Hargeysa	  sleeper	  cell,	  leading	  to	  a	  bout	  of	  arrests.	  See	  ICG,	  2009.	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1 December (Qaran News, 2008). Registration then moved to Togdheer, and finally Sanaag 
and Sool, the two regions along the contested border of Puntland (Map 2), finishing in 
January 2009. 
 
The Registration Process 
Each registration centre was manned by a team consisting of two NEC operators, two police 
officers, three party observers, and a court official or MoI representative. The physical layout 
of the centre was not dissimilar to a polling station (and indeed, these would be future 
polling stations). Voters formed a queue that was monitored by armed police, who would 
permit one or two individuals to enter the building at once (although it was often more than 
this); should they see an elderly person in the line, he or she would be brought to the front 
for rapid processing (Ilyaas, interview, 2014). The queues were generally orderly, but the 
long hours and hot weather led to queue jumping and place holding, and sometimes, 
therefore, arguments, according to Asli, then a team leader (Interview, 2014). She told me 
that the police used whip-like sticks to keep order, occasionally resorting to firing in the air 
when the crowds became rowdy (Interview, 2014). 
 
After entering the centre and having their eligibility confirmed (see below), registrants 
would take a seat in front of a NEC official who would begin the registration process. First, 
the voter’s four names would be recorded,18 and then their gender, date of birth, age, place 
of birth, address (place of residence), and marriage status. After these details were entered, 
the voter’s photograph was taken via a camera on a vertical arm, sometimes with the aid of a 
lamp (Photo 2). Next, a fingerprint from both hands was recorded using the finger-scanner. 
Samatar, a university graduate who had worked as a registration officer, told me that 
sometimes the operator would have to lean over to press the finger in place because of 
problems with the legibility of the prints (Interview, 2014). If the prints were illegible, the 
operator was able to retake them. Two boxes needed to be checked by the operator to permit 
confirmation of the data. Samatar noted that there was also the option to uncheck a box that 
required fingerprint and gender data (Photo 3), a software decision that would later be 
shown to have enabled registration without fingerprints, and hence the commission of 
fraud. Finally, two unique numerical identifiers for citizenship and voter ID cards were 
added, generated by the system based on the registration centre code, the date and the 
voter’s details (the name and number of the centre and the operator were preloaded into 
each kit).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Four	  names	  (a	  person’s	  given	  name,	  followed	  by	  their	  father,	  grandfather	  and	  great-­‐grandfather’s	  names)	  were	  taken	  for	  extra	  assurance,	  rather	  than	  the	  three	  names	  used	  on	  an	  everyday	  basis.	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  Sources:	  1–3,	  Samatar,	  2008;	  4–6,	  my	  images	  with	  material	  provided	  by	  Samatar	  (4)	  and	  Farhan	  (5–6)	  in	  2014.	  
 
Once all this data was captured, the operator printed a draft of the record, which the voter 
would then either review and consent to, or a member of the registration team (sometimes a 
party representative) would read it to them if they were blind or illiterate (Asli, interview, 
2014). Once the information was confirmed, the operator would print three pages: the first 
would add the photograph and the alphanumerical details to the two cards, which were pre-
printed onto a single A4 sheet (Photo 4); the second and third were summary slips, one for 
the MoI and the other for NEC to ensure they had paper records as well as electronic data 
(Samatar, interview, 2014). The cards were then signed, the citizenship card by one of the 
MoI officers, and the voter card by the NEC team leader; marked or signed by the registrant; 
and a special hologram carrying the emblem of the Republic of Somaliland was affixed as a 
security measure (Photo 5). The cards were finally detached from the larger sheet, and then 
laminated – a process that took some time, and, because of this, was often undertaken by 
party observers or the MoI officer (ibid). As a final precaution, the registrant’s finger 
(typically the left small finger) was dipped in indelible ink to prove they had registered. 
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Photo%1:"The"registration"kit"containing"camera,"lamp,"laptop,"printer"and"fingerprint"scanner."
Photo%2:"A"registration"team"at"work"in"Awdal."A"woman"waits"for"a"party"observer"to"laminate"her"ID"cards."
Photo%3:"Snapshot"of"the"registration"software."The"voter’s"details"are"entered"on"the"left,"the"photo"is"captured"in"the"centre,"and"the"fingerprints"on"the"right."
 
 
 
Photo%4:"The"perforated"sheet"of"preprinted"ID"cards,"here"printed"with"a"voter’s"photograph"and"details.""
Photo%5:"The"front"of"complete"citizenship"(top)"and"voter"(bottom)"ID"cards.""" Photo%6:"The"reverse"of"the"national"(top)"and""voter"(bottom)"ID"cards,"with"fingerprints"in"the"place"of"a"signature"to"mark"the"confirmation"of"the"voter."%"
"
  Sources:"1–4,"Samatar,"2008;"5–6"provided"by"Farhan"in"2014. ""
Photo%7:"The"front"of"the"combined"national"and"voter"identity"card"issued"in"April"2010"in"Hargeysa." Photo%8:"The"reverse"of"the"combined"national"and"voter"card,"containing"a"barcode,"and"the"names"of"the"registration"centre,"voting"district"and"region."
  Source:"Anonymously"shared,"hence"details"have"been"redacted.""
 
 
Once all this data was captured, the operator printed a draft of the record, which the voter 
would then either review and consent to, or a member of the registration team ( om times a 
party representative in fact) would read it to them if they were blind or illiterate (Asli, 
interview, 2014). Once the information was verified, the operator would print three pages: the 
first would add the photograph an  the alphanumerical details to the two cards, which were 
pre-printed onto a single A4 sheet (Photo 4); the second and third were summary slips, one for 
the MoI and the other for NEC to ensure they had paper records as well as electronic data 
(Samatar, interview, 2014). The cards were then signed, the citizenship card by one of the MoI 
officers, and the voter card by the NEC team leader; marked or signed by the registrant; and a 
special hologram carrying the emblem of the Republic of Somaliland was affixed as a security 
measure (Photo 5). The cards were finally detached from the larger sheet, and then laminated 
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Verifying Eligibility 
A key aspect of Law No. 37/2007 was the recognition that the eligibility of voters in previous 
elections could not be verified in the absence of a civil register, census or existing voter list. 
The ‘sunset clause’ introduced in the 2005 parliamentary elections law had postponed 
registration, but it had also deferred the conduct of a census, which was politically 
unappetising. Under the 2002 Citizenship Law, proof of Somaliland citizenship can be 
obtained by an individual that has completed a form from the Citizenship Office, and had 
their identity verified by a MoI-registered caaqil at court (Republic of Somaliland, 2002: 
Article 3.1).19 Very few Somalilanders have such documentation, however. The basic issue of 
how to verify the identity of eligible voters qua citizens therefore remained.  
 
Law No. 37/2007 had thus provided for the creation of a second card – a citizenship ID. 
Noting that the legal process of verifying citizenship involving a declaration at court was not 
‘easy’ (due to the fixity and infrequency of courts), the voter registration law amended the 
formal procedure to permit officials of the MoI and the local court to confirm citizenship at 
registration offices (Republic of Somaliland, 2007: Article 7.2). Should the MoI and court 
officials be unable to confirm the citizenship of a prospective registrant, the law provided for 
reversion to the conventional vouching practice: an accredited caaqil or well-known person 
with immovable property in the district (a dammiin) should be brought before the 
registration committee to attest the person’s citizenship (ibid: Article 7.5). These 
arrangements would, it was hoped, enable every applicant to have their citizenship 
corroborated in the absence of formal documentation. Of course, this had been the 
procedure used in 2002, when the NEC had explained this safeguard to the EU technical 
team as the ‘local knowledge of individuals [that] would ensure that inappropriate people 
did not vote’ (Gers and Valentine-Selsey, 2002:10). The formal identification system was 
thus designed from the beginning to include and even depend upon the verification 
practices of the genealogical system of identity, demonstrating the synthesis at work in 
Somaliland’s identity architecture.  
 
At each registration centre, MoI officers assessed registrants’ citizenship and confirmed they 
were eligible to register. In the absence of confirmatory ID, potential registrants were 
supposed to be quizzed on a range of points in order to verify their citizenship. In practice, 
the question was often a perfunctory request for one’s clan name since the clan elders and 
community leaders roped in as MoI representatives supposedly already knew most voters in 
their area: ‘It has to be somebody they know. So if they know that person then they will send 
them to us [the operators]’ (Asli, interview, 2014). There was also a second level of 
identification in cases where the person was not ‘known’: ‘If they get suspicious, then they 
allow to bring them somebody they know’ (ibid). This was one’s caaqil or local elder, the 
conventional backstop that the MoI and NEC had incorporated into the registration process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  These	  citizenship	  certificates	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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in order to resolve the verification problem. Caaqils and elders from each area sat within the 
registration centre, or were summoned by telephone to authenticate someone’s claim should 
there be suspicion or uncertainty (ibid). This process was not designed to confirm identity in 
terms of someone’s name or other details, but simply to ensure that only Somalilanders 
could vote.  
 
Significantly, because people could register wherever they liked, the caaqil for each clan was 
not necessarily present, particularly in the cities, meaning that verification took place at the 
highest jilib. In fact, though, most people I asked about this told me that they were only 
asked their four names and their clan name, and did not need to be authorised by a third 
party (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). In the event of a query or dispute, the matter was 
referred to the court official, who could make clear the legal ramifications of falsely claiming 
citizenship, and more significantly demand a moral commitment to the truth in the form of 
an oath. Obsiye, a young professional working in Hargeysa who had worked as a NEC 
deputy team leader in 2008, told me he thought that the oath was an effective mechanism: 	  Actually	  mostly	  people	  don’t	  like	  swearing	  because	  as	  Islamic	  people,	  they	  know	  the	  punishment	  for	  it.	  So	  if	  you	  are	  saying	  ‘are	  you	  swearing	  for	  Allah?’	  some	  of	  them	  if	  they	  are	  telling	  lies	  they	  go	  back,	  but	  if	  they	  are	  telling	  truth,	  they	  say	  it.	  It’s	  a	  good	  test.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
However, it appears that this verification was superficial. Ilyaas, a trainee lawyer at the time 
of the voter registration, had been appointed as a registration centre legal adviser, working 
to ensure that everyone within the centre had the requisite information to conduct the 
registration properly, and to answer questions from the public about the citizenship law. He 
told me that the time constraints meant that the citizenship verification was little more than 
a cursory check: 	  At	   that	   day	   there	   was	   no	   clarification	   about	   the	   citizenship.	   A	   lot	   of	   people	   are	  coming.	   [Speaking	   quickly]	   ‘Are	   you	   Somalilander?’	   ‘Yeah.’	   ‘Which	   village	   are	   you	  coming	   from?’	   ‘I	  am	  coming	   from	  that	  village.’	   ‘What	   tribe	  are	  you?’	   ‘I	  am	  tribe	  B.’	  ‘Okay,	  continue,	  continue;	  give	  him,	  give	  him.’	  I	  am	  saying	  ‘why	  are	  you	  giving	  him?	  Please	  ask	  him	  a	   lot	  of	  questions	  as	   the	   law	   is	   stating.	   It	   is	  not	  enough	   “are	  you	  a	  Somalilander?”.’	  But	  there	  is	  no	  time.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
Kayse, another university graduate who had worked as a registration officer in 2008, 
confirmed this: ‘Anyone who comes will be registered because we do not have time. A 
hundred people are on the line’ (Interview, 2014). The registration had been set up to give 
not only the voter ID card but also a citizenship ID card, hence anyone able to short-circuit 
the verification process – for instance, by learning the requisite names of clan and village – 
had access to both. The lawyer Ilyaas felt that the process had not been rigorous or 
systematic, and that, at least in the registration centres he worked in, citizenship had not 
been duly tested: ‘Actually, that day we are not working how to give the people citizenship 
ID. Anyone can take. Even you [Anna] can take! You can follow the queue and you can take. 
There is no problem’ (Interview, 2014). 
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Age was the other determinant of eligibility. Many people in rural Somaliland do not know 
their birthday, and in 2002 this had been a source of complication in the determination of 
voters around the age of majority. Unlike the test for citizenship, where an evaluation of 
status was undertaken within the context of communal scrutiny, the age criterion was 
complicated by two factors. Firstly many people in Somaliland do not know their actual date 
of birth, but merely the season or the year. For this reason, documents typically contain the 
standard response ‘1 January’, but in the case of the election, the task was to prove that 
someone was over fifteen years before the election, and hence knowing the month of birth 
was an important technicality. Secondly, it was not clear whether someone had to be over 
the age of majority at the time of registration (autumn 2008) or at the time of the election. 
This was a significant complication since the election date kept shifting.  
 
In recognition of the absence of systematic birth registration documentation, the 2007 voter 
registration law had codified the practice used at previous elections, which was for parents 
or polling station officers to estimate age (Article 25). Verifying whether the applicant was 
over the age of majority (fifteen years) was nevertheless challenging for the operators. ‘The 
age was very difficult,’ said Obsiye, the deputy team leader (Interview, 2014). ‘It was 
possible that someone with a young age was very big, or someone older like 20 was very 
small. So we just said bring your parents and give evidence. The parents say this is my son, 
he was born this time, I know it, I swear it.’ The oath was again used as a test of veracity, but 
the registration officers I interviewed considered this to be weaker than in the case of 
citizenship: ‘They used to bring their parents and they used to swear’, said Asli (Interview, 
2014). ‘Once the person swears, that’s it – you can’t do anything about it, even if he’s 12 
years old.’  
 
This therefore appeared to be an inadequate check of eligibility, but with no other 
information with which to crosscheck the identity of registrants, testimony had to be relied 
upon. These issues highlight the weakness of vernacular verification in the context of 
political processes such as elections. Rather than individual authentication, the connection 
to potential political spoils altered the grounds of trustworthy corroboration. Whereas in 
other interpersonal situations, such as those I described in Chapter 3, ‘1-in-many’ 
verification works to provide communal assurance of an individual, here we see a process 
where the emphasis on the ‘many’ created a different political calculus. Indeed, multiple 
actors, interests and motivations contributed to the defrauding of the register, as I describe 
below.  
 
Fraud Revealed  
When voter registration was completed in early 2009, it was, for a brief moment, considered 
a success, even if the process had been, as a statement from a group of Somaliland scholars 
put it, ‘a logistical nightmare and a daring undertaking’ (Fadal, 2012:10). Registration had 
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taken place at over 1,000 centres across the six regions and returned over 1.3 million voters 
(Mathieson and Wager, 2010). The figure was immediately scrutinised, however. It was a 
plausible number assuming a national population of approximately 3 million, and it also 
aligned with the turnout from the 2001 referendum. However, it was twice as many voters as 
the turnout three years previous (670,322 voters – see Table 2), and Interpeace estimated 
that the figure was inflated by around 40 per cent (Mark, personal correspondence, 2013).  
 
During the interregnum necessitated by the Hargeysa bombing, two significant 
developments had taken place. Firstly, registration had had to proceed without the 
international experts: although they continued to offer support via Skype, to all extents and 
purposes NEC staff now undertook database management and maintenance on their own 
(Farhan, interview, 2014). Interpeace personnel, still constrained by the heightened security 
concerns, were also unable to travel east of Burco and so voter registration proceeded in 
these politically friable regions without external oversight (Tamsin, interview, 2013). 
Secondly, and most importantly, the delay had enabled groups in the remaining regions of 
Togdheer, Sanaag and Sool to mobilise people for registration. Whilst the numbers of 
registered people in Saaxil and Awdal varied within 20 per cent of the 2005 turnout (Table 
2), in Togdheer and Sanaag tens of thousands of voters had been added (over 170 per cent 
and 135 per cent growth respectively). These figures alone indicated that something very 
wrong had happened in Somaliland’s first voter registration.  
 
Table	  1:	  Number	  of	  registration	  errors	  and	  cleaned	  records	  by	  type.	  
 Type	  of	  Error	   Number	  Total	  registration	  records	   1,363,192	  Errors	  identified	  by	  biometric	  filters	  Records	  without	  biometric	  data/no	  picture	   96,111	  No	  fingerprints	   726,583	  Duplicate	  fingerprints	   49,928	  Duplicate	  faces	   65,588	  Duplicate	  face	  and	  fingerprints	   4,815	  Name-­‐birthdate	  matches	   7,507	  
 Sources:	  Mathieson	  and	  Wager,	  2010;	  David,	  personal	  correspondence,	  2013.	  
 
Widespread stories of attempted double registration meant the electoral stakeholders could 
not ignore the fact that the database possibly contained records that were not of unique 
voters. The review of the registration database revealed two serious problems: false data and 
missing data (Table 1). The false data included fake records (discussed below); and false 
photos (photographs held up to the camera, including anecdotally ones from magazines and 
books), which were sometimes the result of benign intervention or because diaspora 
relatives were registered in absentia. The missing data was similarly of two kinds: tens of 
thousands of records had no photograph (or at least images that were so poor that they 
could not be usefully compared); and an enormous number of records were also devoid of 
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fingerprint data.20 It appeared that registration had been afflicted by the problem it had 
sought to eliminate – fraud – with a group of Hargeysa public intellectuals later sadly 
noting, ‘[T]here was no single authority or group to blame … [fraud] has been aided and 
abetted by all stakeholders’ (Fadal, 2012:10). In what follows, I propose three main sets of 
reasons for the errors and fraud of the 2008 Somaliland registration: technical problems; 
administrative and procedural problems; and deliberate fraud, and I explore these factors in 
turn.  
 
Technical Challenges 
In many cases, the registration programme’s technical errors emerged out of poor, rushed or 
inexperienced planning and decision-making, which reflected the logistical, financial and 
human resourcing weaknesses of the NEC and the Somaliland state more broadly. This was 
the first time electronic registration had ever been undertaken in Somaliland, so some 
teething problems were to be expected. However, as I noted above, the rush of planning and 
the absence of piloting meant that at least some of these problems should have been 
mitigated in advance of the core registration phase. For instance, logistical problems meant 
that some of the generators and cars were without fuel meaning that the sophisticated 
biometric technology could not work, and 20 registration teams were unable to get to their 
sites because of transport difficulties (Somaliland Times, 2008b). This latter issue was 
particularly important because it ran the risk of cutting off rural communities and nomadic 
voters – a potentially serious problem because many nomads had yet to begin the seasonal 
move back towards the coast, and therefore needed to access registration sites in the interior 
(Observer, 2008).  
 
The registration kit also presented complications, which may or may not have arisen from 
the original procurement decision, in which the inexperienced vendor Copenhagen 
Elections, rather than purchasing a tried-and-tested off-the-shelf system, had acquired the 
registration in a ‘cut-and-paste’ way (David, interview, 2013). In most cases, the kits 
functioned, but there were reports of laptops failing and printers jamming (Somaliland 
Times, 2008b).21 The poor-quality fingerprint scanner sometimes took as many as twenty-
five attempts to capture a scan, and therefore held up registration (Mathieson and Wager, 
2010:28).  
 
Significant issues arose also from the basic format and operability of the registration 
software. The original technical tender had been supported by Interpeace, but Interpeace is 
not a technical organisation. The authorship of the tender had rather been by an 
international consultant (who departed Somaliland immediately afterwards) and Farhan 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  I	   exclude	   here	   the	   formally	   missing	   data	   of	   the	   12,165	   voters,	   which	   had	   to	   be	   retrieved	   and	   re-­‐entered	   to	   the	  database,	  since	  these	  records	  were,	  though	  lost,	  assumed	  to	  be	  complete	  (see	  Mathieson	  and	  Wager,	  2010).	  	  21	  Walls	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  kit	   failure	  was	  within	  expectations	  (60/1100),	  but	  that	  the	  dusty	  conditions	   led	  to	  failing	  printers.	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(then a recent IT graduate, now a member of the NEC staff) who wrote the final 
specification. He admitted, however, that he was inexperienced. ‘I was very young and 
junior but they accepted it. I looked on Google to look at how to do the ID number’ 
(Interview, 2014). A crucial problem in the software was that errors could not be addressed 
at the time of inputting: even where benign errors were made by operators, they could not 
be fixed or even flagged as problematic, but simply became part of the database, with the 
intention that any duplication would be addressed by the biometric software (see Grace, 
2009; and Mathieson and Wager; 2010). However, this simply stacked up problems for the 
cleaning phase, which lasted much longer than any of the Somaliland electoral stakeholders, 
or indeed the public, expected. 
 
Fingerprint Errors 
The major technical challenge arose from the original poor decision to utilise the data of 
only two fingerprints. Rather than the failsafe of all ten fingerprints, reliance upon only two 
prints increased the difficulty of guaranteeing unique matches. It also meant that when the 
fingerprint scans were omitted or of poor quality, a record had no biometric data at all. The 
poor quality was attributable to environmental conditions: manual labour wears away 
prints; and henna and sweat from the heat also made it difficult to capture the data. Since 
these problems are common to fingerprint scanning (World Bank, 2014:30), safeguards 
could have been built into the system.22 Instead, the Somaliland registration software 
permitted the overruling of the ‘mandatory’ fingerprint scan since the NEC had been 
concerned that manual labourers, such as farmers, and also those with physical handicaps 
would be excluded if it had been compulsory for registration. The former team leader Asli 
told me that she would tell registrants whose print could not be taken to leave and come 
back another time (particularly in the case of henna, which she would tell them to remove) 
(Interview, 2014). However, the situation with farmers and manual labourers who simply 
did not have legible prints was more difficult, and the operators found themselves under 
pressure to omit fingerprints for these registrants. Kayse, who had worked to operate the 
registration equipment, explained that ‘these people do not understand the system, and so 
as soon as you refuse someone because his fingerprint is not working, he is saying, “this guy 
is refusing to register [me]”. Then the head of village, the clan leaders say, “why don’t you 
register this person?”’ (Interview, 2014)23 In some cases, it appeared that operators supplied 
their own fingerprint in the place of the registrant in an effort to benignly move the process 
along or for other malicious reasons, which would later account for 220 entries with the 
same fingerprint (Mathieson and Wager, 2010). Even though Law No. 37/2007 and the NEC 
guidelines specified that fingerprint data should be taken, the poor training, absence of 
quality control, and pressure exerted upon operators meant that in half of all cases 
fingerprint data was not captured (ibid).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Fingerprint	  data	  is	  notoriously	  difficult	  as	  a	  single	  source	  of	  biometric	  data,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  Ghana,	  for	  instance,	  in	  2012	  (Chapter	  1).	  	  23	  This	  pressure	  on	  operators	  would	  increase	  over	  time,	  as	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	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Critically, the operators’ best defence against those trying to manipulate the system did not 
function in any of the regions. This was the automatic fingerprint identification system 
(AFIS), which should have been running concurrently with registration to ensure that 
registrants were double-checked against the emerging national database. Whilst a daily 
summary of the activity of each registration centre was encrypted to a CD-ROM, and a 
weekly report sent back to the NEC headquarters, there were no rolling checks of this data 
(Mathieson and Wager; 2010). AFIS had been one of the conditions of funding by the 
project’s donors, and although a February 2008 NEC concept note had planned for it to be 
run after registration, it had in fact been incorporated into the process, as the first NEC had 
originally proposed. 24  However, ECIL, the Indian company providing the registration 
software, had not completed the programming for AFIS by October 2008 (Farhan, 
interview, 2014). The NEC, not wanting to stomach any further delay, therefore began 
registration without it. This was a grave mistake, since it meant that it was possible for 
someone to register in more than one location, and even in more than one region, negating 
the primary advantage of biometrics, and placing enormous pressure on the database 
managers to be able to identify duplicates after registration.  
 
Face Recognition Errors 
The second major technical oversight was the fact that only the parameters for fingerprint 
data had been specified. The colour photograph taken in the registration process had only 
been to identify the registrant/voter, as explained above. However, when the extent of the 
fraud became clear in 2009, it was decided that FRS was to be applied to supplement the 
poor fingerprint data. However, FRS had not been included in the original tender or 
contract, 25 meaning that FRS-compliant images (in good light with faces clear of coverings) 
were not taken during registration. Introducing FRS at this stage of the registration was 
‘unprecedented’, according to an international expert (Grace, 2009); and bolting it on to an 
existing system was ‘highly unusual and particularly difficult’ (Creative Associates, cited in 
Mathieson and Wager, 2010:28–29). The use of FRS led to software programming 
complications and also did not identify duplicates at the level hoped for, because of the high 
volume and the poor quality of the data, which required the technical expertise of 
consultants and additional computing power (Grace, 2009:2; Kuhlman, 2010). Moreover, 
even with the new filter, underage registrants (and those that may not have met other 
eligibility criteria) could not be technically detected by the system, and there were thus 
limitations on how much could now be done to retroactively save the voter register.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  NEC1	  had	  planned	   to	   complete	   each	   region’s	   registration,	   reviewing	   and	   eliminating	   all	   ‘impurities’	   and	  mistakes,	  before	  moving	  onto	  the	  next	  region	  (Gaani,	  interview,	  2014).	  25	  According	  to	  Farhan,	  a	  NEC	  civil	  servant,	  ECIL,	  the	  technical	  subcontractors,	  agreed	  to	  build	  a	  retroactive	  FRS	  scrub	  for	  an	  enormous	  fee	  (allegedly	  $1	  million),	  leading	  to	  delays	  and	  ultimately	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  contract	  between	  ECIL	  and	  Copenhagen	  Elections.	  A	  new	  firm,	  Biometrics,	  formed	  of	  two	  ECIL	  employees	  from	  the	  original	  team,	  was	  brought	  in	   to	   help	   with	   software	   development	   and	   database	   management,	   working	   remotely	   from	   Hyderabad	   (Farhan,	  interview,	  2014).	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Administrative and Procedural Faults 
In addition to these technical problems were five administrative and procedural decisions 
that contributed to the high number of duplications. First was the extremely tight timeline. 
This was, after all, the first voter registration in Somaliland, beginning from scratch with a 
totally new technical infrastructure, and without the back-up of up-to-date enumerative 
data. In the first region, Saaxil, large crowds and teething problems with the process meant 
that registration was slow and cumbersome. As Asli, a team leader noted, ‘It was the first 
region so people didn’t have much idea on the first day. Everything was new to us’ 
(Interview, 2014). Media reports leapt on the fact that in some places registration took an 
average of 20 minutes per voter rather than the planned three, meaning that only a few 
people could be registered every hour: after the first two days, it was claimed that only 5,000 
people had been registered in Berbera (Somaliland Times, 2008b). It quickly became clear 
that more time would be needed for registration, and President Dahir Riyale Kahin (known 
as Riyale) wrote a letter to the NEC on 18 October criticising the process (Tamsin, interview, 
2013). Berbera’s community leaders also called for more time for registration, but this 
request was not heeded by NEC, in part because of the need to keep to the pre-agreed 
national timeline of 45 days (although now proving, as had been predicted, to be 
fantastically ambitious) and in part because the commissioners, engaged in mutual 
denunciations in the Somaliland press, were distracted.26 The thirty-day ab initio process 
was in retrospect far too short for such a complicated process.  
 
Disconnected Sequencing 
Second was the decision to sequence the registration across space and time rather than 
undertake simultaneous national registration. The sequential phasing of voter registration 
can be a good approach to appropriately manage limited resources (Evrensel, 2006), but in 
Somaliland the short timeframe and poor technical infrastructure meant that registration 
centres were not networked together or to the NEC in Hargeysa. Voters were therefore 
registered but their identity was not matched to other entries, opening a window for 
multiple registrations, which NEC and Interpeace assured could be rectified later. However, 
word quickly spread that it was possible to register more than once without the system 
flagging up the duplication (Rooble, interview, 2014a; Gaani, interview, 2014). By the time 
the registration teams reached the last three regions, political parties had been able to 
mobilise vast numbers of people to register once and more than once, bussing in kinsmen 
from Ethiopia and Djibouti, renting houses for their accommodation and feeding them to 
sustain them for their ‘double shifts’ (Sharif, interview, 2014; see also APD, 2012). Had AFIS 
been running, these efforts would have been useless; but in the face of technical corner-
cutting, these mobilisation tactics paid off.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  During	  the	  first	  week	  of	  October,	  four	  of	  the	  commissioners	  voted	  to	  oust	  the	  NEC	  chairman	  who	  managed	  to	  retain	  his	  position	  following	  an	  agreement	  between	  NEC	  and	  the	  parties	  (Kuhlman,	  2010).	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Voter Illiteracy 
The third procedural error was the absence of effective civic or voter education. This is a 
deeper issue in Somaliland, pertaining to the weakness of standardised school curricula, and 
the scarcity of resources to undertake such programmes (Ubax, interview, 2012; Yasin, 
interview, 2014a). Though scheduled to begin on 19 August, the volume of work to be done, 
together with Ramadan in September, meant that the NEC ran only one week of awareness-
raising at the start of October 2008. The planned information campaign was supposed to 
publicise the registration process, eligibility criteria, locations of registration centres, and 
regional registration dates; and to take place in conjunction with the opening of district 
registration centres from where further information and templates for personal information 
were to be made available (NEC, 2008). However, as in 2002, the material was not well 
distributed beyond Hargeysa, hampered by the limited broadcasting infrastructure, 
widespread illiteracy, and the dependence upon low-capacity community organisations. 
 
Although there was in general great interest and public support for registration, the limited 
nature of the public education campaign raised concerns that not all eligible voters would 
know what to do and where to go (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). Since the NEC had decided 
to create static registration sites,27 it was particularly important that members of the 
nomadic communities received information about their location, but, as in 2002, the public 
awareness campaign had little permeation beyond the main urban areas, relying instead 
upon key influencers and word-of-mouth. This therefore opened up a space for political 
messages that encouraged multiple registrations, and misinformation about the nature of 
registration.  
 
Impunity 
Multiple registrations, incomplete data, and register-stuffing were enabled in part by a 
permissive regulatory environment and the absence of effective sanctions against fraudulent 
behaviour, a fourth procedural mistake. In earlier elections, double voters had their belts 
and shoes confiscated until the end of voting, or were penned together under the 
community’s watchful eye (Abokor et al, 2006:11), but there were no such measures during 
the 2008 registration except inking, which had already been proven to be removable with 
the liberal use of strong solvent. Article 33 of the 2007 Voter Registration Law had 
prohibited the issuance of more than one voting card to a citizen, invoking the penal code’s 
penalty of a two-year prison sentence for falsification of public documents by citizens or ‘any 
officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs who issues a citizenship form to a non-citizen’ 
(Republic of Somaliland, 2007). However, this legal provision required enforcement, which 
does not seem to have happened. The absence of enforceable sanctions combined with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Rather	   than	  mobile	   registration	   units,	   for	   instance,	   such	   as	   had	   been	   used	   in	  Mozambique	   and	   Senegal	   (Evrensel,	  2006:7,	  11).	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  even	  without	  registration,	   it	  was	  estimated	  that	  more	  than	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  nomadic	   population	  did	  not	   vote	   in	   the	  2002	   election	  because	   of	   the	  distances	   involved	   (Gers	   and	  Valentine-­‐Selsey,	  2002),	  suggesting	  that	  the	  static	  approach	  to	  election	  management	  was	  erecting	  barriers	  to	  inclusion.	  
5	  –	  ‘Numbers	  are	  Politics’	  	  
	   144	  
weak norms prohibiting double registration and the inadequate public education campaign 
meant there was little to dissuade those who wanted to attempt registering more than once. 
 
Inexperience and Poor Training 
The fifth enabler of errors and fraud in Somaliland’s registration was the poor training of 
registration officers. This is not to undermine the great enthusiasm and commitment of 
many of them. Kayse, for instance, a young graduate who had been recruited from Hargeysa 
University, remembered that he felt that ‘it was a big responsibility … I was contributing to 
one of the development activities of my country, and also I am helping my community to be 
registered by using the latest technology’ (Interview, 2014). In spite of such sentiments, the 
officers were ill prepared for the many problems they encountered (Samatar, 2008). 
Although the training had included practice on the registration kits, the operators had not 
used the laptops in the field or under pressure (temporal or psychological). Moreover, since 
the whole team was drawn from different organisations and locales, the registration teams 
did not train together or sometimes apparently even meet until the first day of registration, 
affecting teamwork (Asli, interview, 2014). Importantly, some of the personnel also 
appeared to be inexperienced or incompetent, despite testing at the recruitment stage. For 
example, the criteria for the data-entry officer had been computer literacy, but the 
contracted individuals sometimes did not turn up for actual registration: they sent a cousin 
or another person to take their place and earn the 60,000 shillings (around $15) instead 
(Samatar, interview, 2014). These new enumerators were unfamiliar with the system. 
Former registration officer Samatar noted that there were several steps to go through to 
operate the software; without training, it was difficult even to turn the system on (ibid). 
Likewise, the legal advisor Ilyaas recalled that ‘the guy who was responsible for taking the 
fingerprint of the people [had] never use[d] a computer before. He is saying, “Hey, Mr 
Lawyer, where do you restart the computer?”’ (Interview, 2014)  
 
The need for technical competence had thus been recognised, but it was more difficult for 
the NEC to ensure such individuals were in place and able to work. Although Ilyaas’ ironical 
story may have been an exception, overall these issues added to the problems facing the 
technical system. As Breckenridge has noted about South Africa’s biometric smart card, 
‘[t]he biometric data contained on a smartcard and on the national database is only as 
reliable as the original scanning – whether manual or automated – and only as secure as the 
trustworthiness of the officials charged with this task’ (2005:280). 
 
Competition, Clout and Curiosity: Motivations for Fraudulent Registration 
As well as the technical and procedural hurdles, duplications were also the result of 
fraudulent entries, which were difficult to distinguish from those made in error, but were 
deliberate and driven by a number of different (though sometimes intersecting) motivations, 
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including enthusiasm for ID cards for their symbolic and instrumental value; low confidence 
and mistrust in the process; and the distortion of clan numbers based on the desire for 
political gain. I identify four kinds of motivation for repeated or incomplete registration.  
 
Pragmatism 
It could be imagined that the ID cards being created by the registration process had 
symbolic value, which made registering attractive and valuable. The cards were artefacts of 
Somaliland’s improved state capacity – evidence that it could now produce identity 
documents for the whole population. Even more poignantly, in the face of persistent non-
recognition, these substantiated Somaliland’s existence as a state: they were a tangible 
symbol of national identity, emblazoned, after all, with the words ‘Republic of Somaliland’. 
These were good reasons to stand in the long queues and register for the cards, but they do 
not explain why people registered more than once or with false data. In part, this may have 
been because of the scarcity of identity documents in Somaliland. NEC1 commissioner 
Abdirashiid recalled that in 2002, this had been a driver of multiple registrations: ‘there was 
no ID card therefore the youngsters took seven times’ (Interview, 2013a). A member of the 
Interpeace team similarly suggested that there had not been ‘access to such items produced 
professionally in the past. This made the card within itself a highly sought after item’, 
particularly for young and underage people (Mark, personal correspondence, 2013). This 
was not just any card but one that would permit voting (still a relatively novel activity after 
the years of dictatorship and conflict), and which also had other potential uses. For instance, 
it had been suggested in the media that having a voter card would assist people in their visa 
applications for travel abroad: a powerful motivation for having more than one card in a 
place where passports are often shared between relatives (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2012–14). 
At base this was also an understandable response to the context of poverty and paucity: who 
knew what this card could give access to now or in the future? 
 
Fear 
As well as enthusiasm, people were also nervous about the implications of the collection of 
biometric data, and this may account for the dearth of fingerprint data in the initial voter 
register. Older people recalled the anxiety from previous census and registration drives 
undertaken by the British administration, which were used to introduce income and 
property tax (Gaani, interview, 2014; Shuuriye, interview, 2014). During the 1974 census, 
there had been great concern again that this would form the basis of a poll tax for livestock, 
and many nomadic people had apparently fled to the Ogaden with their animals to prevent 
counting (Gaani, interview, 2014). These suspicions remained, and may have stopped 
members of the older generation from registering, in conjunction with the travel and long 
queues (Abdirashiid, interview, 2013a).  
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Amongst younger people, the concerns were different. Some people were worried that the 
fingerprint data would be given to European and North American border agencies and that 
this might affect their chances of travelling out of Somaliland (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). 
These suspicions had not been alleviated by an effective public education campaign. Without 
reassurances about the destination of the data (the registration was after all funded by a 
group of Western countries), some people might have avoided giving fingerprint data or 
encouraged duplicates. ‘We didn’t tell them anything about how to do it [register]’, NEC 
officer Farhan told me. ‘The money for voter education was quite small. The NGOs did not 
go to the regions. There was only clan leaders saying, “don’t put your fingerprint”, and 
Islamic leaders saying, “don’t do it”’ (Interview, 2014). Although the failure to provide 
fingerprints was not technically a commission of fraud, the omission of this important data 
contributed to the poverty of the database and the inability of the biometric scrubs to 
function as expected.  
 
Incredulity 
Multiple registrations appear to have also been driven by the poor credibility of the 
registration – a fatality of well-publicised technical problems, such as the slow biometric 
kits, and the absence of a sustained public education campaign. As discussed above, because 
registration was undertaken in phases across the country without continuous database 
integration, it was possible for people to register in one centre and then later in another, 
within regions and across them. Right from the beginning, rumours and tall tales of fraud 
circulated widely: for instance that children as young as ten years old had been registered, or 
that people had registered as a different voter for every fingerprint (SomaliNet, 2008). 
Rooble, my research assistant, told me that as registration progressed, people understood 
that success in double registration was easiest in rural areas: ‘people who wanted to double 
vote went there’ (Interview, 2014a). ‘There was no technical control in Saaxil’, Gaani, a 
member of the NEC administration, admitted. ‘People knew this information by the time of 
Awdal. [As time went on] everybody knew that there had been a huge messing up of the 
system’ (Interview, 2014).  
 
As well as the lack of credibility, multiple registrations seem to have been motivated by 
incredulity about the system’s ability to verify voters. Reports on previous elections 
suggested that ‘rampant’ multiple voting was driven more by curiosity (about the invisible 
ink, perceptible only under ultraviolet light; and the consequences of double voting) than 
evidence of organised attempts at ballot fraud (IRI, 2005:22–23). Despite these lessons, 
there were few apparent impediments to multiple registrations in 2008, and people sought 
to ‘test’ the system. From curiosity, impulsiveness, game-playing or malice, young men and 
women queued up again to see if they could vote despite being underage, to investigate 
whether the ink really was indelible, to try to evade the gaze of the polling station policemen, 
or to accrue one more vote than their friends in a running tally (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). 
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My research assistant Rooble, for instance, told me that he had been mobilised by his clan to 
return to his home town to register right at the start of registration, but that he never 
considered going to the countryside to secure a second card. However, when registration 
began in Hargeysa, Rooble, an educated man who has worked for NGOs in Somaliland, 
found that the centre was adjacent to his family house, and he was curious about the 
process:  	  On	  the	  last	  day,	  out	  of	  curiosity,	   I	  registered	  myself.	  This	  one	  they	  did	  not	  ask	  any	  questions.	  They	  had	  seen	  me	  [living	  there].	  My	  brother	  said	  he	  was	  just	  checking	  the	  system.	   I	   was	   a	   little	   bit	   of	   nervous	   about	   whether	   it	   would	   say	   I	   was	   already	  registered	  but	  nothing.	  It	  was	  bullshit!	  When	  people	  realise	  this	  can	  take	  place,	  they	  tell	   everyone.	   The	   system	   was	   not	   effective.	   Everyone	   knew	   it	   was	   a	   failure.	  Everyone	  wanted	  to	  deceive	  the	  system	  (Interview,	  2014a).	  
 
Pride and ‘Balance’ 
The fourth impetus for malign duplication was the politics of enumeration. Despite efforts 
by the NEC to argue otherwise, voter registration was seen as an unofficial census in which 
the population numbers of each region would be established (Gaani, interview, 2014; 
Jimcaale, interview, 2014). Clan size – and perceptions of that size – has implications for 
political power and fighting strength in traditional Somaliland society, and no clan wanted 
to be shown to be less than they were or wanted to be, and particularly not less than a rival 
clan. The principle that ‘numbers are politics’ is built into the DNA of Somaliland’s political 
settlement. 28  Between 1992 and 1995, inter-clan fighting over political spoils split 
Somaliland and made clan numbers highly sensitive (see Balthasar, 2012, Bradbury, 2008 
and Walls, 2014). For since clans occupied particular parts of the country, even a fairly 
simple count of households in the interior, for instance, might have revealed the numbers of 
people within each clan, thus tipping the scales of political influence in one direction or 
another. Moreover, since delegations to the peace conferences that characterised the state-
building efforts of those first conflictual years were based on representation proportional to 
estimated clan size, there were significant consequences should those estimates prove to be 
inaccurate (Hoehne, 2015:15). Indeed, as John Drysdale noted at the time, representation 
was the key bone of contention: ‘if representation is faulty and improperly accommodated 
[in Somaliland], the structure of peaceful clan coexistence breaks down’ (1992:8). Civil-
society leader Dacaad admitted that although the publication of numbers at the clan level is 
not regarded as a risk in contemporary times, many people still believe that sub-clan size is 
still a ‘clan secret’ (Interview, 2014). As NEC civil servant Gaani put it: ‘No one wants to find 
their tribe is less than another’ (interview, 2014).  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This	  was	   phrase	  was	   used	   by	   a	   prominent	  member	   of	   Somaliland’s	   civil	   society	   in	   a	   private	  meeting	   (Fieldnotes,	  Hargeysa,	  2014).	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As in 2002, registration was seen as providing ‘accurate’ statistical representations of 
prevailing (and deep-seated) assumptions about clan size, which – in the absence of 
enumerative data – could shape critical political and constitutional decisions. Without a 
census or effective constituency demarcation, there was a perception that region size should 
equate with population size, meaning that Togdheer and Maroodi-Jeex (geographically the 
largest regions) perhaps should have the highest number of voters. There was also the idea 
that, as in 2005, the future provision of state services would be determined by the size of the 
population in each region (Balthasar, 2012:212). A newspaper article in 2009 captured these 
sentiments, stating ‘the registration process challenged tribal demography that is sensitive 
in Somaliland and the region in general, because all tribes wanted to score high in the 
census’ (Al-Mutairi, 2009b). Speaking in his office in Hargeysa in 2014, Gaani said that he 
felt ‘it added fuel to the fire that district and region were added to the challenge. No one 
wants to be small … so there [was] a need to inflate so that you can get a part of the cake’ 
(Interview, 2014).  
 
This ‘cake’ was of course the political resources of the state. Despite the formal 
rapprochement of the 1990s, subterranean clan jealousies endured. Since the early part of 
the decade, politics had increasingly run along lineage-based tramlines: political parties 
were assemblages of clan interests, and the old adage of ‘clan balance’ disguised the 
realpolitik of inter-clan relations. As Chabal and Daloz have noted more generally, 
legitimacy in hybridised or neopatrimonial political systems is based on securing and 
maintaining communal gains from the state: being in opposition therefore has no intrinsic 
value because access to resources is limited or non-existent (1999:55). After narrowly 
missing out on the presidency in 2003, opposition party Kulmiye had waited in the wings 
for six years and counting, and patience was wearing thin amongst the party leadership and 
its supporters. The lack of state-regulated campaign finance in the 2005 parliamentary race 
had meant that many new MPs owed their office to clan backing – often at a cost of tens of 
thousands of dollars – and these backers expected reimbursement in kind.	  29 The Isaaq, 
particularly the Habar Awal and Habar Jaallo that backed Kulmiye, had been the main 
winners of the parliamentary election, but ministerial positions were still dominated by 
Riyale’s Gadabuursi kinsmen (Abokor et al, 2006:21; see also ICG, 2009). Clan political 
elites were therefore strongly motivated to ensure that they got the best outcome in terms of 
political representation. Even were party affiliation to change before the election, what 
mattered was that clan members were registered, so that ‘the sum of the total cards 
belong[ed] to the same clan and so they [c]ould come together when the need to support a 
candidate from their kinfolk arises in future elections’ (Dukseyeh, 2013).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Monies	   raised	   from	   clan	   members	   paid	   for	   campaign	   material,	   vehicle	   hire	   and	   incentives	   for	   supporters	   and	  prospective	  voters	  such	  as	  khat	  and	  money	  to	  pay	  off	  debts.	  In	  some	  cases,	  people	  used	  their	  entire	  personal	  fortune	  –	  including	   selling	   their	   house	   –	   in	   order	   to	   finance	   their	   parliamentary	   campaign;	   they	   then	   expected	   to	   be	   able	   to	  recoup	  these	  costs	  in	  state	  office.	  See	  Verjee	  et	  al,	  2015.	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There was therefore pressure within sub-clans to ensure that their members were registered, 
and this positively motivated efforts to get a high turnout during core registration. In some 
cases, this appears to have arisen from the understanding that community members were 
out of the country at the time of the registration but would return for the election, and so 
would need to be able to then vote. In others, there were deliberate efforts to augment 
numbers, with the bussing in of kinsmen from the Haud (Isaaq) and Djibouti (Issa), and 
within and between regions (Gaani, interview, 2014). This therefore led to multiple, false 
and underage registrations in order to return registration numbers that political leaders felt 
accurately represented the size of their community. Phillips also suggests that multiple 
voting was strongly driven by a feeling that every clan should have an ‘equal opportunity’ to 
do so: ‘the ability to transgress the system was not the particular privilege of one group over 
another’ (2013:63). The same logic appears to have operated during the registration phase.  
 
The incentives to ensure that regions (aka clans) had high numbers of registered voters put 
pressure on registration officers to enrol underage or repeat registrants. Although caaqils 
have an interest in correctly elucidating their members for intra-clan business (for instance, 
determining mag contributions) and in applications for personal identity documentation (as 
explained in Chapter 4), the voter ID card was intimately connected to potential political 
spoils. As Hussein, a local researcher, argued, it is ‘very difficult to overcome the mindset 
[of] numbers, numbers, numbers’ (Interview, 2014).  
 
Clan elders were strongly implicated here. It is true that in many places, particularly the 
early regions and less politicised areas, elders faithfully did their job; but in those places 
where contestation was greatest, caaqil authentication failed as a safeguard for procedural 
legitimacy. ERIS, the election monitoring firm engaged in late 2009 to assess the process, 
explicitly blamed local elders for exerting influence upon registration officers to increase the 
numbers of cards available through falsified registrations. ‘The last resort in identifying 
voters is to be vouched for by the local elders, and it is this which has failed to block 
duplicates’ (Mathieson and Wager, 2010:6). An independent audit of Interpeace’s assistance 
in 2010 similarly found that operators had been encouraged to leave out key details, thus 
enabling voters to register more than once, although its authors blamed a broader group of 
‘politicians, clan elders and some members of NEC … [for] encouraging these malpractices, 
advising registrants not to provide fingerprints and either bribing or pressurizing 
registration staff to admit these’ (Tamsin, interview, 2013). Interpeace was less clear that 
elders were specifically responsible. The Interpeace mission financial advisor observed that: 
‘[deliberate derailment by elders] is harder to pin point … However, given general 
observations of how both elders and political elite can flex their muscle to manufacture 
outcomes which suit only themselves, this possibility is real’ (Mark, personal 
correspondence, 2013). Whether elders actively encouraged fraud, abetted it or merely 
turned a blind eye, the vouching safeguard failed, meaning the use of caaqil authentication 
was a weakness rather than a point of strength.  
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Since the registration staff were pulled from the main universities and sent to a number of 
different regions, in many cases they were able to resist pressure from the community: being 
from another part of the country meant there may have been limited leverage over them 
(Asli, interview, 2014; Samatar, interview, 2014).30 However, in their own communities, 
they were conspicuous. Former deputy team leader Obsiye said that when he conducted 
registration in Hargeysa where he was known, he was under community expectations to 
discharge his duty to clan. 	  Sometimes	  it	  was	  very	  difficult,	  because	  some	  of	  my	  people,	  some	  of	  my	  clan	  people	  they	  are	  coming	  and	  they	  are	  saying	  ‘Hey	  Obsiye,	  we	  need	  ID	  card,	  give	  us	  one,	  talk	  to	   your	   guys’.	   So	   they	   are	   trying	   to	   influence	   my	   colleagues.	   It	   was	   difficult	   –	   I	  cannot	   imagine	   it.	  Even	  my	   family	  was	  coming,	   they	  are	  saying	   these	  are	  our	  kids	  and	  we	  need	  to	  get	  ID.	  I	  would	  say	  he	  is	  not	  eligible,	  but	  he	  will	  get	  it	  when	  he	  grows	  up.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
Presumably, not everyone was as conscientious as Obsiye. In some locations, registration 
team members allegedly sat up through the night fabricating records (Farhan, interview, 
2014). Motivations for doing so differed: for some, they were coerced to do so by local 
leaders (whose guests they were); others were pressured by clan and political leaders to fulfil 
their communal duty and deliver for the clan. Others were encouraged to commit fraud for 
financial incentives: the per diem for the enumerators was, after all, only around $15, which 
had to cover accommodation and food. There had been upset during training because this 
was seen as low (Samatar, interview, 2014), explaining why some registration officers might 
have welcomed the cash payments of reportedly up to $200 to conduct additional 
registrations (Farhan, interview, 2014). Businessmen and wealthy individuals supported 
clans’ political objectives by providing war chests of cash, which were distributed by mobile 
representatives going district to district (ibid). Initially, these schemes financed the after-
hours registration of people bussed around the registration districts; as time passed, 
however, people realised that they did not need physical registrants, but that digital 
photographs and some creative license would suffice (ibid). In the areas in which fraud was 
highest, illegal register-stuffing took place, with enumerators creating fake records with 
made-up names, absent relatives and even famous celebrities, such as popular Somali 
singers, US actor Eddie Murphy, US television personality Oprah, and US President Barack 
Obama, who was reportedly registered in Burco (ibid; Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). The 
software had not been designed with adequate safeguards (as described above), meaning 
that it was possible to import an electronic photograph and leave out fingerprint scans. This 
stuffing increased over time, particularly because as the initial figures became public, there 
emerged a baseline which clans then aimed to surpass in their own registrations. In this 
way, the 2008 registration exercise acted as neither an effective proxy enumeration nor a 
successful voter registration.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  For	  this	  reason,	  NEC	  polling	  officers	  for	  the	  2012	  local	  council	  elections	  were	  drawn	  from	  different	  regions	  so	  that	  no	  staff	  would	  work	  within	  the	  region	  they	  were	  from.	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Fixing the Register: The Technopolitics of Data Rescue 
The scale of error and fraud in the registration database was such that significant ‘cleaning’ 
of the register was needed. The cleaning of biometric databases is not unusual since 
biometric identity comparison typically produces a high number of false duplicates that 
need to be reviewed (often manually) to distinguish duplicates from false matches (Evrensel, 
2006).31 However, the level of duplications in Somaliland was much higher than anticipated 
(around 150,000 invalidated records or 11 per cent of the database), requiring extensive 
‘scrubbing’ of the data in a process that took many months and precipitated a political crisis.  
 
Tensions obviously ran extremely high during the five months of cleaning.32 Although 
designed to ‘rescue’ the voter register, the ‘cleaning’ became a politically sensitive matter: 
people were concerned that regional registration numbers could be augmented or reduced 
during the cleaning operations, and the likely adjustment of the number of registered voters 
from the now-public levels was potentially explosive. Many people had accepted the multiple 
registrations during the registration phase because the NEC had assured them that the 
central server would eliminate the duplicate records, but now the opposition parties in 
particular were nervous that the cleaning would not be uniform across all areas (Fieldnotes, 
Hargeysa, 2014). In order to try to pre-empt such disputes, members of Somaliland’s civil 
society advocated for a comprehensive civic education programme, working particularly 
through traditional leaders, to demystify the process and emphasise the neutrality of the 
technicians undertaking the cleaning (Fadal, 2012). Such interventions by civil society 
members were critical to keeping the registration process on track because the new delays in 
finalising the voter list had led to further deterioration in Somaliland’s political situation 
(see Garowe Online, 2009). The delays caused by the October bombings, the poor and 
fraudulent data, and inaction by the government (particularly over meeting its funding 
commitments) meant that registration would not be complete in time for the planned 29 
March presidential election, preparations for which had not yet even been undertaken by the 
increasingly discredited NEC (Tamsin, interview, 2013). 
 
Of course, delayed elections meant extended terms. Whilst the opposition parties called for a 
caretaker government, the Guurti voted on 28 March to extend Riyale’s term for another six 
months to 29 October 2009, meaning that the election would now be held on 27 September 
(a fourth postponement).33 In the resulting political furore, voter registration was singled 
out as an impediment. Although the 2007 voter registration law had made an election 
without a voter list illegal, opposition leader Silaanyo argued that it should be scrapped if it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  For	  instance,	  the	  2008–09	  Afghanistan	  voter	  registration	  process	  produced	  280,000	  duplicates	  from	  a	  population	  of	  8.2	   million	   registrants;	   whilst	   the	   2008	   Mozambique	   exercise	   contained	   an	   estimated	   400,000	   ineligible	   entries	  (Evrensel,	  2006:45).	  	  32	  This	  included	  the	  40	  days	  added	  to	  the	  timetable	  for	  FRS	  (Walls,	  2009).	  33	  The	   Guurti’s	   repeated	   extensions	   unintentionally	   or	   deliberately	   supported	   the	   ruling	   party.	   Although	   this	   was	  justified	  in	  2007–09	  (and	  again	  in	  2015)	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  constitutional	  caveat	  permitting	  electoral	  delay	  in	  the	  case	  of	  national	   security	   concerns,	   delay	   also	  benefitted	   the	   sitting	   elders,	  whose	  own	  election	   is	   supposed	   to	   follow	  one	  year	  after	  presidential	  elections	  (Ibrahim,	  2015).	  The	  Guurti’s	  actions	  during	  this	  period	  led	  people	  to	  criticise	  it	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  democratic	  progress	  (see	  Hoehne,	  2013:7).	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continued to hold up elections, meaning that what had been seen as a supporting strut of the 
elections was now the proverbial stone in its shoe.  
 
Whilst a new political settlement in May led to agreement about a new election date, moving 
forward on the voter register was more difficult. The donors insisted on a technical deadline 
of 21 June 2009 by which time the remaining duplications had to be purged, but this was 
not met. Rather, an increasingly embattled NEC turned on Interpeace, which called for new 
membership of the commission. At a hearing on the timing of the election in July, the NEC 
chairman Jama deplored that the management of the election was ‘in the hands of [the] 
donors’, calling it a ‘great tragedy’ and arguing that it was Interpeace and the donors that 
were responsible for the final voter register – hence implicitly claiming that the NEC would 
not be culpable should the election be held without a voter list (Somaliland Globe, 2009). 
According to the Somaliland Globe, Jama made it clear that the election would take place on 
27 September with or without voter registration, even if this meant that donor funds were 
withdrawn (ibid).  
 
As the face-off between NEC and Interpeace escalated, Interpeace was roundly blamed for 
the poverty of the data, and the delays in creating a final voter list, in what became known as 
the ‘server problem’.34 From a combination of political manipulation and smearing, and 
genuine misunderstanding and crossed wires about its role, Interpeace was routinely 
denounced in Somaliland’s media. A story on SomaliNet captured this narrative: 	   Interpeace	  itself	  was	  telling	  the	  NEC	  and	  the	  government	  that	  their	  ‘Server’	  was	  able	  to	  pick	  up	  double	  or	  triple	  registrations.	  It	  became	  apparently	  clear	  that	  Interpeace	  failed	  and	   their	   ‘Server’	   failed	  big	   time,	  when	   they	  published	   the	   list	  on	  28	  of	   July	  2009.	  The	  number	   they	  published	  was	  more	   than	  1	  million	  voters.	  Almost	  double	  the	   2005	   voter	   list.	   It	   just	   can't	   be	   taken	   serious.	   It	   is	   a	   total	   failure.	   (SomaliNet,	  2008)	  
 
Later, Qaran News would run a story in which the writer claimed that ‘Interpeace is part of 
the failure in Somaliland Voter Registration, because it failed to generate accurate result 
from the Server, which is under its direct management’ (Al-Mutairi, 2009a). In fact, this 
perception was incorrect: it was not Interpeace that directly managed the server, but the 
acting registrar (a NEC employee) and the commissioners. However, the continued failure to 
appoint a national registrar, who would have had statutory responsibility for the 
registration, meant that there was no one within the Somaliland institutional architecture 
with public responsibility for the process (David, interview, 2013). Despite Interpeace’s 
continued calls for this appointment, it had become stuck in the familiar quagmire of ‘clan 
balance’.  
 
It has been noted in other contexts that hi-tech voter registration processes often trade 
sophistication for transparency: critical components of the process are placed in a ‘black 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  The	  ‘server’	  was	  the	  storage	  and	  processing	  units	  in	  which	  the	  database	  was	  stored.	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box’ that only a few experts understand (Evrensel, 2006:3; Jasanoff, 2006). Members of the 
political elite, civil society and the public felt that Somaliland’s registration process had been 
hidden from view: although there were continual reassurances that appropriate technical 
solutions were being applied, and that no changes were being made to the original data, 
clear updates, in a language in which the lay public could understand, had been few. In May 
2009, the Independent Scholars Group had asked: ‘Why couldn’t the companies and 
agencies responsible for the SERVER process provide a reasonable but firm target 
completion date as well as an estimate of what percentage of the its [sic] work has been 
accomplished, to help all concerned plan their election strategies?’ (Fadal, 2012:17) 
Although some of this information had been provided, it had only been to the NEC and the 
political parties. The Somaliland public instead had to make do with provocative and ill-
informed media reporting, party statements (in which they declared their lack of confidence 
in the server operations), gossip and rumour (ibid). 
 
‘Throw Out the Whole System’ 
In the face of enormous pressure to create a credible register, the process and database was 
reviewed in July 2009 by a specialist firm that offered Somaliland stakeholders a blunt 
choice: ‘throw out the whole system’ (which they advised against because of the loss of the 
‘immense’ effort and cost, and the ramifications for confidence in the election); adopt more 
rigorous scrubbing parameters (a process that would take weeks but could be completed 
within the electoral timetable); or extend the production timeline to bring in a specialist 
team (thus requiring a deferral of the election) (Grace, 2009:2; Mathieson and Wager, 
2010:34). The consultants advocated for option three, or a version thereof, but the parties 
unsurprisingly chose the second option – make the list the best it could be in the time 
available – with Kulmiye leader Silaanyo telling the press: ‘They promised that the server 
will do its job and would not be an obstacle for the election’ (Somaliland Times, 2009a). 
 
However, when, after further cleaning, Interpeace presented the electronic draft voter list to 
the NEC and the three political parties on 27 July 2009, a political crisis ensued. In a shock 
move, the NEC chairman announced on the BBC Somali Service on 28 July that the list was 
unusable, that a complete voter list had not been ready by the deadline anyway (and so did 
not actually exist), and that the election should go ahead without voter registration (Tamsin, 
interview, 2013). This announcement was supposedly reflective of sentiment within the 
NEC, as four of the seven commissioners had expressed concern about the unreliability of 
the voter list in a public letter, advocating for elections in the ‘traditional Somali way’ 
(American Embassy Nairobi, 2009: para 1). Members of Somaliland’s civil society were 
appalled that the NEC was prepared to abandon twelve months of work and its own stated 
commitment to holding an election with a voter register, but privately it was said that the 
president had press-ganged the commissioners into supporting his preferred outcome, so as 
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to prolong ruling party UDUB’s stay in power (American Embassy Nairobi, 2009: para 6; 
Tamsin, interview, 2013). 
 
The new crisis revealed the weakness of the rule of law in Somaliland. In fact, neither the 
NEC nor the government had the legal or constitutional grounds to declare the holding of 
the election without voter registration, since the voter registration law, passed by parliament 
in 2007 and revised in 2008, had made a voter register a legal requirement (Ibrahim, 
personal correspondence, 2013). Since that law had not been suspended or annulled, the 
newly harmonised law on presidential and local council elections had not contravened the 
2007 law, and the NEC was unable to divest itself of its statutory duty to undertake voter 
registration, voter registration remained a pre-requisite for the 27 September election 
(Mohamed, 2009; UDDAA, 2009). Nevertheless, it was clear that the ruling party UDUB’s 
political agenda was shaping the state’s response to election management, abrogating the 
NEC’s independence, and eroding the spirit of consensus and cooperation that had brought 
the parties together but a few weeks earlier. For the ruling party, for whom cleaning would 
not invest the list with greater numbers, it was the list itself that had become the issue of 
contestation, and hence why the list – as a political object – needed to be jettisoned.  
 
The Fantasy of the Clean List 
The situation in Somaliland further deteriorated when NEC chairman Jama wrote a scathing 
open letter on 30 July excoriating Interpeace (part of ‘an aid mafia’) for the registration’s 
technical problems (Jama, 2009). Significantly, he laid the blame for what he called 
‘irregularities’ in the voter list on the ‘server’ rather than on the culture of double voting, 
which could have been eradicated or managed via a substantial public information 
campaign, and the enforcement of sanctions against those who broke the law. His position 
allegedly reflected the mood in the country, which was that people did not blame others for 
trying to register more than once or not provide fingerprints – indeed, this should have been 
allowed, I was told, because the ‘culture’ of doing so could not be changed (Fieldnotes, 
Hargeysa, 2013–14). Rather, they blamed the system that had promised that these 
fraudulent entries would be caught. Asli, the voter registration team leader I interviewed in 
2014, told me that: 
 I	  got	  a	  bit	  disappointed	  because	  we	  went	  through	  a	  really	  hard,	  tough	  job;	  it	  wasn’t	  easy.	   But	   the	   thing	  was	   it	   wasn’t	   our	  mistake,	   it	   wasn’t	   their	  mistake,	   it	   was	   the	  system	   –	   it	   was	   the	   system	   they	   chose.	   You	   can’t	   say	   it	   was	   a	   bad	   system	   but	   it	  wasn’t	   a	   good	  one.	   They	   said	   there	  was	   a	  machine,	   the	   server,	   and	   they	   said	   that	  anyone	  who	  did	  more	  than	  once,	  it	  would	  cut	  it	  out.	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
Interpeace, of course, disagreed: the system could only do so much, and in its 25 July 2009 
press release, Interpeace had belatedly sought to disabuse Somaliland stakeholders and the 
public about the infallibility of the voter registration system, stating ‘No system can catch all 
fraudulent registrations [just as no justice system can catch all criminals and perpetrators]’ 
5	  –	  ‘Numbers	  are	  Politics’	  	  
	   155	  
(2009:1). However, it was too late: expectations had been raised (by NEC and Somaliland’s 
electoral stakeholders) that the expensive biometric system could eliminate double voting 
and identity fraud. Observers and those close to the process warning that this could never 
be, and that voting would still require additional safeguards, including indelible ink, voter 
education and legal enforcement, but the repeated scrubbing had perpetuated the fantasy of 
a ‘clean list’ (Grace, 2009; ICG, 2009). The technical process, which had long been seen as 
the way to save the register, was now also being seen as a hindrance to its production, and 
hence to the holding of elections – a perhaps predictable outcome from what Wrong calls 
the ‘over-selling’ of biometric elections (2015). For instance, this journalist wrote in Qaran 
News: 	  A	  high-­‐tech	  biometric	   technology	   is	   [being]	  used	   in	   the	   registration;	  however,	   the	  use	  of	  such	  technology	  was	  too	  early	  for	  Somaliland	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  public	  awareness	  and	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  country.	  […]	  The	  capacity	  of	  the	  server	  could	  not	  process	  the	   high	   number	   [of	   registrations].	   At	   this	   point	   we	   can	   say,	   modern	   technology	  undermined	  the	  growing	  democracy	  of	  Somaliland.	  (Al-­‐Mutairi,	  2009b)	  
 
This was a significant shift in the discourse around the registration, and played into the 
blame game between the NEC and Interpeace. The NEC accused Interpeace of interference 
and broken promises about the technical process, whilst Interpeace accused NEC of 
obfuscation, incompetence and an inability to navigate the political landscape. This spat 
revealed the two perceptions at play in Somaliland’s registration project. In many respects 
both sides saw these positions as incompatible or opposing dynamics, with Interpeace, a 
non-technical organisation charged with failing to meet technical objectives, blaming the 
problems on the political context; and NEC, ostensibly a non-partisan institution that was 
heavily implicated in the political stew of recent months, seeing the process as being one of 
technical failure. In fact, registration is always a technical and political assemblage, but the 
belief that one part of the process could be distinguished from the other led to the blame and 
recriminations that spoiled the NEC-Interpeace relationship, and dragged the production of 
a final voter list into a political quagmire.  
 
 ‘The List Had to be Saved’ 
In the months that followed, Somaliland faced a spiralling political crisis, in which 
Interpeace was expelled, the opposition parties declared a boycott of the planned election 
and threatened impeachment, and skirmishes in parliament revealed escalating tensions 
that were reflected by growing public disquiet.35 In late August and early September 2009, 
street protests in Hargeysa increased in intensity (Hoehne, 2013:8). Protestors burnt tyres, 
threw stones, and blocked the streets with debris. On 12 September, police used live rounds 
and tear gas on a crowd outside parliament, resulting in the death of four people, and the 
detention of over a hundred protesters and bystanders (Somaliland Press, 2009). This was 
the most unstable political period in Somaliland since the internal wars of 1994–96 (see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  For	  more	  on	  this	  period,	  see	  Walls,	  2014:276–81.	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Walls, 2009). The narrative around voter registration had long been that it was essential to 
the democratisation process, itself necessary to advance the stability of Somaliland. Now 
registration was a cause of conflict.	  	  
 
It is a sign of the complete ossification of the Somaliland political landscape, and the extent 
of the politicisation of the Guurti, that this crisis was only overcome by external mediation 
by representatives from the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry and the British Embassy in Addis 
Ababa. A six-point agreement signed on 24 September 2009 included a commitment to 
further refine the voter list, replace the discredited NEC, and, crucially, agree to a new date 
for elections based on ‘technical rather than political grounds’ (Somaliland Times, 2009b). A 
new review of the registration in November 2009 by British electoral specialists ERIS stated 
that the previous cleaning had been undertaken under ‘extreme time pressure’, and sought 
to emphasise, like Interpeace, that even a perfect system could not have identified all the 
duplicates in the Somaliland registration, because of the data quality (not assured by 
adequate technical controls) and the software functionality (slow to process changes) 
(Mathieson and Wager, 2010:5). NEC had been expecting ERIS to fix the register using new 
equipment and software procedures (Gaani, interview, 2014; Jimcaale, interview, 2014). 
Instead, ERIS argued that the existing technology had ‘reached its limit’ (Mathieson and 
Wager, 2010), and that in conjunction with AFIS and FRS, the register had to be 
‘intelligently examined’: in other words, reviewed by the human eye (David, personal 
correspondence, 2013). Two years after the decision to use biometric technology to ensure a 
database of unique entries, Somaliland’s voter register was to be saved by recourse to lo-
tech, human-based practices.  
 
Computer stations were thus set up in the NEC headquarters for teams of two people to 
review records in batches, with between twelve and thirty people working in shifts for 
twenty-four-hour coverage (Jimcaale, interview, 2014; Mathieson and Wager, 2010:11). 
NEC also drafted in four ‘mothers’ to deal with the set of potentially underage registrants, 
reviewing images to assess age, in a twist on vernacular verification (David, personal 
correspondence, 2013). This process brought the number of approved records in the register 
to 1,191,905 (ibid; Mathieson and Wager, 2010:12), removing 1,895 records with fake 
(digital or photographed) images, 6,493 records of registrants visibly underage, 132 visible 
duplicates, and 548 repeated registrations (David, personal correspondence, 2013). 
 
Of course, this new phase of cleaning could not undo the massive fraud that had taken place 
nor salvage the registration process, but it could enable the NEC and Somaliland’s electoral 
stakeholders to move closer to a credible voter list. Electoral commissioner Jimcaale 
admitted: ‘We used them [ERIS] politically – the list had to be saved’ (Interview, 2014). 
Even with ERIS as the public face of the cleaning operation – and hence taking on some of 
the liability – the pressure to deliver an election in good time in 2010, together with ‘server 
fatigue’ meant that the electoral stakeholders had to collectively agree a tolerable stopping 
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point. ‘Cleaning could not go on forever’, said Jimcaale, ‘so we had to say at one point that it 
was finished’ (Interview, 2014). There was, of course, no independent data with which to 
offer the definitive credible number, other than the estimate of 1.1 million voters made by 
Creative Associates in July 2009 (Grace, 2009), but with advice from ERIS and the new 
national registrar, appointed in January, the NEC was able to produce an official provisional 
voter list in May 2010, having tentatively set the election date for 30 June. 
 
The New Voter Card 
In addition to the refinement and production of the registration database, the clean-up 
process included the production of new ID cards to replace the discredited voter and 
citizenship ID cards. At a press conference in March, NEC spokesman Ahmed Hirsi Geele 
said ‘the reason we have changed the previous cards is due to problems and abuses that 
resulted from the previous registrations. After analysing it we have decided to completely 
abandon the old ones in order to achieve an election that’s free and fair’ (Hassan, 2010).  
	  Voters were told to go to their local display centre (formerly the registration centre), 
bringing their voter or civil ID card to exchange old for new (NEC, 2010). 36 Should they not 
have either of these cards, they could still claim a new smart card. Voters were checked 
against three lists (valid records, invalid registrations, and a comparison table explaining the 
reasons for invalidation): if their registration was found to be invalidated, but their face and 
name matched the register, they could appeal, completing a verification form and, if 
approved, be given a validation certificate to be exchanged later for a new card (Mathieson 
and Wager, 2010:12).37 This was the first time since the initial registration in 2008 that 
Somalilanders were able to see the results of the drawn-out and heavily politicised process, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  The	  display	  period	  had	  been	  an	  Interpeace	  proposal	  made	  early	  in	  the	  year	  to	  reinvigorate	  trust	  in	  the	  voter	  list,	  and	  also	  ensure	  that	  problems	  were	  minimised	  on	  election	  day	  –	  after	  the	  events	  in	  nearby	  Kenya	  in	  2008,	  there	  was	  great	  concern	  to	  avoid	  disappointment	  or	  frustration	  that	  could	  spark	  election-­‐related	  violence	  (David,	  interview,	  2013).	  37	  According	   to	   the	   later	  ERIS	   report,	   over	  18,000	   such	   certificates	  were	   received,	  but	   fewer	   than	  3,000	  were	   finally	  approved	  since	  many	  contained	  incorrect	  or	  illegible	  details,	  were	  detached	  from	  supporting	  documentation,	  or	  could	  not	  be	  uploaded	  to	  the	  main	  database	  (Mathieson	  and	  Wager,	  2010:13–14).	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citizenship ID cards. At a press conference in March, NEC spokesman Ahmed Hirsi Geele said 
‘the reason we have changed the previous cards is due to problems and abuses that resulted 
from the previous registrations. After analysing it we have decided to completely abandon the 
old ones in order to achieve an election that’s free and fair’ (Hassan, 2010). Voters were told to 
go to their local display centre (formerly the registration centre), bringing their voter or civil 
ID card to exchange old for new (NEC, 2010). 30 Should they not have ei her of these cards, 
they could still claim a new smart card. Voters were checked against three lists (valid records, 
invalid registrations, and a comparison table explaining the reasons for invalidation): if their 
registration was found to be inv lid ted, but their face and name matched the register, they 
could appeal, completing a verification form and, if approved, be given a validation certificate 
to be exchanged later for a new card (Mathieson and Wager, 2010:12).31 This was the first time 
since the initial registration in 2008 that Somalilanders were able to see the results of the 
drawn-out and heavily politicised process, giving a much-needed boost to the scheme’s public 
credibility. The new distribution also proved a positive step in weeding out duplicates, as the 
NEC was able to see which cards were collected and to then use this information to update the 
voter list.32  
Photo%1:"The"registration"kit"containing"camera,"lamp,"laptop,"printer"and"fingerprint"scanner."
Photo%2:"A"registration"team"at"work"in"Awdal."A"woman"waits"for"a"party"observer"to"laminate"her"ID"cards."
Photo%3:"Snapshot"of"the"registration"software."The"voter’s"details"are"entered"on"the"left,"the"photo"is"captured"in"the"centre,"and"the"fingerprints"on"the"right."
 
 
 
Photo%4:"The"perforated"sheet"of"preprinted"ID"cards,"here"printed"with"a"voter’s"photograph"and"details.""
Photo%5:"The"front"of"complete"citizenship"(top)"and"voter"(bottom)"ID"cards.""" Photo%6:"The"reverse"of"the"national"(top)"and""voter"(bottom)"ID"cards,"with"fingerprints"in"the"place"of"a"signature"to"mark"the"co firmation"of"the"voter."%"
"
  Sources:"1–4,"Samatar,"2008;"5–6"provided"by"Fa h "in"2014. ""
Photo%7:"The"front"of"the"combined"national"and"voter"identity"card"issued"in"April"2010"in"Hargeysa." Photo%8:"The"reverse"of"the"combined"national"and"voter"card,"containing"a"barcode,"and"the"names"of"the"registration"centre,"voting"district"and"region."
  Source:"Anonymously"shared,"hence"details"have"been"redacted."" !!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30!The!display!period!had!been!an!Interpeace!proposal!made!early!in!the!year!to!reinvigorate!trust!in!the!voter!list,!and!al o!ensure!that!problems!were!minimise !on!election!day!–!after! the!events! in! ear y!K nya! in!2008,! there!was! great! concern! to! avoid! disappointment! or! frustration! that! could! spark! electionarelated! violence! (Harold,!interview,!2013).!31!According!to!the!later!ERIS!report,!over!18,000!such!certificates!were!received,!but!fewer!than!3,000!were!finally!approved! since!many! contained! incorrect! or! illegible! details,! were! detached! from! supporting! documentation,! or!could!not!be!uploaded!to!the!main!database!(Mathieson!and!Wager,!2010:13–14).!32!There! were! problems! with! lost! and! unprocessed! data,! however.! Almost! 124,000! cards! were! unclaimed! and!returned! to!NEC!headquarters,! although!an!unknown!number!of!ot r! cards!went!missing,! raising! the! spectre!of!future!fraudulent!voting!(Mathieson!and!Wager,!2010:13).!
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giving a much-needed boost to the scheme’s public credibility. The new distribution also 
proved a positive step in weeding out duplicates, as the NEC was able to see which cards 
were collected and to then use this information to update the voter list.38 	  
 
The 2010 Election and its Aftermath 
The Somaliland presidential election was finally held on 26 June 2010, over two years after 
the end of Riyale’s original term. The poll was clearly won by Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud 
‘Silaanyo’, leader of Kulmiye, to whom Riyale conceded once the Supreme Court had 
validated the results the following month. The election was peaceful and considered 
relatively free and fair by international observers, who commended the NEC on having 
implemented voter registration – an oft-repeated recommendation.39 At more than 1,000 
polling centres across the country, voters presented their new ID (either brought with them 
or collected from the polling station) or showed a valid letter signed by the national registrar 
(validation certificate) authorising voting without a card (Mark, personal correspondence, 
2013). Any disputes over someone’s inclusion on the voter list seemed to be resolved, and 
observers did not record that legitimate voters appeared to have been unable to vote (see, 
for instance, Walls and Kibble, 2011). However, although reports of multiple voting were 
much reduced in comparison to previous elections, multiple and underage voting 
nonetheless still took place, assisted by the distribution of the ‘missing’ ID cards from the 
display period, and the buying of ID cards for use by party supporters (ibid). 
 
In the final reckoning, the voter turnout of 538,246 was half the figure of the final voter list 
(see Table 2), with every region showing a discrepancy between the number of registered 
voters and actual voters. This was particularly so in Sool, Sanaag and Togdheer, the final 
regions to have been registered and where reports of fraudulent registration were highest. 
Across the board, there was an almost 50 per cent decrease in the number of voters, most 
likely a combination of the inflated registration figures and low turnout after the months of 
delay and disappointment, but it did suggest that the figures were unreliable as a baseline 
for future election planning or as a demographic indicator of Somaliland’s population. 
Moreover, in spite of the years of registration, cleaning, political disputes and agreements, 
the reality was that the voter data was ‘very spoiled’, conceded NEC staff member Farhan 
(Interview, 2014). ‘The plan was very beautiful but … if you put in bad data, you get bad 
results. The people put in bad information but they wanted a perfect list.’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  There	  were	  problems	  with	  lost	  and	  unprocessed	  data,	  however.	  Almost	  124,000	  cards	  were	  unclaimed	  and	  returned	  to	   NEC	   headquarters,	   although	   an	   unknown	   number	   of	   other	   cards	   went	   missing,	   raising	   the	   spectre	   of	   future	  fraudulent	  voting	  (Mathieson	  and	  Wager,	  2010:13).	  39	  The	  International	  Republican	  Institute,	  for	  instance,	  called	  the	  voter	  register	  a	  ‘step	  forward	  for	  the	  election	  process’	  in	  its	  post-­‐election	  press	  release	  (reproduced	  in	  Mathieson	  and	  Wager,	  2010:49–50).	  See	  also	  Kibble	  and	  Walls,	  2013;	  Makokha	  and	  Ali,	  2013;	  and	  SONSAF,	  2011.	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This ‘bad data’ thus posed problems for the sustainability of the voter register. Although the 
final voter list had been used relatively successfully in June, it was hopelessly out of date 
immediately afterwards, if not also at the time of the election (David, interview, 2013). In 
the two years since the initial registration, deaths and birthdays had all taken place, which 
had not been recorded on the voter list since the register was not able to draw from 
complementary data (such as a civil register), but only the one-time process in autumn 
2008. In a country with a huge proportion of the population under the age of 18, this meant 
that young people who had reached the age of majority at the time of the election did not 
have the documentation to do so.  
 
The White Elephant 
Prominent Hargeysa influencers had raised concerns back in May 2009 about the future of 
the voter database, calling on ‘national concerned institutions to look ahead and start 
discussing the future custody of the database and the standardisation of the registration 
process to accommodate new entrants into the voter registration lists’ (Fadal, 2012:17).  Just 
prior to the election, election specialists Creative Associates had cautiously advised that the 
existing voter registry could be used for the local council elections planned before the end of 
2011 (Fischer, 2010). In comparison, ERIS, in its final report in September 2010, argued 
that the system was obviously designed as a one-shot system, and should not be used again 
for future registration – both for technical and reputational reasons (Mathieson and Wager, 
2010). The different opinions reflected the two firms’ dichotomous positions: Creative 
Associates, which had been operating in Somaliland for a number of years and whose 
recommendations had been used to structure and design the voter registration, saw the 
political advantages (for all sides) in the existing system, though recognised that the political 
appetite to keep it might be absent. ERIS, which had been brought in to salvage the 
registration system in 2010 and was more distanced from Somaliland politics, saw the 
register – and the system that ran it – as inherently flawed and infused with the poor 
decisions and technical patches of the previous two years.  
 
Evrensel notes that when a voter register deteriorates beyond a certain point, it is easier to 
start a new one from scratch than attempt to repair the data (2006:23).40 The rancour left 
over from the registration process, together with significant logistical issues, meant that the 
register had become a white elephant: even apart from the issue of technical sustainability, it 
had become politically untenable with high ‘integrity’ costs (ibid:18). Moreover, there was 
neither the political will nor the administrative capacity to maintain the voter list: as the 
months ticked by after the election, people died whilst others crossed the age of majority, 
making the list incrementally out of date. However, jettisoning the list was not legally 
straightforward. The effect of Law No. 37/2007 had been to make voter registration a pre-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Importantly,	   it	   is	   also	   commonly	   easier	   to	   raise	   funds	   for	   registration	   drives	   than	   to	   secure	   continuous	   financial	  support	   for	   the	   infrastructure	   of	   registration,	   meaning	   that	   most	   African	   countries	   opt	   for	   periodic	   registrations	  according	  to	  their	  electoral	  cycles	  (Evrensel,	  2006:24–26).	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requisite for Somaliland elections, a legality that had found further codification in the 
amendment to Law No. 20-2/2005 (within the first schedule of 2009), which had defined a 
voter as someone registered at the polling station at which he is to cast his vote (Republic of 
Somaliland, 2001: Article 5d; Ibrahim, 2010:4). In other words, a legal voter was a 
registered voter.  
 
Abandoning the Voter Register 
The pressure to deliver the long-postponed local council elections as soon as possible 
resurrected the problem of Somaliland’s early elections: how to conduct voter registration in 
time for the fast-approaching poll.41 It was clear that there was not time, political will or 
crucially donor funding to further clean, maintain or redo the register. Whereas in 2009, the 
proposal to conduct elections without a voter register had met with sustained opposition, by 
2011 the situation was very different. In late 2011, the Somaliland parliament voted to 
abolish the voter register, passing an amendment to Law No. 37/2007 that voided the 2008 
voter list; permitted the holding of the forthcoming local council elections without a voter 
register; called for a new voter register for subsequent elections; and repealed any contrary 
provisions in an effort to harmonise the various electoral instruments (SomalilandLaw.com, 
nd). This was a similar move to that undertaken in 2005 to solve the problem of holding that 
election without a voter register. This time, however, there was a voter register. Moreover, 
although technical reasons were given for its abandonment, there were clear political 
advantages to doing so for the long-sitting MPs (in post since 2005) and the president. NEC 
civil servant Gaani claimed that the NEC was not consulted over the suspension of the voter 
list, but that it was the result of collusion between the president and parliament to secure 
term extensions through electoral delay (Interview, 2014). Both bodies did gain extended 
mandates as a result, lending support to such interpretations.  
 
The voiding of the 2010 voter list meant that the delayed local council elections on 28 
November 2012 took place without voter registration. Summarising the responses from a 
national consultation in early 2012, civil society organisation SONSAF warned that the lack 
of a voter register for the elections ‘shall lead to increased double or multiple voting, 
encourage non-national and under-aged voters, tempt organized electoral fraud and 
ultimately create widespread disputes that can lead to disorder’ (2012:21). SONSAF’s 
predictions proved remarkably prescient: with the 2010 final voter list sitting in the NEC 
warehouse in Hargeysa, the safeguard measures of community scrutiny and indelible ink 
were not able to prevent multiple voting on a wide scale. Though there is no way of knowing 
how much double voting occurred, the inflation of voter turnout is an indication: as shown 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  The	   local	   council	   elections	   had	   been	   originally	   deferred	   from	   2007	   to	   the	   following	   year,	   together	   with	   the	  presidential	   poll,	   in	   order	   to	   put	   in	   place	   the	   voter	   registration	   system	   and	   the	   requisite	   election	   management	  procedures.	   In	   light	  of	   the	   increasingly	  high	   stakes	  of	   registration,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   repeated	  electoral	  delays,	   the	   local	  council	   elections	  were	   postponed	   indefinitely	   in	   order	   to	   concentrate	   on	   the	   executive	   vote.	   In	   the	   years	   since	   that	  initial	   deferral,	   the	   municipal	   councils	   had	   been	   technically	   without	   a	   mandate,	   since	   their	   term	   had	   expired	   in	  December	  2007,	  with	  the	  Guurti’s	  six-­‐month	  extension	  only	  bringing	  the	  term	  to	  the	  middle	  of	  2008.	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in Table 2, voter turnout increased between the 2010 presidential election and the 2012 local 
council election by around 50 percent nationwide, and by almost 100 percent in the 
northwestern region of Saaxil.  
 
In Awdal, voter turnout had also increased by around 40 percent, a particularly significant 
change in light of the violence that broke out over contested polling results in Seylac, a 
coastal town in Awdal, near the Djiboutian border. As expected in the context of potential 
electoral and political spoils, this dispute turned on perceptions of clan size and entitlement: 
the Issa, believing themselves to have a (unverified) majority in the area expected to win key 
positions on the local council, as a reflection of their traditional stake in the town (Kibble 
and Walls, 2013; Suleiman, nd). Without credible registration (or, indeed, a census), there 
was no way to ascertain claims by either the Issa or the Gadabuursi (which in any case 
would not have changed the votes that had been cast); and no means with which to 
determine whether the situation had been manipulated by multiple voting. The situation 
was only resolved by traditional mediation, but it exposed the fragile balance of power in 
mixed clan constituencies, and demonstrated how competing claims of authenticity and size 
can have political consequences (APD, 2015:58–60). As in 2005, it was the holding of a 
heavily politicised and contested election without a voter register that re-confirmed the 
urgent need for one in Somaliland. In the following chapter, I trace how the most recent 
process of voter registration has endeavoured to address Somaliland’s enduring verification 
problem.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the efforts of subsequent Somaliland governments to establish a 
system of voter registration to support the objective of free and fair elections, part of the 
package of institutions that it is hoped will deliver recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. In 
many ways, the efforts I have described here signify an extraordinary effort on the part of 
the Somaliland political elite and public to deliver a vision of a credible modern state. 
Nevertheless, as this chapter has argued, these schemes have been beset by institutional 
under-development, political agendas, and the ‘politics of enumeration’ that makes any kind 
of registration appear as a de facto counting of the population (and hence of clan numbers 
and relative influence). In Somaliland, ‘numbers are politics’, and thus these registration 
programmes have been deeply politicised as well as highly technical undertakings.  
 
To date, the adoption of biometric technologies has not been the silver bullet that 
Somaliland’s election managers and donors hoped for. Somaliland’s experiences since 2002 
exhibit similar characteristics to projects in other African states during the same period, 
including overwhelming logistical challenges of unreliable electricity access, operator error 
and data poverty; and the larger issues of political buy-in. Wrong (2013) has argued that the 
promise of biometrics to create ‘techno-elections’ are ‘over-sold’ as solutions to enduring 
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political challenges. Certainly, the Somaliland case shows that the political and legal context 
of identification is in many ways more important to the success of registration than the 
technology used to conduct it.  
 
It also demonstrates that ID cards stand and fall by the credibility and neutrality of their 
verification procedures. In Somaliland, biometric enrolment in 2008 was used to address 
Somaliland’s verification problem, but registration processes repeatedly defaulted to 
‘traditional’ practices, not least in the use of caaqils to authenticate identity. Since these 
practices can also be defrauded and politicised, however, the draughtsmen of Somaliland’s 
new ID projects will need to find ways of leveraging the benefits of both hi-tech and lo-tech 
options, without their weaknesses. In the next chapter, I extend these conclusions by 
examining the new national ID card, a biometric project championed by the Ministry of 
Interior and Presidency to solve Somaliland’s verification problem.  
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Chapter	  6	  	   The	  Politics	  of	  the	  New	  National	  ID	  Card	  	  	   Citizens	  are	  getting	  their	  national	  ID	  cards.	  This	  is	  somehow	  a	  sign	  of	  national	  pride,	  since	   Somaliland	   is	   looking	   for	   an	   international	   recognition	   (Qasim,	   personal	  correspondence,	  2014).	  	  The	  country	  still	  remains	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  transition,	  and	  transition	  favours	  the	  role	  of	  tradition	  (Battera,	  cited	  in	  Balthasar,	  2012:216)	  	  
I have thus far shown the ways in which the genealogical idiom of clanship interacts with 
official forms of identification. Though the reliance on the mediated use of genealogy might 
be a pragmatic solution to the state’s myopic sight, it is not without political consequences, 
as demonstrated by the case of voter registration in Chapter 5. Regardless of the normative 
dimensions of this issue, from a practical point of view it is clear that clan identity has 
provided an effective means of situating Somaliland citizens within the field of social 
identity for both official and non-official purposes. 
 
In this chapter, I examine the most recent addition to Somaliland’s emerging official 
identification system – the much-vaunted ‘Smart National Identity Card’ – that, after much 
delay, finally began in September 2015. I look at the way that this project has worked with, 
and come into competition with, the post-2011 voter registration programme, which aimed 
to equip Somalilanders with documentation of their eligibility to vote. The national ID card, 
designed as a symbol of statehood, evidence of nationality, and the basis of a civil register, 
instead became associated with proving voter eligibility. Fraught debates over which scheme 
would solve the verification problem for Somaliland’s next elections led to an extension of 
the ‘politics of delay’ that has characterised Somaliland’s electoral history, and the 
bifurcation rather than consolidation of its nascent identity-management system.  
 
The endurance of Somaliland’s verification problem has meant that registration for the 
national ID card is premised on the incorporation of vernacular practices of verification, 
including caaqil authentication and self-presentation. In this chapter, I consider how the 
dependence of official identification upon clan identity reinforces it as a principal socio-
political framework of action, meaning and identification, in a way that works to privilege it 
above other forms of identity. Not everybody feels that their clan identity should be the 
‘passport’ to official identity; and this tension is played out in broader debates about the 
impact of ‘tribalism’ in Somaliland politics, and state-building more generally, which I 
address in the final part of the chapter.  
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The National ID Debates 
After the suspension of the voter list in 2011 and the holding of the fraught local council 
elections in 2012, it was clear that a new process of voter registration was required. In 2013, 
the NEC designed its second-generation programme, this time using iris scanning – a 
learning point from the 2008 registration that fingerprint data is too unreliable in the 
Somaliland context. With funding agreed from the foreign donors’ Democratisation Steering 
Committee (DSC), the NEC proceeded to draw up plans for a new biometric registration and 
biometric voter card. In another lesson learned, the NEC undertook a pilot in June 2014 to 
test the equipment in the field, registering two sets of voters in an urban and rural setting, 
and then passing a portion of those voters through again to test for duplication (APD, 2014). 
Although the pilot was relatively limited – testing just 1,062 records, with no disabled or 
elderly voters (ibid) – the data was found to be relatively accurate, with an expert biometrics 
research team at Notre Dame University able to detect all 457 duplicates (Sandhana, 2014). 
Although some of the data acquisition encountered problems (such as blurry images or eye 
disease), the American team leader declared that national registration using the iris 
technology would mean that ‘Somaliland would have the most technically sophisticated 
voting register in the world’ (ibid).  
 
Nevertheless, despite these plans for hi-tech registration, a familiar problem remained: how 
to verify the name, age and nationality of potential voters. The original 2008 voter 
registration had of course produced separate voter and citizenship ID cards in the form of 
‘one process, two products’ (Farhan, interview, 2014). The production of a citizenship ID 
card during voter registration was problematic for its credibility as a ‘national identity’ 
document. Since it was issued at the same time as the voter ID, it was only given to eligible 
voters – or rather, voters who turned up to register – meaning around 40 percent of the 
electorate did not have proof of citizenship.1 Since registration had not continued beyond 
January 2009, newly eligible voters (young people who passed the age of majority) did not 
have either the citizenship or voter card. Additionally, the relative underserving of the 
eastern regions at election time meant that exactly the contested population that the 
Somaliland government wished to demarcate as falling under Somaliland citizenship did not 
have this documentation. When the decision was taken to replace the tainted paper cards 
with a single plastic card in 2010, the citizenship component had been sutured on, ham-
fistedly labelling the card ‘national identity – voter identity’, even though it was to all extents 
and purposes a voter card, valid only for elections as a mechanism for voter authentication. 
Although the card was now made of durable plastic suggesting a long shelf life,2 its joint 
nature meant that since the voter component was delegitimised, the national identity 
authorisation was too.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Turnout	  at	  previous	  elections	  had	  been	  estimated	  at	  around	  60	  percent	  (IRI,	  2005).	  2	  The	   original	   paper	   voter	   card	   had	   had	   three	   places	   for	   ‘punching’	   to	   show	   when	   someone	   had	   voted,	   giving	   it	   a	  lifecycle	  to	  match	  the	  electoral	  cycle.	  The	  paper	  citizenship	  ID	  card’s	  duration	  had	  not	  been	  specified	  in	  the	  2007	  voter	  registration	  law	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2007).	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Since the 2011 suspension effectively voided the voter cards as legal documents, new 
national identity documentation was required. However, no new national schemes of 
registration or identification had been rolled out in the interim. Whilst other forms of 
identification had been initiated or developed in 2013 (specifically smart driver’s licenses 
and e-passports, as discussed in Chapter 4), these did not ascertain citizenship and hence 
eligibility to vote. Rather, it became clear that if the problem of multiple registrations and 
duplications in voter registration was to be addressed, the paucity of documentation 
verifying eligible voters needed to also be solved. In other words, although iris scanning 
would prevent duplicate registrations, verifying age and nationality had to be done another 
way. This therefore led to plans to develop a national ID card. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
the standard convention is for the production of national ID cards (a functional system) to 
be sequenced after the establishment of a civil register (the foundational system), so that the 
identity of the applicant for the ID can be assuredly verified. However, there is no civil 
register in Somaliland. This chicken-and-egg situation, therefore, in which both ID and a 
civil register were lacking and yet needed, meant one had to be developed first, and in 
conjunction with or prior to a voter ID card. How this was to be done led to a difficult period 
of debate and institutional rivalry as the NEC, supported by the donors, and the MoI, 
supported by the Presidency, went head-to-head in the years 2013–15.  
 
‘Civil’ Registration 
Although no civil register had been constructed, some planning for civil registration and 
national documentation did exist. In 2007, the United Nations Development Programme 
had commissioned US firm Creative Associates to assess the feasibility and potential 
benefits of a Somaliland national identity card system (Creative Associates, nd.a). However, 
during the early stages of the 2008 voter registration project – which, of course, contained a 
citizenship ID card component – donors had begun to revisit the idea of supporting the 
development of a civil register in Somaliland, a need that had been identified as early as 
2001. In February 2009, the British Embassy requested that Creative Associates undertake a 
second assessment, this time of the MoI’s capacity to administer a civil registry and personal 
identity card programme, and to consider the process in which this capacity and the 
administration of such a programme could be developed (Creative Associates, nd.b). In May 
2010, Jeff Fischer, Creative Associate’s senior election adviser, produced a concept paper 
that extended this analysis and laid out clear recommendations on how to proceed with the 
development of a civil registry. In particular, Fischer recommended that whilst the NEC 
would have to continue with voter registration for the intended 2011 local council elections, 
the MoI was the ‘proper institution’ for the creation of a sustainable identity infrastructure, 
and as such the task of national identification needed to be ‘re-orient[ed]’ to it (2010:1). 
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Figure	  3: Proposed civil and voter registration scenarios for Somaliland. 
Source: Creative Associates, 2013:7–8. 
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Figure!4: Proposed civil and voter registration scenarios for Somaliland. 
Source: Creative Associates, 2013:7–8. 
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Fischer (2010) proposed the phased development of a civil register and voter register in 
order to meet the identification needs of the NEC and the MoI, laying out three scenarios 
(Figure 3) and recommending the first, which was the option adopted in the 2001 master 
plan, and which Fischer argued would depoliticise registration whilst still enabling the 
production of a voter list. Of course, both the government and the donors recognised that a 
complete, sustainable civil register would take years. Back in 2010, however, there seemed 
plenty of time for its development and the subsequent generation of the electoral roll for the 
2015 presidential elections. 3  Preferred scenario 1 would initiate a process known as 
continuous passive registration, making repeated, periodic voter registration redundant, 
and improving capacity (and possibly saving money) in the long run (Evrensel, 2006:22). 
The NEC and MoI therefore agreed to a joint implementation plan in a memorandum of 
understanding in 2011, having identified five main problems in the form of the lack of civil 
registration, the lack of a uniform identification system across the country, the lack of a 
central database for locally issued ID cards, the lack of demographic statistics, and 
difficulties undertaking anti-criminal and surveillance tasks in light of these challenges 
(MoU, 2011). The case for putting a civil register in place therefore seemed unambiguous.  
 
ID Card or Voter Card 
When I conducted research in Hargeysa in 2013, civil registration seemed to be on the cards. 
The Ministry of Interior had a unit dedicated to the project, headed by an experienced civil 
servant who had undertaken this kind of work in the former Republic of Somalia. A draft 
civil registration law had been produced, and plans appeared to be underway, clearly framed 
in terms of development goals and improved state functions. When I interviewed Khalid, a 
senior member of this unit, he shared with me his copy of the report from the Second 
Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Civil Registration, a 2012 conference in 
Durban, South Africa, which had committed African leaders to reforming and improving 
civil registration and vital statistics over the period 2010–15 (Interview, 2013). The 
significance of this system as a symbol of modern governance for Somaliland was clear: 
Somaliland wanted to be recognised as a ‘proper’ state that would meet the commitments 
expressed in that document to have a fully-functioning civil registration system. 
 
However, over the course of 2013, the wind changed. The open-ended, long-term process of 
civil registration was not regarded as delivering security and assurance (and political 
windfalls) in the face of what would be a crucial presidential election in 2015. The 
Somaliland Presidency and Ministry of Interior thus backtracked on the dual-track process 
in late 2013 and sought to adapt the Creative Associates master plan. In early 2014, the MoI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Fischer’s	  report	  (2010)	  had	  envisioned	  that	  preparation	  and	  planning	  would	  take	  place	  in	  2011–12,	  with	  piloting	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2012,	  followed	  by	  a	  two-­‐year	  programme	  during	  2012–13.	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embarked on a programme that, whilst called ‘civil registration’, was in reality an ID card 
scheme, the ‘Somaliland Smart National Identity Card’ (SLSID, nd). 4  
 
The card was billed as a multipurpose smart card, with a number of proposed functionalities 
including ‘amongst other things, a reliable system of uniquely authenticating and verifying 
the identity of every citizen’s individual [sic], improve national security through efficient 
and reliable identity authentication, promote consumer credit and minimize identity fraud’ 
(Ministry of Interior, 2014:1; Somali Diaspora News, 2014). Whilst public narratives 
therefore emphasised the ‘national identity’ element of the card, it became overtly linked to 
elections in official discourse, prominently demonstrated by the March 2014 presidential 
decree which stated that civil registration was central to voter registration and ‘necessary to 
ensure that only the citizens of Somaliland vote’ (Republic of Somaliland, 2014a: preamble; 
my translation).  
 
The associated register that the ID scheme was going to produce, however, was only of 
citizens who had come voluntarily to register, and it was not clear how this was going to be 
connected to a more conventional civil register in order to create the kind of system of 
administrative oversight that the government had said it wanted. Over the summer of 2014, 
it emerged that the view at the MoI was that every eligible voter should have a national ID 
card in order to register, thus eviscerating the functionality of the voter ID card (since the 
national ID card could be used instead). The government used the legislative vacuum posed 
by the need for a new voter registration law (repealed in 2011) to manipulate the sequencing 
of the two registrations. The draft voter registration law had been stuck in the parliamentary 
queue for months, whilst the existing draft of the civil registration act had been written for a 
civil register rather than the national ID cards and so had never made it to the agenda of the 
House of Representatives (Haybe, interview, 2014; Khalid, interview, 2013; translated by 
Tawfiiq). In August 2014, the MoI therefore drafted a combined voter and civil registration 
bill, stipulating that the national ID card would be compulsory for voter registration (Haybe, 
interview, 2014).5 The dual-track process agreed in 2011 (Scenario 1, Figure 3) had meant 
that voter registration was supposed to be completed on a schedule to match the election 
cycle (pre-2015), whereas civil registration could take as long as necessary. This new joint 
law had the effect of putting the national ID card on course to be completed not only on a 
similar timeline, but in fact more quickly, despite the elections being less than a year away. 
This brought back a version of the sequenced registrations, but did not obviate the repetition 
this created: Somaliland would have two processes of registration of the voting-age 
population, with biometric data capture and the production of photo ID cards, with both 
cards being necessary for voting, just that the ‘civil’ registration would come first.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘national	  ID	  card’,	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  voter	  card	  and	  citizenship	  card	  of	  Chapter	  5.	  	  5	  The	   joint	   law	   was	   gazetted	   in	   January	   2015	   and	   then	   corrected	   in	   May	   2015	   to	   address	   unclear	   passages	   and	  typographical	   errors.	  There	   is	  very	   little	  elucidation	  of	   the	  national	   ID	  card/civil	   registration	  component	   in	   this	   law.	  Instead,	   this	  was	  done	   in	   regulations	  dated	  8	  August	  2014	  and	   the	   taskforce	  decrees	  of	  20	  March	  2014	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2014a).	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This seemed to be another example of the ‘technopolitics’ (Hecht, 2009) of registration that 
characterised the 2008–10 voter registration, whereby technical processes were being used 
as a foil for political machinations. This opened up considerable debate, with the opposition 
parties questioning the government’s decision to register only the voting-age public, arguing 
that if it was to be a national ID card, all citizens should have the paperwork (Gulaid, 
interview, 2014a). In part this was a problem of the divergence from civil registration, which 
would have provided birth certificates and hence some form of documentation for all 
citizens. A senior Waddani representative argued that it was a contradiction for the 
government to say that the card was to know ‘who is a Somalilander’, whilst only giving the 
card to those eligible to vote (ibid). Another senior Waddani member complained: ‘why do 
they [the government] want ID? It is simply to create problems for the voter registration and 
the election’ (Tarabi, interview, 2014). Likewise NEC’s legal advisor complained, ‘It’s all 
about delaying tactics. It’s all about politics and it’s all about playing games’ (Haybe, 
interview, 2014).  
 
The spectre of a return to the politics of delay that characterised the 2007–09 period created 
considerable concern amongst the opposition parties, and they saw the national ID card as a 
symbol of the government’s entrenchment. In turn, pro-government media criticised the 
card’s opponents in nationalist terms: ‘Why are they refusing national IDs?’, an article in the 
pro-state Horn Tribune asked. ‘By denying the populace to have their personal indices 
registered is to deny the essence of nationhood, statehood or our whole essence of 
Somaliland’ (Horn Tribune, 2014). Waddani retorted that they were not against the card 
itself, seeing this as an important development for Somaliland, but that, as Gulaid, a senior 
party member, put it, planning civil registration without the legal framework, and ID cards 
without a civil register, was like ‘a driver at midnight with no lights on the highway with no 
map’ (Interview, 2014a).  
 
Just as in previous years, these debates took up enormous political energy, with the 
opposition arguing that the holding of elections was now dependent upon voter registration, 
which was in turn dependent upon the production of the national ID cards, which made 
delay (and term extensions) inevitable (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). This was particularly so 
since the new draft voter-civil registration law had resurrected the ‘idle six-months’ clause 
(Waddani, 2014), meaning that voter registration would have to take place six months 
before an election.6 It could not begin before December 2014 (six months before the June 
2015 elections), however, since the prior national ID card scheme would not be complete by 
then. This was a real conundrum, posed, again, by Somaliland’s fundamental verification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	  his	  2009	  report	   for	  Creative	  Associates,	   Jeffrey	  Grace	  had	  expressed	  surprise	   in	   its	  review	  that	  the	  voter	   list	  was	  being	  prepared	  so	  far	  in	  advance	  (two	  months	  before	  the	  election	  date),	  whereas	  in	  similar	  post-­‐conflict	  or	  new	  state	  contexts	  (such	  as	  East	  Timor	  and	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina),	  it	  is	  typically	  prepared	  three	  days	  before,	  to	  ensure	  it	  is	  up	  to	   date	   with	   no	   possibility	   of	   tampering	   (Grace,	   2009:3).	   But	   in	   Somaliland,	   the	   months	   of	   delay,	   distrust	   and	  disagreement	  made	  an	  early	  phase	  of	  review	  necessary	  to	  reassure	  all	  election	  stakeholders	  that	  a	  credible	  list	  could	  be	  produced	  in	  time.	  After	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  2008–10	  registration,	  this	  was	  arguably	  even	  more	  pertinent,	  even	  though	  it	   risked	   making	   the	   list	   out	   of	   date	   by	   the	   time	   of	   the	   election	   unless	   sufficient	   opportunities	   for	   review	   and	  amendment	  were	  made.	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problem since the state did not have alternative means of vetting applicants for the ID 
project in order to then provide the means for verifying voters. In the end, pragmatism won 
the day.  
 
The stand-off over voter registration was finally defused by two agonisingly negotiated 
amendments to the draft bill, meaning voter registration was to take place within six 
months of the election, and the national ID card would be essential but not compulsory 
(Haybe, interview, 2014; Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014).7 This essentially brought the NEC and 
the MoI back to the dual-track process of 2013, but along a new timeline (Figure 4), with 
implications for planning, procurement and implementation, leading inevitably to new 
delay.  
 
 
Figure 4: Planned integration of national ID, voter and civil registration in Somaliland. 
	  Source:	  My	  illustration,	  adapted	  from	  Creative	  Associates,	  2013.	  	  
A Symbol of Statehood 
Despite the case for civil registration that had been agreed in 2011, the national ID card was 
therefore seen as the favoured project. It offered the Somaliland state a much more powerful 
tool in the construction of official legibility – an artefact of Somaliland’s stateness – than a 
civil register. By creating a tangible token emblazed with the name ‘Republic of Somaliland’, 
the national identity card had an important state-building and ‘PR’ function. The 
development of Somaliland’s first national identity card since the proclamation of 
independence in 1991 is therefore intimately connected to its campaign for recognition. Civil 
servant Qasim wrote to me in late 2014, exclaiming ‘Citizens are getting their national ID 
cards. This is somehow a sign of national pride, since Somaliland is looking for an 
international recognition’ (Personal correspondence, 2014). The new card therefore appears 
as a totem of Somaliland’s existence in the face of repeated failures to woo the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Whilst	  the	  smart	  card	  would	  be	  asked	  for,	  should	  not	  all	  citizens	  hold	  it	  by	  the	  time	  of	  the	  election,	  MoI	  officials	  would	  confirm	  citizenship	  at	  voter	  registration	  centres	  (a	  tacit	  reversion	  to	  the	  2008	  practice).	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since the prior national ID card scheme would not be complete by then. This was a real 
conundrum, posed, again, by Somaliland’s fundamental verification problem since the state 
did not have alternative means of vetting applicants for the ID project in order to then provide 
the means for verifying voters. In the end, pragmatism won the day. The stand-off over voter 
registration was finally defused by two agonisingly negotiated amendments to the draft bill, 
meaning voter registration was to take place within six months of the election, and the 
national ID card would be essential but not compulsory (Haybe, interview, 2014; Fieldnotes, 
Hargeysa, 2014).7 This essentially brought the NEC and the MoI back to the dual-track p ocess 
of 2013, but along a new timeline (Figure 5), with implications for planning, procurement and 
implementation, leading inevitably to n w delay.  
 
 
Figure 5: Planned integration of national ID, voter and civil registration in Somaliland. 
 
!!
Source: My illustration, adapted from Creative Associates, 2013. !
Technopoliti s: Biometrics and Nation lism  
Great optimism for the recognition of Somaliland’s statehood is clearly inscribed in the 
national ID ca d proj c , which is a symbol of its ambi ion for sover ignty. And yet the esire 
to quickly and effectively orchestrate an entire identity infrastructure that puts the state at the 
centre of a new system of verification has been complicated by the importance of voter and 
civil registration, championed by foreign donors, to which the national ID card scheme has 
stood in uncomfortable juxtaposition. In the face of the internationally sponsored voter card, 
the Ministry of Interior has d termin dly d veloped its own project. Indeed, the posi i ing of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!Whilst!the!smart!card!would!be!asked!for,!should!not!all!citizens!hold!it!by!the!time!of!the!election,!MoI!officials!would!confirm!citizenship!at!voter!registration!centres!(a!tacit!reversion!to!the!2008!practice).!
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community over the country’s de jure status; ‘to mark out a different idea of Somaliland’, 
claimed President Silaanyo in November 2014 (Mareeg Media, 2014; my translation). The 
escalation of violent secessionist politics in the Taleex region in recent years, together with 
the ever-present threat of skirmishes along the Puntland border, and the periodic 
vocalisation of frustration within the Awdal region against Isaaq domination, suggests 
delineating Somalilandness is politically essential. Indeed, a ‘testimonial’ from the former 
Minister of Interior Ali Mohamed Warancadde on the card’s website stated that ‘the 
nationality identity cards would be offered to the utmost nationals’ (SLSID, nd). The card 
therefore offers the possibility of strongly demarcating Somalilanders and reinforcing the 
authenticity narrative that is implicit in Somaliland’s genealogical citizenship. In this sense, 
the card is a clear device for ‘legibility’, wherein Somaliland citizens (nationals) can be 
distinguished and demarcated from non-Somalilanders by a tangible artefact of statehood 
that serves to represent, instantiate and verify the existence of Somaliland as a state with a 
definite, discrete and narrated population. 
 
When I visited Hargeysa in 2014, the rationalisation of the scheme to enable the 
identification of Somalilanders, and create a technology that is a hallmark of the modern 
state, was part of the narrative on the radio and in newspapers, and taken up in the 
teashops, streets and mosques where Somalis ‘talk politics’. Saadaq, for instance, a driver of 
one of the new small taxis in Hargeysa, saw the card as being a distinctive token of 
Somalilandness: ‘how do people know who is from here?’ he asked (Interview, 2014). ‘They 
will know you are a Somaliland person if you have an ID card. If you have that card you 
don’t need anything else.’  And he added a further advantage of the card in terms of the 
quest for recognition: ‘It makes it easier for international recognition. When they see your 
ID card they will recognise your country’ (ibid). 
 
Saadaq’s view found public voice in the Somaliland press and diaspora websites. Just prior 
to the late September 2014 launch of the card, an op-ed in Somaliland Press argued that: 	  We	   have	   to	   Recognise	   ourselves	   through	   an	   official	   ID	   documents	   which	   In	   turn	  could	   facilitate	   expediting	   an	   automatic	   recognition	   [from]	   the	   larger	   world	  communities.	   …	   How	   can	   we	   or	   the	   international	   community	   will	   identify	   or	  differentiate	  between	  Somalilanders	  and	  other	  Somali	  speaking	  regions	  if	  we	  do	  not	  possess	   standard	   identification	  paperwork	   similar	   to	   the	   ID	  documents	  owned	  by	  other	  nationals	  of	  any	  other	  country	  on	  the	  planet	   if	  you	  don’t	  have	  or	  carry	  your	  identity	   with	   you.	   We	   must	   implement	   the	   proposed	   national	   ID	   registration	  initiatives	  without	  delay	  in	  order	  to	  show	  the	  world	  our	  unique	  identity	  i.e.	  who	  we	  are	  and	  where	  we	  are	  from.	  (Ahmed,	  2014)	  
 
The author thus framed his support for the project in three interrelated ways: as a pathway 
to international recognition, as a way to distinguish Somaliland nationals from Somalis, and 
as a means to provide ‘standard’ paperwork, referencing the powerful idea that 
identification papers are simply what citizens have, and that to be a formal state, Somaliland 
citizens must have these too. When I asked people why the national ID card was necessary 
or important, they often responded with these kinds of tropes. For instance, Kulane, a 
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construction worker living in north Hargeysa, told me that although he did not know much 
about the new scheme, he welcomed an ID that ‘said Somaliland, because I am from 
Somaliland’ (Interview, 2014; translated by Ashkir). Kulane indexed the idea of the card as 
artefact of Somaliland’s existence, a sentiment also expressed about the voter ID card back 
in 2008. My interlocutors were sometimes surprised by the question, pointing out that I had 
official ID from the UK, so they should similarly have ID from Somaliland. ‘We have every 
right to be a nation!’ declared Qays, a senior official working on civil registration, when 
discussing the lack of international funding for the national ID card (Interview, 2014). 
Similarly, Obsiye, a young man I interviewed who had worked on the 2008 voter 
registration, argued that ‘Every nation has civic ID – every nation has it. It is very important’ 
(Interview, 2014). 
 
Biometric Nationalism 
Great optimism for the recognition of Somaliland’s statehood is therefore clearly inscribed 
in the national ID card project, which is a symbol of its ambition for sovereignty. And yet the 
desire to quickly and effectively orchestrate an entire identity infrastructure that puts the 
state at the centre of a new system of verification has been complicated by the importance of 
voter and civil registration, championed by foreign donors, to which the national ID card 
scheme has stood in uncomfortable juxtaposition. In the face of the internationally 
sponsored voter card, the Ministry of Interior has determinedly developed its own project. 
Indeed, the positioning of the smart card has been very much in terms of a nationalist 
narrative of self-reliance, drawing on the ‘founding myth’ of Somaliland that it has rebuilt 
the state on its own via indigenous means of consensus and traditional institutions, despite 
the international community’s cold shoulder. With voter registration being funded and 
supported by the DSC, the positioning of the identity card as essential to nationhood was a 
form of technopolitics in which the administrative-technical undertaking of registration 
became a cipher for political goals. 
 
This nationalistic politics has been played out in the dispute with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) over civil registration, and the nature of the tender and 
procurement process for the national ID card. The IOM had secured funding in the 2012/13 
period to support civil-registration capacity-building at the MoI, and to develop a pilot 
scheme with a small ID-card component (Cosoble, interview, 2014; John, interview, 2014). 
However, when the government chose to prioritise ID cards, the IOM baulked at supporting 
the scheme, arguing that the money was earmarked for civil registration (ibid). The line 
from the Somaliland government, however, was that the international community would not 
pay for Somaliland’s national ID cards because it would be ‘tantamount to recognition’ 
(Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). This was refuted by IOM’s man on the ground, who pointed 
out that the original programme had included a small ID card component, and thus the 
donors could not be ideologically opposed to ID cards for Somaliland (John, interview, 
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2014). However, with the DSC’s continued support for voter registration set against the 
embargo on using the civil registration equipment, the narrative of international opposition 
to the project persisted, with repercussions for attitudes towards the DSC. For instance, a 
civil registration taskforce member told me: ‘I have got a lot of pain when I hear that the 
donors are not wanting to support the ID card. That is really wrongdoing. They are guilty! I 
will not forgive them forever’ (Qays, interview, 2014). 
 
In response, the government was able to position itself as providing an essential national 
programme of which it would be the sole funder, thus propounding a narrative of self-
sufficiency. Biometric data is integral to this account. Somaliland policymakers had a choice 
between developing basic paper-based biometric or advanced ‘smart’ cards, and chose the 
latter, confirmed senior MoI official Abdullahi (Interview, 2014). Moreover, whereas the 
voter card was to utilise iris recognition, the MoI chose a triumvirate of iris, fingerprint and 
facial recognition. This was framed as a decision explicitly taken to ‘avoid the mistakes’ of 
six years before, said Dahir, a senior civil servant and member of the civil registration 
taskforce (Interview, 2014), but it ignored the logistical, triangulation and storage 
challenges of so much data, and hence why the NEC had streamlined the biometric system 
for voter registration (Farhan, interview, 2014). The decision suggests the technical 
ambition of the MoI scheme, and also a silver-bullet belief in biometrics as able to deliver 
advanced official identification in Somaliland by using citizens’ bodies to solve the 
verification problem. Like the 2008 voter registration project, technology appeared to be 
seen as an antidote to fractious political relations and weak institutional procedures. 
 
Tender Politics 
The new policy meant that new procurement was needed, since sophisticated scanners were 
now required. Donor procurement rules meant that the generators, scanners and printers, 
laptop and desktop computers, servers and software already procured by the IOM for civil 
registration and by the NEC for voter registration could not be used, according to Daleel, a 
member of the civil registration team at the Ministry of Interior (Interview, 2014). These 
therefore sat gathering dust in the civil registration unit at the MoI whilst procurement 
began for the ‘civil’ registration (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). Putting together the request 
for proposals (RFP) was challenging however. Like the tender process for the 2008 voter 
registration, much was underspecified and vague, and the timeline was short and ambitious. 
‘The RFP preparation was not so easy’, MoI official Abdullahi admitted. ‘We didn’t have time 
to hire technical experts’ (Interview, 2014). Companies from the US, Australia, Europe and 
Asia applied, but each was rejected on grounds of expense: some companies suggested 
extremely expensive (though, admitted a member of the civil registration taskforce, 8 more 
effective) systems; others included huge security costs for working in what is internationally 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  taskforce	  was	  set	  up	   in	  early	  2014	  to	  oversee	  the	  ID	  card’s	  development	  and	  subsequently	  the	  civil	  register,	   in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  steering	  committee	  (Republic	  of	  Somaliland,	  2014a).	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regarded as Somalia – a high-risk country (Dahir, interview, 2014). ‘Most of them were 
afraid of Somaliland. They were thinking there were a lot of problems, so they were putting a 
lot of cost for security. The price was double or triple’ (ibid). Instead, a Somaliland company, 
Sahal Technical Solutions, was appointed, composed of IT and business administration 
graduates from Somaliland universities. Salow, a graduate of Hargeysa university and 
technical manager of the company, told me that they outdid the international companies by 
having ‘local expertise and knowledge, people who know the environment’ (Interview, 
2014).  
 
Apart from the fact that using locals obviated expensive security and logistical 
arrangements, there appeared to be a strong undercurrent in favour of a national company 
winning the bid. A member of the civil registration taskforce told me it was ‘fortunate’ that a 
Somaliland company had won the tender (Dahir, interview, 2014). ‘This project belongs to 
Somaliland’, he explained. ‘The funding is from the Somaliland government, the expertise is 
from Somalilanders, the company is from Somaliland. The previous voter registration did 
not belong to Somaliland – it belonged to Interpeace.’ Privately civil servants and 
researchers expressed suspicion over the awarding of the contract, with the UCID leader 
Jamal Ali Hussein reportedly describing it as ‘naked corruption’ (Abdirahman, 2014). 
Although at the time of writing it was too early to tell what the implications of hiring an 
untested, inexperienced local firm would be for the national ID card project, it seemed as if 
the cart of political decisions (in the name of nationalist politics) had been put before the 
horse of technical expertise, suggesting that the lessons of 2008 had not been adequately 
learned, and the process was again to be haphazard and rushed.  
 
The Verification Problem, Again 
Despite the expensive biometrics, another problem with the national ID card became 
apparent during the planning stage. Although the biometric filters would be able to ensure 
that each person enrolled only once, applicants still did not have a way of proving their 
identity. The national ID card therefore faced the same verification problem that it had 
purported to solve for voter registration. The Somaliland state therefore had to draw on the 
vernacular verification practices that I described in Chapters 3 and 4, in particular caaqil 
authentication, undermining the vision of panopticism that the programme implies. Rather, 
the legibility of the Somaliland population remains within the genealogical idiom, with 
caaqils as gatekeepers of authenticity and readers of identity. 
 
When I conducted my final interviews in the summer of 2014, the plan was for each national 
ID card centre to have three staff: a data entry officer, a centre administrator, and a court 
official to administer an oath. The centre administrator would be responsible for 
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verification, asking, in the first instance, for the name of the registrant’s caaqil.9 Here again, 
the local, informal and contextual knowledge of clan elders was thus called upon to enable 
the state to ‘see’ – an invocation of ‘metic legibility’ in the guise of ‘official legibility’. Dahir, a 
member of the civil registration taskforce, claimed that this was necessary because ‘the 
traditional structure of Somaliland already identifies which person is a Somalilander. 
Ninety-nine per cent of people are covered by this’ (Interview, 2014).  
 
This single question about a person’s caaqil is supposed to activate a number of layers of 
information. ‘When he mentions the caaqil, he also mentions the clan’, said Dahir (ibid). 
Should the applicant not be known, or his identity suspect, the administrator is supposed to 
ask follow-up questions, such as the structure of the sub-clan, the name of the caaqil’s 
father’s father (the chief caaqil at the time of independence) or the way in which the tribe 
pays the mag (ibid). Dahir claimed that each administrator would be equipped with 
knowledge of the relevant sub-clans in the area of the registration centre so as to be able to 
assess the veracity of the information supplied by the applicant. Failing this, the 
administrator would be able to call upon one of the 200 chief caaqils recruited by the MoI: 
these are caaqils whose father and grandfather were also caaqils (‘not the people who just 
put on the hat’, Dahir said), who know at least the clan structure if not the individuals (ibid). 
It was planned that two caaqils would be in every registration centre to assess citizenship 
and age. However, because sometimes an caaqil would not be present (for instance, because 
of clan business), or because someone might seek to register in a place where their lineage 
was not known by the resident caaqil, the chiefs could also be called to attend to a particular 
case.  
 
Although this thesis does not cover the actual registration process of the national ID card, 
reports from Somaliland suggest that clan identity is indeed being used as the principal 
means of identification. Researcher Ridwan Osman, for instance, said that when he applied 
for the card at the start of 2015, he was asked directly about his clan and the name of his 
chief caaqil (University of Oxford, 2015). He said that the name was checked against a long 
list, after which the application process began. Genealogical situatedness – what Dahir 
termed Somaliland’s ‘tree structure’ – has therefore apparently been placed at the heart of 
the new registration process, in an effort to resolve the verification problem. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  draft	  amendments	  to	  the	  voter	  registration	  law	  proposed	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  2014	  stated	  that	  citizenship	  for	  civil	  registration	  could	  be	  confirmed	  by	  ‘a	  Sultan,	  Aqil	  (Chief),	  members	  of	  the	  two	  Houses	  of	  Parliament,	  local	   councils,	   heads	   of	   villages,	   business	   people	   of	   the	   district	   or	   the	   Imam	   of	   the	   village’	   (Republic	   of	   Somaliland,	  2014b:	   Article	   17.1).	   The	   representative	  would	   swear	   an	   oath	   before	   a	   court	   official	   and,	   thus	   being	   confirmed,	   the	  citizen	  would	  receive	   their	   ID	  card.	  Those	  unable	   to	  be	  certified	  by	   the	  named	   individuals	  would	  need	   to	  bring	  with	  them	   a	   guarantor	   (a	  well-­‐known	   person	  with	   immovable	   property	   in	   the	   district)	   to	   certify	   that	   the	   individual	   is	   a	  citizen	   (ibid:	   Article	   18.4).	   There	   was	   no	   mention	   of	   using	   existing	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   documentation	   to	   prove	  citizenship,	   such	   as	   a	   passport	   or	  MoI	   citizenship	   certificate,	   even	   though	   the	   former	  was	   being	   revised	   to	   be	  more	  secure	   and	   reliable	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   new	   registration	   legislation,	   and	   the	   latter	   used	   the	   same	  verification	  approach.	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Graduated Citizenship 
As I argued in Chapter 3 though, not everyone in Somaliland has legibility under the 
genealogical idiom. It assumes unity and relativity in a national family tree, but in at least 
the cases of the Gabooye and garacyo, some people face extreme stigma and difficulty when 
it comes to identifying themselves via lineage. Continuing to draw on clan identity as the 
basis of verification for official identity reinforces these power-laden narratives of 
authenticity and exclusion, which perpetuates a system of graduated citizenship in 
Somaliland (Migdal, 2006; see also Bezabeh, 2011). It is not clear whether these ideational 
barriers will affect the ability of marginalised groups of people to claim the national ID card, 
but in my interviews with government officials, there seemed to be a formal confidence that 
all Somalilanders would be included (Dahir, interview, 2014; Abdullahi, interview, 2014). 
‘Whether you are a majority or a minority, you have an caaqil’, argued a senior MoI official 
(Daleel, interview, 2014; translated by Rooble).  
 
Utilising lineage as the marker of citizenship also impedes the extension of naturalised 
citizenship in Somaliland. As I explained in Chapter 4, there is a provision for naturalisation 
in the Somaliland constitution and the 2002 citizenship law, but jus sanguinis dominates 
conceptions of citizenship. Naturalisation appears to be infrequent and difficult. If the 
national ID card is to act as a ‘breeder document’ for other forms of documentation, 
including those that recognise citizenship, it seems important that consideration be given to 
whether those seeking naturalisation will be able to apply for the national ID as a first step 
to citizenship. However, if this process necessitates having a relationship to a local clan that 
can be authenticated, it seems challenging if not impossible for long-term residents that are 
not from Somaliland’s clans to become a citizen and gain a national ID card.  
 
The members of the civil registration taskforce I interviewed did not seem concerned that 
any Somalilander would fall through the gaps of this system nor that the system was open to 
fraud. They also did not want to engage with the question of naturalisation. For instance, 
MoI official Abdullahi declared: ‘the Ethiopians that live here and southerner Somalis, they 
are not going to take the ID card: they have a country’ (Interview, 2014). This official line 
critically overlooks the importance of documentation to these two groups of people living in 
Somaliland. It also demonstrates the strength of the hegemonic narrative of authenticity 
that I described in Chapter 3.  
 
Bringing ‘Tradition’ and ‘Modernity’ Together 
It is clear from the above that the current Somaliland government perceives the ongoing 
dependence on caaqil authentication as a pragmatic adaptation whilst the identity-
management infrastructure is augmented via biometric registration. My interlocutors, who 
acknowledged the drawbacks of the current official systems, and the relative predictability of 
vernacular practices, also echoed this explanation. ‘If we didn’t have them [caaqils], what 
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would happen?’ asked Dacaad, a civil society leader. ‘There would be more mistakes if we 
didn’t have them’ (Interview, 2014) 
 
However, as I have argued in the rest of this thesis, and as the responses above about the 
question of naturalisation show, the image of authentic Somalilandness is a strong 
underlying justification for using caaqils and clan identity as the basis for verification. It is 
also part of an ongoing debate in Somaliland about the desirability of the hybridity of 
‘traditional’ and clan-based institutions, norms and processes, and those of the ‘modern’ 
state. Projects such as the national ID card exhibit a tension between needing to utilise the 
whole range of resources provided by clan institutions and wanting to ‘develop’ like other 
states. ‘Without ID, no one can survive’, the head of the ID project at the MoI asserted 
(Daleel, interview, 2014; translated by Rooble), emphasising the modern credentials of the 
new system, whilst protocols were put in place to incorporate clan vouching.  
 
The issue about how ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ approaches are blended together, and the 
desirability of this synthesis, finds expression in quotidian discussions about qabiilism 
(tribalism) in political and public life, such as the extent of nepotism in public appointments 
and the prospect of fair competition in the multi-party elections. Editorials in online and 
print news outlets regularly raise these issues, typically drawing on a shared vocabulary of 
motifs. For instance, in an article for Somaliland Press entitled ‘The Challenges of 
Tribalism’ in December 2017, the author railed:  	  Tribalism	  is	  responsible	  for	  underdevelopment,	  corruption,	  the	  rigging	  of	  elections	  and	   violence.	   In	   Somaliland	   context,	   it	   is	   indeed	   a	   major	   stumbling	   block	   to	  democracy	  as	  well	  as	  socioeconomic	  development.	  …	  We,	  the	  Somalilanders,	  should	  always	  have	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  most	  significant	  thing	  is	  to	  present	  the	  public	  security	  and	   integrity	  of	  our	  masses	  and	  bringing	  our	  nation	  ahead.	  Therefore,	  we	  need	   to	  wipe	  out	  this	  evil	  and	  make	  the	  country	  for	  all	  Somalilander	  (Abdiqani,	  2015).	  	  
 
Such commentaries reflect concerns about the ‘tribalistic’ character of Somaliland’s political 
parties (Ahmed-Yasin, 2012; Abirahman, 2015), and the ‘stirring up of tribal emotions’ in 
the public media (Somaliland Press, 2012); captured in deliberations about whether land 
disputes in Hargeysa will be resolved by the courts or clan leaders (Somaliland Press, 2016), 
and whether the Silaanyo administration has fostered or eradicated the political leverage of 
clan leaders (for instance, compare Ahmed, 2013 and Yusuf, 2013). Debates about the 
election of the Guurti and parliamentary quotas for women and Gabooye similarly evoke 
questions about to what extent Somaliland politics should be shaped by clannish or 
democratic principles, and whether hybrid governance remains appropriate.10  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  On	  the	  women’s	  quota,	  see	  Elder,	  2013;	  Ismail,	  2014;	  Nagaad	  Network,	  nd;	  Riordan,	  2015.	  On	  the	  Gabooye	  quota,	  see	  Yusuf,	  2014.	  On	  the	  Guurti	  as	  an	  elected	  or	  nominated	  body,	  see	  Abokor	  et	  al,	  2006;	  and	  IRIN,	  2013.	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‘Traditional’ Identification 
During my fieldwork, these issues often animated public discussions in teashops, or private 
conversations between friends and colleagues (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2012–14). They show 
that the identity architecture that I have theorised in this thesis is not merely a heuristic 
concept, but refers to the assemblage of norms and practices that is part of the broader 
landscape of hybridity in Somaliland. Discussions about verification and identification in 
Somaliland are therefore structured by assumptions about how this architecture is 
manifested and understood, in particular the degree to which vernacular practices should be 
formally integrated into the official system.  
 
We can see this playing out in the formulation of the national ID card in 2014. Amongst the 
technocrats of the newly formed Civil Registration Task Force, the appointment of former 
senior politician Qays stood out. Not only was he the only ‘independent’ member, but he is   
an outspoken proponent of basing the state’s identification system on genealogy, specifically 
the structure of mag-paying groups headed by the caaqil, and including that information 
explicitly on the card and within the accompanying database.  
 
Qays has argued that the way to mitigate fraud in future Somaliland ID schemes is to 
explicitly base the process in what he calls ‘TI’ (traditional identification). Noting that each 
caaqil knows the number of males, and laterally females, within the mag-paying group, the 
Ministry of Interior should, he proposed, create a spreadsheet with ‘columns for the name of 
the citizen (in seven genealogical names instead of four), age, and his address’, which each 
caaqil should complete within a period of two months (see also Daud, 2013). The resulting 
national database, he argued, would create a ‘complete and comprehensive ancestral tree … 
for every citizen, with absence of alien machinery and expensive technology’ (ibid). 
Traditional identification would therefore take the place of the ‘decorative and international 
practice’ of biometric data (ibid).  
 
When I met him in August 2014, Qays had an impressive digital genealogy-mapping tool, 
which he demonstrated on his Samsung smartphone. Drawing on British genealogical 
records, it included the clan lineages of the Gabooye (excluded by the British)11 and the 
eponymous paternal generations since the British Protectorate. A simple tree-based 
diagram, he could follow descent all the way from the named fathers through twenty 
junctions to the present day. Qays boasted that by using this technology he could map the 
genealogy of any person, and did so using my research assistant Rooble as an example:  	  Here	  is	  Somaliland,	  when	  I	  click	  over	  there	  I	  get	  the	  names:	  this	   is	  Issa,	  this	  Isaaq,	  this	   is	   Samaroon,	   this	   is	  Darood.	  Here	  are	  Samaroon,	   they	  have	   thirty-­‐seven	  diya-­‐paying	  groups;	  here	  are	  Isaaq,	  they	  have	  207	  diya-­‐paying	  groups.	  So	  now	  I	  am	  going	  to	   Rooble.	   Rooble	   belongs	   to	   Isaaq,	   so	   I	   [am]	   clicking	   to	   Isaaq.	  Here	   are	   all	   these	  guys	  [sons].	  Then	  I	  go	  Habar	  Awal,	  then	  I	  go	  Zubeer.	  Zubeer	  has	  got	  63	  diya-­‐paying	  groups	  –	  so	  I	  know	  all	  these	  numbers.	  Zubeer	  is	  the	  only	  son	  of	  Awal.	  Zubeer’s	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  Gabooye	  lineages.	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son	  was	  Muse.	  I	  am	  also	  Muse,	  I	  belong	  to	  same	  family	  as	  him.	  We	  are	  common	  up	  to	  him.	  Now	  Muse	  had	   six	   sons.	   I	   belong	   to	   this	   guy,	   Sacad.	  Rooble	  belongs	   to	  Cisse.	  Cisse	  has	  got	  four	  sons.	  Rooble	  belongs	  to	  Maxamed.	  So	  I	  go	  here,	  Maxamed	  has	  two	  sons	  only,	  Hassan	  and	  Jibril.	  I	  think	  he	  is	  Jibril.	  Ok,	  Jibril	  has	  got	  Omar,	  Abokor,	  Muse	  and	  Yunis.	  He	  is	  Muse.	  Muse	  has	  got	  two	  children:	  Abdirahman	  and	  Abdullah.	  He	  is	  Abdullah	  definitely.	  Then	  Abdullah	  has	  got	  Xasan	  and	  Abdullah.	  Abdullah	  has	  got	  10	  fathers;	   his	   number	   is	  HA61,	  which	  means	   he	   is	  Habar	  Awal	  with	   61	   diya-­‐paying	  groups,	   so	   [it	   is	   a]	   four-­‐digit	   number.	   From	  Abdullah	   up	   to	   Sheikh	   Isaaq	   it	   is	   ten	  fathers.	  Then	  we	  are	  Rooble	  Ahmed,	  his	  names	  –	  he	  has	  got	  another	  nine	  including	  him.	  (Interview,	  2014)12	  
 
This was a technical demonstration of the abtirsiino, the naming of the fathers, that is at the 
heart of the practices of verification and vouching that I described in Chapter 3 (see also 
Figure 1). With a few clicks and a variation of the one question ‘yaad ka sii tahay?’ (‘who are 
you [within that group]?’), Qays was able to accurately trace and visualise Rooble’s lineage.  
 
This mapping was part of a coding system that Qays had developed, in which each person 
could be assigned a four-digit number that included the name of his or her clan and the 
number of mag-paying groups within that clan (for instance, HA61). These are, he stated 
simply, people’s addresses (or postcodes). ‘My address now is [the mag-paying group] and 
the number of Habar Awal joined together. So if my card is lost in the street, it can be 
returned immediately because my mag-paying group is a unique number so they can come 
to my chief and say “do you know him?” because every day he is collecting money, the 
subscriptions. There is no need to go to the police’ (Qays, interview, 2014). Qays hence 
explicitly acknowledged the centrality of clan life, particularly the vibrant networks that 
transmit trust, obligation and favour, to identification and verification in Somaliland, and 
advocated for them to be integrated fully into the national identity scheme.13  
 
Qays’ efforts to modernise the abtirsiino as a form of official identity verification suggest 
that the genealogical idiom is not ‘traditional’ but a custom that continues to have meaning 
and utility in the present (Hobsbawm, 1983:2). Rather than seeing it as either antiquated or 
a critique of modernity, the use of genealogy in Somaliland’s official state practices appears 
to reflect adaptation and flexibility, drawing on available resources in a context of 
institutional weakness, under-funding and development. We might imagine how such a tool 
would enable the genealogical gatekeeping of the caaqils to be democratised: everyone could 
have such software on their phones, and be able to trace lineages for themselves. 
 
At the same time, of course, the map that Qays has created has another implication: the 
codification and validation of clan lineage as the principal form of identity in Somaliland. As 
I noted in Chapter 4, the stabilisation of clan relations in genealogical trees was a colonial 
tool of legibility, ignoring the essential dynamism of clan relations in which genealogical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Note	  that	  although	  I	  use	  ‘mag’	  in	  the	  thesis,	  Qays	  used	  ‘diya’	  and	  so	  I	  have	  retained	  this	  usage	  in	  the	  quotation.	  13	  Interestingly,	  Ruggiero	   (2001:195)	  notes	   that	  a	   similar	   idea	  using	  a	  personal	  number	   to	  create	  a	   ‘national	  book	  of	  personality’	  was	  an	   influential	  suggestion	  in	  1930s	  Argentina.	  This	   is	  of	  course	  the	  basis	  of	  national	   insurance/social	  security	  numbers,	  and	  personal	   identity	  numbers,	  such	  as	  the	  Indian	  Aardhaar	  scheme.	  See	  World	  Bank,	  2014:33–34	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  advantages	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  unique	  identification	  numbers.	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proximity and distance were shaped by marital alliance and treaty. Size not genealogical 
hierarchy defines clan segmentation, meaning junctures in the line of descent are not 
necessarily equivalent across clans (Lewis, 1994; see also Djama, 2010). Advocating the use 
of the abtirsiino as a form of identification thus brings to the fore the authenticity inequities 
that I discussed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the ‘reading’ of clan lineages to prove a person’s 
identity makes genealogy the principal marker of belonging, excluding those who cannot 
situate themselves in these biographical texts, and risking the basing of ‘official identity’ in 
essentialised categories.  
 
Indeed, Qays had been defeated in his efforts to have his software incorporated into the ‘civil 
registration’ by inscribing the national ID card with the caaqil’s name or the relevant code. 
‘My opponents said it would lead to segregation – that if tribe is written on the card, it could 
harm you. I say [to them] “I know your group. Have I ever harmed you?”’ (Interview, 2014)14 
Whilst the obvious case of Rwanda was not mentioned by any of my interlocutors in our 
discussions about clan identification, it does serve as a cautionary tale, as Qays implies here. 
Although Qays’ idea may have been rejected, its underlying recognition that the norms of 
‘tradition’ shape and influence the construction of authentic belonging in Somaliland 
endures. Moreover, Qays is not the only person I encountered to acknowledge that the 
relationship between clan and official identity is still being imagined and negotiated, as I 
explain in the following section.   
 
‘Already We Know Each Other’  
As I have noted in other chapters, fluency in navigating the ‘traditional’ networks is 
determined by lineage, contemporary status and the fungibility of contacts. The chain of 
connections that people activate to access guarantees, surety and support may be longer or 
shorter depending upon these factors. ‘Knowing’ other people is backgrounded by 
configurations of trust and obligation, which derive from the clan system. This ‘knowing’ is a 
form of legibility: it signals the relativisation of identity, by which one’s clan and genealogy 
are the basis of identification. ‘Someone will say, “I know your uncle”, and then he knows 
you’, Farah, the young engineer, told me in Chapter 4.  
 
The idea that everyone is knowable and connected emerges, I have argued, from the 
regulatory power of genealogy and the attendant narratives of authenticity and unity. The 
ability of community scrutiny and triangulation to verify identity is a pervasive myth – a 
myth not because it is necessarily false but because it has a strongly symbolic narrational 
power. For instance, reflecting on the 2008 voter registration, Fawzia, a consultant working 
closely with the government, argued that: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	  idea	  that	  ‘everyone	  already	  knows’	  people’s	  clans	  is	  a	  trope	  that	  I	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  dominant	  image	  of	  unity	  and	  relationality	  that	  enables	  the	  practice	  of	  triangulation.	  Resistance	  to	  documenting	  tribal	  information	  on	   the	   card	  may	  also	  be	  because	   the	   card	   is	   supposed	   to	  be	   symbolic	  of	   Somaliland’s	  modernity	  and	   statehood,	   as	   I	  explained	  above.	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  If	   the	   system	   had	   been	   left	   intact	   the	   ID	   wouldn’t	   be	   needed.	   Everyone	   knows	  everyone.	  They	  will	  say,	  this	  house	  has	  seven	  people	  and	  they	  have	  all	  voted.	  It	  was	  the	  interference	  from	  the	  election	  committee	  that	  meant	  the	  system	  couldn’t	  work	  and	  so	  there	  were	  people	  with	  two	  cards,	  underage	  kids	  voting.	  (Interview,	  2013)	  
 
Rather than utilising the resources in the ‘public’ system of knowledge, Fawzia argued, an 
alien process of identification had been adopted, which had not brought with it the 
normative censure inherent in the clan system. People had not seen the processes of 
registration and ID production as authentic or credible – rather, as my research assistant 
Rooble admitted in Chapter 5, they had deceived the official system, which did not really 
‘know’ them.  
 
In the early days of the ‘civil’ registration scheme, the impact of the national ID card could 
not be known. As I explained above, the Somaliland government made it clear via its public 
information campaign that the card would be required for voter registration, and would be 
required in a range of transactions in which identity needed to be proved, including 
registering for school, applying for passports and drivers licenses, getting healthcare, 
passing checkpoints, staying in hotels, and sending and receiving money. The latter was 
recognised as necessary because of the shift in recent years in the international regulatory 
climate, which now demanded that ID was included in all transactions.  
 
However, in many identification encounters, the card did not seem to offer a benefit over the 
practices of vouching, triangulation and acquaintance, upon which people have relied for so 
long. ‘Already we know each other’, said Qays – an acknowledgement of the sophisticated 
way in which identity is situated and understood without formal documentation. ‘Silaanyo 
doesn’t need ID to know Xirsi to make him the minister. He knows him!’ (Interview, 2014)  
 
The ‘we’ in Qays’ words is instructive, referring to a particular ‘we’: the ‘we’ that can be 
known. In other words, people who fall within and can therefore exploit the networks of 
genealogical verification and vouching. These are not boundless, however: at some point the 
chain of identification stretches and links become tenuous. For instance, Asli, the young 
woman who had worked as a voter registration team leader, and was now raising her family, 
told me that she thought the national identity card would be good for travelling within 
Somaliland, but during our discussion she conceded that she would still need intermediary 
contacts. ‘If I go out of Hargeysa of course I have to show my ID, if I go to Berbera or 
Carabsiyo or Borama. [So do you take your passport?] No, I don’t take my passport. [So 
what do you take?] Somebody…’ (Interview, 2014). Asli explained that she felt that outside 
of Hargeysa, her passport would not carry value – she still needed the intervention of an 
identity broker: ‘someone from that region or somebody [from] that place, a contact, 
somebody who is known there’ who would intercede on her behalf (ibid). However, such a 
‘passport’ works only in places where her name – or rather her family name – has currency. 
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Asli felt that a national ID card would open up new possibilities, giving her a device with 
which to access other parts of the country – places she was not ‘known’.  
 
Here again was the idea of being known. Asli is ‘known’ in Hargeysa and in her clan places. 
She felt that an ID would give her the ability to become ‘known’ in some way – albeit not the 
same way – in sites where she was ‘not-known’. Similarly, she felt that the same benefit 
could accrue to people without fungible connections in Hargeysa: ‘Having an ID is 
important because people who are not known, people who come from small families, people 
who come from small villages that are not known, or maybe they didn’t go to university, it 
will help those people be identified if they need anything’ (ibid). In other words, within their 
own locales and collectivities, these people may indeed be ‘known’, but in the encounter with 
the urban environment, where there are a number of intersecting identities and different 
conceptions and configurations of power, they lack convertible currency with which their 
‘knowability’ in one context can become such in another. This is an important 
acknowledgement: not everyone has the advantages of Asli’s positionality that means they 
can move back and forth across different kinds of identification. The national identity card 
appeared to offer the promise, at least, of such knowability – a way to simplify identity, to 
strip it of clan connotations and offer instead a singular identity of ‘citizen’.  
 
‘Your Card is Not Telling Your People’ 
And yet, the card is also problematic – new and untested in such encounters, and without 
shared grounds for knowability. The move to standardise, simplify and stabilise identity in 
administratively legible ways promises to create a token that represents a particular 
conception of identity, backed by citizenship. This idea of a common national identity is of 
course not shared in Somaliland, where contestation remains over the shape and extent of 
the nation. Moreover, the card itself is not seen by some people as being backed up by the 
trust and security afforded by vouching. Or rather, it might imply a guarantee, but the state 
was not (yet) a reliable or effective voucher, and hence the authentication of identity as true 
and trustworthy could not be made.   
 
‘They trust more the personal relationship than the ID because that’s how the system used to 
work, and it still works like that’, acknowledged Asli (interview, 2014). For her, the two 
‘systems’ were compatible, rather than in tension. ‘Both [systems] are working: so if you 
bring an elder or show your ID, both will work. In certain places, the ID doesn’t work; and in 
some places the elder doesn’t work.’ Other young Hargeysa people that I met were also 
nonplussed by the prospect of an additional identity card, and nonchalantly utilised 
different identification pathways according to the need at hand. They were accustomed to 
the traditional form of ‘name as passport’ but they were also familiar with, and often 
furnished with, actual paperwork, such as school or university ID, the 2010 voter ID card 
(which they had enthusiastically registered for), and even actual passports, for travel to 
6	  –	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  New	  National	  ID	  Card	  	  
	   184	  
Ethiopia or Tanzania for education. Rather than being in contradiction, this suppleness 
across different modes of identification substantiates what Chabal and Daloz term operating 
in different ‘registers’ (1999:149). Just as one might speak in a different tone according to 
different circumstances, identity can be similarly modulated, working up and down a scale 
of possibilities, as the situation requires. This nicely captures the kind of flexibility in 
identification practices that Asli sees: different kinds of encounters require differences in 
how identity is pitched, and thus the way in which it is received (and authenticated). This 
flexibility to use certain aspects of traditional norms and forms in new contexts or by new 
actors demonstrates the creative accommodation that has characterised much of 
Somaliland’s post-conflict reconstruction (Walls and Kibble, 2010:53). 
 
However, Asli had a particular positionality that means she can move back and forth across 
different kinds of identification: a young graduate, from a politically prominent and 
connected family, fluent and at ease with diaspora and foreigners, she has the full scale of 
registers at her disposal. For others in Somaliland, vouching and caaqil authentication will 
remain the most meaningful and useful modes of identification, and it is these people who 
tend to rebuff narratives of ‘independence’ (qua autonomy) and citizenship. ‘Clan is always 
going to be there and be the highest priority in society. It is insurance. You need it even if 
you have hundreds of IDs’, declared Sagal, a woman in her thirties working for an INGO 
(interview, 2014). 
 
An ID card does not seem to symbolise these shared grounds of knowability and trust. ‘Your 
card is not telling your people,’ my research assistant Rooble exclaimed one day, as we 
discussed the forthcoming ID cards (Fieldnotes, Hargeysa, 2014). ‘Who are your people? 
Tell me someone who knows you who I know.’ A name on a card was insufficient evidence of 
identity for Rooble: it carried none of the furnishings of relativity or the possibility of 
triangulation, or indeed, the guarantee of the clan. ‘If someone ran away and I just say his 
name, nobody will know him’, he argued. ‘If someone comes to marry my daughter and 
shows me his card, I do not know him. There is a whole process. The ID card is not marrying 
my daughter!’ (ibid) 
 
Rooble thus echoed what Inshaar shared in Chapter 3 about the importance of the caaqil to 
a whole set of social interactions, including marriage, in which the caaqil’s endorsement 
authenticates a person and also acts as a promise on behalf of the clan to support and 
protect him. In each of these conversations about identification was the implication that 
official ID does not index the guarantees that are implicit in the clan system, which I 
profiled in Chapter 3. With both formal dammiin and informal sponsor arrangements, other 
people, not formal paperwork, backstop complex transactions and relations. These powerful 
norms are bound up in the institution of caaqil authentication, meaning that even if the card 
becomes a default means of affirming identity in interactions with state and state-like 
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institutions, there is another layer of meaning that it cannot replace. Obsiye, who had 
worked on voter registration as a recent graduate, emphasised this point in our interview:  
 Those	  ID	  cards	  in	  Somaliland	  are	  not	  useful	  to	  us.	  The	  community	  know	  each	  other;	  [caaqil	   authentication]	   is	   familiar	   to	  us.	   If	   they	   [the	  government]	  only	   focus	  on	   ID	  cards,	  it	  will	  not	  work.	  For	  instance	  if	  you	  go	  to	  the	  rural	  area,	  those	  papers	  are	  not	  working;	   they	  will	   say,	   “who	   are	   you?	  Who	   are	   your	   clan?	  Who	   are	   your	   caaqil?”	  (Interview,	  2014)	  
 
Resisting Situatedness: The Narrative of Independence  
Whilst many of my interlocutors therefore emphasised the importance of clan for identifying 
trustworthy others, verifying their identity and enabling social relations, I also encountered 
a discourse vocalised particularly by mostly young, professional and diaspora Somalis in 
Hargeysa, based on the desire to be autonomous from the clan system, both in terms of 
financial obligation and identification. Whilst some people were happy – indeed proud – to 
recite their forefathers to me, explicitly locating themselves in genealogical terms (for 
instance, Bilal, a member of the diaspora now living in Hargeysa as an electoral 
commissioner, told me: ‘I can count to twelve or thirteen fathers. I can recite the chain’ 
[Interview, 2013]), other people demurred. This seemed to come from two reasons: firstly, 
that people thought it would be meaningless to me – an address without context; and 
secondly, and importantly, because they did not want to be situated in that way. Farah, for 
instance, told me that he had never learnt his abtirsiino: his sisters had, he said, but for him 
it was not necessary (Interview, 2013). Farah was indeed unusual: a young engineer and 
university lecturer in his mid-20s, he wanted to be defined on his own terms.  
 
This narrative of ‘independence’ arose in discussions with both young and old interlocutors 
in Hargeysa. Nur, a senior immigration official, told me that ‘modern and sophisticated 
people will not permit someone to use clan identity’ (Interview, 2014). He argued that whilst 
the argument about clan for protection might be something used in Mogadishu, ‘here there 
is stability and security. There is no person who needs his clan for protection’ (ibid). Rather, 
there is a suggestion that citizenship and nationalism, long denigrated as the mask of 
clannism (from the post-independence years) or a tool of repression (from the Barre years), 
might again become meaningful frameworks of identity. There is thus the anticipation of a 
near future in which ‘[you] no longer say what tribe are you but just [that you] are a 
Somalilander and a businessman’, said Hassan, a university graduate swept into a senior 
position in the Ministry of Finance with the 2012 election (Interview, 2012). 
 
Some of my interlocutors expressed their resistance to clan identity in terms of meritocratic 
advancement based on personal achievement, rather than genealogical connections, which 
was part of a deeper recognition articulated by civil society leaders that ‘culture here does 
not support the merit’ (Omar, interview, 2012). Bashiir, the executive director of a leading 
civil society organisation, argued that enhanced education opportunities could stimulate 
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civic rather than clan commitments: ‘people can have skills … the people will be 
transformed’ (Interview, 2012).  
 
Certainly, this ‘transformation’ seemed to be at work amongst some of my young 
interlocutors and research assistants who had fluency across different social groups via 
connections of friendship and collegiality, and bristled when clan was mentioned. Others, 
however, resisted their emplacement within the context of clan, wanting instead to be 
‘individuals’. This is particularly noticeable amongst young diaspora. For instance, at an 
event for Somaliland youth in London, a young woman Muna, who had visited Hargeysa 
recently, declared: ‘Back home it’s all about who you know, who you’re connected to, who 
you’re affiliated with’ (Oxford House, 2014). Amal, another young woman at the London 
event, echoed Muna’s sentiment: ‘We don’t have a CV in Somaliland. Why do we need to 
know someone? Why is it all about connections?’ (ibid) They sought to be defined in terms 
of their own credentials, and, like other young diaspora, struggled to situate themselves in 
terms of personal identity separated from clan identity. ‘[When you go back] you have to 
look a certain way, fit a certain box. Different is ok: we’re just different-different. What we 
lack as dhaqan [culture], we make up for in other ways’ (Muna, Oxford House, 2014). Both 
Muna and Amal seemed to recognise the difficulty of operating in a context in which the 
dominant frame is one of ‘knowability’ based on clan identity, and for which they may not 
have the requisite fluency.15  
 
Diaspora Somalis who are now living permanently in Hargeysa face these dilemmas acutely.  
Ugbaad, a British Somalilander woman working for one of Somaliland’s political parties, 
told me that she felt that there is a ‘façade of being empowered’ in Hargeysa (Interview, 
2014). She argued that women need men to identify them in order for them to access key 
services, but she said that ‘if you are married, your father won’t vouch; if you are married, 
your husband won’t vouch because he doesn’t want her to be independent’ (ibid). Other 
diaspora Somalis, such as Liibaan, who worked for a local NGO, or Ashkir, an English 
teacher, talked to me of the difficulties they faced in either learning to work the system or 
risking problems in navigating the neopatrimonial processes of politics and power. Liibaan, 
an entrepreneurial man in his late twenties who I interviewed in 2012, complained to me 
about the difficulties he had experienced trying to claim back a piece of land in Hargeysa 
that his family owned, but which was now occupied by a number of IDPs and ramshackle 
businesses (Interview, 2012). He said that for over a year he had written letters, beseeched 
local government and police officials, and tried to utilise the ‘bureaucratic’ processes of land 
entitlement and registration. ‘[We] have gone to the government, to the council, to the 
police, to get these people to move on so we can build our land. Right? And then they write 
the letters every month, and they will say “‘oh, give me one month”, and then they’ll give you 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Some	  find	  that	  their	  lack	  of	  fluency	  in	  Somali	  and	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  of	  their	  clan	  lineages	  leads	  to	  charges	  that	  they	  do	  not	  know	  their	  culture,	  and	  are	  acting	  or	  living	  in	  an	  un-­‐Somali	  way	  (dhaqan-­‐xumo).	  A	  recent	  trend	  has	  been	  to	  send	  UK	  Somali	  young	  people	  back	  to	  learn	  about	  culture,	  language	  and	  religion	  (dhaqan-­‐celin	  or	  ‘culture	  return’).	  In	  some	  cases,	  this	  is	  motivated	  by	  poor	  or	  un-­‐Islamic	  behaviour,	  notes	  Ahmed	  (2012).	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one year. “Oh, give me one month”, and they’ll give you another year. And then nothing 
happens.’ Liibaan said that he felt he had two choices to resolve the land dispute: firstly, to 
try to take matters into his own hands, for instance by threatening violence, because he felt 
that ‘in this country, if you don’t act, you look weak. And if you look weak, people will take 
advantage’ (ibid). Alternatively, he knew he could utilise the patronage and clientelism of his 
clan networks:  
 So	  the	  ruling	  party	  right	  now	  is	  my	  tribe,	  but	  I’m	  not	  using	  that	  as	  a	  weapon	  to	  come	  from	   the	   top.	   Because	   I	   can	   easily	   do	   that:	  my	   father	   and	   the	   president	   are	   good	  friends.	   I	   don’t	   want	   to	   do	   that.	   My,	   you	   know	   ...	   a	   lot	   of	   the	   people	   in	   the	  government	  ministries	  are	  good	  friends	  with	  me	  and	  my	  father.	  But	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  use	  their	  power	  just	  to	  move	  –	  I	  want	  the	  system	  to	  work.	  And	  the	  system	  is:	  you	  go	  to	  the	  local	  government,	  you	  do	  your	  paperwork.	  If	  you	  found	  out	  this	  is	  your	  land,	  you	  have	  the	  right	  to	  this	  land,	  and	  you	  have	  the	  papers,	  and	  you	  pay	  taxes,	  and	  you	  tick	  all	  the	  boxes,	  then	  you	  have	  the	  right	  to,	  you	  know,	  for	  all	  the	  police	  and	  these	  other	  guys	  to	  do	  their	  job.	  And	  that’s	  not	  happening!	  (ibid)	  
 
Liibaan was frustrated, and in the end admitted that he had all but abandoned the objective 
of reclaiming the land. Here is therefore another example of how back channels and 
networks based on clan can be lubricated in order to facilitate politics in Somaliland. 
Despite the fact that Liibaan said that he had the correct paperwork, ultimately only his 
connections held the potential to materialise his claim. However, he refused to utilise this as 
a currency, using the loaded term ‘weapon’ to describe the way that such a move would 
utilise certain configurations of power. He wanted the bureaucratic ‘system’ to work, but as a 
citizen he had less hope of getting the situation resolved than as a clan member. His 
predicament thus shows the power of the ‘clan-citizen’ frame that I discussed in Chapter 4, 
in which one gains rights and entitlement through one’s clan and not from the state.  
 
Similarly, Askhir, a young man in his twenties who had moved to Hargeysa from the UK, 
told me that he wanted to be his own man, not beholden to a family who he did not know or 
who did not know him (Interview, 2014a). Ashkir’s concern was that his relatives did not 
know who he really was, that they had not taken the time to find out about his personal life 
and identity. Mustafa, an American-Somali businessman, expressed a similar discontent 
about the way information about him was assumed. He was vehement about the imprimatur 
of clan within one’s names, protesting that when someone asks who you are, they do so to 
understand your collective not your personal identity: 	  What	   is	   clan?	   It	   is	  my	  name.	  What	  do	  you	  want	   to	  know?	   [Do	  you	  want	   to	  know]	  who	  are	  you	  or	  where	  you	  come	  from?	  …	  Saying	  what	  clan	  you	  are	  does	  not	  say	  who	  
you	  are.	  (Interview,	  2012)	  
 
Of course, this is a different conception of ‘knowing’ to the one that operates within notions 
of genealogical situatedness, implying instead a wrestling of personal identity out of the clan 
identity that is matched to one’s ‘official’ identity. Mustafa’s predicament brings into relief 
the complicated way that personal and collective identities intersect in Somaliland society, 
and expose the tensions between what are crassly labelled ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ 
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identities. People do not have to make a choice between ‘citizen’ and ‘clan’ (or any other 
identities), but multiple ‘points of identification’ come into play to permit social 
interactions. Nonetheless, it is also the case that the verification of identity in everyday life 
draws very particularly on practices of situating and vouching that are enabled by the 
knowledge and deployment of personal genealogies and clan networks. These practices, and 
the norms and expectations that accompany them, significantly underlie efforts to create 
standardised and formalised procedures of identification and verification in Somaliland.  
 
Deferral and Duplication: The Next Stage of Registration  
All these questions and debates about the utility of ID cards, the pre-eminence of ‘modern’ 
or ‘traditional’ identities, and the desirability of hybrid political processes formed the 
background to ongoing challenges in the development of Somaliland’s ‘Smart National 
Identity Card’, and the new voter registration, throughout 2014. Concerns mounted that the 
national ID card would not be issued in time to permit the effective implementation of voter 
registration for the June 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections. Indeed, as has been 
the standard pattern in Somaliland, these elections were duly deferred to March 2017. The 
legality of the deferral was immediately questioned by Somaliland’s civil society (see 
Ibrahim, 2015) and also the international community: the DSC, for instance, declared in a 
letter on 15 May 2015 that the extension of the terms of office threatened Somaliland’s 
democratic process, public image and its partnership with the UK (British Office Hargeisa, 
2015). However, the constitutional court sustained the decision (Somaliland Sun, 2015c), 
and the government was able to controversially secure extensions for the terms of all three 
bodies of state.16 
 
The postponement also meant that there would be enough time for both national ID card 
and voter registration to take place before the election. The dual-track compromise agreed 
in mid-2014 had planned for two separate systems until their integration at some as-yet 
unspecified point in the future (see Figure 4), but the realities of their coincidence was 
confusing. As Cosoble, a Somalilander working for the IOM as a consultant, puzzled: 
‘simultaneous [processes] rather than sequenced doesn’t make any sense!’ (Interview, 2014) 
The concurrence of the ID card schemes means that the NEC and the MoI both have to 
undertake separate identity verification from scratch. Both schemes are therefore 
documenting unique identifiers based on biometric data capture, but without data-sharing 
or interoperability, so that the resulting records may not be able to be shared. At a basic 
level, the projects’ synchronicity also suggested that although at the time of voting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  parliamentary	  and	  presidential	  elections	  were	  scheduled	  for	  March	  2017,	  and	  Guurti	  elections	  for	  2018.	  
6	  –	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  New	  National	  ID	  Card	  	  
	   189	  
Somalilanders’ identity might be checked against the voter and the national ID cards, there 
would be no such triangulation at the point of enrolment for most voters.17  
 
In the end, these issues about verification and checking eligibility were resolved not by 
harmonisation of the projects, but by the politics of delay in which the time was again ‘eaten 
up’. Deferrals and interruptions over the course of 2011–14 had meant that planning and 
preparation was also delayed. Even when the election postponement was agreed, the voter 
registration scheduled to commence in July 2015, was unable to do so.18  The national ID 
card registration finally began to great fanfare in autumn 2014. President Silaanyo 
symbolically received the first card on 25 September, followed by key cabinet members and 
Hargeysa’s mayor, with the scheme rolling out to the public in Gabiley and Hargeysa in 
October (Hargeisa Press, 2014; Somaliland Informer, 2014). The launch of the ‘Kaadhka 
Aqoonsiga’ (literally, ID card) signalled the beginning of a programme of registration in 
which all citizens above the age of fifteen19 were to have their details entered into a central 
database and be issued with a durable ‘smart’ card based upon biometric data collection. 
Voter registration, meanwhile, was rescheduled for December 2015. This meant that there 
would be a slight staggering in sequencing, but effectively that voter and ‘civil’ registration 
would happen together, resurrecting the problems of duplication and verification I have 
discussed above. When voter registration finally began in January 2016,20 the momentum of 
national ID card registration had slowed, again calling into question the relationship 
between the two processes, and raising the issue of how Somalilanders’ identities were to be 
verified. The progress of these two projects, and the implications their success or failure has 
for Somaliland’s official identification system, are thus important areas for future study, as I 
reflect in the concluding chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
From the events I have described in this chapter, it is clear that the disjuncture between 
voter and ‘civil’ registration in Somaliland’s emerging official identification system is the 
outcome of nationalist politics, institutional hubris, poor planning, and limited resources. As 
a result, millions of dollars are to be spent on two almost-identical systems rather than the 
national identification infrastructure that the NEC-MOI MoU identified as a priority in 2011. 
These do hold the promise of the creation of a viable voter list in time for the elections 
scheduled for March 2017, although there are concerns about whether these schemes will 
strengthen political commitment to timely, effective and, importantly, documented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Presumably	  the	  plan	  was	  for	  those	  who	  received	  the	  national	  ID	  card	  in	  the	  first	  stages	  of	  registration	  would	  be	  able	  to	  use	  this	  as	  proof	  of	  identity/eligibility	  once	  voter	  registration	  began.	  The	  delays	  in	  initiating	  voter	  registration	  might	  have	  addressed	  this,	  however,	  and	  this	  is	  therefore	  an	  area	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  18	  Political	   wrangling	   over	   sequencing	   affected	   this.	   In	   March	   2015,	   Interpeace	   cancelled	   its	   contract	   with	   Creative	  Associates	   over	   irregularities	   in	   the	   tender	   process,	   raising	   questions	   about	   the	   expertise	   available	   to	   the	   voter	  registration	  process	  (Somaliland	  Times,	  2015),	  and	  this	  might	  also	  have	  affected	  the	  rollout	  of	  the	  project.	  	  19	  The	  objective	  was	   the	   registration	  of	   1.5	  million	   citizens	   (Ministry	  of	   Interior,	   2014)	   i.e.	   the	  population	  of	   eligible	  voters,	   rather	   than	   all	   citizens,	   drawn,	   presumably,	   from	   the	   voter	   turnout	   baseline	   in	   the	   2001	   referendum.	   See	  Chapter	  5,	  and	  particularly	  Table	  2.	  	  20	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  this	  appeared	  to	  be	  progressing	  smoothly	  (see	  SONSAF,	  2016a,	  2016b,	  2016c).	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elections, or undermine it. Moreover, despite the years of planning and months of delay, 
other outstanding election and identity-related issues, such as constituency demarcation 
and the development of a civil register, have not been addressed, and there are questions 
about whether the necessary political capital and finance to do so will be available after the 
extraordinary investment in the national ID project. Crucially, the planning and preparation 
phases of these landmark registration programmes also do not appear to have had valuable 
‘spillover’ effects (Piccolino, 2015a), for instance by strengthening administrative 
infrastructures, inter-agency relations, civil service capabilities, or state capacity more 
generally.  
 
As in 2008–10, these projects have shown that registration (and, relatedly, enumeration) is 
an intensely political – and politicised – area of public policy in Somaliland. Different actors 
use the issue of registration to win political points – particularly in the form of extended 
tenures – rather than investing in a process of long-term institution-building. The longevity 
of these registration schemes, and their place within a networked, searchable and secure 
identification infrastructure for Somaliland, is therefore not certain, and so it remains to be 
seen whether these new projects signify the consolidation of Somaliland’s identity-
management infrastructure or new white elephants in the making.  
 
In this chapter, I argued that the use of clan identity as a ‘passport’ for the national ID card 
raises anew the problem of verification faced by the Somaliland state. The interplay between 
the two cards, and the deeper issue of verification that it indexes, are crucial aspects of the 
development of Somaliland’s identification infrastructure. In its planning and early 
implementation, the national ID card scheme appears to have faced the verification problem 
that it purported to solve for the voter card: the Somaliland state has no independent way of 
assuring age and citizenship in the absence of a civil register or continuous ID registration. 
We have thus seen the continued dependence upon vernacular practices of identification, 
predominantly caaqil authentication and testimony. The ongoing significance of these 
vernacular practices of identification, and the comparatively unproven nature of the new ID 
cards, also calls into question the utility of formal identity documentation, as the accounts 
from my interlocutors in this chapter show. Official ID cards do not seem to be backed by 
the same assurances as those given by clan relationships, because of the persistent weakness 
and circumscription of state institutions, and the unreliability of ID cards. For now, it seems 
that the state is not yet the trustworthy authoriser of identity, but that legibility remains 
with Somaliland’s guarantors using the ‘map’ of genealogical relationships. In the next and 
final chapter, I draw my conclusions about these issues of verification and legibility in 
Somaliland’s identity architecture, and reflect on the outcomes of my investigation as a 
whole.  	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Chapter	  7	  	   Conclusions	  
 [T]he	  constant	  reinforcement	  of	  identificatory	  demands	  becomes	  explicable	  by	  the	  extension	   of	   the	   chains	   of	   interdependence	   that	   link	   humans	   together.	   (Noiriel,	  2001:48)	  	  Formal	   schemes	   of	   order	   are	   untenable	   without	   some	   elements	   of	   the	   practical	  knowledge	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  dismiss	  (Scott,	  1998:7)	  	  
In undertaking this thesis, I explored many lines of inquiry, met a great many people, 
attended workshops and meetings, and read, reread and read again my journals, interview 
notes and memos. This iterative process came from my methodological approach based in 
grounded theory and interpretive methods. By going back and forth to Somaliland, and 
through repeated coding of the resulting interviews and fieldnotes, I developed a richly 
layered picture. One observation by a young man called Farah, who I met in the spring of 
2013, stood out across all of these experiences, and it is this statement that acts as an 
epigram to the thesis. Farah said: ‘the genealogy is the real ID. You do not need ID. 
Someone will say, “I know your uncle”, and then he knows you’ (Interview, 2013). What did 
Farah mean? Was this the case? What did this mean for Somaliland’s new ID card schemes? 
From this remark, the contours of my account thus emerged: the use of genealogy as a form 
of ID, the idea of vouching as a verification mechanism, and the interplay between ‘official’ 
forms of identification and ‘vernacular’ practices.  
 
Over the course of my research, I went back to some of the most basic questions about 
identity, recognition, and relationality. How can we be assured that others are who they say 
they are? How do people that do not know us verify our identity? How do authorities do this, 
and what is the impact of this verification? These queries prompted reflection on large 
political issues, not least the forms of knowledge, truth, and power that undergird 
identification; the role of interpersonal relations in the construction of social identities; and 
the consequences of the authorisation, classification, and surveillance of identities by state 
institutions.  
 
In this concluding chapter, I first review my argument and principal findings under the aegis 
of the two research streams with which I started: the investigation of the political drivers of 
national identification schemes, and the conceptualisation of vernacular verification and its 
role in those programmes. I secondly outline the thesis’ three theoretical dividends in the 
context of the broader thematic scholarship. Finally, I reflect on the study as a whole, 
offering suggestions for future research both on the Somaliland case and more generally.  
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Verification: The Official and the Vernacular 
Verification has been the key analytical frame of my inquiry. Verification is critical to the 
ability of state officials to uniquely and unambiguously register and document official 
identities, and thus the success of a state’s ID schemes turn on the credibility and 
effectiveness of verification processes. Verification therefore needs to be examined deeply 
and carefully in order to illuminate how states construct grand schemes of official 
identification. Such a methodological call is important because verification remains 
surprisingly under-studied as a political process. It appears in technical manuals or as 
glimpses in academic scholarship, but is not the subject of extensive empirical research. In 
this thesis, I have shown that not only is it a valuable area of research, but that the study of 
identity-management infrastructures necessitates attention to how identification in a 
community of people actually works. 
 
Although hi-tech identification systems using biometric data and electronic IDs are 
increasingly the norm, I have argued in this thesis that ‘vernacular’ practices of testimony 
and guarantee are integral to a state’s sight of its citizenry by ameliorating the ‘verification 
problem’. Certainly, biometric technologies can, when properly designed and implemented, 
enable 1-to-1 and 1-to-many verification, protecting ID systems from fraudulent and 
repeated registration. However, the effective operation of these systems assumes that there 
are underlying legal and administrative frameworks that control eligibility and entitlement. 
Bureaucratic rules about who can cross borders, take up residence, receive welfare, and vote 
– in short, who is a citizen – underwrite technical registration, but these are more than 
administrative policies: they are deeply political. How a state derives and enforces these 
rules come, I have argued, from narratives about belonging and authenticity – in other 
words, ideas about who really belongs and who is an authentic national.  
 
The verification of identity is thus not simply a technical procedure of ascertaining likeness, 
but a political process of authentication, of 1-in-many verification, which produces and 
reinforces boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. In the case of Somaliland, I have shown 
how verification implicitly or explicitly draws on interpersonal ‘chains of interdependence’ 
(Noiriel, 2001:48) that situate people in social terrains, and which are used by guarantors 
when they vouch for a person’s eligibility or nationality. Unlike the state’s ID cards, these 
forms of situatedness signify relations of reciprocity and trustworthiness, and make identity 
intelligible through the use of genealogical reckoning and relational triangulation. These 
social resources of verification are available in quotidian settings and to ordinary people. 
Such ‘practical knowledge’ can also be incorporated into ‘official legibility’. In Somaliland, 
these vernacular practices of identification are integrally connected to official modes and 
structures because verification for official ID makes provision for, and sometimes requires, a 
person’s authentication by their clan elder (caaqil). Even in the new biometric registration 
programmes, the safeguard of caaqil authentication and genealogical situatedness endures.  
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The Identity Architecture 
In this thesis, I have argued that this is not primarily explained by institutional weakness or 
a political logic of hybridity, but have made a stronger claim about the ‘identity architecture’ 
that structures the norms of identity management in a state. This assemblage of 
identification meanings and practices is composed of both official categories and protocols, 
and mundane, micro, and lo-tech practices and institutions. The relationship between the 
‘official’ and the ‘vernacular’ is not crystallised, but a shifting configuration in which the 
balance of components changes over time and space. For instance, where schemes of 
legibility are inadequate or incomplete, guarantors will be critical to official identification. 
Where such systems are more consolidated, the verification problem might be addressed in 
more ‘bureaucratic’ ways. My argument – and original theoretical contribution – is that this 
identity architecture shapes how people understand, valorise, negotiate, and contest 
practices of verification, which in turn determine ways of addressing the verification 
problem.   
 
The idea of the identity architecture therefore draws on the notion of hybridity, but adds to 
the analytical toolbox by making space for the variety of components, levels and actors that 
are enmeshed in systems of identification and registration. Some accounts of hybridity 
prefer structural terms such as constellation or configuration, but like Santos’ use of 
‘palimpsest’ (2006), I sought to make the agency in these processes clear. As I explained in 
Chapter 1, the term ‘architecture’ captures the work of design and construction that goes 
into maintaining, interpreting, negotiating, and recombining the relationship between the 
official and the vernacular.  
 
As a conceptual framework, the identity architecture has proved as useful to ‘think with’ as it 
has been to analyse my empirical material. In the thesis, I showed how it can valuably be 
applied to states that experience an acute ‘verification problem’. Somaliland is a clear case 
but not the only one: there are many emerging and developing states without effective 
breeder documentation, which utilise alternative sources of authentication. My argument 
about the identity architecture does not apply only to states that openly or extensively 
deploy guarantors in their identification practices, however. Official ID schemes in other 
states may not explicitly utilise vernacular forms of identification or verification such as 
testimony or guarantee, but the formal design of such programmes is likely built upon the 
same assumptions about authenticity and trustworthiness. At the risk of extending the 
metaphor too far, whilst such practices may be absent from the apparent form and function 
of the state’s identity infrastructure, they exist in the blueprint.   
 
It would therefore be productive to apply the conceptual framework of the identity 
architecture beyond states that overtly utilise societal intermediaries such as Somaliland, 
and to consider how identification in modern states in general is constructed from 
bureaucratic rules, technical processes, and legal considerations, and social practices of 
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naming, recognising, and situating. Examining how these different processes work together 
can thus reveal the ambiguities, tensions, and collaborations of such a constellation, and the 
ways in which such ‘architectures’ are constructed and maintained.  
 
In doing so, we open up the state to look at the warp and weft that underlies its ‘routine 
functioning’ (Blundo and Le Meur, cited in Fourchard, 2015:39), leading to more nuanced 
analysis of the state as itself a configuration of processes, institutions and actors that is 
embedded in, and interacts with, the processes, institutions and actors of society. By looking 
at identification systems, we thus see that institutions – and the processes and norms that 
they embody and enact – are rich areas of sociological focus. In Somaliland, the 
intersections between state institutions and the social context in the area of identification 
and verification evidence the idea that ‘organizational practices and structures are often 
either reflections of or responses to rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider 
environment’ (Powell, 2007). Certainly the ‘identity architecture’ of Somaliland shows that 
institutional design must be responsive to the actual norms, practices and beliefs within 
society, and therefore this research speaks to ideas of ‘new institutionalism’ (ibid), which not 
only sees institutions as socially embedded, but also seems to be fruitful for thinking about 
political reform and institutional power more generally (Bates et al, 2012).  
 
New ID Cards and the Biometric Turn 
My investigation into national schemes of identification in Somaliland contributes to a set of 
studies on registration and documentation within the bodies of literature on citizenship, 
state-building, development, and democratisation. Of these, a small, though important, 
subset has been written on contemporary identification in sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Breckenridge on biometrics in South Africa (2005, 2014) and e-commerce in Ghana (2010); 
Fourchard on certificates of origin in Nigeria (2015); Marko on biometric passports in South 
Sudan (2015); and Piccolino on biometric voter registration in Benin (2015a). Szreter and 
Breckenridge (2012:30–31) acknowledge that registration in particular is a relatively novel 
subject of study, but they argue that it is a critical conceptual tool for illuminating how 
individuals are recognised as legal persons and represented as members of particular 
communities. They call for more analytical elucidation of registration as a concept, and for 
more comparative studies (ibid). By presenting Somaliland’s experiences of conducting 
registration, this thesis profiles a compelling example of civil and voter registration in Africa 
that contributes to the growing body of evidence on registration that Szreter and 
Breckenridge invite. 
 
The studies that I have cited above and in this thesis offer important insights into how 
African states, in conjunction with donors and vendors, are delivering complex systems of 
identification in contexts of under-development, weak economies, and high expectations. 
They raise important points about how these projects are delivered; the ways in which 
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multinational contractors have won costly tenders and ‘locked-in’ specific technologies upon 
which national governments are then dependent (Breckenridge, 2010; World Bank, 
2014:27); and how the involvement of foreign experts and service providers means that 
important technical decisions appear to be made inside a ‘black box’ impenetrable to local 
actors (Jasanoff, 2006; Mathieson and Wager, 2010; Piccolino, 2015a). These issues 
highlight the difficulties African states face in overcoming historical under-investment in 
civil registers and national record-keeping procedures, and how political the work to 
improve such systems can be.  
 
Three Recommendations 
My research on the development of Somaliland’s official identification system since 1991 has 
revealed a number of important points about the construction of new ID systems that are 
relevant to African states that are also embarking on similar programmes, and to developing 
states more generally. This thesis has therefore added new empirical material to our 
understanding of how developing states grow their capacity for official identification. From 
this research, I recommend three areas of empirical and analytical focus for the study of 
these ID card systems, in Africa and beyond.  
 
Inside the Black Box 
In general, African bureaucracies and their procedures and processes remain within an 
analytical black box, in particular the production of identity documents in Africa, which 
Fourchard (2015:39) argues are still poorly researched. Examining identity-management 
systems means considering a whole tranche of technical, infrastructural, economic, social, 
and political factors. Importantly, it also requires looking ‘under the hood’ at how the 
ministries and agencies responsible for official identification function and work together. 
Research on the day-to-day operation of these bureaucratic institutions is important for 
revealing how identification systems are managed, where gaps and weaknesses might arise, 
and the power of relevant actors. It can also tell us more about the way that states undertake 
the surveillance and documentation of their citizens, and thus explain the resultant or 
related techniques of control.     
 
Across all of this, it is critical to consider the ways that registration systems actually work 
within local contexts. As well as problematising the functionalist understanding of the state 
‘as a set of institutions that can be delivered like a product’ (Boege et al, 2008:15), we must 
also resist assuming that registration systems can be set up ‘out of the box’, or that 
difficulties in implementation reveal deviance rather than bespoke conditions. This is why I 
have emphasised the importance at looking at the social context as well as the bureaucracy 
of official identification. Vernacular processes of identification and verification can also be a 
‘black box’, and thus also need to be investigated. The concept of the identity architecture 
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that I have proposed in this thesis can open up these deeper structures of meaning and 
explore how they shape administrative processes of file-making and legibility.  
 
Politics Matters 
Official identification is a technical and political undertaking. Whilst there are a great 
number of technological and administrative considerations, the failure of which can have a 
notable impact on registration and documentation activities, it is the political aspect that is 
more unpredictable, costly and, ultimately, portentous of success or failure. The case study 
of Somaliland’s voter registration in this thesis clearly confirms Putzel and Di John’s 
argument that ‘[t]he creation of state capacities is deeply influenced by political decisions 
and is never simply the result of having the technical expertise necessary for a particular 
activity’ (2012:vi). At various times during 2008–10, technology was hailed as either the 
saviour or slayer of the voter list according to the direction of the political winds. In the 
development of Somaliland’s new voter and national ID cards, we have again seen that 
political agendas are wrapped up in debates about procedural sequencing, and that technical 
specifications were developed before the political and legal framework was in place.  
 
The politicisation of these programmes in Somaliland show how identity records can 
become political objects, with an existence apart from the relations, identities and practices 
that produce them. It also shows that though voter registers may not be infallible, public 
expectations that they should be can lead to the withdrawal of support for such projects. 
Even if identification projects are technologically sustainable, they may not be politically 
viable, leading – as in Somaliland in 2011 – to their demise. These factors confirm the 
importance of examining political discourses about the objectives and costs of identity-
management programmes, in order to scrutinise underlying motivations, identify vested 
interests (winners and losers), and map the margins so as to recognise the excluded and 
voiceless. Quite simply, politics matters, and thus these programmes need to be studied in 
the broader context of a state’s socio-political dynamics.  
 
Biometrics in Perspective 
My third recommendation is to fully investigate the realities of biometric and new 
technologies for identification without being either romanticisers or naysayers. It is 
important to take seriously the commitment that Somaliland and other African states are 
making to biometric technologies. These programmes may be challenging, but they are 
modern and trim interventions: a few hundred laptops and iris-scanners are more 
manageable than enormous paper archives. Certainly the ‘bureaucratic mirror’ (Agar, 
2001:104) of record-keeping will still be necessary, but it is likely that innovation will help 
African states meet the World Bank’s ambition of universal civil registration and access to 
legal proof of identity for all individuals by 2030 (World Bank/WHO, 2014). 
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However, research on new identification systems also means being open to the difficulties of 
executing these hi-tech solutions in the context of underdevelopment, poor funding, and 
weak administrative and logistical infrastructures. We have seen how biometrics can be 
regarded as a silver bullet, holding the promise of ‘leapfrogging’ conventional techniques of 
identification and documentation by using physical data from the body to ensure accurate 
and unique registration (Gelb and Clark, 2013; Breckenridge, 2010). However, the case 
studies I have presented in this thesis suggest that the capacity to properly implement 
current biometric technologies may not be in place in some African states, impeding their 
full potential and making the ‘leap’ a stumble. Somaliland’s experiences call into question 
the notion that biometric technology obviates institutional systems such as the civil register. 
Experts at the 2015 Hague Colloquium on Legal Identity noted that there is no empirical 
evidence yet available that suggests that (high-cost) biometrically enabled national ID 
systems can perform the necessary requirements of civil registration systems (such as 
permanent legal recording of identities and the generation of vital statistics) or that such 
programmes are sustainable without functioning civil registration systems (Hague 
Colloquium, 2015). Indeed, some scholars and policymakers are sceptical that they can 
emulate these functions at all, particularly in terms of essential vital statistics (for instance, 
Setel et al, 2007); whilst others question whether biometrics are simply a ‘fad’, distracting 
from the real democratic and political challenges facing African states (Wrong, 2013). 
 
Somaliland’s national ID cards are obviously only just being developed. It is possible that 
the promised civil registration component will be delivered in the near future, and that 
therefore Somaliland will join Nigeria and the handful of other African states that are 
effectively integrating biometric components into national identity-management 
infrastructures. However, it is also the case that the energy, resources, and institutional 
capital that has been invested in biometric ID cards may have been more wisely spent on 
election management (skills, resources, planning and expertise) and permanent systems of 
citizen identification, which practitioners and observers agree are more likely to have 
greater long-term state-building benefits (for instance, Gelb and Clark, 2013; Hague 
Colloquium, 2014). Moreover, as I have argued above and throughout this thesis, biometric 
processes of identification need political commitment and public engagement to work, and 
thus both the technical and political aspects of these new biometric ID programmes need to 
be considered.  
 
Theoretical Dividends and Broader Themes 
At the start of this chapter I reflected that this research has indexed some of the big 
questions of politics. The work I have presented in this thesis is empirically rich, 
contributing principally to the literatures on Somaliland, and registration and identification. 
It speaks also to broader analytical themes and scholarly debates, and my findings on the 
political drivers of official identification schemes and the identity architecture are relevant 
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to research projects on state administration, citizenship, electoral management and 
democratisation, neopatrimonial politics, and state-building and consolidation. In 
particular, I see my research as having three main theoretical ‘dividends’, which I elucidate 
in this section.  
 
The Usefulness of Legibility  
Scott’s idea of ‘legibility’ has been the leitmotif of this thesis. Empirically, of course, my 
fieldwork sought to ‘read’ and understand the materials, texts, and interpretations I 
encountered in Hargeysa. Analytically, it has been an important optic with which to 
interpret the ways that authorities in Somaliland try to ‘see’ the population in order to make 
manifold identities intelligible and regulate variety and difference. Scott’s 1998 work is of 
course a critique of the standardising vision of high-modernism, and I have concurred, 
arguing that, though Somaliland governments have sought to fabricate the administrative 
fiction of unique official identities, such panoptic programmes are out of reach. Nonetheless, 
I have found that legibility has been productive heuristic in my research, leading to new 
analytical applications. I have therefore used it to explain the ways that guarantors and 
vouchsafers read and situate people in social networks and structures of meaning (‘metic’ 
legibility); and how political actors are trying to make Somaliland recognisable as a de jure 
state through the production of ‘stately’ artefacts like national ID cards.  
 
I am certainly not the first to see the possibilities in the concept of legibility. We find traces 
and echoes of the underlying ideas about ‘ways of seeing’ in the influential political writings 
of Weber, Foucault, and Anderson, to name a few. More contemporaneously, Piccolino 
(2015a) has described Benin’s voter registration project as an attempt to ‘make democracy 
legible’; and, although he did not use the term, Balthasar’s 2012 PhD thesis about 
institutional and socio-cognitive standardisation in Somaliland indexes the key themes of 
simplification and intelligibility. More generally, Geschiere (2007:129) has noted that 
applying Scott’s central ideas to the analysis of African states produces ‘valuable insights’. Of 
course, this does not mean it is without critique. Whilst acknowledging the ‘clarity and 
power of Scott’s analytic vision’, which makes it seem as though state simplifications are 
‘everywhere we look’, Ferguson (2005:377) has notably called into question the 
generalisability of Scott’s theoretical schemes in the present world. Obviously Somaliland is 
not one of Scott’s classic high-modernist states, but neither is it an organisation like 
Ferguson’s global oil company. In fact, as with other states in sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
doggedly pursuing an agenda of development, state-making and ‘modernity’, as evident in 
its emulative biometric registration schemes. In such cases, legibility is a rich and generative 
concept that offers considerable analytical mileage for the study of identification and 
registration.  
 
7	  –	  Conclusions	  
	   199	  
Nuances of Hybridity  
The second theoretical dividend of this thesis has been the contribution to the emerging 
scholarship on hybridity, thus meeting the call by Meagher (2012:1073) for more empirically 
informed analysis of hybrid governance contexts. In this thesis, I have explored the ways in 
which hybridity is manifested in particular processes and sites, rather than being a systemic 
designation such as the concept of ‘hybrid political orders’ (Boege et al, 2008). Rather than 
making claims across the whole system of governance, I have examined the interlocking of 
specific practices and actors in a particular area of state functionality – the system of official 
identification – and sought to portray the heterogeneous landscape of power and authority. 
In making this argument, I have necessarily juxtaposed the different forms of identification 
and contextualisation undertaken by, crudely, ‘the state’, which seeks individualisation, and 
‘the clan’, in which relationality matters. However, as I emphasised in the thesis, in reality 
there are critical interplays and overlaps between the ways that socially embedded actors 
and state officials ‘read’ applicants. Indeed, I have argued that the incorporation of caaqil 
verification into state procedures of identification is more than coexistence, positing that 
verification is a key site of normative and institutional synthesis, in which metic and official 
legibility are conjoined. I explained the emergence of this synthetic practice in terms of 
pragmatism and symbolism: it has been an essential response to the actualities of the state’s 
nascent (and thus incomplete) identity-management infrastructure; and part of a deeper 
commitment to blending clan and state institutions, and replicating narratives of authentic 
belonging that provide coherence and meaning in the unrecognised state.  
 
I have argued that this vernacular-official hybridisation is not a one-off adaptation, but a 
process that exhibits flexibility and flux. As Galvan has noted about rural councils in 
Senegal, ‘syncretic adaptation does not entail a singular, uniform reinterpretation of new 
institutions in terms of a timeless or homogenous tradition’ but iterated acts of invention 
and definition (in Galvan and Sil, 2007:19). The ways in which the Somaliland state is 
undertaking identification is evolving, as officials acquire institutional memory and 
experience, and the emerging documentary ecosystem becomes more interconnected. 
Moreover, even though the role of elders and other witnesses is codified in law and 
regulations, the actual practice of these responsibilities is changing over time. These are not 
essentialised ‘traditional’ actors, and they do not ‘mechanically stick to some institutionally 
prescribed roles, discourses or modes of action’ (Renders, 2010:26), but exercise discretion, 
manipulation, and influence, as we saw during the 2008 voter registration. In Somaliland, 
official procedures are inflected with ‘social’ logics, just as caaqils’ roles are shaped by their 
incorporation in state institutions. This therefore supports Galvan and Sil’s proposition that 
actors’ encounters with institutional settings not only shape and change those institutions 
and their formal rules and routines, but also affect the understandings and practices of the 
actors’ sociocultural resources in a dialectical or creative process (2007:8). Moreover, it also 
shows the value of resisting tradition-modernity dichotomies, and examining instead the 
contemporaneous ways that actors and practices intersect and are understood. Through this 
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thesis, I therefore show that more attention should be paid to the complex configurations of 
hybrid politics, and the ways in which such systems adapt over time and space. There is not 
as single moment of hybridisation, but rather repeated, dynamic engagements between 
multiply situated actors and the practices they deploy.  
 
Adopting these conceptual nuances will serve to enrich accounts of hybridity, in Somaliland 
and elsewhere. The conceptual framework of the identity architecture also demonstrates the 
utility of hybridity to our understandings of identification processes, and thus key areas of 
statecraft, more generally. In being open to the different ways that social, political, economic 
and bureaucratic logics and practices mesh together, we can learn more about the ways that 
states and citizens interact, and thus gain more insight into the quotidian realities of 
contemporary socio-political life.    
 
Identity and the State 
As I made clear above, Scott’s idea of legibility has been integral to my argument that 
successive Somaliland governments have tried to use ever-more complex national 
identification schemes as ways of instantiating Somaliland’s claim to statehood – of making 
it ‘legible’ as a state within the global system of states. Certainly the idea that ID cards can 
help make states is not a new one (Caplan and Torpey, 2001; Szreter and Breckenridge, 
2012). As with tax collection, the provision of law and order, and the maintenance of public 
goods, the registration and identification of citizens is a principal aspect of the state’s 
standardising and infrastructural power. In Somaliland, however, ID card and registration 
systems are more than the accoutrements of a functional, modern state, important for good 
planning and policy-making. The issue of who counts as a Somalilander is critical to 
Somaliland’s claims to statehood: in naming, identifying and thus recognising citizens, 
Somaliland’s state-makers make a statement about Somaliland’s own recognisability. The ID 
card programmes I have described in this thesis can thus be seen as projecting ‘lines of sight’ 
(Amoore, 2009) into the unknown in an attempt to bring into focus a recognised state in 
which the name imprinted onto ID cards and passports – the Republic of Somaliland – has 
meaning and credibility. Of course, recognition needs more than claims inscribed on paper 
artefacts, requiring change in the norms of legality, sovereignty and stability that form the 
nucleus of the current international system. However, just as the documentation of a 
person’s status can be subject-making – they become a citizen – so it is possible that the 
Somaliland state’s repeated efforts to materialise its claim may lead to, if not external 
validation, then perhaps more consolidated endorsement from its internal constituencies. 
The study of official identification schemes therefore reveals critical insights about nation-
making. Just as the Somaliland state seeks to be seen by the international community, it also 
seeks to be recognisable to its citizens as a state. Although we cannot predict the trajectory 
of Somaliland’s quest for recognition, following the trail of its ID-card programmes may 
light the way, and in the process, tell us more about how states gain facticity and meaning. 
7	  –	  Conclusions	  
	   201	  
My study also emphasises the importance of examining the techniques of power and 
inclusion that are often captured under the more general category of ‘state-building’. 
Typically, studies on state-building are concerned with the macro level of economics and 
politics, but I have focused in this thesis on specific procedures of administration in order to 
offer a more fine-grained analysis of state-building processes in Somaliland. Doing so opens 
up the ‘humble modalities of power’ that help us to understand how states ‘actually 
constitute and maintain themselves as going concerns’ (Torpey, 2000:3). This shows, 
therefore, how important it is to look at the different components of the state, dereifying it 
as far as possible to get into the ways that different ministries, agencies, and institutions 
operate, and the constellation of norms, practices and actors that make up state authority at 
all levels of governance. The success of schemes of registration and identification can also 
demonstrate the degree to which a state is able to reach into and across society. As 
policymakers and scholars continue to see such penetrative power as an indicator of state 
resilience and fragility (for instance, Putzel and Di John, 2012), understanding projects of 
identity management can only enhance such evaluations for the better by offering new lines 
of inquiry and more detailed empirical assessments. 
 
Research Reflections 
Having reviewed my findings and their theoretical implications, I turn now to considering 
the research project as a whole. As I explained in Chapter 1, my methodological approach 
was inspired by the principles of grounded theory. This meant that, although I began this 
study with a number of lines of inquiry, I was open to the actual stories (and silences) of my 
interlocutors in Hargeysa. I began with an interest in the ways that Somalilanders 
conceptualise and negotiate their citizenship; once in the field, I shifted track to attend 
closely to the ways in which such identities and statuses are publicly articulated. This led me 
to the projects of official identification that I have explored in this thesis. Through this 
iterative and attentive approach, I have opened up a field of research that is new to the 
academic scholarship on Somaliland politics. Overall, the triad of methods that I adopted – 
interviews, participant observation, and archival research – proved to be appropriate and 
generative, and therefore can be recommended for further empirical study of this type. 
Nonetheless, this study has been subject to certain constraints, not least the challenges of 
solitary fieldwork, such as scalability, mobility, and funding, and thus my analytical and 
empirical findings have understandable limitations. I outline three significant areas below, 
reflecting on how these shaped my research project, and the opportunities for further 
research that they signal.  
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On the Threshold: Somaliland’s ID Ecosystem 
My fieldwork spanned the period 2012 to 2014, enabling me to observe and participate in a 
number of different events and activities, and also to witness the unfolding of the political 
debates around the voter register and national ID card. Indeed, it was this flexibility that 
enabled me to grow and adapt my research over time in response to developments in 
Somaliland. This was particularly important since I had intended to cover the launch and 
implementation of the new voter registration scheme in 2013/14 and then also the national 
ID card scheme in the summer of 2014. Unfortunately, the political debates that I described 
in Chapter 6 impeded the scheduled rollout of these projects. This meant that, although I 
made a fourth trip to Somaliland in August 2014, the final thesis does not include material 
about these projects. Nonetheless, the transitional phase between the suspension of the 
2010 voter register and the development of a new one actually proved extremely productive 
to study since it brought to the fore debates about the desirability and functionality of 
biometric technology in Somaliland, the importance of vernacular verification, and the 
political tensions and trade-offs between the Ministry of Interior, NEC, Presidency and 
international donors. 
 
This is a time of transition for Somaliland’s official identification infrastructure. As I 
described in Chapter 4, new e-passports and smart driver’s licenses are also being rolled out, 
and the voter and ‘civil’ registrations of 2015/16 are underway. Further research can 
therefore usefully explore the modalities of these different forms of ID. For instance, if the 
national ID cards are to be required at checkpoints, as the Ministry of Interior has declared, 
observation and interviews of these new practices will shed light on the power relations 
produced at these sites of control. In many countries, the introduction of biometric national 
IDs is related to anti-terrorism and migration control (see Amoore, 2006; Lyon, 2007), as 
well as commercial concerns such as identity security and the management of welfare 
payments, such as in South Africa (see Breckenridge, 2005; 2014). Though unrecognised, 
Somaliland is not immune to such influences, and therefore future work may fruitfully 
consider also the broader implications of Somaliland’s ‘biometric turn’, in particular the 
aspects of surveillance and control (Agamben, 2008; Zureik with Hindle, 2004). 
 
As Somaliland tries to construct an ‘ecosystem’ of ID cards, important tests are on the 
horizon, not least in terms of the maintenance of the resulting databases, the utility of the 
cards, questions of compliance, and data-sharing and privacy issues. Further research on the 
development of these ID projects individually and as a system, as well as longitudinal 
research, can therefore address questions about the sustainability of this growing ID system, 
record changes in people’s perceptions of the utility and symbolism of ID cards, and 
consider the broader context of political reform and state-building in Somaliland.  
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Of the Emic and the Banal: Researching Everyday Practices of Identity 
The explication of vouching represents a key contribution of this research to work on 
identification systems, particularly in emerging and developing states where verification 
does not draw on a comprehensive, precise or impartial system of breeder documentation. 
In the thesis, I described how naming and recognition work within scripts of 
trustworthiness, reciprocity and authenticity, and focused on the particular ways that these 
work to identify and verify Somalilanders in quotidian social contexts. I used a mixture of 
interviews, ethnography and secondary literature to draw out my interpretation of these 
practices. Of course, observing, describing and interpreting these practices posed a 
considerable ‘outsider’ challenge. On the one hand, ‘being an outsider gave me the freedom 
to ask seemingly banal questions about what it “feels like”’ (Miller-Idriss, 2009:197), and 
therefore to ‘draw into analysis […] the very things that insiders take for granted’ (Soss, 
2006:137). On the other hand, as I reflected in Chapter 1, it is exactly the ‘taken-for-
grantedness’ of these practices that makes them difficult to view, for ‘insiders’ as well as 
‘outsiders’.  
 
It would therefore be interesting and rewarding to extend the qualitative findings of 
Chapters 3 and 6 through more intensive periods of participant observation and political 
ethnography, in order to dig deeper into the times, spaces, and relations of vouching and 
vernacular verification. Taking an immersive, fine-grained view will not only be revealing of 
the variety and complexity of these practices – for instance, through looking at the ways in 
which they function in different social segments or geographic regions – but it will also help 
to problematise the often-reified and over-simplified ways in which people talk about clan 
identity, lineage and genealogy. In addition, ethnographic research into the ways in which 
vouching works in ‘public’ spaces and encounters, such as the ‘homework’ for meetings in 
ministerial offices as described by the civil servant Sharif (Chapter 3), will not only 
supplement the work in this thesis, but also bring it into closer conversation with the 
literatures on neopatrimonialism, clientelism and patronage that comprises an influential 
theme in African political studies; and open up opportunities for rewarding comparative 
work on the ‘economy of connections’ (Simons, 1995) in other African countries.  
 
Beyond Hargeysa: Extending the Case 
The research presented in this thesis is drawn from fieldwork in Hargeysa, the seat of 
decision-making about the design and implementation of Somaliland’s national 
identification and registration programmes. Over the course of my repeated visits, I 
undertook a variety of interviews with key officials and stakeholders, as well as 
Somalilanders from different backgrounds. Of course, as I reflected in Chapter 1, research 
beyond the capital was impeded by complicated logistics and high costs. This therefore 
presents an opportunity to undertake research amongst different urban and rural 
communities in order to augment the picture presented here of Somaliland’s identity 
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architecture. Work in the west and east of the country will be particularly productive for 
understanding regional and clan variation in authentication practices and assessing national 
support for the government’s schemes of legibility.   
 
As I explained in Chapter 1, the single case-study approach I pursued here fitted with my 
epistemological and methodological principles. Certainly, my findings might usefully form 
the basis for research into other single-cases (such as an examination of the ways in which 
the new state of South Sudan has used identity documentation to project its stateness); or as 
the basis for comparative study (for instance by applying my research approach to the ID 
card programme in Mogadishu, Somalia to see whether similar genealogical frames are at 
work). In light of how many African states are rolling out new systems of registration, 
research into how these schemes are built, and how they work with local notions of 
authentication, will be timely and worthwhile.  
 
In addition, further research could open up other ways of addressing the verification 
problem. Although national ID cards appear to be a priority for African governments, there 
are innovative means of identifying people without traditional paper-based approaches that 
constitute interesting research avenues. Mobile phones are increasingly being recognised for 
their potential as identity-authentication devices (Smart Card Alliance, 2012); and, in light 
of the ‘mobile first’ development trajectory of many countries of the Global South, mobile 
applications are being seen as opportunities for better service delivery and communication 
(World Bank, 2012; Plan International, 2015; Donovan and Martin, 2012; Iazzolino, 2015). 
Similarly, the impact of ‘big data’ on transforming conventional databases and information 
sharing will lead to new innovations in identity management (Jacobs, 2014; Mann; World 
Bank/WHO, 2014). The ways in which new technologies can be used to authenticate identity 
is thus a fertile area of research that could complement and extend this thesis’ contribution 
to the study of identity verification.  
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